An Introduction to Culture and Psychology

A Sociocultural Perspective

Valery Chirkov

ROUTLEDGE

AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

The book offers an innovative introduction to culture and psychology, taking a sociocultural perspective to understand the complexities of culture-mind-behaviour interactions.

In this book, the author emphasizes the dynamic relationship of the culture and the mind, outlining how organized sociocultural models regulate actions and practices across different domains of people's lives, such as parenting, education, communication, and acculturation. Each chapter features a chapter synopsis, boxed examples, a glossary of key terms, reflective questions, and recommended reading to help students engage further with the material. The book includes a range of cross-cultural case study examples and discussions which offer insights into the connections between culture, human psyche, and behaviour.

An Introduction to Culture and Psychology is essential reading for undergraduate students taking culture and psychology courses. It can also be of interest to students and young scholars of psychology, anthropology, sociology, communication, and other related disciplines.

Valery Chirkov is Professor in the Psychology and Health Studies department at the University of Saskatchewan, Canada. His research interests include applied sociocultural psychology, cultural and cross-cultural research, immigration, and acculturation.

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AN INTRODUCTION TO CULTURE AND PSYCHOLOGY

A Sociocultural Perspective

Valery Chirkov

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PREFACE

Currently, there are many textbooks on Culture and Psychology on the market. Most readers have expectations of the materials that will be presented to them. These textbooks primarily present cross-cultural comparisons and studies of how people from various cultures think, feel, and behave differently – just because they belong to different cultural communities and discuss interesting and peculiar manifestations of various cultures. The book that you hold is also on Culture and Psychology; thus, it provides the important aspects described earlier. However, its subheading, 'A sociocultural perspective,' differentiates it from other textbooks. It is important to clarify what 'sociocultural perspective' means and how this perspective takes this textbook beyond the many generic textbooks on the market. Therefore, in this preface, I discuss the highlights and advantages of this perspective and present the pedagogical features of this textbook.

Sociocultural thinking is a relatively new (with a long history) way of conceptualizing Culture and its relationships with the human mind and behaviour (DiMagio, & Markus, 2020; Kirschner & Martin, 2010; Markus, & Hamedani, 2007; Martin et al., 1995; Rosa & Valsiner, 2018). The literature provides several interpretations of it. I will introduce several principles of sociocultural thinking that I incorporated in this textbook.

Let's start with the term *sociocultural*. A firm conviction of this approach is that 'social' and 'cultural' attributes should not be separated. These are two indivisible aspects of people's existence in communities. The primary motto of the book is that *there is no social without cultural and no cultural without social. There is no social without cultural* means that social interactions always mean something to an agent, their partners, to other people, or to a community. People borrow these meanings from the communal storage of symbols and meanings (that are cultural) or create them with interacting parties within their cultural context. *No cultural without social* means that various cultural meanings and symbols exist only if they are included in people's social interactions. These interactions maintain cultural meanings and make them work. The term 'sociocultural' indicates also that 'social psychology' and 'cultural psychology' should not be two separate disciplines. They should be

combined into one discipline – *sociocultural psychology* – that studies people's mental functioning in and dialectical relationships with the indivisible 'sociocultural environment.'

The primary idea of the sociocultural approach is the *sociocultural regulation* of people's functioning. The approach prioritizes this form of regulation over the individual forms that people develop uniquely during their lifetime. This means that cultural communities create mechanisms to regulate and synchronize the behaviours and experiences of their members. Such regulation is crucial for these communities to survive. (We discuss this thesis in Chapter 4.) Thus, communities impose this form of guidance and control on every member and demand their compliance. Of course, people have unique interpretations of the world and distinctive ways of acting. However, according to the sociocultural approach, these individual and distinctive behaviours are always embedded in and depend on the sociocultural matrices of communal regulation.

Although the approach of this textbook is labelled sociocultural, it could perhaps be better defined as *psychosociocultural*. This update of terminology has two implications. First, it indicates that social and cultural environments shape the minds and mentalities of people – the human psyche and people's behaviour are not simply 'influenced' by Culture and society; rather, social and cultural are inseparable from mental and psychological in their continued co-construction of each other. The sociocultural aspects of people's mentalities and identities are an inextricable part of their existence. The update of terminology also means that sociocultural mechanisms work only through people's minds. People internalize sociocultural aspects into their minds and, consequently, externalize mental representations through meaningful social actions in the sociocultural world. This comprises the circle of existence, maintenance, and regulation of the triad Culture, society, and the human mind.

Philosophically, this textbook's approach can be characterized as *sociocultural realism*. This stance indicates that sociocultural regulation is executed through mechanisms that are real and represent forces that powerfully manage people's lives. This occurs whether they want it to happen or not and whether or not they are aware of these forces. This is an important ontological proposition taken from critical realism (Bhaskar, 1975/2008, 1979/2015). Realist scientists aim to hypothesize such mechanisms and verify their hypotheses by conducting empirical studies. Therefore, according to realism, textbooks should present and discuss the mechanisms of things and events that they are examining. Only by presenting these mechanisms can textbooks explain the phenomenon in question, which then allows readers to understand the subject matter. In this book, the author presents the mechanisms of the various phenomena that are discussed: Culture and its regulatory power, the human self, identity, ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, language, intercultural communication, and immigration and acculturation.

This textbook is structured around the central mechanism of the sociocultural regulation of people's functioning – namely, the *system of sociocultural models* that constitutes the essence of Culture (or better, the 'sociocultural environment') and its regulatory power.

This textbook presents a sociocultural approach that is *multidisciplinary*. By uniting 'social' and 'cultural,' it demanded that the knowledge from all the disciplines that study these two aspects be blended. Therefore, multidisciplinarity is required by the very nature of the topic of this textbook: the *sociocultural regulation of people's lives*. This topic is multidimensional as it includes cultural, social, and mental aspects. It cannot be examined adequately from the position of one or two psychological disciplines. Thus, the textbook relies strongly on anthropology, sociology, psychology, biology, developmental sciences, history, linguistics, and other social, natural, and psychological disciplines.

The sociocultural approach requires another important mode of thinking that is typically omitted by mainstream cross-cultural psychology: *historicism* (which I discuss in detail in Chapter 5). It is important to remember that everything people deal with, where they live, what institutions guide their lives, what customs they practice, and how they think and talk about these elements are the products of the historical development of communities. These started with the social interactions of our ancient ancestors and continue through our modern institutions and communication technologies. The sociocultural environment in which people live is a historical product. Thus, to understand people's lives in this environment, researchers must start by examining its history. The space constraints of this textbook prevented me from applying this principle to each chapter's topics. However, it is explored in depth when examining the *natural history* of the sociocultural regulation of human functioning (Chapter 4) and the *intellectual history* of theorizing about such mechanisms (Chapter 5). This approach to Culture and Psychology will deepen readers understanding of what it means to be a human being in the sociocultural environments of their own making.

The sociocultural approach in psychology emphasizes that culture does not belong to or exist only among 'others' as such, culture does not refer only to ethnic minorities, immigrants, and other outsiders that are culturally and linguistically different from the group that is interested in studying culture (Causadias et al., 2018). All communities of people – insiders and outsiders – have a culture, a complex mechanism that regulates its members' actions and experiences. Therefore, to study culture, one should not look for 'others' to understand what culture is; rather, one can and should examine their own community and reflect on how this community shapes and manages their behaviours, thoughts, and feelings.

To promote such an understanding, this textbook has several pedagogical features that will help readers appreciate its content. Each chapter starts by outlining the issues and topics that will be covered in the chapter. These synopses provide

a road map for the reader: They will know what to expect and in what sequence. The chapters are accompanied by boxes, tables, and figures that define, clarify, and illustrate the concepts, terms, processes, and phenomena that are discussed in them. Examples and illustrations provide readers with a complete understanding of the mechanisms and theories discussed in the chapters. Each chapter ends with a glossary, questions, and recommended reading. The glossaries define all the introduced concepts in one place for easy reference. The questions invite readers to practise their understanding of the material and prepare to use it outside of the class. Finally, the recommended reading allows readers to deepen their knowledge of the material. These readings are complemented by references to the sources used in each chapter. The textbook ends with an index that allows readers to quickly find the required concept, term, or name in the text.

After this short introduction, I invite you to open the textbook and start your journey into the exciting world of Culture and Psychology.

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1 Culture and psychology

What is culture, and why is it important for psychologists?

Chapter content

- The two concepts that this chapter addresses are *Culture* and *psychology*, otherwise referred to as *people's psychological functioning*.[1] The chapter investigates the main questions: What is Culture?, what role does Culture play in shaping people's behaviour, cognition, and feelings?, and what are the mechanisms of these influences?
- Culture is interpreted as a *sociosymbolic reality* with *social*, *ideational*, and *material* aspects.
- Culture as a sociosymbolic reality is collectively *intentional*, *intersubjective*, and *taken for granted by* nature. People construct it through their interactions.
- Culture regulates people's behaviour through *sociocultural models (SCMs) 'of' the world* and *SCMs 'for' acting*.
- Components of these SCMs are discussed.
- This chapter argues that there is a mutual constitutive nature between Culture and human psychological functioning.

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Box 1.1 Case study: The Shafia family murder case (From *Maclean's* November 14, December 26, 2011; February 13, 2012; and Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shafia_family_murders. A detailed account of the police investigation of this case can be found in Schliesmann (2012).)

The Shafia family murder is an alleged honour killing. Sisters Zainab Shafia, 19, Sahar Shafia, 17, and Geeti Shafia, 13, as well as their father's first wife Rona Amir Mohammed, 50, were found dead inside a car that was discovered underwater in the northernmost Kingston Mills lock of the Rideau Canal on June 30, 2009, in Kingston, Ontario, Canada. On July 23, the teenagers' parents, Mohammad Shafia, 56, and Tooba Yahya Shafia, 39, and their brother Hamed Shafia, 18, were charged with four counts of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The Shafia family, originally from Afghanistan, lived in Dubai, United Arab Emirates for over a decade before immigrating to Canada and settling in the Saint-Léonard borough of Montreal. In 1979 or 1980, Mohammad Shafia married Rona Shafia, who they later determined was unable to have children. In 1989, he took Tooba Yahya Shafia to be his second wife. She gave birth to seven children, with Rona Shafia playing a crucial role in their upbringing. After immigrating to Canada, tension mounted between the teenage daughters and their parents. Zainab and Sahar longed to live like Canadian teenagers, to wear lipstick and tank tops instead of hijabs,[2] but their parents (and their brother, Hamed) were obsessed with maintaining 'tradition.'

In 2008, Zainab, the eldest sister, had a boyfriend. When her parents found this out via Hamed, she was banned from leaving the house and not allowed to attend school for a year. When she turned 19, she worked up the courage to run away from home, taking refuge at a women's shelter. Days before her murder, her mother convinced her to return home. In the preceding years, Sahar complained frequently about the beatings she endured at home; thus, school officials called the province's youth protection services. In one diary entry, Rona recalled how her surrogate daughter swallowed a bottle of pills. "She can go to hell," Tooba, her mother, allegedly said. "Let her kill herself" (*Maclean's*, November 14, 2011, p. 30). Sahar also talked about the physical abuse that she and Zainab endured; she was so petrified of her parents that she wore a hijab to school and then changed clothes as soon as she arrived. Geeti revealed that her dad yanked her hair and punched her in the face when she was late coming home from the mall.

Here is a short list of these girls' supposed misdeeds: having boyfriends and their photos on their cellphones, wearing Western clothing, fighting for their privacy and independence, and demonstrating disobedience and rebellion. Their father, Mohammad Shafia, called his eldest daughter a 'whore' and a 'prostitute' (*Maclean's*, November 28, 2011, p. 25) and told his daughters that "they betrayed kindness, they betrayed Islam, they betrayed our religion and creed, they betrayed

our tradition, they betrayed everything" (*Maclean's*, February 13, 2012, p. 41). [It is important to note that, according to the specialists, Quran does not prescribe an exact dress code for women except for the requirement of being modest. VC.]

Their "Dad allegedly grew so enraged with his daughter's Westernized disobedience – revealing outfits, the cellphone photos of their boyfriends, the repeated visits from police and child welfare authorities – that mass murder became the only way to reverse the family's shame" (*Maclean's*, November 14, 2011, p. 28).

One of the main factors that the accused used to justify this murder was the notion of 'honour' for the head of the family. Here are some extracts from Mohammad Shafia's wiretapped conversations: "We lost our honour"; "I do not accept this dishonour"; "Even if they hoist me up onto the gallows, nothing is dearer to me than my honour" (*Maclean's*, December 26, 2011, p. 24). [And again, as experts have commented, the Muslim religion has nothing to do with the notion of 'honour' and 'honour killing.' VC.] All three accused were found guilty and received life in prison for their crimes.

Aqsa Parvez murder case (from *Maclean's*, June 16, 2010, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aqsa_Parvez).

Several years before the Shafia's case, a similar murder was committed in Mississauga, Ontario. Aqsa Parvez, a high school student, was strangled by her father Muhammad Parvez and her brother. As in the Shafia case, Aqsa rebelled from the tradition of wearing a hijab and wanted instead to live like a typical Canadian teenager. Both her killers were sentenced to life imprisonment.

To understand a justification for this crime, let's consider Aqsa's father Muhammad Parvez's words to his wife right after he murdered his daughter: "My community will say you have not been able to control your daughter. This is my insult. She is making me naked" [again, meaning that she "dishonoured" him. VC] (*Maclean's*, June 16, 2010, p. 37).

These two cases describe very gruesome episodes; unfortunately, such crimes are not that rare. Similar killings of women in the name of 'family honour' have happened in US and European immigrant families (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009). They also occur frequently in some Islamic countries, India, and some Mediterranean countries. For example, in 2009, 604 Pakistani women were killed in the name of 'honour' (*Maclean's*, 2010, September 13, p. 70). (See Box 1.2).

What is the nature of these crimes? Some commentators have suggested that these crimes resulted from the perpetrators' mental health issues; others argued that these were cases of family disputes and family violence. However, the majority of experts indicated that these cases were a demonstration of the cultural tradition of *honour killing* (Korteweg & Yurdakul, 2009). Let's look at the last explanation in more detail.

Box 1.2 'In Focus' feature. The case of honour killing

The cultural tradition of honour killing is spread across various religious and cultural communities: Muslim, Christian, Hindu, and some others. Honour killing has long been noted as a 'normal' ineradicable part of Christian and Muslim cultures around the circum-Mediterranean. There are several Kanuns (or Codes) in the Balkan highlands that specify the conditions under which one can kill for honour, how it must be done, payments for the killing, as well as a period in which the family can bereave; there is also a period of truce between families before 'the favour' is returned. In the machismo culture of Brazil and more extensively through South and Latin America, honour-style killings of homosexual family members and allegedly unchaste daughters or sisters and wives are often condoned or not prosecuted. Multiple honour killing stories that are well known in the Mexican highlands tell of adulterous wives killed by their husbands or who committed suicide before they were killed. As with the Muslim cases, these stories reflect a man's desire to regain control over his family and women specifically. In the case of women committing suicide, it is considered her acknowledgement that she bears shame on her family (de Munck, V., March 2012, personal communication).

The quotations attributed to Mohammad Shafia and Muhammad Parvez in Box 1.1 indicate that the perpetrators of these killings acknowledged communal/group expectations about these families and their women's behaviours. Notably, they were sensitive to these expectations about family maintenance, the women's behaviour and appearance, and the men's behaviour regarding their women's conduct. It is possible to imagine that some of these expectations about the appropriate behaviours of the daughters and their fathers' reactions to these behaviours were expressed explicitly by the members of the ethnic communities in face-to-face interactions; however, it is also true that these expectations may have been located exclusively 'in the heads' of these men and their collaborators. These expectations were internalized and accepted by them, and they guided the actions of the murderers. The ethnic communities' expectations and norms were represented in their minds and justified, if not incentive, to interpret their feelings in a culturally understood way and to act upon them.

This brief analysis confirms the idea that these acts of violence and murder were driven by a set of expectations in a particular community; these expectations were part of a specific tradition, and this tradition determined the behaviours of these criminals. This tradition provided a rationale for these fathers and family members and shaped their actions to kill their daughters and sisters. Most experts agree that this *cultural* tradition of *honour killing* has several components. First, there is the notion of family honour; second, there is the notion that the women of a family are the primary bearers of this honour; and third, there is the notion that men should take appropriate

sanctions, up to the killing, if these women's behaviours threaten a family's honour. These sanctions 'cleanse' the person or family whose honour has been stained.

Thus, honour killing has all the characteristics of a cultural phenomenon and the above-presented cases are examples of the cultural determination of people's experiences and behaviours. (Using Box 1.3, reflect on this tradition in your community.)

Box 1.3 Discussion questions

- Does the notion of 'family honour' exist in your community?
- What is this honour about?
- Who are the bearers of this honour?
- What sanctions can family members implement to maintain and protect their family honour?

These extreme cases reflect culture's role in people's functioning: their thinking, feeling, and acting. A subtle example of the role culture plays is that in some communities, December 25 is celebrated by families placing a spruce tree in their homes, decorating it, and putting boxes with gifts under their trees. People invite relatives, friends, and neighbours for a gift exchange and other festivities. Other examples to consider: In many countries around the globe, when a driver is stopped by the police, depending on the severity of the violation, it is customary to hand over cash. In some countries, parents believe that their children may – and even should – sleep in the same room with them or even in their beds; conversely, in other communities, parents are firmly convinced that co-sleeping with parents harms children and they insist that their children sleep in separate beds or even in separate rooms. (By following Box 1.4, describe cultural traditions in your community.)

Box 1.4 Discussion questions

Consider and provide examples of cultural traditions in your community and other cultural communities you know.

We shall continue this analysis by asking the following questions: What is the nature of the phenomenon of 'Cultural tradition?' Subsequently, what is *Culture*, and how does it relate to people's actions, feelings, and thoughts? Through what mechanisms does it exert its influence? Are these cultural influences inevitable and inescapable or do people have the power to overcome them?

What is Culture?

First, let's answer the questions 'what is *Culture*?' and 'what are *Cultural* traditions, *Cultural* norms, and *Cultural* rules of behaviour?' It is impossible to give a

'one-size-fits-all' definition of these complex and often very elusive concepts – especially not a definition that members of all disciplines will agree upon. Anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and the representatives of other branches of social science have tried to define Culture and apply it to their sciences (Baldwin et al., 2005). Rather than looking for the universal definition of Culture, let's investigate the nature of the phenomena labelled by these terms and explore their relations to people's psychological functioning and behaviour.

Two meanings of the word 'culture'

The term 'culture' emerged about cultivating or tilling land. "The noun 'culture' originated from the French word *culture* or directly from Latin *cultura* – 'growing, cultivation'" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008). Etymologically, the term 'culture' has two meanings. The first is related to "the arts and other manifestations of human intellectual achievement regarded collectively." The second is "the customs, ideas, and social behaviour of a particular people or group" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008). When people talk about a country with a rich culture – meaning that it has famous artists, writers, and philosophers, and the ability of people to understand and appreciate the products of artistic and intellectual activity – they are talking about *culture* in the first sense. When social scientists lecture about Culture and psychology, they describe Culture in the second sense. We will proceed to understand what Culture means in this second sense. (See Box 1.5 about using the term 'culture' in this textbook.)

Box 1.5 Definition and explanation. How the term culture is used in this textbook

In this textbook, when addressing culture as "the customs, ideas, and social behaviour of a particular people or group" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008), we differentiate two ways of using this term. According to the first connotation, *Culture* (with a capital letter 'C' and always singular) is a generic term that represents the human-made sociocultural environment of any community, regardless of its geographical location. We will talk about Culture in Chapters 4 and 5 when analysing its role in phylogenetic and ontogenetic development of humans. In the second sense, this notion conveys the idea of multiple specific *culture(s)* (small letter 'c' singular and plural). These cultures are geographically distributed and they are categorized based on different criteria: ethnicity (Aboriginal, Slavic, Anglo-Saxon, and Zulu cultures), nationhood (French, Chinese, Indian, or Canadian cultures), language (Francophone and Anglophone cultures), religion (Muslim or Catholic cultural communities), or on some other criteria (e.g., urban versus rural subcultures; youth and virtual subcultures, class-based subcultures, or sub-cultures based on professional activity; and academic culture, professional sport cultures, criminal culture, etc.).

Three aspects of Culture: Material, social, and ideational

In Chapter 4, we will discuss the emergence of Culture in phylogenesis in detail as it is presented by the *shared intentionality theory* (Tomasello, 2014, 2019). For now, it is simply necessary to know that according to this theory, Culture emerged as a normative regulatory mechanism that was developed by the community of people (later, the *cultural community*) through both the explicit and the implicit interactive negotiations among the members of this community. The purpose of this cultural mechanism is to regulate people's behaviours and experiences in such a way that their social lives become coordinated and cohesive. Cultural communities may be actual contact ones – think about a tribe living on a particular territory – or imagined – like a nation, where it is impossible for all community members to interact face-to-face (Anderson, 2006).

Culture has three aspects: *material*, *social*, and *ideational*. The *material aspect* includes items such as banknotes, churches, bridges, books, the Internet, and other visible, touchable, and audible representations of various symbols and their meanings. The *social* aspect of culture includes the everyday interactions among people about parenting, schooling, maintaining justice and order, and many other everyday issues. The *ideational* aspect of culture is a set of beliefs, values, norms, 'rules of a game,' and other knowledge about life in these particular communities that reside in the minds of the members of a community and are shared among them.

The material aspect is the most visible manifestation of Culture (Boivin, 2008; Hodder, 2012). Material cultures exist even after the communities that developed them disappeared from the face of the earth. By exploring the artefacts of civilizations that have vanished, archaeologists aim to recreate their styles of life, beliefs, states of technology, and even the psychological characteristics of the people who lived there. However, only people who live in a particular community can bring the community's artefacts to life and make them functional and meaningful through their use. To be what they are and fulfil their functions, material artefacts must be included in people's interactions; they must be a part of people's actions, their mediums, and products. These material artefacts have been created for particular purposes within a community (churches are used to worship the divine, a saw is used to slice wood, and a computer is used to do myriads of things, including work and play). They demand that certain behaviours are performed when people are dealing with them (if you are in a library, you select books and read them; if you are in a nightclub, you dance; if you have a hammer, you strike a nail; etc.). Therefore, these artefacts are woven into the network of social relationships and saturated with the ideas and knowledge their creators have infused into them. Consequently, the people who use these artefacts need to learn these ideas and learn the skills to utilize them efficiently. It is important

to note that these material artefacts constitute the physical milieu that generations of members of communities have constructed, and they allow people in these communities to live, function, and prosper. This human-made milieu is often called a species-specific *niche* (Laland et al., 2000) or an environment where people feel comfortable living and functioning. Material Culture is the human-made niche wherein humans' phylogenetic and ontogenetic development happens.

Social interactions among community members are the medium through which the other aspects of Culture (material and ideational) interconnect and work together. When members of a cultural community greet each other, joke about various things, set meetings, arrange family dinners, teach children, serve food, and do myriads of other rituals within their communities, they do them in a relatively uniform and structured way. There are particular customs of greetings for men, women, and children in different situations, along with specific forms of arranging conversations, identifiable means of managing conflicts and disagreements, accepted methods for disciplining children and students, expressing love and affection, and so on. Every cultural community has uniform and characteristic customs of social behaviour that are inseparable from these communities' values, worldviews, beliefs, and histories. In addition, these interactions unfold within the material niches (households, school buildings, or meeting halls) that have been designed to fit the purposes and meanings of these social interactions.

When these interactions are formalized and ritualized, they become *social institutions* that have both *social structures* and assigned *social roles*. For example, almost every large community has an army. The military, a social institution, has a very articulate social structure that has prescribed roles within these divisions. A specific code of conduct accompanies every role articulated explicitly in special documents and regulations and through unspoken rules of behaviour in different situations. Hence, communities have social institutions of family and parenting, communal governance, education, health care, military service, and so on. For example, the interactions among students, instructors, and staff that happen within the materiality of university campuses bring to life the cultural phenomenon of university education; the interactions among the members of sports teams within the structure of an arena or field create the cultural phenomenon of a sports game; the interactions between all participating parties within the confinement of a courthouse generate the phenomenon of a legal case. Because of the importance of this social component in carrying out any cultural phenomena, many scholars prefer to use the adjective *socio*cultural instead of simply 'cultural' to describe these kinds of events

and occurrences. They use such concepts as *sociocultural world* (Martin et al., 2009), *sociocultural environment* (Shweder, 1991), and *sociocultural systems* (Rohner, 1984). In this textbook, together with these concepts, we often use the terms *sociocultural* or *sociosymbolic reality* to highlight the inseparability of social and cultural (symbolic) features in their construction of the human-made realities or niches that people created for their existence.

The ideational aspect However, to be properly executed, social interactions must be guided by the ideas, knowledge, and beliefs of the people who perform them. For example, students and instructors must have the same ideas about what university education means, together with the knowledge of the subjects that they examine; sports team members must know the rules of the game, while lawyers and judges have to have procedural knowledge and belief in justice and the rule of law.

One specific component of the ideational aspect is the *systems of meaning* that have been developed by cultural communities and assigned to everything that exists within these communities' physical and human-made worlds. Consequently, a strip of sand by the ocean acquires the meaning of a *beach* or a *resort*; pieces of plastic and metal become means of financial exchange in the form of *money*; particular gatherings of people become a variety of activities, including *birthday parties*, *weddings*, or *funerals*; special arrangements of particular people, called *students*, within a set of specialized buildings, called a *university campus*, obtain the meaning of *university lectures*; and after weddings, the men and women who were at the centre of these celebrations become husbands and wives, while their parents and other family members become in-laws. Many similar examples illustrate the primary idea of cultural psychology – that members of communities create cultural things by assigning meanings to existing objects, events, things, and people. These cultural meanings, in which something stands for something else (a piece of plastic stands for money), constitute the essence of Culture as a regulatory system for people's communal behaviour. These systems of meaning exist and manifest themselves through the social interactions that they regulate; as such, the second part of the adjective within the term socio*cultural* world becomes an inevitable constituent of the human-made worlds. As such, people's patterns of thoughts, meanings, and feelings (the ideational aspect of Culture) are always there in every social interaction among the members of cultural communities. These ideas also instantiated and materialized in building structures and purposes as well as in the design and usage of tools – the material aspect of Culture. The interconnectedness of these three aspects of Culture is illustrated in Figure 1.1.


Three aspects of culture
Culture exists and functions through social interactions
Sociosymbolic reality is driven by ideas, norms, and values that are shared by members of cultural communities
Social aspect:
Structured and uniform social interactions among members of communities
Social and ideational aspects are mutually constitutive: one cannot emerge and exist without the other
Ideational aspect:
Ideas, knowledge, meanings, beliefs, norms, and values of cultural communities
Social interactions are arranged within or around material forms: campuses, lecture halls, conference rooms, concert halls, or other public or private places
Human ideas/knowledge sediment in material forms: books, computer programms, movies, libraries, art galleries, architectural styles, etc.
Material aspect:
Cities and villages, buildings and constructions, technologies and means of transportation, books and computers, paintings and sculptures, and myriads of other "footprints" of human civilizations

Figure 1.1 Three aspects of Culture. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

Main features of culture as a sociosymbolic reality: Collective intentionality, collective intersubjectivity, and taken-for-grantedness

Step by step, we are learning that Culture is a unique form of a human-made environment – sociosymbolic reality and a uniquely human form of collective regulation of people's behaviours and experiences. What is the nature of such a reality? What 'materials' does this reality consist of? How does it regulate people's actions? In the following sections, we address these questions.

Culture has three main features when it is understood as a human-made sociosymbolic reality: *collective intentionality*, *collective intersubjectivity*, and *taken-for-grantedness*.

Collective intentionality

Philosophers use the term *intentionality* to indicate that people's mental states are 'directed towards' or 'about' something that constitutes the objects of these states. This means that our mental states (perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and motivations) are always directed towards or are about some objects, events, or conditions

in the external or internal/mental worlds. When we go out for dinner, when we watch a beautiful sunset, or when we think about people we care about, our corresponding mental states are intentional because they are about our hunger, about the beauty of the world as we see it, or about our loved ones and our relationships with them. Hence, our perceptions, cognitions, and emotions are intentional, as they all represent something or are directed towards something.

Philosophers differentiate among *individual*, *joint*, and *collective intentionality*. The above examples of mental states illustrate *individual* intentionality, meaning that these intentional states (my need, my visual image, and my thoughts and emotions) belong to one individual – to me. Other people may have very different perspectives on these same items. In contrast, *joint intentionality* exists in small groups, like family, friends, work colleagues, or sports teams. Individuals who belong to a particular group share some mental states. For example, sports team members share the same intentional states that include the desire to win, the feeling of camaraderie, and the tactical plans of their game. Likewise, a family may create jointly valuable memorabilia and pleasant emotions based on its members' joint experiences during a vacation. *Collective intentionality* occurs when mutual beliefs, thoughts, emotions, and motivations belong to the collectivity of people. Because these ideations belong to the whole community, this form of intentionality regulates and coordinates the behaviours of all members of a community. We will discuss these three forms of intentionality in more detail in Chapter 4. In this chapter, collective intentionality is the primary focus of our discussion. Cultural anthropologist and psychologist Shweder (1991) described the intentionality of a sociocultural reality as follows[3]:

> A sociocultural environment is an intentional world. It is an intentional world because its existence is real, factual, and forceful, but only so long as there exists a community of persons whose beliefs, desires, emotions, purposes, and other mental representations are directed at, and thereby influenced by, it.
>
> Intentional worlds are human artefactual worlds, populated with products of our own design. An intentional world might contain such events as 'stealing' or 'taking communion,' such processes as 'harm' or 'sin,' such stations as 'in-law' or 'exorcist,' and such practices as 'betrothal' or 'divorce.'
>
> Such intentional (made, breed, fashioned, fabricated, invented, designated, and constituted) things exist only in intentional worlds. *What makes their existence intentional is that such things would not exist independently of our involvements with and reactions to them; and they exercise their influence in our lives because of our conception of them*. Intentional things are causally active but only by virtue of our mental representations of them.
>
> Intentional things have no 'natural' reality or identity separate from human understandings and actions. Intentional worlds do not exist independently of

> the intentional states (beliefs, desires, emotions) directed at them and by them, by the persons who live in them [emphases in italics added].
>
> (Shweder, 1991, pp. 74–75)

Based on this description, we can articulate that the *intentionality of a sociosymbolic reality* means that the objects within such a reality – intentional things – exist only because of people's understandings of them and the meanings that they assign to them. People interact with each other based on these understandings and meanings; thus, these intentional objects have power over people's actions and lives through these people's conceptions of them. Culture is made up of collectively intentional things that belong to the whole community and that regulate the behaviours of all community members through their sharing of the corresponding intentional states. (See examples in Box 1.6).

Box 1.6 Case study

Inspired by Shweder's (1991) description of intentionality, here is an illustration of this phenomenon. The author of this textbook was born and raised in Yaroslavl, Russia, and he lived in that nation for the majority of his life.

When he moved to Saskatoon, Canada, and bought a house, the grass on his front lawn was, for him, simply the grass that grows naturally and requires no upkeep aside from mowing occasionally. One day, a neighbour stopped by and commented on the weeds on his lawn. To him, based on his upbringing in Russia, weeds existed only in vegetable gardens, interfering in the growth of various valuable plants. In his mind, grass on the lawn was not differentiated into 'weeds' and 'non-weeds.' The neighbour pointed to dandelions and some other types of weeds and said: "These are weeds, and they need to be removed. We do not want these weeds to be spread from lawn to lawn here." As a result of this conversation, he realized that he had entered the intentional world of Canadian homeowners, wherein such intentional things as 'weeds' exist. Dandelions on the front lawn in this community meant 'weed'; thus, they must be removed or killed by weed-control pesticides. In different intentional worlds, a particular object can have diverse meanings. In the orchard of a naturopath, for example, a dandelion may mean a valuable plant that can be used for healing. People in his neighbourhood have an idea of 'weeds'; they share the same understanding of what they are, agree that they are bad, and these community members have ample knowledge of how to deal with them. When the author arrived in this community as an immigrant, they taught him about their intentional world and politely asked to share with them this understanding and this interpretation of different types of grass on a lawn and to incorporate such actions as 'weed control' into my repertoire of behaviour. In this example, despite weeds having the physical essence as plants, they are

intentional things because they exist only in this type of community, and they exist as such only because the members of this community think about them in the same way. This is also an example of how living in a new culture, as an intentional sociosymbolic reality, influenced people's perception of grass and their behaviour towards it. After nearly 20 years of living in the same house, the author is probably one of the most furious fighters of lawn weeds in my neighbourhood.

Collective intersubjectivity

Collective intersubjectivity is another fundamental feature that any sociocultural reality has. Cognitive anthropologist Roy D'Andrade (1987) explained this phenomenon in the following way:

> A schema [the author talks here about 'cultural schema,' a term that he later replaced with 'cultural/folk models.' VC] is *intersubjectively shared* when everybody in the group knows the schema, and everybody knows that everyone else knows the schema, and everybody knows that everyone knows that everyone knows the schema.
>
> (D'Andrade, 1987, p. 113)

From this quote, it is obvious that the adjective *collective* could be applied to the phenomenon of intersubjectivity. This happens when mental states are shared among the collectivity of people and not just among two or three closely related individuals.

Following D'Andrade's definition, the simplest way to explain collective intersubjectivity is through an expression: "I know that you and other people know that I know." This expression highlights the mutuality of knowledge and understanding between two or more people. This mutuality provides a shared comprehension of the meaning of a situation around which the interactions of these people evolve; moreover, it makes their coordinated actions possible. Through these coordinated actions, people's collective lives are maintained and regulated. For the collectively intentional world to exist, members of this world must have not only 'conceptions' about it and be 'involved' with and 'react' to it but they also need to share these conceptions and the reasons for their involvement with this world among themselves. Plus, they need to be aware that the people around them have these conceptions and similar reasons for involvement and reacting. Stating it differently, members of a cultural community need to know that other people have the same knowledge and understanding about their world and that this knowledge is shared among them. This mutuality of a shared understanding of meanings, beliefs, and motives for behaviour that exists in the intentional worlds is labelled *intersubjectivity*. It is *inter*-subjective because this mutuality exists 'in-between' the *subjectivities* of individuals among the conscious minds of the members of a cultural community. Because this knowledge and sharing happen in communities, the adjective *collective* is applied here.[4]

Another example of collective intersubjectivity is provided by Chirkov (2020):

> I know that you believe in God and you know that I believe in that same God. In addition, we both know that others in our community possess this same belief, and we know that they know that we and others believe in our God too. We all share not only the collectively intentional states of a belief in God (where God is a collectively intentional thing) but also the knowledge about the subjectivities and intentional states of others: everybody knows that others have this belief.
>
> (Chirkov, 2020, p. 154)

This mutuality of a shared understanding of meanings, beliefs, and motives for behaviour in the intentional worlds of cultural communities gives Culture its regulative power. Recall the feelings of mutuality you may have experienced upon meeting a Canadian person while travelling in another country. You could immediately start a conversation with them to discuss your impressions of the host community and feel that you understand each other instantly without extra explanations. This feeling of togetherness is based on the existence of the intersubjective sharing of some basic schemas for interpreting and explaining reality: You may see the host community, react to it, and behave fairly similarly to this stranger from your own land – that is why your discussion can unfold so easily.

In this regard, D'Andrade identified two functions of collective intersubjectivity. The first is that through collective intersubjectivity and intentionality, cultural things such as money, weddings, education, hospitalization, or divorce acquire the status of objective facts. These cultural things become a socially constructed reality that exists out there. The second function is that through intersubjectivity, people understand each other and their environment implicitly; in this way, there is no need for explicit explanations and justifications. When people interact within the network of collectively intersubjective ideas and meanings, they do not waste their time articulating and explaining these obvious things; they just take these unspoken practices, meanings, and codes of conduct for granted. They live within them like fish live in the water. Such implicitness makes communication among people of the same community smooth, quick, and efficient.

In addition to collective intentionality and intersubjectivity, **taken-for-grantedness** is the third attribute of the sociocultural world that is crucial for understanding the nature of Culture and its relation to people's behaviours and experiences. When people say that fish are the last to know that they are swimming in water until they are taken out of it, we mean that fish take water for granted. In the case of Culture, 'taken-for-grantedness' means that people who were socialized into their cultural community perceive and accept their sociosymbolic reality as the ultimate and validated reality: "This is how things are supposed to be." This reality does not require any further verification, and it remains the valid and 'real' reality until some life events – like travel, emigration, entering another cultural community, or

critical reflections – seed doubts about the rightness and validity of this primary reality. Unless such an event happens, people take their culture, its traditions, practices, norms, and rules of behaviour for granted. Again, as one would imagine, the experiences of immigrants provide a good example of the deconstruction of one's primary reality. When people move from, for example, Afghanistan to Canada, the 'taken-for-granted' world of their home cultural community is shattered; it almost falls apart as they enter an intentional and very different world of the Canadian cultural community. This destruction of immigrants' taken-for-granted reality after the migration is considered to be one of the most serious psychological causes of their acculturation stress.

Taken-for-grantedness also means that members of a cultural community perform their daily routines nearly automatically; they do not have deep reflections and reasoning of why they are doing this. If, while driving in Canada, you violate the speed limit and are stopped by a police officer, you know what to do: you submit your license and registration to them, wait for the ticket, and then leave the scene without arguing too much. You certainly would not offer them cash, as in other countries. "This is how things are done here" expresses the taken-for-grantedness of routine everyday practices. (Use Box 1.7 to train yourself to identify and understand these three attributes of Culture in your life.)

The three primary features of Culture are illustrated in Figure 1.2.


THE NATURE OF CULTURE
Culture is a sociosymbolic reality composed of intersubjectively shared and taken-for-granted collective intentional things
Collective intentionality:
Collectively intentional things are real and powerful because people think of and act towards them as real entities; thus influenced by them
Collective intersubjectivity:
Collectively intentional things are shared in such a way that "I know that you know that I know about them." All people in our community know that and share that knowledge
Structured and mutually coordinated social interactions guided by verbal communication
Taken-for-grantedness:
Sociocultural reality is perceived as a 'real reality'; people act towards this reality without much reflections: "This is how things are done here"

Figure 1.2 The nature of Culture as a sociosymbolic reality. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

Box 1.7 Discussion questions

To better understand the processes of collective intentionality, intersubjectivity, and taken-for-grantedness, consider your everyday life and find instances of each. (Type your examples and their explanation on a separate sheet of paper.)

Collective intentionality. In class, we have discussed money as an example of a collectively intentional thing. Can you think of other cultural things (come up with two) that have been constructed through collectively intentional processes? Identify both the collectively intentional *things* that are created by these processes as well as their corresponding intentional *states*. Include your own experiences of these states and indicate the role they have played in your behaviour. Use the provided definition and description of collective intentionality to justify your examples.

Collective intersubjectivity. This phenomenon is another side of collective intentionality. The textbook suggests that sharing beliefs in God is an example of intersubjectivity. Write down another example of such intersubjectivity that you have personally experienced and describe your feelings of intersubjective sharedness. Relate your example to the provided definition and to the two functions of intersubjectivity discussed in this chapter.

Taken-for-grantedness. This phenomenon is a consequence of the previous two processes. Describe your experience of taken-for-grantedness in relation to your above examples and reflect on its possible influence on your social interactions.

The mechanism of the culture-mind interconnectedness: The theory of sociocultural models

Thus far, in our discussion of Culture and its different aspects and features, we have talked about this phenomenon as a large, all-encompassing, relatively undifferentiated whole that penetrates all forms and ways of human existence. Although such an understanding may be useful for many purposes, for the psychologists who aim to examine and explain people's behaviours and experiences in particular cultures and amid specific situations, such an understanding is too general; it does not permit sociocultural psychologists to guide their research in various cultural communities. Thus, such a holistic understanding must be complemented by a more differentiated interpretation of Culture that can allow researchers to analytically break apart this phenomenon into distinct units of analysis to understand it better.

Another reason that a more detailed interpretation of Culture is necessary is that sociocultural psychologists aim to understand how sociocultural reality and the human mind interact and co-construct each other. To understand the role Culture plays in human functioning, an exploration of the culture-mind co-construction is necessary. While discussing collective intentionality and intersubjectivity, we repeatedly talked about people's conceptions of *collectively intentional thing*s, their understanding of these things, and the meanings that community members assign to them. Correspondently, we talked about people's *collectively intentional mental state*s and how intentional things influence people's perceptions and actions by activating the corresponding intentional states. To make connections between intersubjectively shared collective intentional things and individual minds, researchers need to have a theory that describes and explains these connections. Such a theory must clarify the structure of the sociocultural reality and its relations to the human psyche, and it must describe the regulatory function of this reality towards people's experiences and behaviour.

The theories of cultural/sociocultural models

The theories of cultural models are the theories that addresses the processes of mutual constitution of Culture and the mind and their mechanisms (D'Andrade, 1995; Dressler, 2018; Holland & Quinn, 1987; Quinn, 2011; Shore, 1996). (We will discuss some of these theories and the history of ideas behind them in Chapter 5.) Every community of people creates its specific ways of dealing with every aspect of their lives: how to hunt, how to fish, how to cook, how to date, how to create and arrange a family, how to bring up and educate children, and so on. After years of successfully applying these ideas and ways of behaving, these accepted customs of solving everyday problems become routinized and habitualized, and they turn into the staples of a particular community: this is how we hunt; this is how we fish; this is how we prepare food; and ultimately, this is who we are as people – we are the ones who live in this particular manner. These habitual and accepted ways of doing things not only provide community members with the repertoires of behaviours and prescribe scripts for actions but they also shape how these people perceive and interpret the world; they construct meanings that members assign to various aspects of their world and everyday lives. In addition, these habitual modes of functioning determine people's values and provide means to control and regulate their actions. Ultimately, many ways of living are developed into various social institutions, becoming full-fledged sociocultural regulators of people's behaviours. These modes of living and thinking that emerged in various domains of communal everyday life were initially named *cultural*, and later, they became referred to as *sociocultural models* (*SCMs*) (Chirkov, 2020). Take, for instance, the 'weeds-on-a-lawn' example provided earlier. It conveys that Canadian homeowners have a shared sociocultural model of

being a homeowner and sub-models for taking care of their lawns and other things around their houses. These models shape their perceptions (they see weeds where newly arrived immigrants do not see them), influence their attitudes towards them (weeds are bad and they need to be removed), and prescribe behaviours for taking care of their lawns (go to the store, buy weed-killing chemicals, and remove the weeds from their lawn).

The nature of sociocultural models

Organisms consist of cells that constitute it and contribute to its existence. Similarly, communities' material, social, symbolic, and ideational fabric consists of SCMs. They are discrete units that constitute Culture.

SCMs have been created by community members to instil relatively uniform and normative patterns of thoughts and actions that allow members of these communities to coordinate their actions and understand each other. SCMs affect many diverse areas of functioning: dating, family building, childrearing, conflict resolution, health maintenance, and many others. In addition to this coordinating function, SCMs represent the accumulated knowledge of many generations of people. Because ancestors have worked through many successes and failures to determine proper community procedures, the new community members do not need to develop all the communal practices, technologies, tools, and necessary knowledge from scratch. Rather, they just need to learn what their ancestors have created; learning this 'social [communal] stock of knowledge' is the essence of children's socialization and enculturation. For example, new parents do not need to invent a new method to care for their child. Communal SCMs for parenting supply them with the necessary knowledge about childrearing (i.e., how to feed, discipline, or entertain their children), prescribe what skills to acquire, and provide justification of why it is important to parent their child in this particular way (see Chapter 7). Thus, SCMs are a repository of collective knowledge and practices that are transmitted from generation to generation.

Public and internalized aspects of sociocultural models

SCMs are composed of *public* and *internalized* aspects. *Public aspects* exist in the intersubjective communal space. They are visible to and observable by all community members and their guests. Public aspects include material features, for example, a university campus, a library building with all its books and other resources, museums, advertisement, entertainments, and other material cultural things. These aspects also include conventional social interactions, for example, a lecture, a meeting, a conference, a demonstration, a strike, and many other social events that exist

independently if a person knows about them or participates in them. Finally, public aspects are composed of conventional ideation aspects that are shared by the majority of community members, for example, the idea of justice and a criminal code that aims at supporting it; the idea of democracy and a constitution that support it; and the concept of equal education and normative acts that promote this idea in practice. These material, social, and ideational features of the public aspects of SCMs constitute a widely accepted understanding of Culture (see the corresponding sections in this chapter).

For SCMs to work as regulative mechanisms, they must be 'taken inside people's minds' or, in other words, they must be *internalized*. (We will discuss this term in more depth in Chapter 6.) When members of a community internalize them, SCMs become incorporated into their mentalities and transform into the psychological systems of representations that guide people's behaviours in the community. For example, the notion of 'justice' is central to the Criminal Code of the community (a public aspect of SCMs of crime and punishment); for it to become a directive force for all members of this group, people must believe in justice expressed in this particular way, take it to heart, and act upon it as an essential value. The majority of group members must see the acts and deeds of other people through the 'lens' of justice and fight to restore it. In diverse communities, people may understand justice differently and act upon very different convictions. (Consider the example of 'honour killing' discussed earlier.)

It is important to notice that these internalized aspects exist together with people's *personal/idiosyncratic mental models*, which each individual constructs during their life and that are composed of a person's unique autobiographical memories, experiences, representations, and scripts for actions. A critical distinction between sociocultural internalized mental models and personal/idiosyncratic mental models is that SCMs are the *collective shared mental models* developed by cultural communities; they are transmitted to the community's members and shared by them. People use these models to guide and regulate their behaviours according to collectively intentional norms, beliefs, and practices. In contrast, personal models belong to an individual, and they are the results of their unique circumstances in life; thus, they correspond to a person's specific decisions, actions, and individuality. People use them to overcome normative prescriptions and demonstrate autonomy and self-determination.

Sociocultural models 'of' and 'for' something

Anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) recognized two sides of cultural models: a model '*of*' and a model '*for*.' 'A cultural model *of*' represents how communities of people understand the world in which they live; "it is a model *of* 'reality'"

(p. 93). 'A cultural model *for*' contains guidance and prescriptions for organizing people's actions in their environment; "it is a model *for* 'reality'" (p. 93). Researchers discuss, for example, the 'cultural models *of* health' or how cultural communities perceive and interpret what it means to have good health; they also debate the 'cultural models *for* health maintenance,' or what these cultural communities prescribe to do to maintain good health. These aspects are the two regulative mechanisms of *SCMs*.

To understand the challenges and difficulties that some people experience in different cultural communities – for example, Aboriginal people in the 'white' world, immigrants in new countries, or first-year students from small rural communities on big university campuses – researchers need to explicate these people's cultural models and analyse them in relation to the models that exist in their new communities. These 'outsiders' may experience incongruences and conflicts between these two models: those from their home communities and their host communities. Consequently, such incongruences may create stress and mental disturbances in colonized people, immigrants, or first-year students on university campuses.

Functions and components of sociocultural modes

If we consider SCMs to be the 'cells' that form the sociocultural fabric of communities, then it is logical to enquire about the components of these 'cells,' their constitutive elements, and the functions that they execute. When Mohammad Shafia arrived in Canada, what elements of his home SCM *of* and *for* parenting were imbedded in his mind?

The basic idea behind the theory of SCM is that these models regulate people's actions towards creating and maintaining cohesive and coordinated sociocultural communities. As a result, these models must supply the community members with the tools to regulate their actions and coordinate these actions with others. SCMs categorize the things, events, and situations that happen in the community. These models direct the attention of community members towards particular things, and they keep other things and events out of their focus. They work as interpretive lenses ('cultural models *of*' something) through which communal members relatively uniformly interpret their environment. These models supply people with values and moral norms that justify such interpretations. They provide repertoires of practices, and they regulate these actions ('cultural models *for* actions'). They serve as a repository of knowledge that community members need to know to function smoothly within their community.

The regulatory functions of SCM allow us to conclude that cultural models must include the following components, among others: *concepts* and *categories* about

the world or its segments, a *repertoire of practices* and *rules* for their execution, a *system of beliefs and moral codes* of what is right and wrong, *cognitive schemas* for interpreting events and situations, and *rules for regulating* these actions, like rewards, punishments, and other sanctions to discourage the violation of the moral codes. It is easier to comprehend these components and apply them to real life if you think about the sociocultural world not as homogeneous but as being divided into different institutions, such as family, education, health care, religion, work, and others – each of which has its own cultural model. Figure 1.3 illustrates five components of the SCM.

Let me demonstrate all these components of SCM of parenting by using the example of the Shafia family murders.

Based on their knowledge of SCMs before moving to Canada, the members of the Shafia family all knew what family honour was, who was responsible for it, and all the other information related to women's positions in the family and their appropriate behaviours. Their primary categories were 'honour,' 'family honour,' 'father's honour,' 'traditions,' and 'women should always follow traditions.' This is the *conceptual/categorical component* of the Afghani cultural model of parenting


Components of Sociocultural Models
OF the world and FOR human actions in this world
Concepts and categories:
The ways the world is categorized and understood
Repertoire of practices:
Types of behaviour and actions that are prescribed and allowed
Interpretative schemas:
Cognitive lenses through which people perceive and interpret the world
Norms, rules, and sanctions
that are used to regulate behaviour of members of a community
Values, beliefs, and moral principles:
Overarching guiding principles about what is important and right to do

Figure 1.3 Main components of sociocultural models. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

daughters. In this culture, there are *prescribed repertoires of behaviours* and practices for the female and male members of the family, depending on their age and marital status. Women must be accompanied by a man when going out and they must wear particular clothing; in turn, men have to be vigilant about the behaviour of their female relatives and they must take appropriate actions if the behaviours of these women deviate from the prescribed norms. The family's mother is also responsible for maintaining family honour by regulating her daughters' behaviours. The male members of the Shafia family had culturally inspired ways of interpreting young women's behaviours in Canada. When these women were dressed in the attire of young Western women, they were judged as being dressed inappropriately. Because they were wearing Canadian apparel, their father called them 'whores.' These interpretations and the meanings that they produced were provided by the *cognitive interpretative schemas* supplied by the home cultural community. These men saw the world through these cultural lenses. They also had a set of *regulatory rules and sanctions* for violating these rules: no unsupervised trips outside of the home, house arrest, physical violence, and, finally, killing. For the Shafia family, the *moral value* of 'family honour' was considered the highest priority. To 'purify family honour,' killing was deemed morally suitable. The value of the women's lives, their health, psychological well-being, dignity, and the right to education and privacy were considered of much lower importance, perhaps even nearly negligible.

As you can tell from this description, SCMs have the mechanisms and powers to influence and regulate the functioning of community members. They supply knowledge and information about how to live one's life, how to see the world, how to behave in this world, what to believe in, and what to value. SCMs provide meaning for people's lives and actions. Thus, Culture can be seen as a powerful regulator of people's lives: this regulator unifies them, makes it possible for them to communicate and coordinate their efforts and, ultimately, makes human social living possible.

Examples of cultural/sociocultural models in research

American researchers Fryberg and Markus (2007) investigated the cultural models of education of American Indian (see Box 1.8 for clarification of the terminology), Asian American, and European American university students.

Based on three studies, Fryberg and Markus found that the cultural model of education of American Indian students is different from the cultural model of a predominantly 'white' university campus. They primarily based their hypothesis on these students' inherent relations to their families and communities, where these relations take priority over academic concerns. In study two, participants were asked what they would do if they had 'a home annual celebration' at the

Box 1.8 Definition and explanation. How Aboriginal peoples are called in different countries

There are differences in how Aboriginal people are named in different countries. In Australia, the accepted terms are *Indigenous Australian peoples* or *Aboriginal peoples* and *Torres Strait Islander peoples*. In Canada, they are typically labelled *First Nations*. This term refers to 'registered Indians.' In addition to First Nations, Aboriginal peoples of Canada include *Inuit* (Indigenous people of the Arctic area) and *Métis*, people who are the descendants of European (often French Canadian) settlers and Aboriginal (mostly First Nations) peoples. In New Zealand, Aboriginal people are commonly called *Māori*. In the United States, the most typical terms are *Native Americans* and *American Indians*.

same time they had to submit a 20-page paper. American Indian students most commonly answered that they would go home. For both Asian American and European American students, the most frequent response was that they would stay at school (p. 231). The authors described this as "the 'close other first' philosophy" (p. 233). Related to this philosophy, they discovered that American Indians saw their education as a tool for individual and communal success, while European Americans viewed education as a personal achievement. For American Indians, learning may encompass developing supportive relationships between students and teachers. However, the mainstream cultural model of education does not support such relationships; thus, Indian American students often experience frustration and alienation from the educational process. The researchers highlighted that "the AI [American Indian] model of education … diverges most notably from the mainstream model" (p. 239). In turn, they saw this divergence as one of the causes of American Indian students' underachievement in higher education. At the end of the article, the authors provided suggestions for the classroom that may be implemented based on their results. As you can see, applying the theory of cultural models may be practically useful and promising; however, it must be noted that many aspects of the theory remain untouched in their investigation.

Another research programme was developed by Chinese-American educational psychologist Jin Li. She conducted a comparative study of the cultural models of the Western (primarily the United States) and Eastern (Chinese) education systems (Li, 2003, 2012). Several outstanding features were derived from this research. First, Li conducted a historical analysis of these two models of teaching and learning. She traced the Western model to Socrates and other Ancient Greek philosophers,

while tracing the Eastern one to Confucius and his followers. Second, after identifying the main components of these models in both regions, she performed a comparative analysis that outlined their connectedness to the cultural milieu wherein they were created. Third, using diverse methodologies, the researcher performed empirical tests on students of different ages to determine how strongly these models are internalized in modern-day youth in both cultural regions. In summary, according to Li's results, these two models can be characterized in the following ways. Li labelled the Western cultural learning model as 'mind-oriented,' meaning that education aims to train students' minds to investigate and understand the outside world. To succeed, students must be curious and innovative and experience the intrinsic enjoyment of learning new things. In contrast, she labelled the Chinese cultural learning model as 'virtue-oriented.' This means that Chinese learning aims for students to become mature and virtuous people who are continuously involved in self-cultivation and self-development. This ultimate goal can be achieved by learning about the world and examining that world. Within this model, Chinese learners are required to attain further degrees of self-cultivation by demonstrating hard work and persistence in the face of challenges and difficulties. This hard work is visible through students continuously practicing skills and working to understand new material. Students strive to achieve perfection in their performance but are taught to remain humble regarding their achievements. While striving for perfection, it is crucial that students have perseverance and resilience.

Other studies that have used the idea of cultural models include an investigation of the American Indian cultural model of career (Juntunen et al., 2001), the Euro-American cultural model of marriage in the United States (Quinn, 1987), and the Hmong (people of Laos) cultural model of health and illness (Hickman, 2007).

A definition of sociocultural model

SCMs are collectively intentional and collectively intersubjective normative mechanisms that regulate community members' experiences, cognition, and actions. These models have public aspects available to all community members and internalized aspects that make up individuals' mental mechanisms of sociocultural regulation. These two aspects continuously co-construct each other through social interactions among community members. SCMs assist people in interpreting events and situations in the community (SCMs *of*) and prescribe appropriate actions (SCMs *for*). These models are composed of concepts and categories, interpretative cognitive schemas and the meanings produced by these interpretations, repertoires of practices, and rules of behaviour; they also include a system of behaviour regulation through rewards and sanctions as well as the values and moral principles that guide people's lives and actions. These cultural models are mostly taken for

granted and powerfully regulate people's actions 'behind the scenes.' SCMs control all domains of communal life from preparing food and raising and educating children to governing society.

Box 1.9 Discussion and training questions

Examining a sociocultural model

Please think about one of the segments/institutions of your everyday life: your family life, your schooling, taking care of your health, work, or dating. These are the domains of your sociocultural world. Now, consider what cultural models regulate the behaviours and experiences of the people in these domains. What is a cultural model of family life, a model of education, or a model of dating in your cultural community?

Think about what concepts, categories, and terms members of your community use within this domain, what repertoire of behaviours and actions they typically execute, how they interpret different events and situations within this domain, what rules and sanctions people use to regulate behaviours and actions, and what values and moral norms guide the behaviours of people within this institution. Reflect upon what is prescribed in this domain, what people are typically doing, and how you usually behave.

The segment/domain of my life that I want to explore:_____ (write down the domain you want to examine).

1. *Concepts and categories* that people operate with within this domain. What words, terms, and expressions do they use to describe, articulate, and make sense of this domain and people's actions in it? How do people talk within this domain?
2. What practices, typical actions, and behaviours are prescribed and usually performed within this domain/institution? (Reflect also on what is prescribed as the 'right,' 'moral,' and 'correct' way of behaving and compare this to what you and other people actually do.)
3. How do people *interpret* different events, situations, and actions within this domain? For example, in Canadian universities, cheating is interpreted as a serious violation of academic conduct, and it is severely prosecuted (this interpretation is driven by *Canadian SCM for university education*). In other cultural communities, cheating may be interpreted as a minor violation. What interpretations of events, situations, or behaviours are prescribed by the cultural model you are analysing? Describe *your* personal interpretations of the same aspects within the chosen domain. Reflect on the similarities and discrepancies between the two forms of interpretations: the prescribed one and your personal code.

4 What values and moral codes regulate people's behaviours and interpretations within this institution/domain? What are the right and wrong ways to behave, react to events, and interact with people? Think about the prescribed values (based on the SCM) and actual values that regulate your behaviour and life.
5 How are behaviours in this domain regulated? What rewards, sanctions, and punishments are used for this purpose? Think about formal sanctions, like laws, and informal ones, like gossiping, boycotting, bullying, etc.

Now, we are ready to articulate a definition of Culture for psychologists.

> **Culture** is a human-made sociosymbolic reality and normative regulatory mechanism. This reality has material, social, and ideational aspects. Culture comprises intersubjectively shared collective intentional things enacted through everyday interactions and may be deposited in various material forms and social institutions. The cultural regulation of behaviour takes place through sociocultural models (SCMs). These models are cells of the sociocultural fabric of a community; they are the main elements of Culture and the mechanism of the interconnectedness between Culture and psyche. These models regulate people's experiences and behaviours in all domains of their everyday lives. They are the taken-for-granted schemas for interpreting and the scripts for acting in the surrounding community. Each community creates its system of SCMs, and these models are responsible for the diversity of people's customs, behaviours, and social institutions. These models are responsible for the diversity of people's mentalities and the multiplicity of people's ways of thinking about, reacting to, and acting in the world. To understand the mechanisms of human psychological functioning, psychologists must study its sociocultural regulation through SCMs.

Conclusion

We may say that Culture is the sociosymbolic reality in which people live. Culture supplies people with various regulatory mechanisms – knowledge, interpretative schemas, values, sets of practices, etc. – that guide their everyday routines and interactions with other community members. Cultures are responsible for the diversity of people across various communities regarding their cognitions, motivations, feelings, personality characteristics, moral values, and behaviours. Therefore, if psychologists want to understand the nature of human development, social behaviour, motivation, personality differences, and many other aspects of people's functioning, they must study the Culture where people are born and where they live. Without paying attention to the sociocultural environments of people's lives, knowledge about human psychology will never be complete.

Glossary

Culture is a human-made sociosymbolic reality and normative regulatory mechanism. This reality has material, social, and ideational aspects. Culture comprises intersubjectively shared collective intentional things enacted through everyday interactions and may be deposited in various material forms and social institutions. The cultural regulation of behaviour takes place through sociocultural models (SCMs). These models are cells of the sociocultural fabric of a community; they are the main elements of Culture and the mechanism of the interconnectedness between Culture and psyche. These models regulate people's experiences and behaviours in all domains of their everyday lives. They are the taken-for-granted schemas for interpreting and the scripts for acting in the surrounding community. Each community creates its system of SCMs, and these models are responsible for the diversity of people's customs, behaviours, and social institutions. These models are responsible for the multiplicity of people's ways of thinking about, reacting to, and acting in the world. To understand the mechanisms of human psychological functioning, psychologists must study its sociocultural regulation through SCMs.

Human psychological functioning is an umbrella term to describe people using their main psychological functions: seeing, hearing, thinking, imagining, acting, etc. This term represents people's psychological capacities, skills, and knowledge.

Intentionality of the sociocultural reality means that the objects within such a reality – collective intentional things – exist only because of people's understandings of them and the meanings that they have assigned to them. People construct and maintain intentional things by interacting with each other based on these understandings and meanings. These intentional things have power over people's actions and lives because of these people's conceptions of them and corresponding intentional states.

Internalization is a process of taking inside external regulations through which a human child becomes a fully functioning member of their community. Internalization means that a person takes cultural schemas, rules of regulation, values, and other initially external elements of the stock of knowledge and transforms them into their internal mental mechanisms to regulate their own behaviour. Internalization consists of developing the corresponding mental representations for external demands; this development happens through meaningful interactions with other people.

Interpretative schemas and production of meaning: Interpretative schemas are the specific types of cognition by which people interpret the world and assign particular meanings to intentional things. People with different interpretative schemas assign different meanings to the same events or objects.

Intersubjectivity of a sociocultural reality is the mutuality of a shared understanding among people of meanings, beliefs, and motives for behaviour in their collectively intentional worlds.

Repertoire of practices is a set of taken-for-granted patterns of behaviour that are considered to be appropriate for a particular place, time, and occasion.

Sociocultural/cultural models are cells of the sociocultural fabric of a community; they are the main elements of culture and the mechanism of the interconnectedness between Culture and psyche. They are collectively intentional and collectively intersubjective normative

mechanisms that regulate community member's experiences, cognition, and actions. These models have public aspects available to all community members and internalized aspects that make up individuals' mental mechanisms of sociocultural regulation. These two aspects continuously co-construct each other through social interactions among community members. SCMs assist people in interpreting events and situations in the community (SCMs *of*) and prescribe appropriate behaviour actions (SCMs *for*). These models are composed of concepts and categories, interpretative cognitive schemas and the meanings produced by these interpretations, repertoires of practices, and rules of behaviour; they also include a system of behaviour regulation through rewards and sanctions as well as the values and moral principles that guide people's lives and actions. These cultural models are mostly taken for granted and powerfully regulate people's actions 'behind the scenes.' SCMs control all domains of communal life from preparing food and raising and educating children to governing society.

Taken-for-grantedness of a sociocultural reality is a condition when people who were socialized into their cultural community perceive and accept their sociocultural reality as the ultimate and validated reality: "This is how things are supposed to be." Taken-for-grantedness also means that members of a cultural community perform their daily routines nearly automatically, without deep reflections on why they are doing these things.

Questions

1. Explain why the majority of researchers argue that *honour killing* is a cultural phenomenon and not a mental pathology.
2. As an example, examine the religion you are most familiar with as a sociocultural phenomenon. What is religion's material, social, and ideational aspects as a cultural institution? How does collective intentionality, intersubjectivity, and taken-for-grantedness work in the case of religion?
3. Provide your examples of collective intentionality and collective intersubjectivity of cultural reality.
4. What is the taken-for-grantedness of a sociocultural environment? Give an example.
5. Describe the cultural model of dating that exists in your cultural community. Identify its main components and explain their functions in regulating dating behaviour.

Recommended reading

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Notes

1 **Psychological functioning** is a broad term that is used here to indicate the manner in which people use their main psychological functions: seeing, hearing, thinking, imagining, acting, and so forth. This term represents all the manifestations of people' uses of their psychological capacities, skills, and knowledge.
2 A *hijab* or *hijāb* is a veil which covers the hair and neck. It is worn by Muslim women, particularly in the presence of non-related adult males. According to Islamic scholarship, a *hijab* is given the wider meaning of modesty, privacy, and morality (Wikipedia, Hijab).
3 Shweder does not differentiate between individual and collective intentionality. Thus, if you insert the adjective *collective* every time he uses the term *intentionality*, you will have a nearly perfect definition of this phenomenon.
4 Similar to the concept of intentionality, *joint* intersubjectivity is present in small cohesive groups. For example, it exists between twins in a family, between husband and wife, and between members of a tight sports team, work group, or military unit.

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2 Attributes and characteristics of Culture/s

Chapter content

- This chapter discusses some characteristics of Culture as our collectively intentional sociocultural reality.
- It starts by emphasizing that despite the tremendous power of Culture to regulate people's actions, members of communities may develop the power to reflect upon and change their communal sociocultural models (SCMs). This power comes from people's selves that generate self-understanding, self-determination, and self-regulation.
- *Culture reification* is a phenomenon that occurs when human-made entities and conditions are perceived as alien to the people who created them. This chapter discusses the consequences of reification both for members of communities and researchers.
- This chapter presents the problems of *universalism* versus *relativism* in relation to sociocultural phenomena and humans' mental composition.
- The first set of problems is related to the *universality versus relativity of people's psychological make-up and mentality* across diverse cultural communities: Are people psychologically the same across cultures, or are their mentalities culturally unique and specific?
- The second set of problems addresses the *moral and ethical evaluation of various cultural practices*: Is it right for outsiders to ethically judge the customs and practices of cultural communities? Do universal and cross-culturally valid moral principles exist, or are these principles always culture-specific?
- The second half of this chapter examines cultural communities based on *ethnicity*, *religion*, and *language*. Cultural communities based on gender, age, job, and place of living are also discussed.
- The chapter ends by introducing and defining the concepts of *ethnocentrism*, *racism*, and *nationalism*.

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In Chapter 1, we discussed the concept of Culture and introduced its inherent connectedness to people's minds and behaviours as Culture is a complex phenomenon that has a profound effect on people's lives, experiences, and functioning. To fully appreciate the importance of this phenomenon, in this chapter, we continue discussing Culture's attributes, characteristics, and constituents.

Culture and human agency; reification of culture

Human agency, autonomy, and the power for cultural change

In the previous chapter, we talked about the pervasive power of Culture to shape and regulate people's experiences and behaviour. This discussion may have created the impression that people are the puppets of their cultures and that the corresponding SCMs program everything they think and do. People are controlled by their SCMs – otherwise, it would not be possible for them to have a coherent and coordinated communal life and, consequently, for people to survive (the evolutionary consequences of the emergence of culture are discussed in Chapter 4). However, there is another side to this cultural dependence. Culture also creates conditions for people to become relatively independent from it and, in turn, to change themselves and their communities if these cultural conditions become harmful or damaging. Thus, one needs to ask, where does this power for autonomous agency, self-determination, and culture change come from?

Culture, with its repertoire of SCMs, pre-exists the birth and life of any community member. These members are included into their communities through socialization and enculturation (which will be discussed in Chapters 6 and 7). Consequently, the corresponding mental regulatory mechanisms for successful communal living are developed in the minds of these people. However, simultaneously with these socialization processes, other remarkable transformations in people's psyches occur. Humans' *selves* are developed along with the processes of *self-understanding*, *self-determination*, and *self-regulation*. In this case, the self is understood as "the centre of experience, reasoning, and acting from the perspective of a functioning person" (Chirkov, 2010, p. 68). This self (an 'I') is the pivotal point of every person's mental life around which all their thoughts, emotions, and actions are organized. All these self-related phenomena are characteristically and uniquely human attributes that animals do not have. (We discuss the phenomenon of self in Chapter 8.)

As a result of the emergence of the self, people acquire the *first-person perspective* (I see the world – both perceptually and mentally – from my personal point of view, where I [my self] am the centre of this point of view). In addition to this capacity, each person attains the experience of being the same coherent and understanding individual across various events, situations, and happenings (this is called *trans-situational self-sameness*). This capacity makes every person

a psychologically integrated individual who can demonstrate this integrity and coherence during various life situations and contexts. Based on this constellation of self-related processes, people acquire the capability of *self-determination* or *autonomous agency*. Self-determination is defined here as "the deliberate, reflective activity of a human being in framing, choosing, and executing his or her actions that is … [determined] by his or her own understanding and reasoning [or self]" (Martin et al., 2003, p. 82). Consequently, this ability towards self-determination can move a person's activity beyond its complete dependency from the SCMs.

This potentiality for the relative independence of the self from the SCMs is also supported by another aspect of the self – namely, its reflective capacity of 'Me-self' or self-concept. This reflective self is based on the capability of the human being to become the object to oneself.[1] This means that because you have the self, you may look at yourself and observe your behaviours and judge them the same way others can see and evaluate you ("Oh, my God, how rude I acted when my boyfriend called me."); may reflect on your personality ("Am I a kind and compassionate person?") or your abilities ("I failed this exam, but I am not stupid. What happened to me?"). Hundreds of similar dialogues unfold in the heads of every person on Earth daily because of their selves and their capacity and desire to look at themselves the way an outside observer or a commentator may do. These self-as-the-object-to-oneself processes allow people to understand their wants, set goals, orient themselves in different environments, plan and manage their actions based on their wants and goals, and work to achieve these goals. Altogether, these processes are called the *self-regulation* of human behaviour.

Correspondently, because of the existence of the self, both in its agentive and reflective aspects, people may reflect on the cultural factors and conditions that initiate and regulate their actions, and they have the potential to become conscious of and critical of these sociocultural causes and circumstances. Therefore, people can rise above their sociocultural regulations, develop relative independence from them, and gain a fair degree of autonomy. This autonomy enables them to become the masters of their actions and not the puppets of their SCMs. Because they have this reflective power, members of cultural communities may thoughtfully accept their cultures or become critical of some of its SCMs and, in turn, work to initiate their change. As such, old models may be discarded gradually, and new ones emerge. For example, think about how the cultural model of the traditional family as a unit of man and woman has been questioned by LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) communities in recent decades; in turn, a new model of the family as a unit of either man and man or woman and woman is emerging. Also recall women's fight for their voting rights against the SCM of the male-dominated patriarchy. These are examples of cultural changes driven by individuals and by the collective agency of members of various groups and communities.

The danger of culture reification[2]

Culture as sociosymbolic reality is the product of human collective activity. It does not exist outside of communities of people and their social engagement. People are the authors and producers of their cultures. Once cultures are created, they constitute powerful mechanism for regulating communal social life and its members' behaviour. For people in a community, this ability of cultures to manage people's actions and to work as a powerful controlling device 'behind the scenes' creates the impression that their cultures are not human products but something that exists outside of human affairs; one might even say that it is alien to them. Thus, Culture becomes perceived as an external reality, similar to physical reality, with its own nature, laws, and powers over which people have no or limited control. This situation, when a product of human activity is perceived as an alien entity that is beyond people's control and that may function independently of their actions, is labelled *reification* (see Figure 2.1).

As an example, consider how social scientists or journalists talk about the 'culture of corruption' as a causal and explanatory factor of the 'white-collar' crimes of some corporate executives or bureaucrats; in such situations, a danger of reifying this type of culture emerges. This means that the culture of corruption, which is the product of some corporates' or governmental's activities and which has complex dialectical relations with its producers, is presented as an external determinant of the conditions of abuse of power, fraud, and unlawful acquisition of wealth that are beyond any control or management by the members of these communities. Phenomenological sociologists Berger and Luckmann (1966/1989) described the reification of sociocultural worlds in this manner:

> Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. Another way of saying this is that *reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human products* [emphasis added] – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies


A community of people
People feel powerless and alienated from their culture
Reification of culture
produces
Culture as a set of sociocultural models *of* and *for* living
Culture acquires mechanisms for its realization and power over people's lives
People start thinking about culture as a force outside of their control

Figure 2.1 The reification of Culture. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

> that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world, and further, that the dialectic between man, the producer, and his products is lost to consciousness. *The reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world* [emphasis added]. It is experienced by man as a strange facticity, an *opus alienum* [Lat.: alienated creation] over which he has no control rather than as the *opus proprium* [Lat.: creation that is one's own] of his own productive activity.
>
> (Berger and Luckmann, 1966/1989, p. 89)

The reification of Culture has several serious consequences for organizing the communal and individual lives of people as well as for studying cultures.

For people's living

As Bergman and Luckmann mentioned, "The reified world is a dehumanized world." If we reify the 'culture of corruption,' 'criminal culture,' or 'culture of poverty,' we alienate these cultures from the people who produce and maintain them. As a result of this alienation, we imply that people are the powerless victims of these cultures' forces over which they have no control. Thus, we remove from people their essential capability to produce, maintain, and change their sociocultural environments; we dehumanize them by transforming them into powerless pawns of alienated cultural forces.

For studying cultures

The reification of Culture creates an illusion that cultures can be studied in the same way natural/physical entities are investigated. It can be measured, evaluated, calculated, and included as an independent variable in various equations and experimental designs. When culture is reified, the interactive, dynamic, intentional, and intersubjective nature of the sociocultural reality is completely lost; ultimately, Culture as a phenomenon disappears. Discussions about the essentialization of various culture-related categories, such as ethnicity and race, are intense within the social sciences and psychology. In Chapter 3, we will discuss some areas of cross-cultural psychology research wherein the reification and essentialization of cultures are happening. We will also talk about cultural psychologists who struggle against such reification and try to maintain culture's social and interactive nature as part of their research programs.

The problem of cultural universalism versus cultural relativism

Universalism versus relativism regarding people's psychological make-up

Before discussing two major disciplines that study psychology and Culture, cross-cultural and cultural psychology (in Chapter 3), I need to comment on one of the fundamental problems of these disciplines – the problem of *cultural universality* versus *cultural relativity/specificity* in psychological processes. Important questions

are: Are people psychologically the same around the world? Or does each cultural community shape its own psychological type of people in terms of their cognition, motivations, personality, emotions, and behaviours?

Cultural universalists state that, in principle, people are psychologically the same across different cultural communities; this means that, in essence, they share the same set of psychological processes and states and strive to reach the same goals and satisfy the same basic needs. Cultural communities adjust these universal characteristics to the specific ecology, climate, and available resources. Young people all over the world are developed into adults: They learn, speak, form families, have relationships with relatives, raise and teach children, and strive to gain status in their groups; they play music, go to war, face fear, and experience joy; or they may become happy or sad, motivated, or unmotivated. Moreover, almost all communities have some form of religion or a system of beliefs in supernatural powers, have institutions to govern social life, have a system of justice to punish wrongdoers, and many other social institutions. In short, people possess 'human universals' (Antweiler, 2016; Brown, 1991). A fitting analogy is that people's personalities vary psychologically just as much as individual cultures vary cross-culturally but that does not mean that there are not some basic psychological or cultural universals. To cultural universalists, cross-cultural psychology aims to discover the psychological universals and study factors contributing to their variations across cultures.

In contrast, *cultural relativists* posit that the sociosymbolic environment is responsible for people's psychological make-up; as such, people's thoughts, values, emotions, and behaviours depend on what they learn and internalize in their communities. Each community develops the psychological make-up of its members according to its SCMs. Therefore, the psychology of people is culturally relative, and it should be studied only with reference to the nature of the cultural communities where these people were born. Cultural relativists believe that the way people perceive the world, what they laugh at, what they find morally right or wrong, how they behave, and just about everything they do, think, and feel is culturally relative and culturally unique. Examples of emotions that are instilled in members who are unique to communities include *amae* (voluntary dependence on another person) in Japan and *toska* (deep sadness) in Russia. Similarly, some communities identify colours with only three words corresponding to white, black, and red. In some communities, it is appropriate to eat your own relatives after they die (as Mayorina people in South Africa or some South American tribes practice) or to offer one's wife to a guest to sleep with as a sign of hospitality (a practice known in some ethnic groups in Namibia, Africa, and Inuit [Eskimo] groups). Examples of human diversity across cultures are practically infinite. Thus, for cultural relativists, the goal of cultural psychology is to focus on the uniqueness of cultures and the uniqueness of the psychological make-up of the members of these communities. Cultural relativists do not deny psychological universalism; rather, they strive to understand the

psychological diversity of people from the point of view of the cultures where these people function.

The arguments between universalists and relativists started a century ago during the early period of modern anthropology. German anthropologist **Adolf Bastian** (1826–1905) coined one of the earliest postulates of modern anthropology, the postulate of 'the psychic unity of mankind.' This postulate has two meanings. Initially, Bastian intended for this concept to define a set of 'elementary ideas' (*Elementargedanken*) that are universal for all people. An example of this is the similar themes that have been discovered in myths around the world. These elementary ideas represent themselves in a variety of 'folk ideas' (*Volkergedanken*) that constitute cultures and that are particular for each cultural community. For example, each culture has ideas about God, the afterlife, good and evil powers in the universe, etc. Bastian postulated a thesis about the mental unity of people, about people sharing a universal mental framework for seeing and interpreting the world. Later, as the idea of 'the psychic unity of mankind' developed, researchers interpreted that "humans [are] everywhere born with roughly the same potentials, and inherited differences are negligible" (Eriksen and Nielsen, 2001, p.17). This second interpretation means that despite different cultural, racial, and ethnic backgrounds, humans share basically the same psychological, cognitive, emotional, and motivational make-up (from http://www.anthrobase.com/Dic/eng/def/psychic_unity.htm). This second meaning of Bastian's proposition almost entirely coincides with the idea of cultural universalism.

Moral/ethical relativism versus universalism

Another interpretation of the universalism/relativism problem is associated with *moral* or *ethical relativism*, which is related to cultural diversity. Recall the moral norms and values component of SCM, which indicates that what is considered morally right or wrong varies across cultural communities. This diversity of moral codes suggests that "there are no universally valid moral principles applying everywhere and at all times" (Pojman, 1999, p. 790). Rather, these principles are culture-dependent. Therefore, culture-dependent moral relativism has become a powerful argument that cultural and social anthropologists use in their work. According to this principle, cultures cannot be judged or evaluated by 'outside' criteria; the morality and rightness of people's actions can be assessed only by the standards and values that are rooted in these people's cultural communities. For example, using this conviction, American anthropologists, through their association, argued against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that the United Nations had accepted. They claimed that the notion of 'human rights' is a Western idea that cannot be imposed on people throughout the world as a universal moral principle (The Executive Board, 1947). Similar moral cultural relativism debates occur in regard to female genital mutilation (Shweder, 2002),

multiculturalism (Shweder, Minow, & Markus, 2002), Muslim women's attire in Western societies (debates are currently occurring in Europe and Canada), and many other topics. All these relativist arguments are centred around the main idea that people in Western societies cannot judge the practices of other cultures by their Western values; these practices can only be evaluated through the lenses of these cultural communities. This type of relativism supports cultural sensitivity and tolerance, which are becoming crucial in our modern world.

Despite the widespread belief in *moral cultural relativism* among social scientists, a large number of scholars argue for *moral cultural universalism* (Harrison & Huntington, 2000; Hatch, 1983; Maslow, 1968; Nussbaum, 2000). For the majority of them, the universal criteria for evaluating cultural practices and moral standards are human health, well-being, dignity, personal growth, and self-actualization. Accordingly, cultures that hinder human health, dignity, well-being, and personal growth are considered 'poor,' while those that promote and facilitate such capacities are 'better.' Humanistic psychologist Abraham Maslow presented this idea:

> … [A] society or a culture can be either growth-fostering or growth-inhibiting. … This is true even though we know that a culture is a *sine qua non* [an indispensable and essential condition, VC] for the actualization of humanness itself, e.g., language, abstract thought, ability to love; … The 'better' culture gratifies all basic human needs and permits self-actualization. The 'poor' cultures do not".
>
> (Maslow, A., 1968, p. 211)

This humanistic criterion is supported by anthropologist Elvin Hatch (1983), who proposed "the humanistic principle … by which … the well-being of people ought to be respected" (p. 134). He insists that humanistic principles apply to the basic human conditions: poverty, illness, malnutrition, material discomfort, and human physical and moral suffering, all of which are universally bad (p. 135). Moral cultural relativism, according to Hatch, is welcomed regarding "sexual mores, marriage patterns, kinship relations, styles of leadership, forms of etiquette, attitudes toward work, personal advancement, dietary preferences, clothing style, conceptions of deity, and others" (pp. 137–138). Therefore, moral cultural universalists support the idea of universal ethics that is human-centred and is based on human growth promotion.

Varieties of cultural communities: Ethnic groups, races, nations, and other communities

To use the concept of Culture effectively, it is useful to think about cultures in terms of the different communities of people who negotiate and create their sociosymbolic realities. In Chapter 1, it was stated that such cultural communities can be actual or imagined contact communities, where direct contact among all members is impossible. These latter types of communities are imagined by the people who perceive themselves

as part of them (Anderson, 2006). In this section, I discuss such units as ethnic groups, races, nations, religious and linguistic groups, as well as some other, less identifiable cultural communities, both contact ones and imagined, such as *teenage communities*, *criminal communities*, *communities of people with disabilities*, and some others.

Ethnicity and ethnic groups

The category that is most frequently associated with the notion of Culture is *ethnic groups* or *ethnicity*; hence, 'ethnic culture.' The term *ethnicity* (from the Greek word *ethnos*: people, nation) and the boundaries of the ethnic communities are topics of never-ending debate among social scientists. The terms and categories related to the notion of *ethnicity* – 'ethnic,' 'racial,' 'coloured,' 'minority,' etc. – are widely used in the media, in the everyday language of citizens, and in various demographic and census surveys that aim to identify the origin and identity of the citizens of countries. Despite this attention, various categories surrounding the notion of *ethnicity* are difficult to define clearly and unambiguously. This ambiguity forces scholars to ask questions like: "When we talk about ethnic groups, what do we mean?" (Phinney, 1996). If we also add the notion of culture, which leads to the notion of *ethnic culture*, this ambiguity becomes even more obvious.

Why is it important to define terms like *ethnic group* and *ethnicity*? Having a clear definition of significant concepts is one of the fundamental requirements of any scientific research. This is particularly important for the psychological and social sciences because their language often overlaps the everyday language of people, which uses many similar concepts that have very fuzzy, if any, definitions and blurry boundaries between them. Ethnicity is one of these overlapping concepts, along with Culture, society, race, identity, self, and many others. Second, in colloquial discussions, the term *ethnicity* is commonly used along with or instead of the term *culture*. When ordinary people are asked about culture and cultural differences, they usually interpret these notions in terms of ethnic cultures and ethnic differences. Following this common-sense distinction, many cross-cultural psychologists use 'reported ethnicity' or 'ethnic self-identity' as the markers for the cultural background of their participants. There is also some confusion in differentiating between the terms 'ethnic group' and 'nation,' 'ethnic group' and 'minority group,' and 'ethnicity' and 'race,' which need to be clarified.

Summarizing some of the debates about *ethnicity* (Phinney, 1996; Smith, 1986; Zagefka, 2009), the following definition of *ethnic group* may be suggested:

> **Ethnic group** is a term for a community of people who have (1) a collective name, (2) similar physical, physiognomical, and biological (racial) features, (3) shared beliefs in their common descent, (4) a sense of common history, (5) a distinctive shared culture (including language and religion), (6) an association with a specific territory, and (7) a sense of identity and solidarity.

Let's consider each of these attributes.

(1) Every group that claims their ethnic commonality has to label themselves by giving their ethnic group a *name*. For example, 'Anglo-Saxon' – the collective name for the Germanic tribes resident in Great Britain since the 5th century; 'Arab' – the collective name of the nomadic tribes settled initially in the Arabian peninsula; 'Han Chinese' – the collective name of the largest ethnic group native to China; 'Caucasian' – a collective name of various ethnic groups inhabiting the Caucasus Mountains; 'Jew' (the Jewish people) – an ethnic group originating in the Ancient Near East (Southern Levant or Palestine); and 'Slavs' – the collective name of the ethnic groups living in Eastern and Southeast Europe, North Asia, and Central Asia. These names "... are a sure sign and emblem of ethnic communities, by which they distinguish themselves and summarize their 'essence' to themselves ..." (Smith, 1986, p. 23). The name of an ethnic community is like a person's name as it brings a person identity and a feeling of uniqueness that separates that person from others.

(2) People belonging to the same ethnic group may also be distinguished by *physical*, *physiognomical*, and *biological features*. These features are often referred to as *racial* features. *Race* is a classification system that categorizes humans into groups based on their physical appearance and biological features. *Racial grouping* is fundamentally based on humans' biological characteristics and has little or no reference to cultural (religious or linguistic) dimensions. Nowadays, in sociocultural studies, the term *ethnicity*, which includes cultural categories, is usually used as a substitute for the concept of *race*. Different ethnic groups have distinctive physical

Table 2.1 Ethnic (selected) composition of Canadian population by origin (2011 and 2016 census) (Statistics Canada, 2011, 2016)

	2011	*2016*
White (European origin)	20,157,965	19,683,320
White (North American origin)	11,070,455	11,628,535
Aboriginal (Inuit, Métis, and North American Indian)	1,836,035	2,130,520
South Asian	1,615,925	1,963,330
Chinese	1,487,580	1,769,195
Arab/West Asian (e.g., Armenian, Egyptian, Iranian, Lebanese, and Moroccan)	778,465	1,011,150
African origin	766,735	1,067,925
Filipino	662,600	837,135
Caribbean origin	627,590	749,155
Latin American	543,380	674,640
Vietnamese	220,425	240,615
Korean	168,890	198,210
Japanese	109,740	121,485

Note: Total population estimate is 33,476, 688 (2011) and 34, 460,065 (2016); numbers below include single and multiple ethnic origin responses, and the sum of total responses is greater than the population estimate.

features mostly related to skin colour, texture, shape, and hair colour, as well as the shape of eyes, nose, lips, cheekbones, and the whole skull and body. To differentiate the term *race* from that of ethnic group, one must remember that race is not a community of people but a system of categorization. That is why race is typically not associated with culture; notably, for Culture to exist, there must be a relatively bounded community of interacting people who create their shared symbolic reality. The physical and physiognomical features of people are genetically predetermined, but the system of classifying people into races is a social convention (social construction) that was created for the convenience of dealing with the diversity of people. Ethnicity refers to a community of people who, together with some physical features, share several other important characteristics.

Two other characteristics of an ethnic group are (3) *shared beliefs in their common descent* and (4) a *sense of common history*. Smith (1986) considered these two attributes essential features of ethnicity, especially having shared beliefs in their common descent. These beliefs in their common descent may be based on real historical facts or just a myth, a set of legends not supported by historical facts. For the members of an ethnic community, this often does not matter as long as all of them believe in these myths.

> (...) Myths of origins and descent provides the means for collective location in the world and the charter of the community which explains its origin, growth and destiny. (...) A myth of descent attempts to provide answer to questions of similarity and belonging: why are we all alike?
>
> (Smith, 1986, p. 24)

Thus, having beliefs in their shared descent and history unites people based on their mutual understanding of their origin with regard to place, time, and ancestors. This unity also explains people's similarities in appearance, traditions, tastes, and feelings. These beliefs bring people together as a unique ethnic community. For example, there is historical evidence about the origin of Aboriginal people in North America, as their ancestors moved from Siberia to North America through the Bering Strait about 17,000–20,000 years ago. There are also beautiful myths and legends that different native tribes have developed about their origin, identity, and uniqueness (see, for example, Grinnell, G.B. 1990. *Pawnee hero stories and folk-tales*. University of Nebraska Press).

Ethnic communities also share some (5) cultural attributes, mainly *language* and *religion*, along with various traditions, social institutions, rituals, art, dress, food, music, and more. *Language* is considered one of the most essential and easily identifiable markers denoting ethnicity. By asking a person about their mother tongue, researchers may easily identify their ethnic belonging, place of origin, and other ethnocultural characteristics. Within a large ethnic group, language may differentiate into various ethnic sub-groups. For example, there are dozens of specific languages belonging to particular groups of Slavic people: Russian, Ukrainian,

Belarusian, Polish, Czech, Serbo-Croatian, Bulgarian, and others. To maintain their ethnic identity, members of ethnic communities try to maintain their mother tongue when they are occupied or colonized by other groups or when they migrate to other countries. Language is their link to their origin and their core identity. (We discuss the relation of Language and Culture in Chapter 9.)

Within this, same umbrella of distinctive shared Culture is *religion*. However, religion usually crosses the boundaries of ethnic communities, thus enabling it to unite people of different ethnic descent while also separating people of the same ethnic background. For example, Christianity unites Christians all over the world, despite their differences in ethnic background. The same can be said about Islam, Buddhism, and other world religions. But religion may divide people even if they belong to the same ethnic community. Think about Arab nations divided by the Shia and Sunni versions of Islam. A notable example is the dissection of nations of the same ethnic background in the former Yugoslavia, which had many different religions: Serbs, who are Orthodox Christians; Croats, who are Catholics; and Bosnians, who are Muslims. These religious divides have been a strong contributor to animosity among these groups and, finally, led to war among them in the early 1990s. It is also worth mentioning that Serbs and Croats share the same Serbo-Croatian language; however, despite this linguistic unity, they experienced strong negativity towards each other during the war conflict in these countries.

Another widely used identifier of ethnic belonging is (6) *the association of members of a particular ethnic group with a specific territory*, usually the land of their origin or some very important events in the common history of this group. One of the most vivid examples of territory relating to ethnic identification as well as inter-ethnic conflicts is Palestine, which is considered to be the ancestral land of both the Jewish people and Palestinian Arabs. Both communities have proclaimed that this land is their sacred motherland and consistently fight each other for their right to live there. Nowadays, when members of many ethnic communities are dispersed all over the world due to various migration processes, the term *ethnic diaspora*[3] is used to identify the members of ethnic communities who live away from their original place of settlement. One of the world's oldest diasporas is the Jewish one; Chinese people living in Canada constitute a Chinese diaspora. The same can be said about many ethnic groups who have moved from their original territory but retain their ethnic identity.

Finally, the last ethnic identifier is (7) a *sense of ethnic identity* with and *solidarity* towards the members of an ethnic community. This is a subjective criterion based on people's feelings of belonging to a particular ethnic group and their attitudes of solidarity, unity, and commonality with other members of their ethnic community. This feeling of solidarity and belonging may motivate these members to do something for their community when it experiences problems. For example, members of ethnic diasporas in Canada and around the world, including those who have never visited

the places of their ethnic origin, collected money and make other valuable contributions to help their co-ethnic countrymen in cases of earthquakes, war, conflicts, or other disasters. Cross-cultural psychologists often used this ethnic self-identification as a marker of participants' ethnicity (and, hence, their culture) because, for these psychologists, this subjective identification is more important for understanding people's behaviour than these people's national or racial backgrounds.

Ethnic communities are the predecessors of *nations*[4] (Smith, 1986). The most common distinction between an ethnic group and a nation is that a nation has a state or, to say it differently, is a *nation-state* – a self-governed political entity that has distinct borders (Smith, 1986). Think about Japan, Germany, Ukraine, and many other countries that have particular ethnic groups at their cores that are organized in states, have governments, and live within protected national boundaries. But nations can also be identified within existing states without being a separate nation-state. Think about the Québécois nation within Canada that was announced on November 22, 2006, Scotland as a nation within the United Kingdom, Basque Country in Northern Spain, as well as many other large ethnic or linguistic groups that have acquired the status of nations within existing nation-states.

Religion and language as the constituents of cultural communities

In the previous section, we discussed that religion[5] is one of an ethnic group's identifiers. Religion can also be a relatively independent constituent of a cultural community because religion forms one of the most obvious and central elements of a human-made intentional symbolic reality (Geertz, 1973). Culture and religion are so closely connected that there are academic departments at universities, scientific societies (for example, The International Society for Study of Religion, Nature and Culture), and journals on this topic (for example, *Journal of Religion and Culture*).

Each religion, both as a system of beliefs and as an institution, has most of the elements of Culture that have been discussed earlier. Each religion creates an artificial, intentional, and negotiated reality that competes with objective physical reality.

Table 2.2 Religions in Canada (2006 Census survey and 2011 National Household Survey) (Statistics Canada, 2006; 2011)

Religious denomination	*2006*	*2011*
None	16.2%	23.9%
Christianity	77%	75.4%
Islam	2.0%	3.2%
Hinduism	1.0%	1.5%
Buddhism	1.0%	1.1%
Judaism	1.1%	1%
Sikhism	.9%	1.4%

(Think about ideas regarding the existence of God or gods and their power to govern the affairs of nature and people; also consider debates between 'evolutionists' and 'creationists' concerning the origin of humans.) It is intersubjectively shared among the people of this faith and those who believe, take this religious reality for granted without requiring validation or proof. Each religion has a set of knowledge, both formal (theology) and informal, that supplies its believers with information about its origin, main postulates, practices, and principles; it provides its followers with a set of interpretative schemas of how to understand the world, other people and one's Self, their position in the world, and their virtues and vices. Every religious system has a set of values and moral beliefs that guide believers' behaviour, practices, and codes of conduct that determine the everyday routines of people of this faith. There are hundreds of different religious systems around the world that unite and/or separate people of the same ethnicity, race, or nationality. The largest religion is Christianity (around 2.4 million followers or 31.2% of the world population), followed by Islam (around 1.8 million [24.1%]), Hinduism (around 1.2 million [15.1%]), and Buddhism (around half-a-million [6.9%]) (Wikipedia/Major_religious_groups).

Language is another marker of ethnicity that may be a stand-alone organizing factor of a cultural community. People may identify themselves as belonging to the same community for the sole reason that they speak the same language. Language can also be an instrument for struggles related to ethnic identification, national independence, cultural protectionism, and some other agendas. For Canadians, the most vivid example of this is the fight of Quebecers to protect and maintain the French language and related to it, their Québécois culture and cultural/linguistic identity. In this case, their French language serves as a nation-forming factor that unites Francophones by giving them an identity and a sense of unity. As we discussed earlier, language, as one of the basic forms of symbolic representation of reality, is an inherent constituent of the fabric of cultural reality. Without language, people cannot create any culture. But language is quite a different constituent of cultural communities compared with other factors such as religion. Religion is a system of beliefs and practices expressed by a language, where language is a means of communication and negotiating ideas. Fundamentally, language is not a culture-organizing factor; rather, it works with other elements such as common history, territory, and others to form a cultural community.

Through their vocabulary, grammar, syntax, and semantics, particular languages may construct relatively different realities for their speakers, thus contributing to the debates around cultural/linguistic *relativism*. This form of relativism poses questions such as: Do people who speak different languages perceive and understand the world differently? Do people who speak different languages think differently and have different cognitions, motivations, and feelings? If a language has only three words describing colours – white, black, and red, in the case of the Bambara language of Mali people – can people who speak this language perceive colours

Table 2.3 Language affiliation in Canada (2016 census Statistics Canada). The total population is 34, 460,065. (Statistics Canada, 2016)

Language families and languages in Canada (mother tongue)	*2016*
Official languages	
English	19,460,850
French	7,166,705
Bilingual	165,320
Non-official languages	
Aboriginal languages: Cree, Inuktitut, Ojibway, Oji-Cree, Innu, and Dene	195,700
Chinese languages: Mandarin, Cantonese, other	1,253,360
Semitic languages: Arabic, Hebrew, Amharic	509,190
Romance languages: Spanish, Italian, Portuguese	1,154,270
Germanic languages: German, Dutch, Yiddish	538,765
Slavic languages: Polish, Russian, Ukrainian	689,450
Indo-Iranian languages: Punjabi, Urdu, Hindi, Persian	1,312,750
Austronesian languages: Tagalog, Malay, Ilocano	511,480

such as yellow, green, and blue? These are interesting questions that raise intensive arguments in psychology and anthropology.

To account for people's language affiliation and use, censuses and nation-wide surveys use the following identifiers: *mother tongue*, *knowledge of language*, and *language spoken at home*. "A person's mother tongue refers to the first language learned or spoken in early childhood within his or her family; it may also correspond to the language spoken most often at home until the age of five" (Lachapelle & Lepage, 2006, p. 6). "Knowledge of a language is defined as the ability to conduct a conversation in a given language. It should be noted that the data provided by these questions concern knowledge of languages, not their use" (p. 27). When asking about language(s) spoken at home, researchers ask two questions: "the language that is spoken *most often*" and "other languages that are spoken *on a regular basis* at home, if any" (p. 47). The results of various surveys about languages use reflect answers to these three sets of questions and their combinations.

Other sociocultural communities

Cultures may also be formed within different contact and imagined communities. In modern times, researchers investigate and discuss concepts such as *work culture* (Levine, Harrington, & Uhimann, 2019), *organizational culture* (Schein, 2018), *the cultures of social classes* (Henry, 2014; Kraus et al., 2019), *generational culture* (Gentle, Campbell, & Twence, 2014) including *youth culture* (Burlingame, 1970); similarly, social scientists investigate *criminal culture* (Berg & Stewart, 2013) within the discipline of *cultural criminology* (Ferrell, 1999), *virtual*

communities and their cultures (Doheny-Farina, 1996; Jones, 1997), the *cultures of various sexual communities* (Dean, 2009; Kulick, 1998; Zimmerman, 1998), and the cultures of other communities, such as the *cultures of people with disabilities*, the *culture of corruption* in different communities (power elite, corporations, police, etc.) or countries, and the *culture of poverty*.

These forms of culture usually are not composed of clear-cut communities of people. Some of these communities are face-to-face interactive groups, for example, the work collectives of small or medium organizations. Other communities are vast, for example, social class, generational cohort, or virtual ones. Members of these communities do not interact in a face-to-face fashion. However, they still have a set of specific models, openly spoken or hidden, that guide and regulate their behaviours and members of these communities have a sense of belonging to and identity of being their part. The mechanisms of the emergence of SCMs in these not-direct-contact communities are different from the ones that are developed in contact communities; as such, they should be investigated further. Regardless of these different development routes, these cultures' functions and structures are the same. They create cohesion in the collectivity, mutual understanding among their members that share similar practices, values, preferences, and identities.

An important aspect of these cultures is that they are nested within larger societal, national, or institutional cultures and continuously interact with them. Because of this, they often labelled *sub-cultures*. This means that members of sub-cultures are also members of larger sociocultural units; therefore, they learn and internalized their SCMs also. Besides, people may be members of several sub-cultures. For example, one might be a member of the upper-middle class while also being part of a lesbian community; one might be young (being a part of age-based subculture) and work in a small restaurant (with its unique work culture); or one might be a baby-boomer (a generational sub-culture) and actively participate in several virtual communities. This complex network of the various communities to which people belong creates multifaceted mechanisms of sociocultural regulation that are guided by the individual's self along with their ability for reflection, rational analysis, and agency.

This picture can become even more complicated and interesting for research when one considers the processes of people's transitions from one community to another. For example, people migrating from rural to urban areas or immigrating from a collectivistic culture to an individualistic one. Similarly, people might be hipsters during their student years and become corporate employees with completely different values and practices. People are continuously moving across various communities and their sociocultural regulatory models change concerning their communities. People may experience serious psychological tensions and distress when such changes take place. Thus, sociocultural psychologists and other social scientists are examining the causes of these tensions and the ways to ameliorate them

to help people with their transitions. Think about the acculturation stress of newly arrived immigrants; the strong stress of loneliness and isolation a new student on campus may exhibit upon arriving from a close-knit community, cohesive extended family, and a network of good friends; or the strain a successful manager will have upon retiring from his career and moving to a remote sleepy community.

In conclusion, it is important to state that cultural communities and the corresponding regulatory mechanisms based on the systems of SCM are strongly intertwined with people's mental and behavioural functioning. These complex systems of regulatory mechanisms not only make it challenging for researchers to study people's behaviours in various sociocultural settings, but they also make it an interesting endeavour. To make progress in these research projects, researchers must have deep knowledge of the complexities of psychosociocultural regulation.

Ethnocentrism, racism, nationalism, and related *-isms*

All the groups and communities that people form based on ethnicity, religion, language, or other constitutive factors are established upon categories negotiated, agreed upon, and shared among these groups. This means that these categories are socially constructed and are arbitrary. However, for people who accept them, these constructions become important in shaping their identities, categorizing others, and influencing their experience, behaviour, cognition, and emotion. Several terms reflect how these arbitrary categories shape people's perceptions, cognitions, and actions. These phenomena are *ethnocentrism*, *nationalism*, and *racism*, and potentially other *-isms*, such as *ageism* and *sexism*.

Ethnocentrism

Ethnocentrism is a set of beliefs and attitudes of members of an ethnocultural community towards themselves and towards people who do not belong to their community. It is a prism through which community members see and evaluate the world and other people in that world. According to Smith (1986), there are several aspects of ethnocentrism: "first, is the sense of group centrality, the feeling of cultural uniqueness and [second] the attitude of superiority toward other people and their mores" (p. 47). He calls the first aspect an *attitude of centrality and uniqueness*. (Think about expressions like 'God's chosen people' or 'God's own country' as examples of the feeling of a community's uniqueness.) The second aspect is an *attitude of superiority* towards members of other communities, which sometimes can be arranged in the form of hierarchy with regard to the closeness-farness of various groups to the 'blessed' one. According to this set of attitudes, community members believe that their way of life, practices and customs, world philosophy, and many other components of their cultural models are correct and valid. With consideration of members of other communities who have and practice other worldviews, different

moral values, and exercise different customs, they judged them to be wrong, weird, bizarre, or even savage-like, uncivilized, and brutal. They perceive, evaluate, and judge other communities' cultures by their own culture's standards. Smith makes another vital conclusion that ethnocentrism is a natural and normal condition to people's social life. As individuals have a first-person perspective of the world that is different from the perspectives of other people, people who were enculturated and socialized in a particular cultural community have no other option but to internalize their community's perspectives and to see the world through the glasses of these perspectives. This is how we, as sociocultural beings, are developed. The problem with ethnocentrism starts when it goes unreflected – when people who do not know about its existence genuinely believe that their perception of other cultures and other people is wholly valid and morally correct. If it goes untreated, unreflected, and blind, ethnocentrism can lead to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. The main treatments for it are gaining knowledge about other cultures through education, travelling, and critically reflecting on one's own and other cultures.

Racism and nationalism

Racism and nationalism derive from ethnocentrism. *Racism* has the same origin as ethnocentrism, differing in that not an ethnic group but the whole race is treated as central, unique, and superior to other races (think about white supremacists). Racism can also be defined as a set of beliefs that other races have particular characteristics and qualities that make them inferior or superior to other races. Based on these beliefs, racists justify their attitudes of prejudice and practices of discrimination towards the representatives of 'inferior' racial groups. Another aspect of racism occurs when an individual of a particular race is attributed characteristics that are believed to be inherited by all people of this race; this person is then treated not as a unique individual but as a representative of their racial group, deemed to have inherited all the negative and positive attributes of that group. Based on such stereotyping, an individual is stripped of personal characteristics and considered exclusively based on ascribed racial qualities. In this aspect, racism is closely related to stereotyping.

Nationalism also has its origin in ethnocentrism; however, it is applied not to an ethnic group but to a nation. Correspondently, nationalists perceive their nation as being central and unique among and superior to other nations. Usually, nationalism is arranged as a political movement that is structured, organized, and institutionalized (for example, nationalist parties). Common characteristics of nationalism include having a strong identification with one's nation, a belief in its exclusivity, and a desire to defend the unity and distinctiveness of this nation from intruders and contaminators. Nationalism should not be confused with national identity and national pride. The extreme forms of nationalism treat other nations, ethnic groups,

and races as inferior, as enemies who deserve to be exterminated. (Think about the Nazi's ideology of national-socialism and their practices of exterminating Jews, Slavs, Gipsies, communists, disabled people, and others who differed from the Arian people.) Less extreme forms of nationalism may guide a struggle for independence and sovereignty.

Other -isms: Agism and sexism

Other *-isms* have emerged or may emerge based on the same principle that one's community or group becomes central and superior for its members in perceiving and understanding other communities and other people. When young people who are nurtured in the culture of youthful beauty begin to perceive all elderly people as ugly, dumb, or intellectually and physically incapable, they demonstrate extreme forms of *agism* or negative stereotyping and prejudice towards people because of their age. Similar biases happen in regard to multiple differences; for example, they may be based on gender (*sexism* happens when representatives of one sex/gender are considered smarter, more powerful, and superior to the members of other sex groups). Because of these stereotypes, prejudices, and biases, people lock themselves into different categories and build barriers preventing them from better understanding each other, enjoying productive cooperation, being inclusive, and, ultimately, building egalitarian, cohesive, creative, and real human societies.

Conclusion

This chapter builds upon Chapter 1 by further discussing some attributes and characteristics of Culture. It stresses that people have the power to overcome the influence of Culture and become relatively free from its tenets. This power comes from developing the Self. The dialectics here is that only because of Culture can people develop their selves together with self-determination, self-understanding, and self-regulation. Consequently, these self-related capacities allow people to reflect on and even change their cultures. The reification of Culture constitutes a controversial phenomenon that may have serious consequences both for people's lives and sociocultural research. The debate between cultural universalism and relativism in both of its manifestations is very contentious. First, scholars deliberate upon the psychological make-up of people, whether humans are mentally the same or different across cultural communities. The second debate is related to cross-cultural moral universalism versus relativism. Specifically, can people from one cultural community impose moral judgements on the practices of other cultural communities? The chapter ends by discussing various cultural groups – ethnic, religious, linguistic, and some others – that develop their cultures and the corresponding biases and prejudices.

Glossary

Cultural relativism refers to either psychological or moral relativism. *Psychological cultural relativism* is a point of view that the sociosymbolic environment is responsible for people's psychological make-up; their thoughts, values, emotions, and behaviours depend on the nature of the cultural models they have learned and internalized in their communities. Therefore, people's psychology (mentality) is culturally relative, and it should be studied only with reference to the nature of the cultural communities where they were born and live. *Moral cultural relativism* emphasizes that the worldviews, customs, and practices of cultural communities cannot be judged and evaluated by 'outside' criteria but only by the moral standards of that community.

Cultural universalism refers to psychological or moral universalism. *Psychological cultural universalism* is a point of view that suggests that in principle, people are psychologically the same across different cultural communities. This means that, in essence, they share the same set of psychological processes and states, and they strive to reach the same goals and satisfy the same set of basic needs. These aspects can be identified relatively independently of people's culture; subsequently, they can be studied systematically in different cultural communities. *Moral cultural universalism* states that the humanistic criteria can be used to evaluate different cultures. Cultures that promote people's well-being as well as the healthy satisfaction of basic psychological needs and personal growth can be evaluated as 'good.' Those that thwart such promotion are said to be 'bad.'

Ethnic group is a term for a community of people who have (1) a collective name; (2) similar physical, physiognomical, and biological (racial) features; (3) shared beliefs in their common descent; (4) a sense of common history; (5) a distinctive shared culture (including language and religion); (6) an association with a specific territory; and (7) a sense of identity and solidarity.

Ethnocentrism is a set of beliefs and attitudes of members of an ethnocultural community towards themselves and towards people who do not belong to their community. Ethnocentrism has several aspects: the sense of group centrality and uniqueness and an attitude of superiority over members of other communities. Ethnocentric people also perceive, evaluate, and judge the cultures of other communities by the standards of their own culture.

Human Self is a set of processes when the individual becomes the object to oneself and because of this capacity acquires the capability to a personal perspective and self-sameness. The Self becomes the centre of self-regulation and may evolve as the source of self-determination and autonomy.

Nation is a state, or, to say it differently, it is a nation-state – a self-governed political entity that has distinct borders and a government.

Nationalism has its origin in ethnocentrism; instead of being applied to an ethnic group, it is applied to a nation. The common characteristics of nationalism include a strong identification with one's nation, a belief in the centrality and uniqueness of it, and a desire to defend the unity and uniqueness of this nation from intruders and contaminators.

Race is a classification system that categorizes humans into groups based on their physical appearances and biological features.

Racism has the same origin as ethnocentrism; here, not only an ethnic group but also the whole race is treated as central, unique, and superior to other races. Racism is also a set of beliefs that other races have particular characteristics and qualities that make them inferior or superior to other races. Based on these beliefs, people justify attitudes of prejudice and practices of discrimination towards representatives of other races.

Reification of culture is a situation when a product of human activity is perceived as an alien entity that is beyond people's control and that may function independently of their actions.

The thesis of "the psychic unity of mankind" was first coined by German anthropologist Adolf Bastian. He postulated the mental unity of people, meaning that they share a universal mental framework for seeing and interpreting the world. This thesis also states that all people around the world are basically (psychologically) the same. Despite different cultures, racial, or ethnic background, human individuals share fundamentally the same psychological, cognitive, emotional, and motivational make-up.

Questions

1. This chapter argues that people are not puppets of their sociocultural models (SCMs). Do you agree with this thesis? Provide your arguments for or against this statement.
2. How do you understand the differences between 'I-Self' and 'Me-Self'?
3. Please reflect on the phenomenon of culture reification; explain it in your own words and give an example when you encounter the reification of culture in your thinking or in the arguments of others.
4. Provide your arguments for and against cultural psychological relativism.
5. How do you understand cultural moral universalism? Provide an example of this point of view.
6. Apply the seven criteria of the ethnic group discussed in the textbook to your ethnic background and justify that your ethnic group meets all these requirements.
7. What are the differences and similarities between ethnicity and race?
8. Think about your ethnic identity; describe the attitudes, thoughts, and feelings that are related to your sense of identity with a particular ethnic group.
9. What is the mechanism of the emergence of various *-isms* (ethnocentrism, racism, ageism, and sexism) based on people's categorization into different groups?

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Notes

1 This approach to the Self is based on the works of American social philosopher and psychologist **George Herbert Mead** (1863–1931). His theorizing about the human self and mind, society, and social actions (Mead, 1934/1962) have been commented on and elaborated by sociologists (Blumer, 1966) and psychologists (Martin, 2007; Martin & Gillespie, 2010).
2 **Reify** – to make (something abstract) more concrete or real (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008).
3 **Diaspora** (from Greek *diaspora* that means 'scattering, dispersion') – people who have spread from or been dispersed from their homeland (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008).
4 **Nation** (from Latin *nation(n-)*, from *nat-, nasci* 'be born') – a large body of people united by common descent, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or territory (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008).
5 **Religion** (from Old French, or from Latin *religio(n-)* 'obligation, reverence') – (1) the belief in and worship of a superhuman controlling power, especially a personal God or gods and (2) a particular system of faith or worship (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008).

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3 Researching culture and psychology

Cross-cultural, cultural, and indigenous psychologies

Chapter content

- The chapter starts with a historical excursus into the emergence of psychology as a science in *Wilhelm Wundt*'s laboratory in Leipzig, Germany, in 1879. Wundt distinguished two disciplines of psychology: *Physiological Psychology*, to which experimental methodology can be applied, and *Ethno-Social Psychology (Volkerpsychologie*), which requires an interpretative methodology different from the experimental one.
- Modern mainstream psychology follows the requirements of the natural science methodology and tries to apply it to all forms of psychology: social, cross-cultural, cognitive, motivational, and personality. It justifies this by a desire to discover *universal laws of human functioning* and behaviour. For a long time, mainstream psychology has been considered *a-social and a-cultural*.
- *Cross-cultural psychology (CCP)* emerged in the last half of the 20th century to test these universal laws against the cultural realities of non-Western communities. Despite including culture in their research programs, most cross-cultural psychologists continue to believe in and apply the natural science methodology to their studies. Based on this belief, they developed their understanding of culture and its relations to psychology and implemented a well-articulated strategy for empirical studies of culture and psychology.
- *Cultural psychology (CP)* has emerged as a form of the second discipline of psychology – *ethno-social psychology* (by Wundt). It is based on the idea of the mutual constitution of culture and the human psyche; it uses *understanding* and *interpretation* as basic analytical tools and is an *interpretative human science*.

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- *Indigenous psychology (IP)* emerged as a reaction of psychologists from non-Western countries against the Westernization of the psychology of their people. They discover and further develop the systems of psychological knowledge indigenous to their communities and apply them in their studies.
- Several examples of different cross-cultural and cultural psychological studies finalize this chapter.

The first chapter aimed to convince readers that humans' psychological make-up is culture-bound and strongly depends on people's environments' social and symbolic ingredients. That chapter also demonstrated that culture constitutes a powerful regulatory mechanism that manages people's behaviours in different situations, as was shown by the Safia family murder case. These arguments inevitably lead us to conclude that if psychologists want to understand human psychological capacities and want to know how these capacities function in regulating people's lives and actions, they must incorporate culture into their analysis and make cultural aspects necessary components of their research programs. Thus, Chapter 3 discusses three disciplines that study psychology and culture: cross-cultural, cultural, and indigenous psychologies.

A historical excursus into the demand for two psychologies

The role and importance of sociosymbolic contexts in shaping people's psychological composition and managing their lives and actions have been highlighted and discussed by philosophers, scholars, and researchers since the early days of the emergence of psychology as an independent scientific discipline (Cahan & White, 1992; Farr, 1996; Jackson, 1988; Jahoda, 2007).

Psychology as science emerged in 1879 when German scholar **Wilhelm Wundt** (1832–1920) opened the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig, Germany. Psychology became an independent science when it was separated from philosophy, with its speculative contemplations about the human psyche, and became an empirical science where researchers collect data using scientific methods to validate their hypotheses and theories. The hallmark of scientific methods has been (and *is* now) *laboratory experiments*. The opportunity to apply experimental procedures to study human psychological functioning was the most fascinating possibility for the psychologists who wanted to see psychology in the camp of natural empirical sciences.

It is important to note that, from the first days of psychology as a science, Wundt highlighted its dualistic nature and the necessity of two different approaches to

studying people's psychological functioning. He differentiated the *lower mental functions*, which include sensations, some forms of perceptions, some forms of memorizing and thinking that do not require the verbal and conscious transformation of stimuli, and basic emotional reactions and motivations, such as hunger, thirst, and avoidance of pain. These functions that nature supplied to humans are similar to those provided to other higher animals. He called this branch of psychology *physiological psychology*. Wundt also identified *higher mental functions* together with the exclusively human capabilities for language and conscious rationality. Here, he discussed conceptual cognition, symbolic memory, creativity, language, and the ability to write, speak, and communicate using various symbolic forms. In his analysis, Wundt also included the products of higher symbolic processes, through which these processes represent themselves, such as art, science, religion, music, poetry, and almost everything that constitutes the human-made environment. According to Wundt, these manifestations of the human mind belong to another domain of psychology, exclusively to human psychology, which does not have any similarity with the functioning of animals. He labelled this second discipline of psychology *Volkerpsychologie*[1] or *ethnopsychology* (from Greek *ethnos* – nation), sometimes translated as *social psychology*. (For more on the history, see Chapter 5.)

According to Wundt, the natural science empirical approach can be applied only to physiological psychology, whereas the second layer of human psychology requires very different methods and cannot be approached as natural science phenomena. Almost everything psychologists borrowed from the natural sciences – various forms of measurements, experimentations, and intensive use of different mathematical and statistical analyses – applies only to a certain point and to the functions that evolved with minimum interference from the symbolic and consciousness-mediated processes. Intensive studies of sensation thresholds, conducted by German experimental psychologist **Gustav Fechner** (1801–1887) in the early ages of psychological science, are instances of a quantitative approach to studying the human mind that led to the development of *psychophysics*. Fechner studied relationships between the intensity of different stimuli and participants' experience of these intensities to establish mathematical equations that describe these relations. The precision of the measurements and the possibility of strict mathematization attracted many young researchers to this new field of experimental psychology. They dreamed of making psychology as precise and as objective as physics. In these psychophysiological studies, researchers wanted to find the causes of psychological phenomena in the environment and, by using the language of mathematics, to establish empirical laws of human sensation and perception.

The second branch of psychology that, according to Wundt, deals with the higher mental functions and various symbolic forms of human activity that cannot be studied experimentally. Researchers need a completely different methodology for this branch. This different methodology must be based on the fact that these higher-level

mental phenomena have not emerged directly from the biological and physiological roots of the human organism; instead, they have arisen because of meaningful interactions between people who use symbolic forms of communication. According to Wundt, these are "mental products which are created by a community of human life and are, therefore, inexplicable in terms merely of individual consciousness since they presuppose the reciprocal action of many" (Wundt, 1912/1916, p. 3). This quotation corresponds directly to the idea of sociocultural mental models discussed in Chapter 1. The 'mental products' that Wundt mentioned correspond to the sociocultural mental models that are created by cultural communities and transmitted to their members. These products supersede individual mental models; they are 'inexplicable in terms of individual consciousness.' These cultural models are constructed and maintained through meaningful social interactions among community members. As a result, they 'presuppose the reciprocal action of many.' Therefore, the methodology of this second discipline should be directed towards uncovering the 'communal mental products' by investigating and understanding these communities' myths, customs, rituals, written texts, histories, material artefacts such as architecture, pieces of art and technology, and other forms of the cultural manifestations together with observing their members' practices and interviewing them about these practices. The type of ethnosocial psychology that Wundt propagated has to be a multidisciplinary science that incorporates the knowledge and methods of history, anthropology, linguistics, sociology, and many other human sciences that are concerned with people functioning in different cultures and societies. Therefore, this second discipline of psychology aims to understand people's sociocultural determinants for their actions and not explain them through precise empirical laws, as in physiological experimental psychology.

German philosopher and psychologist **Wilhelm Dilthey** (1833–1911) devoted his academic life to justifying and promoting psychology, which is a form of human sciences, as opposed to experimental psychology, which has located itself within natural sciences. According to Dilthey, human psychology must be based on studying people's experiences during their lives, and sociocultural communities must be part of these inquiries because humans' lives never unfold in isolation but always in social contexts. As Polkinghorne (1983) commented on Dilthey's approach: "The individual life is not an isolated monad; it is merged and integrated into levels of intensity with various group lives, including the group life of mankind. And because individuals do not exist in isolation, they cannot be studied as isolated units; they need to be understood in the context of their connections to cultural and social life" (p. 25).

We may conclude that, historically, psychology has been split between two modes of thinking: a natural science or experimental perspective and a sociocultural one. According to Wundt, both modes can be applied in psychology, but to two different psychological processes and functions. The natural science approach applies

to psychophysiological processes with minimal symbolic mediation. In contrast, the sociocultural approach should work exclusively with human mental functions and processes that are symbolic and language-driven.

The struggle of modern psychologists to differentiate between these two disciplines of psychology

This struggle regarding different approaches to studying human psychology is reflected in the differentiation between the *quantitative* and *qualitative* methodologies (Camic, Rhodes, & Yardley, 2003; Clark-Carter, 2010; Polkinghorne, 1983).

The *quantitative methodology* continues the above-mentioned natural science approach to psychological studies based on studying relatively isolated individuals in laboratories or by giving them standardized surveys. Quantitative psychologists transform the results of these experiments and surveys into numbers to establish empirical statistics-based regularities among different mental variables and between these variables and some environmental conditions and social and cultural factors. In contrast, the *qualitative methodology* aims to study humans' thoughts, emotions, desires, reasons for actions, and other mental states by using these people's verbal reports, observing them, talking to them, and studying them in their natural habitats. Analysing these habitats' sociocultural aspects is considered one of the most important aspects of this type of enquiry.

One of the main questions related to this division in psychology is not which methodology is correct. The main challenge for any scientific discipline, including psychology, is to apply the relevant methodologies corresponding to the objects of its studies. To say it differently, the methods of an investigation have to be pertinent and adequate to the nature of the objects of a scientific enquiry. Let's take biology as an example. Modern biology studies the nature of life and living organisms of different kinds; it is currently divided into evolutionary, molecular, cell, environmental, population, and many other sub-fields that employ different systems of thinking and methods depending on the nature of organisms and at the level of their organization. Consequently, population biologists cannot use the methods of cell biologists to do their research and vice versa. Each biological sub-discipline must use methods corresponding to the nature of the objects of their enquiry.

Unfortunately, psychologists frequently violate the requirement for the separation of methodologies depending on the nature of the objects of a study. Many have decided to use experimental methods and natural science methodology to study higher mental functions, symbolic forms of the manifestation of human consciousness, and people's social behaviour. These psychologists have been striving to establish new scientific psychology and separate themselves from, as they considered, descriptive and less scientifically rigorous studies in anthropology, linguistics, and some areas of sociology. However, this enthusiasm led to a strong exaggeration

of the applicability of experimental methodology in psychology. The experimental psychologists decided that they could apply it to all manifestations of human psychology, not only to the lower mental functions, as Wundt proposed, but also to social, personality, cognitive, and even sociocultural phenomena.

For example, American psychologists decided that the social behaviour of people can and should be studied by experimental methods in laboratories by randomly assigning individuals to different groups and placing these groups under different experimental conditions. They insisted on removing their participants from their natural sociocultural environments and putting them under the scrutiny of the scientific experimental methodology. They justified such decisions by their desire to discover universal psychological laws of social behaviour, laws free from contextual (including cultural) contaminations that constitute the core of human universal psychology. Thus, sociosymbolic contexts (cultures) were considered to be irrelevant to this mandate. That is why the emerged form of social psychology in North America has been often characterized as *a-cultural* and even *a-social* (Brannigan, 2004; Greenwood, 2004; Misra & Gergen, 1993).

It is fair to say that many psychologists have disagreed with such assumptions and the uncritical applications of naturalistic methodology to study sociocultural psychological phenomena. In the second half of the 20th century, these scholars started advocating using qualitative methods and borrowing methodologies from anthropology, linguistics, history, and other social and humanities disciplines to examine people's sociocultural environments and their behaviours there. Culture and psychology studies did not avoid such a divide and two disciplines have emerged – *cross-cultural* and *cultural psychologies*.

The emergence of cross-cultural psychology

Partially, in response to the a-cultural crisis in psychology, a new sub-discipline started emerging organizationally: first, the *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* was formed in 1970 and second, the *International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology* emerged in 1972. The practitioners of this new discipline, which they labelled *cross-cultural psychology*, have continued the traditions of mainstream experimental psychology (mainly social psychology). Still, they decided to include culture and cross-cultural comparisons into their agenda. Their goal has been to enquire about people's psychological functioning in different cultures. Psychologists from North America and several European countries were the founders of this discipline, including **Harry C. Triandis** (United States), **John W. Berry** (Canada), **Walter J. Lonner** (United States), **Marshall H. Segall** (United States), **Pierre R. Dasen** (Switzerland), and **Ype H. Poortinga** (the Netherlands).

The starting point of the CCP approach to culture and psychology has been the thesis that, by using the experimental methodology, Western psychologists have built

a body of knowledge in social, developmental, cognitive, and personality psychology that they believe reflects the universal (or near-universal) laws of human psychological functioning. The knowledge that has been developed in the purity of the laboratories and has not been contaminated by situational (contextual, including cultural) factors is considered to be the core knowledge about the psychological processes and states of any human being. These are the works on obedience, attributions, and self-concepts in social psychology; invariant personality-trait structures, like the Big Five, in personality psychology; various theories of human development; cognitive universals related to perceptions and thinking, and many others. This assumption lays the basis for a psychological universalist approach to studying psychological processes across cultures. This is how the founders of the CCP approach explained this approach:

> [It is] the assumption that basic psychological processes are common to all members of the species (that is, they constitute a set of psychological givens in all human beings) and that culture influences the development and display of psychological characteristics (that is, culture plays different variations on those underlying themes).
>
> (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dazen, 1992, p. 5)

That is why the goals of CCP include investigating psychological universals and variations of psychological states and processes across different cultural communities and differentiating the universal and culture-dependent components of human psychological functioning on an empirical basis. The ultimate goal of these investigations is to "generate … nearly universal psychology, one that has pan-human validity" (Segall et al., 1998, p. 1102).

Box 3.1 Definition and explanation. A definition of cross-cultural psychology

"Cross-cultural psychology is the study: of similarities and differences in individual psychological functioning in various cultural and ethnocultural groups; of the relationships between psychological variables and socio-cultural, ecological and biological variables; and ongoing changes in these variables" (Berry et al., 1992, p. 3).

Understanding of culture

Cross-cultural psychologists have a convoluted relationship with the concept of culture. On the one hand, it is the central concept of this discipline, and they fully appreciate its importance for psychology. On the other hand, these scholars emphasize its complexity, vagueness, and difficulty for empirical investigation, and because of this, they debate abandoning it altogether or replacing it with other more definite

constructs and variables (Poortinga, 2015). Due to this complexity, when it comes to empirical research, cross-cultural psychologists are determined either to abandon the concept of culture or replace it with various proxies, such as countries/nations, ethnic/racial self-identification, sets of cultural dimensions, or several eco-social variables.

"In this comparative mode (in cross-cultural psychological research), culture is treated as comprising a set of independent or contextual variables affecting (causality language) various aspects of individual behaviour (Lonner & Adamopoulos, 1997; Segall, 1984). Cross-cultural research typically seeks evidence of such effects (Segall et al., 1998, p. 1102)."

An example of the application of such thinking is the dimensional approach to culture executed by Dutch cross-cultural organizational psychologist **Geert Hofstede**. He conducted a factor analysis of job attitude surveys conducted by IBM in nearly 70 countries. From this analysis, he first extracted four dimensions of cultures (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005). These dimensions include *individualism-collectivism*, *power distance*, *masculinity-femininity*, and *uncertainty avoidance* (see Example 2 at the end of the chapter). Later, based on research in Hong Kong, Hofstede added a fifth dimension of *long-term* versus *short-term orientation*. According to Hofstede's theory, each national culture can be represented by a five-dimension profile, with each dimension represented by a number. Such enumeration of cultures allowed psychologists to correlate these dimensions with political, economic, health, psychological, and other outcome variables (see review in Minkov (2013)). These correlations depicted the relations between culture and psychology. The cultural dimensions theory has become so popular among social and behavioural scholars that many consider it one of the major contributions of CCP to social scientific knowledge and theorizing about cultures. This theory perfectly represents the *culture-as-a-combination-of-variables* approach and many cross-cultural psychologists have embraced it.

The inevitable consequence of such an interpretation of culture is its *reification*. As you will recall from the previous chapter, reification means that culture is separated in its functioning from the ongoing interactions of the members of a cultural community and is considered a relatively independent factor that influences human behaviour. Cross-cultural conceptualization of culture as a set of independent variables has allowed cross-cultural psychologists to reify culture by assigning dimensions and then statistically associating them with psychological states and processes. Interacting human beings are excluded from these equations.

Conducting research in cross-cultural psychology

The above considerations about psychological functioning lead directly to cross-cultural psychologists' main methodological tools: a variable-based analysis of sociocultural and psychological states and processes on the individual and country levels, a comparative approach, and the intensive utilization of quantification and statistical analysis.

"Because CCP is descended from modern, scientific, and general psychology, it is part of an intellectual tradition, rooted in Europe but developed mainly in America, that was a reaction to an earlier European tradition of political and social philosophy. Rejecting this as 'soft,' the late 19th-century founders of psychology followed the Wundtian laboratory tradition and adopted the controlled experiment as the *sine qua non* (something that is absolutely needed) of scientific research (Segall et al., 1998 p. 1106)."

CCP continues the social and behavioural sciences tradition that every sociocultural and psychological phenomenon can and should be studied based on the natural sciences methodology, mostly by applying experiments and various forms of measurements and quantifications. This tradition requires standardized assessments and measurements of psychological states and processes to make valid cross-cultural conclusions about their universality or cultural specificity in different cultural communities. Thus, the goals of CCP are to investigate how the universal psychological mechanisms develop, work, and manifest themselves in diverse cultural communities and to discover universal and culture-specific aspects of resolving various adaptation problems that emerge in different communities.

Box 3.2 Case study: An example of an application of the experimental methodology to study lower mental processes cross-culturally

The first of this kind, now considered to be a classic, is the cross-cultural investigation of the sensory and perceptual process of Aboriginal people on the islands of the Torres Strait in British New Guinea. This study was conducted in 1895 by British psychologist W. H. R. Rivers and his students, who later became well-known psychologists, C. S. Myers and W. McDougal. These psychologists were members of a multidisciplinary team of researchers from Cambridge University who wanted to study the differences between so-called civilized and non-civilized people (Ray & Haddon, 1901). At that time, there were many unjustified and frequently racist assumptions about these differences based on the ethnocentric European view that the white civilized race was superior to uncivilized races. Among these prejudices were some related to psychology: that primitive people have a higher acuteness of senses, that they are more prone to different illusions, and that they are very simplistic and primal in their thinking and cognitions, among others. These scholars decided to test these assumptions using the newly emerging experimental psychology methods. Rivers studied visual acuity, colour vision, and visual-spatial perception; Myers studied auditory acuity, smell, and taste; and McDougal studied tactile sensitivity, weight discrimination, and the size-weight illusion (Cole, 1996, p. 41). (Note that these sensory functions belong to the lower-level mental processes by Wundt and are appropriate for experimental investigation.) To do

their examinations, these researchers brought with them many sophisticated devices and experimental techniques designed to investigate these sensory systems, and they strictly followed the requirements of experimental laboratory methodology. Their results, which are still valuable nowadays, indicated that the expected cross-cultural differences in sensory processes were exaggerated; these results also provided substantial evidence to the future thesis of 'the psychic unity of mankind' (see Chapter 1).

> Rivers reports that in addition to an impoverished color vocabulary, his subjects displayed somewhat diminished sensitivity to the color blue, and were less susceptible than European subjects to certain visual illusions. ... McDougal found that the Torres Straits natives could detect a gap between two points roughly half the size of that reported for three different European samples [this means the higher tactile sensitivity of the native people VC]. He also found that the Torres Island natives had a lower threshold for detecting the difference between two weights. Myers, however, found that auditory sensitivity was somewhat greater for European samples while there was no apparent difference in sensitivity to odors.
>
> (Cole, 1996, p. 43)

Comments: Despite some methodological criticism, these studies may be considered as examples of appropriately applying the standardized experimental methodology for cross-cultural research. This methodology addressed several psychophysiological sensory processes that are not strongly influenced by the sociosymbolic environments of the participants. It is obvious that these processes are universal across the human species and that they have innate physiological mechanisms that develop based on genetic programming and interactions with a physical environment, where people receive adequate visual, auditory, and tactile stimulations. In this case, the application of this naturalistic methodology to study the cross-cultural variance of sensory processes is considered adequate.

An example of a cross-cultural study of higher mental functions

A more controversial set of cross-cultural studies is the research of human intelligence or IQ testing (Cole, 1996). The issue of intelligence testing emerged initially in France at the beginning of the 20th century as a response to the problem of students' frequent failures in public schools. Two psychologists, **Alfred Binet** (1857–1911) and his student **Théodore Simon** (1873–1961), were asked to find a way to identify slow-learning children at an early stage of their education. These researchers created a standardized set of tasks that resembled school-like activities for each year of education and applied it to pupils.

Based on students' performance on these tasks, researchers determined a child's *mental age*, which is recognized by the highest level of tasks they performed successfully. Then, psychologists compared a child's mental age with their chronological age. The IQ of a student (or their ability for successful school education) was calculated as follows: IQ = Mental Age/Chronological Age × 100%. The emergence of the *Binet-Simone Intelligence Scales*, its various modifications (such as *The Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scales*, developed by American psychologist **Lewis Terman** (1877–1956), and other intelligence tests (for example, the *Wechsler Intelligence Scales* for children and adults) initiated a flow of cross-cultural research based on the application of these scales to participants from different racial and ethnic backgrounds.

This set of research has been one of the most controversial pages in the history of CCP. Started as a standardized study of children's intellectual performance in the specific sociocultural environment of the French public schools, these studies were quickly reformulated as investigations of people's innate universal intellectual capacity, which is relatively independent of the influence of the sociosymbolic contexts of their development. Thus, human intelligence, which was later recognized as the higher mental capacity of any human being, which is contingent in its content and mechanisms on the sociocultural environment and types of early cognitive training and schooling, was treated at that time as an innate, relatively stable, culture-free set of cognitive dispositions that is universal in their content, processes, and manifestations. Because of this 'universalization' of intelligence, it was justified that a standard set of psychometric procedures can measure intelligence and that these procedures can be uniformly applied to participants from different cultures. Based on these cross-cultural studies, an intellectual hierarchy of races was developed, with white people being at the top of it. (Now Asians replace them in this hierarchy.) Scholars who interpreted IQ as a culture-contingent ability argued that the standardized experimental methodology was inappropriate in this case and that an analysis of culture-appropriate intellectual tasks and activities is required before any meaningful testing and comparisons can be executed (Greenfield, 1997).

Comments: This is an example where one of the higher mental capacities, which require a culture-sensitive investigation of its nature, was interpreted as one of the innate and biologically based capabilities for which the standardized naturalistic methodology was appropriate. Because of this controversy regarding the nature of the phenomenon of intelligence and the proper methods for its investigation, a controversy that has not yet been resolved, cross-cultural intelligence testing remains one of the most contentious topics in modern psychology.

The assumptions presented above directly affect how cross-cultural psychologists conduct their research. Let me remind you that the ultimate goals of any CCP investigation are (a) to test psychological regularities discovered by Western psychologists in other cultures, (b) to explore the universal and culture-specific aspects of these regularities in other sociocultural settings, and (c) to integrate this newly discovered knowledge with the previous one to ultimately develop the universal theory of psychological functioning that will apply to all representatives of the human species (Berry et al., 1992; Segall et al., 1998). Before we proceed to the main steps of cross-cultural research, it is essential to talk about *etic* and *emic* approaches in studying culture.

Etic versus emic approach and the researcher's positions

Etic, *emic*, and the *researcher's positions/stances* are central to investigating culture and psychology. Linguistic anthropologist Kenneth Pike (1967) introduced the first two concepts, which were coined by analogy with the linguistic terms phone*tics* and phone*mics*. Pike used *etic* and *emic* terms to designate the researcher's stances or viewpoints on objects of their investigation. He defined them the following way, "The etic viewpoint studies behaviour as from outside of a particular system, and as an essential initial approach to an alien system. The emic viewpoint results from studying behaviour as from inside the system." (p. 37). This distinction between the *etic* or *outsider* and *emic* or *insider* positions of researchers towards their objects of investigation is a significant methodological consideration regarding culture and psychology research. According to Pike, the etic approach, accompanied by the outsider position of a researcher, has the following features. First, units of analysis (segments of behaviour, personality traits, language idioms, etc.) are assigned *a priory*, meaning that they are designated before the study. Second, researchers use the study design they bring from the 'outside' the system they want to study. Third, etic researchers apply absolute or universal criteria to evaluate cultural communities and the investigation units. Fourth, units of analysis are not required to be considered part of a larger system of meanings and practices. Finally, the etic approach is considered to be the first step in studying people in different cultural communities.

The emic approach, together with the insider position of a researcher, is different from the etic one. 'Insider' researchers plan all elements of their research – units of analysis, design, and analysis – based on the criteria and considerations that are 'internal' to the community being investigated. Emic researchers apply relative criteria that stem from inside the community to evaluate the components and results of the study. All units of investigation are considered parts of a larger sociocultural system and must be discovered by scholars. Lastly, etic research is believed to provide a deep and thorough analysis of the units and communities. Cross-cultural

psychologists execute the etic approach in their research and usually hold the outsider position to their objects of investigation.

The main steps of a cross-cultural study

To achieve their goals, CCP researchers typically go through the following steps.

1 A researcher selects one or several psychological processes that they want to compare across cultures and wants to establish their relations with other variables. They may choose such processes as obedience, intelligence, causal attribution, self-concept, various emotional or motivational states, different forms of cognition, or developmental processes. These processes, their labels, the understanding of their nature and constituents, and instruments for assessment are usually taken from Western psychological research under the assumption that these processes in their Western interpretations constitute a part of the 'universal human psychological make-up' and are legitimate for cross-cultural comparison.
2 A researcher selects the psychological instruments – tests, scales, and personality questionnaires – that they will use to measure these processes and translate them into the language(s) of the communities where they will conduct the study. The primary task of any cross-cultural comparative research is to translate the original questionnaires or tests into a target cultural community's language and establish the comparability of these two versions of the questionnaire or test. The primary challenge of this translation procedure is to solve one of the fundamental problems of any CCP research, the problem of the *equivalence* of the psychological phenomena under investigation.

   Let's consider an example. A researcher wants to compare levels of depression in samples of Canadian and Russian students. (My colleagues and I conducted several similar studies comparing Canadian and Russian students on different variables.) They have a standard English-language depression inventory and must translate it into Russian to proceed with this investigation. First, researchers must ensure that the idea of *depression*, the way it is formulated and understood in Canada, exists similarly in Russia. For many centuries, Russians talked about *toska* or *deep melancholy* as the closest equivalent to Western depression. In modern times, Russians have accepted this notion of depression and doctors and the public successfully use it. This cross-cultural analysis of the phenomenon under investigation aims to establish *construct equivalence*. The cross-cultural analysis of construct equivalence seeks to ensure that the phenomenon of interest is identified in both cultural groups and understood similarly. If such equivalence is not established, researchers cannot conduct cross-cultural comparisons. Simply put, apples should be compared with apples, not with oranges.

When cultural equivalence of a construct is established, it is crucial to ensure the *linguistic equivalence* of the questionnaire. For example, in an English depression inventory, there may be expressions such as 'feeling blue' or 'feeling down,' which, if translated into Russian, may not indicate the same emotional state in that country. Therefore, researchers must find linguistic expressions in Russian that convey the same feelings of being sad and feeling inferior. Establishing linguistic equivalence requires a psychologist to collaborate with specialists in Russian culture and the Russian language. When testing for linguistic equivalence, researchers may implement *forward-and-back translation* approach. In doing this, a depression questionnaire is first translated from English to Russian, then back from Russian to English. These translations are conducted by bilingual researchers or with the help of professional interpreters. Discrepancies between the original and translated versions of the questionnaire are resolved by discussing them among bilingual psychologists and experts in both languages.

Finally, when the questionnaires in both languages are developed, the researcher needs to determine their psychometric qualities as measurement instruments are comparable. For example, the investigator may want to ensure that similar items equivalently correlate with each other, and the same factors are extracted from each questionnaire through a statistical procedure of factor analysis. This statistical investigation is called establishing *measurement invariance* or *measurement equivalence* and is an integral part of any cross-cultural investigation (van de Vijver & Leung, 2011). If the invariance is not verified, researchers must implement appropriate corrections to the scales or the design of the study. If the invariance is confirmed (or if it has not been tested and only assumed), researchers compare the mean differences of the measured psychological variables and conduct various forms of statistical analysis to make conclusions about cross-cultural similarities and differences between studied psychological states and processes.

3 In the subsequent step, researchers select one or more cultural groups among which they want to provide comparisons. This selection can be based on various reasons. One of the most frequent is a difference between the original and target cultures along with one or several cultural dimensions, such as individualism versus collectivism or large or small power distance (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2005; Triandis, 1995). In this case, researchers want to investigate the relationship between these cultural dimensions and psychological variables (see Example 2 at the end of the chapter). Often, researchers come from one of the cultures of comparison and have access to the participant pools there, which may guide their choice of countries. The important note here is that cross-cultural psychologists rarely conduct a cultural analysis of the communities they decide to compare. To extract the cultural aspects, they are interested in studying, psychologists often rely on the existing international databases about countries' cultural dimensions,

such as the World Values Survey (www.worldvaluessurvey.org), European Social Survey, or Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions. Recall one of the features of the etic approach, which is when researchers bring the units of analysis and plan for their study from outside of the community to be studied. The ultimate goal of using these dimensions is to represent cultures by a set of measurable and quantifiable variables that can be statistically analysed.

It is also important to note that the samples within each country are typically selected not by probability sampling procedures but through convenience sampling (Boehnke, et al., 2011). Because of this, these samples do not statistically represent the population of the corresponding communities. As a result, generalizations to the whole population cannot be made. For example, a researcher may study samples of students from Japan and the United States. These samples are often arranged by the participant pool system in the United States and convenience sampling in Japan. When researchers start the data analysis and derive a conclusion about cross-cultural differences, they often say, "American students behave or think this way, whereas Japanese students think and act differently." Thus, they generalize from their convenience and non-representative samples to the student populations of the participating countries. According to the rules of inferential statistics, such generalizations from this type of samples are unfounded.

4 Different forms of statistical analysis follow the collection of data. These forms included multiple regression analysis, factor analysis, path analysis, structural equation modelling, or hierarchical linear analysis. The application of these forms of analysis depends on the research questions (van de Vijver and Leung, 1997).

5 Based on the similarities and differences of the studied psychological processes across samples, researchers conclude and theorize about the universal and culture-specific aspects of the studied psychological processes.

Critique of cross-cultural psychology

Several authors provided critical reflections on the practice of CCP, and I summarize some of their arguments as follows (Boesch, 1996; Chirkov, 2009, 2016; Gergen et al., 1996; Moghaddam & Studer, 1997; Shweder, 1991).

CCP continues the tradition of mainstream psychology, assuming that every psychological phenomenon can and should be studied using the natural sciences methodology by applying various standardized instruments and experiments to ensure the quantification of cultural and psychological variables. As we discussed earlier, this assumption violates one of the most important rules of the philosophy of science, which is that the way a phenomenon is studied has to be justified by the nature of this phenomenon. Cross-cultural research focuses on the relations of sociocultural phenomena with various psychological processes and states. This means that cross-cultural psychologists enquire into the phenomena constituted by

intentional and intersubjective realities, mediated by symbolic forms of communication and executed by agentic and reflective human beings. However, for the most part, they use a methodology that applies only to physical or biological realities that do not have all these qualities. Saying it differently, cross-cultural researchers apply the natural science methodology to the phenomena that belong to Wundt's 'second discipline of psychology.' This discrepancy between the nature of the culture and how it is studied is the biggest weakness of cross-cultural psychological research.

Cross-cultural psychologists implicitly or explicitly assume the *universality* of the psychological phenomena discovered in Western psychology and impose this understanding on the psychological processes developed in other cultural communities. Again, recall another feature of the etic approach, when outsider researchers bring universal criteria to evaluate phenomena that belong to different communities. They presume that, for example, 'depression,' 'jealousy,' and 'intelligence' exist in many other cultures and have the same or similar nature. As a reaction to this weakness, numerous indigenous psychologies, the psychologies rooted in the cultural traditions of non-Western communities, have emerged. (We discuss these psychologies later in this chapter.)

Cross-cultural psychologists typically utilize the etic approach in their studies and examine cultural communities from an 'outsider' position, which is inevitably accompanied by some level of reification of cultures. They do not usually incorporate emic thinking and do not 'dive' into the cultural communities they want to study. They make few attempts to understand people's experiences and behaviours from 'within' their particular culture.

Thus, CCP studies could be labelled *a-cultural*, meaning that Culture as the collectively intentional and intersubjective reality of communities is not the object of their investigation. Cultures are usually represented by the nationality or ethnicity of participants or by a set of standards 'cultural dimensions' such as individualism and collectivism.

The strong emphasis on the equivalence of the constructs and the standardization of the measures lead to a forceful imposition of the meanings and operationalizations of psychological processes that researchers developed in one cultural community on the representatives of different cultural communities. Going back to the example of the cross-cultural study of depression in Canada and Russia, although researchers worked vigorously to establish all forms of equivalence, they still developed a Russian language version of the Western-type depression inventory. This is understandable as, to make meaningful comparisons, investigators must have standard measures that are equivalent across samples. What if a cultural group has a unique understanding of symptoms related to sadness, loss of interest in everyday activities, loss of sleep, and excessive fatigue? What if they understand, conceptualize, and explain them differently from the Western researchers? Will the Western-based questionnaire capture all the nuances of that culture-specific affective disorder? In China, for example, health care specialists use the concept of 'neurasthenia' to designate some of the symptoms of Western

'depression.' Thus, for many Chinese, asking them about depression may not make sense, whereas talking about 'neurasthenia' – will. Cultural psychologists and medical anthropologists seriously question the striving for cross-cultural equivalence and approach comparative studies from their unique emic perspective. (See a description of a clash between etic and emic thinking in studying depression cross-culturally in Boesch (1996).) As a result of this standardization and the establishment of equivalence, cross-cultural researchers ignore the distinctive cultural interpretations and the culturally diverse forms of manifestations of the psychological phenomena under investigation.

As mentioned earlier, the ultimate goal of CCP is to develop universal or panhuman psychology. This goal requires a representative probability sampling of participants to make appropriate generalizations possible. Cross-cultural psychologists rarely do this type of sampling (Boehnke et al., 2011).

Many cross-cultural studies have resulted in calculating statistical generalizations among variables. These generalizations do not address the mechanisms of interactions between cultures and the human psyche, which, according to the opinions of many scholars, should constitute the goal of cultural psychological studies. These statistical regularities provide little or no opportunity for theorizing about the nature of human psychological functioning, cultural reality, and their interactions.

As a reaction to these problems and weaknesses of cross-cultural studies, another discipline emerged – *cultural psychology*.

What is cultural psychology?

CP is a discipline that scholars have developed as a response to the criticism of mainstream cross-cultural research. It was initiated by psychologists and psychological and cultural anthropologists who wanted to include culture and sociosymbolic environments as an organic part of psychological research across cultural communities. The following scholars stand at the foundation of this new discipline in the second half of the 20th century: **Jerome Bruner**, **Michael Cole**, **Patricia Greenfield**, **Hazel Markus**, **Richard Nisbett**, **Richard Shweder**, **Jaan Valsiner**, and many others.

Box 3.3 Definition and explanation. A definition of cultural psychology

"Cultural psychology is the study of the way cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche, resulting less in psychic unity of humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion. Cultural psychology is the study of the way subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, person and context, figure and ground, practitioner and practice, live together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other up" (Shweder, 1991, p. 73).

As you may see from this definition, CP constitutes the 'second discipline' of psychology (by Wundt), which deals with the intentional, symbolic, and linguistic manifestations of human functioning that are inseparable from the sociocultural environments where they have emerged. It emphasizes the intentional nature of sociocultural contexts and their role in constituting and regulating people's experiences and behaviours. CP is based on the fundamental assumption that the sociocultural worlds and human psychological functioning are mutually constitutive, meaning that they cannot be understood and studied separately.

Understanding of culture is the first point where cultural psychologists remain faithful to the definition of their discipline and deviate from their cross-cultural colleagues. Cultural anthropologist/psychologist Richard Shweder (1991) was one of the first social scientists who brought the concepts of *intentionality* (*intentional things*, *intentional worlds*, and *intentional states*) into culture and psychology research and who defined the concept of culture through its application. By using this term, he built a bridge between 'cultural' and 'psychological' (see Chapter 1).

The cultural psychological understanding of culture inevitably brings to light the complex nature of human interactions with their sociocultural worlds. On the one hand, people share and execute the practices and meanings that they learn and internalize in their communities and use them to guide and regulate their lives. On the other hand, cultures exist only because members of cultural communities intend, share, and execute those practices and meanings rooted in corresponding intentional states. But even more, because of the agency people acquire in their lives, they can make changes to their cultural worlds. Through these changes, they can change themselves. Such an understanding of psychological functioning makes the cultural psychological approach more advanced than the cross-cultural psychological approach in understanding how culture and the human psyche constitute and change each other. Besides, it has a high humanistic potential to help people deal with their social and cultural problems.

Box 3.4 Case study

American psychological anthropologist Kathleen Barlow (2010) investigated food sharing between mothers and their children in a Murik community in Papua New Guinea, reporting her results in the article *Sharing Food, Sharing Values: Mothering and Empathy in Murik Society*. The researcher used the theory of cultural models to guide her research and wanted to investigate the deeper layers of mothering in this community through food-sharing practices. In this society, mothering and feeding symbolically are the same. Mothers transmit cultural models of parenting and communal living to their children and socialize them into the community through feeding practices and practices of sharing food. The research was conducted using ethnography, mostly participant observation

and interviews. The researcher wrote field notes while living in this community and then interpreted her data to understand the system of cultural models (she called them 'cultural schemas') that guide the social life of Murik society and the role that food sharing plays in raising children to become mature and full-fledged members of that society.

A comparison of cultural and cross-cultural psychologies

If cross-cultural psychologists conduct their research with the assumption of the universality and relative independence of people's psychological make-up from their cultural environments, the CP's main assumption is that psychologists cannot understand the essential characteristics of human psychology without analysing the contexts where these processes emerged and the practical activities which these processes serve. Saying it differently, CP places "an emphasis on the context-dependent and activity-dependent nature of psychological processes" (Cole, 1996, p. 330). Therefore, it highlights the cultural relativity of people's psychology.

The cultural psychological treatment of the universality/relativity problem

How do cultural psychologists deal with the problem of the universality and cultural specificity of the psychological make-up of people? Shweder (2000) proposed an answer to this question. He suggested differentiating the *universal human mind* from the *multiplicities of cultural mentalities*. The term *mind* refers to humans' universal brain-determined and mind-related cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms constituting humans' universal biological, physiological, and psychological propensities. This is the set of universal capacities that makes all human beings' members of the same species, *Homo sapiens*. According to Shweder, the term *mentality* refers to the mental composition of people's minds in particular cultural communities. These mentalities include people's thinking about and cognizing the world, culture-specific emotions and motivations, and culturally unique personality proclivities. Mentalities are formed by adjusting the universal mind to particular sociocultural environments or, saying it differently, by moulding it into distinct mentalities through learning and internalizing communal cultural models. The human mind is the same everywhere, but each community creates its specific mentality of its members. Hence, there is the Canadian mentality, Aboriginal mentality, Chinese mentality, Soviet mentality, and so on.

This distinction between the mind and mentalities finds support in modern theorizing about the structure of the human brain and the mechanisms it produces to regulate psychological processes. One of the world's leading neuroscientists, Jaak Panksepp, and his colleagues (2000), argued that to solve the numerous adaptive problems that emerge in the species-specific human environment, evolution "was based upon the

rapid expansion of general-purpose cortico-computational space (which permitted the emergence of foresight, hindsight and language), rather than on any fine-grained moulding of special-purpose socio-affective mechanisms" (p. 113). This hypothesis denies that specific innate cognitive adaptations developed, each aimed at solving a specific evolutionary problem, as evolutionary psychologists have hypothesized (Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). (We will discuss these hypotheses in Chapter 4.) Conversely, it proposes a 'general-purpose cortico-computational space' that interacts with sociocultural contexts and produces highly specific cortical mechanisms that allow people to adapt and survive in their sociocultural environments. Saying it differently, while CCP assumes that the human mind is pre-equipped by a universal psychological toolset of genetically predetermined psychological processes, Panksepp and his colleagues suggest that the mind has general-purpose brain capabilities (the universal human mind) that produce specific psychological mechanisms only if they interact with social and cultural contexts. Humans' culture-specific mentalities are the products of the interactions of their massive and generalized intellectual abilities with sociosymbolic environments. If we accept this hypothesis, it becomes clear that human mentalities cannot evolve without culture, and the universal human mind will remain a collection of possibilities without any opportunity to create culturally diverse human beings.

Using the emic instead of the etic approach

Another way cultural psychological research distinguishes itself from cross-cultural research is that it exercises the emic approach by looking at the behaviours and experiences of people from 'within' their culture. CCP, as you remember, implements the etic approach; accordingly, researchers study cultural communities from the 'outside.' By using this tactic, cross-cultural psychologists impose their frameworks about human psychology on these communities as they try to find a fit between these 'imposed' frameworks and people's behaviours and experiences. These imposed frameworks may be alien to these communities, or they may have little or no meaning to them. The 'within' position offers the opportunity to grasp the psychological phenomena in their authentic cultural manifestations and to study them as they unfold in their natural sociosymbolic environments. In the example above, Barlow had no preexisting conceptions or hypotheses about food sharing in Murik society. She entered the field with an open mind to discover the systems of meaning around mothering and food in this community. She exercised *outsider-to-insider position* because she, as an American researcher, is alien to these people, but she made every possible effort to understand them and to look at their lives from the 'insider' stance.

Denial of the naturalistic methodology

Another distinction of cultural psychological studies is that in this discipline, researchers do not use the term 'variables' and are not striving to quantify and measure the

phenomena they plan to address. They conduct various forms of fieldwork, including ethnography, participant observations, sociohistorical analysis, interviews, archival data analysis, and many other methods commonly called qualitative ones. They rarely use statistics and usually present their results in narrative form. Because of this, many cross-cultural psychologists believe that these ethnographic studies are less 'scientific' than their quantitative and statistically sophisticated reports.

Main steps of a cultural psychological study

A cultural psychological study starts with a cultural analysis of the community that psychologists want to investigate. This means that they unpack the main cultural models with all their components: systems of knowledge about the world, other people, and individuals; basic values and moral principles of behaviour; a set of social practices that runs the everyday lives of its members; rules of conduct for these practices; and sanctions for violating these principles and rules. Researchers may focus on a particular domain of people's lives: family life and parenting, schooling, health care, relations with authorities, mating, or any other areas that constitute people's everyday lives. Psychologists may study the history of the emergence of these models, thus providing a cultural-historical analysis of the targeted community.

Such an analysis starts by analysing the literature about this community, its history, ethnography, ecology, and other relevant aspects. To complement this literature analysis, researchers may live in this community for a while, observing and talking to people.

Box 3.5 Case study: An example of a cultural psychological study conducted 'at distance'

A classic work of this type was conducted by **Ruth Benedict** (1887–1947), a renowned American anthropologist. After World War II (WWII), the American government asked her to prepare an ethno-psychological portrait of Japanese people. The Office of War Information wanted to understand and predict the behaviour of the Japanese after the war and during the occupation. Benedict never visited Japan to do this project. She conducted so-called 'anthropology at distance' by studying corresponding literature, newspapers, and films and interviewed Japanese-Americans. The results of this work were published in her book *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* (Benedict, 1946/1974). Although criticized by some anthropologists, this book is highly popular nowadays; more importantly, it influenced Japanese self-understanding (translated into Japanese in 1948) and later became highly acclaimed in China and Taiwan, especially during times of tension with the Japanese government.

After analysing cultural communities, psychologists focus on their area(s) of interest, particular psychological phenomena, and their sociocultural constitution and regulation. Consider the notion of 'face' in Chinese society. Suppose psychologists want to understand the motivation and regulation of the academic behaviour of Chinese students. In that case, they must explore the cultural models related to the moral regulation of social actions, discover the concept of 'face' and understand its meaning and relevance to social actions by reading the literature, talking to Chinese people, and observing their behaviour under various conditions of 'face' threat or support. Only after doing such an investigation, they focus on the behaviour of Chinese students and the motivation for their academic achievement in their country and abroad. At this stage, they must explore how students internalize the concept of face and its role in regulating their academic behaviour. Subsequently, psychologists may continue doing their naturalistic observations and applying some psychological instruments if they meet the criteria of the emic approach. However, their primary method remains to interview these students about their experience of losing and acquiring face during their studies.

Thus, cultural psychologists focus on analysing the intentional phenomena in the lives of their participants ('face' is an example of such a phenomenon). These intentional things exist and exert their causal power only if the community members internalize them and make them the regulators of their actions. Thus, the unit of analysis in CP is not an individual psyche per se, and it is not culture as it is, but the unit is the intentional things as they are presented in the cultural models and, consequently, how they are represented in the minds of their members. This is an example of a *monocultural study* in CP, meaning that an investigation of a mutual constitution of the psyche and sociosymbolic worlds are conducted within one cultural community.

Psychologists may instead compare different intentional worlds and their formatting role in shaping the different mentalities of their members, thus conducting *comparative* cultural psychological research. For example, Shweder and colleagues (Shweder, Jensen, & Goldstein, 1995) conducted a comparative study of the moral principles of Indian and American families regarding various sleeping arrangements of their family members. By doing this, he and his team were able to inquire into the moral codes of life of these two cultural communities. (See Example 5 at the end of the chapter for more details.)

Understanding and interpretation in cultural psychological research

How do cultural psychologist think of doing their research? The main intellectual analytical tools to achieve these goals are *interpretation* and *understanding*. In CCP research, if psychologists rely on statistical analysis to come to conclusions

about the universality or specificity of psychological phenomena, the cultural psychological approach leaves no space for statistics. There are no statistical techniques to make penetration into the intentional worlds of others possible. Cultural psychologists have to rely on their knowledge, intuition, imagination, and analytical thinking skills to get inside the intentional worlds of their participants and their communities and to come up with interpretations of these worlds and these people's mentalities. As analytical tools, interpretation and understanding are applicable only to symbolic intentional objects. If researchers are interested, for example, in the economic behaviour of Canadians, they need to study the meaning of money (which is a symbolic and intentional thing) for Canadians and their typical practices of earning and spending it. Subsequently, the researcher must investigate what particular people (students, farmers, middle-class urban professionals, etc.) think about these issues and how strongly they internalize these meanings. Ultimately, researchers must understand (get inside) the intentional world of Canadian consumers' behaviour. *Interpretation* is the process of grasping the meaning of symbolic intentional worlds and *understanding* occurs as the result of interpretation. Because these two processes are intimately connected, some researchers suggest using *interpretive understanding* (Schwandt, 2007). Interpretation is not a fantasy where 'everything goes'; it subsumes to the laws of logic, is rooted in the collected data, corresponds to other existing interpretations and theories, and has to make sense to other researchers and the members of the community the researcher is investigating. The interpretations are fallible (capable of being wrong). Still, they must correspond to the reality of the intentional world and address a research problem of a scientific project. Those who are critical of a researcher's interpretation may go back to the initial sources of information or collect their own data and reinterpret them. Based on these arguments, CP is classified as an *interpretative science*.

This interpretative nature of CP constitutes the main point of its critique by cross-cultural psychologists. They blame it for its inability to establish causal relations between cultural and psychological variables, argue that it does not operate in the scientific mode and that, ultimately, it is not scientific enough. They contend that CP should be used as a preliminary description of a cultural phenomenon before applying more rigorous and precise psychological measurements and experiments.

This critique is pretty easy to sort out if we go back to the distinction between the two disciplines in psychology: One applies the naturalistic methodology to psychological and related sociosymbolic phenomena, while the other searches for the co-construction of human mentalities and their sociocultural environments and is in principle different from any natural science. As you may

remember, CCP continues the traditions of the first discipline of psychology and strives to be naturalistic in studying sociosymbolic psychological events. It applies this methodology to studying all manifestations of the human mind as well as people's mentalities and their intentional worlds. CP belongs to the second discipline, and the naturalist methodology does not apply to it. It is a different science that utilizes a different methodology: instead of experiments, it uses participant observations and ethnography; instead of standardized scales and tests, it uses interviews and analyses artefacts; and instead of statistical analysis, it uses interpretation and understanding as analytical tools to reach their implications and conclusions.

CP is still not immune from the critique that applies to other interpretative sciences, interpretative anthropology and sociology. Critics question whether it is possible to 'read others' minds' (which means getting into the intentional worlds of cultural communities and understanding the mentalities of their people) objectively and scientifically. The concern is: Aren't the products of the interpretative sciences too subjective, producing no hardcore evidence and criteria for their truthfulness and validity? This is a fundamental problem of all interpretative sciences and cultural psychology, too.

Indigenous psychology as a form of cultural psychology

Indigenous psychology (IP) is a form of CP that deals with specific – indigenous – cultural communities: Aboriginal, Chinese, Indian, or African (Kim and Berry, 1993). As we have already discussed, CCP emerged as a response of Western psychologists to address the call for more culture-sensitive psychology, a call to take the psychological knowledge from the laboratories and test it against the realities of various cultural communities. However, CCP remains the same Western psychology that is imported to other places in the world. But what about the cultural communities where these Western cross-cultural psychologists are trying to apply their knowledge? Do these communities have their indigenous psychological ideas and knowledge? Do these communities have their ideas about the human mind, consciousness, human development, cognition, emotions, and all other manifestations of people's mentalities? The answer is definitely: Yes, they do have this knowledge. Every community develops a system of categories and propositions about the human psychological world, people's consciousness, selves, feelings, motivations, and thoughts – almost everything that constitutes the world of experience and behaviour. This system of knowledge is labelled *Indigenous* (growing, living, or occurring natively or naturally in a particular region https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/indigenous) psychology.

Box 3.6 'In Focus' feature. Motivation in Indian indigenous psychology

This is how an Indian indigenous psychologist Adhikari Dash (2008) summarizes the Indian understanding of motivation:

> Indian psychology considers that motives are inherent in the basic nature and the physical composition of the individual organism. It is recognized that human actions, like animal actions, are based on physiological needs arising from the *guṇas* of *prakṛti* (major operating principles of universal nature). Actions should be undertaken without any expectation of its fruits or attachments to the consequences, free from love and hatred and feeling of success or failure. Human actions should be conducive to the well-being of society, *lokasaṃgṛha*. ... The innate or inborn motives are attributed to the recollection of the *saṃskāra* (sub-conscious memory traces) of past lives pleasant or unpleasant experiences. The involuntary actions are based on the vital needs (*prāna*). Voluntary actions are aimed at the attainment of objects which promote well-being and the avoidance of objects which are harmful. Voluntary action must be based on due deliberation. The truly voluntary actions are those which lead to the emancipation of the individual from the inferior desires. It is further pointed out that constant preoccupation with the objects of the senses, constituting the lower self, leads to insatiable craving, which finally results in the clouding of reason and memory and lands people in disaster.
>
> (Adhikari Dash, 2008, p. 346)

Comments: You may see that some aspects of Indians' understanding of motivation are similar to Western ones: a distinction between involuntary and voluntary actions, the identification of physiological/animalistic needs in humans, and sub-conscious motivation. Other ideas are unique to the Indian system of psychological thinking: undertaking actions without concerns for their results and with no attachment to their outcomes, connecting voluntary human actions with the well-being of a society, building voluntary actions on deliberations about various desires and acquiring freedom from these desires. It is evident that Indian thinkers have elaborated upon the original ideas about multiple sources of human actions, their relations to societal well-being and personal freedom and autonomy. This system of thought has created prescriptions for proper motivation, which have been practiced in Indian society for centuries. To understand the motivation of Indians, researchers have to consider the existing cultural systems of knowledge about the psychology of motivation and then investigate the internalized individual motivational systems of Indian people.

Thus, IP can be defined "as a system of psychological thought and practises rooted in a particular cultural tradition" (Enriquez (1990) cited from Yang (2000, p. 245)). Almost every large cultural community has its system of psychological thoughts and practices: Indian (Sinha, 1993), Chinese (Yang, 1999, 2000), Filipino (Enriquez, 1993), Islamic (Haque & Mohamed, 2008), and many others.

The attention to IPs came as a reaction of non-Western cultural communities to the imposed Westernization of psychology. In other words, indigenous psychologists are dissatisfied with the situation when the psychology of culturally diverse communities and the mentalities of their people have been described only in terms and concepts of Western psychology, ignoring the indigenous categories and ideas about human psychology. Chinese-Taiwanese psychologist Kuo-Shu Yang (1997), one of the major proponents of Chinese IP, described his transition from Western-based psychology to indigenous psychology in the following manner:

> I finally found the reason why doing Westernized psychological research with Chinese subjects was no longer satisfying or rewarding to me. When an American psychologist, for example, was engaged in research, he or she could spontaneously let his or her American cultural and philosophical orientations and ways of thinking be freely and effectively reflected in choosing a research question, defining a concept, constructing a theory and designing a method. On the other hand, when a Chinese psychologist in Taiwan was conducting research, his or her strong training by overlearning the knowledge and methodology of American psychology tended to prevent his or her Chinese values, ideas, concepts and ways of thinking from being adequately reflected in the successive stages of the research process. Research of this kind resulted in an Americanized Chinese psychology without a Chinese "soul". Research findings in such an imposed, "soulless psychology" would not do much good in explaining, predicting and understanding Chinese behavior, simply because the imported Westernized concepts, theories, methods and tools habitually adopted by Chinese psychologists could not do justice to the complicated, unique aspects and patterns of Chinese people's psychological and behavioral characteristics.
>
> (Kuo-Shu Yang, 1997, p. 65)

Most indigenous psychologists insist on doing culture and psychology research by going back to the cultural communities where their psychological ideas and insights have been developed. They propose to study the behaviour and experiences of people from these communities through the prism of these indigenous systems of thoughts and ideas. Indigenous psychologists strongly resist the notion that the psychological thinking that is brought on the soil of these communities by Western psychologists represents the universal human psychology. They insist (and many cross-cultural and cultural psychologists agree with them (Gergen et al., 1996)) that Western psychology is another version of IP that has been developed based on the values, scientific

principles, and world outlooks rooted in the Judeo-Christian religious and European-American cultural traditions. Thus, the psychology we study that has emerged from the psychological laboratories in Europe and North America cannot be the basis for universal human psychology. Instead, it should be treated only as one of the many versions of culture-specific indigenous systems of psychological knowledge. Many critics of the universalist approach consider that only the blind ethnocentrism of Euro-American psychologists has driven some of them to think that the way they study, conceptualize, and understand human psychology is actually how all human beings on Earth think and feel about psychology (Harré, Clarke, & De Carlo, 1985).

This description shows that IP and CP are very close in their theoretical premises: to look at local people's mentalities from inside their local communities' cultural models and systems of thought. The difference is that most indigenous psychologists are the nationals of the corresponding countries and related cultural communities. In contrast, cultural psychologists are mostly Western researchers who share the ideas of the emic and culturally relative approach to studying psychological functioning. That is why most indigenous psychologists exercise a pure insider position of researchers compared to the *outsider-to-insider position* utilized by Western cultural psychologists. Similar to the research strategies of CP, an indigenous psychological enquiry can be *monocultural* or *comparative* (Yang, 2000).

"The main purpose of the MCI [**M**ono**C**ultural **I**ndigenous] approach is to study the psychological and behavioral functioning of people in a given culture in order to develop an evolving system of psychological knowledge specific to that culture. For this purpose, the investigators' research activities (including topic selection, conceptual analysis, research design, and theory construction) must be sufficiently congruous with the native people's studied psychological or behavioral elements, structures, mechanisms, or processes as rooted in their ecological, economic, social, cultural, or historical contexts" (pp. 249–250).

Yang further suggests that the indigenous scholars' theories, concepts, and methods should be congruent with the nature, structure, and mechanisms of the psychological functioning of the members of these indigenous communities. In addition to observing and interviewing native people, indigenous psychologists may develop indigenous psychometric instruments (tests and psychological questionnaires), design psychological experiments, and apply them to their participants. The major difference between indigenous and mainstream cross-cultural psychologists is that their thinking, the concepts they use to contemplate their participants' psychology, and their principles of organizing their studies are taken from within their indigenous communities' cultural traditions and not borrowed from the Western intellectual conventions.

A comparative cross-cultural indigenous approach aims to study two or more indigenous systems of psychological thoughts, compare their insights about particular phenomena and build empirical research based on these understandings. Thus far, there have been very few of these studies.

Conclusion

Researching the relations between human psychology and culture is a challenging enterprise. There is no one universal way to conduct this type of research. There are two approaches to studying culture and psychology: CCP and CP. (At this point, I consider IP a form of CP.) These disciplines differ in their understanding of the nature of culture and its relation to people's psychological worlds and in their methodology. Cross-cultural psychologists see culture and human psychology as two relatively independent phenomena that influence upon each other. Cultural psychologists have a fairly well-defined conception of culture as an intentional, intersubjective, and taken-for-granted reality. They approach this research from a position of the mutual constitution of culture and psychology. Depending on one's understanding of culture and its relations to psychology, researchers use either the natural or interpretative science methodology. Cross-cultural psychologists mostly gravitate towards the former, where both cultural context and people's psychological functioning are considered a constellation of variables that can be measured and statistically analysed. They apply quantitative methodology. Cultural psychologists use the interpretative science methodology and ethnographic and qualitative methods, which are accompanied by interpretation and understanding. Each approach has its weaknesses and points of serious critique that are ultimately related to their respective methodologies. It is strongly recommended that researchers maintain a thoughtful and reflective position when researching culture and psychology. IP is a part of CP and shares its many conceptual systems and methodological approaches.

Examples of studies on culture and psychology

Cross-cultural studies can be conducted by using either countries (cultural communities) or individuals as the units of analysis. If a study uses countries as the units of analysis, it is labelled a *country-level* or *ecological-level study*. If researchers use individuals as the units of analysis, such studies are called *individual-level studies*.

Example 1. A country-level cross-cultural psychological study

Levine, R. V., Norenzayan, A., Philbrick, K. (2001). Cross-cultural differences in helping strangers. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32*(5), 543–560.

The goal of the study is to explore if helping strangers varies cross-culturally.

Specific research questions: (a) Is helping strangers a cross-culturally meaningful characteristic of a country? (b) does helping strangers vary cross-culturally? and (c) what are some community characteristics that are related to helping strangers across cultures?

Method: A field quasi-experiment; *samples:* convenience samples of pedestrians in large cities in 23 countries, such as Vienna (Austria), Shanghai (China), Calcutta (India), etc.

Assessment of helping behaviour – standardized behavioural measures:

1 Dropping a pen in front of a pedestrian who is going in the opposite direction.
2 While walking with a heavy limp and wearing a leg brace, the experimenter dropped a pile of magazines and struggled to reach them.
3 Dressed as a blind person, the experimenter was standing at a street corner trying to cross the street and waited for 60 seconds for someone to help.

Experimenters calculated the percentages of the pedestrians who helped them relative to the overall number of people who were approached. All experimenters were international students returning home and travelling students. Between 210 and 280 pedestrians were approached at each location.

Communities characteristics: Population size of the participating cities; *economic indicators:* gross domestic product per capita; *cultural values:* experts rating of the 23 countries on a dimension of individualism-collectivism and the presence of a *simpatia* cultural value – a proactive socioemotional orientation and concern with the social well-being of others; *pace of life:* walking speed of average pedestrians.

Results: All participating cities were ranked based on the percentage of the passers-by who offered help. These numbers were correlated with various economic and social indicators. The three most helping cities were Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; San José, Costa Rica; and Lilongwe, Malawi. The least helping places were Singapore, Singapore; New York, the United States; and Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The only significant correlation was discovered between helping behaviour and an economic indicator: $r = -.43$ ($p < .001$). This correlation means that the more prosperous the country, the less helping behaviour was demonstrated. There were no significant correlations between helping behaviour and other community measures.

Comments: This is a typical country/ecological level cross-cultural study. This descriptive study aims to establish the frequencies of the targeted behaviour across different cities and find statistical correlations with some community variables. Researchers used countries from various geographical regions as a proxy for diverse cultural communities. When they wanted to study the cultural aspects of helping behaviour, they used country-level indicators of individualism and collectivism. Researchers used standardized behavioural measures, which they believe have the same meaning across all the countries. This assumption has never been tested by cultural analysis of helping behaviour. The helping measures were calculated by averaging the results of about 200 individuals. Researchers used a non-probability non-representative sampling procedure but tended to generalize their results to the whole country.

Example 2. A country-level cross-cultural psychological study that uses Hofstede's cultural dimensions

Arrindell, W.A., et al. (1997). Dimensions of national culture as predictors of cross-national differences in subjective well-being. *Personality and Individual Differences, 23*, 37–53.

The goal of the study: What cultural dimensions (by Hofstede) are associated with the better well-being of the populations of 36 countries?

Geert Hofstede, a Dutch cross-cultural organizational psychologist, analysed the work attitude surveys conducted by IBM in nearly 70 countries. He used these countries as the units for his analysis and implemented a statistical procedure called factor analysis to find common factors across these countries. He discovered four factors, which Hofstede later called the *cultural dimensions*. Later, based on the studies with Chinese employees and managers, a fifth dimension was added:

1. **Small or large power distance:** The extent to which less powerful members of a society accept and expect that power (in a society, organization, or institution) is distributed unequally.
2. **Individualism-collectivism:** The level of integration into groups; *Individualism:* ties among individuals are loose and everyone looks after himself or herself. *Collectivism:* ties are strong, a group looks after its members and the members are loyal to their group.
3. **Masculinity-femininity:** The degree to which a society emphasizes *masculine values:* assertiveness, aggressiveness, independence, and dominance; or *feminine values:* compassion, empathy, caring, and emotional openness.
4. **Uncertainty avoidance versus uncertainty acceptance:** The way a society deals with uncertainties and ambiguities. *Uncertainty-avoidant cultures* create strict laws and rules together with strong safety and security measures. *Uncertainty accepting cultures* try to have as few rules as possible and be more tolerant of the opinions of others.
5. **Short-term versus long-term orientation:** Values related to long-term orientation are thrift, perseverance, and favouring the future. Values associated with short-term orientation are respect for traditions, fulfilling social obligations, and favouring the present/past.

Hofstede and his colleagues calculated scores on these dimensions in approximately 100 countries, and these data have become very popular in country-level cross-cultural studies (see www.geert-hofstede.com).

Method: The researchers collected scores on Hofstede's cultural dimensions and correlated them with people's subjective well-being (SWB) indicators for 36 countries. (The SWB scores were obtained as an average of the answers to two questions 'How happy you are?' and 'How satisfied are you with your life?') The database with the SWB scores is published in Diener, E., Diener, M., & Diener, C. (1995). Factors predicting the subjective well-being of nations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69*, 851–864.

Results: High individualism, low masculinity, and low uncertainty avoidance statistically predicted a high national level of SWB.

Comments: This is another example of popular culture-level cross-cultural research. Researchers use the existing international databases on various cultural, political, economic, and other aspects of countries' functioning and correlate them with average scores of national or similar surveys for various forms of social behaviour, psychological well-being, personality characteristics, and many other indicators to find their associations with countries' cultural, economic, and sociopolitical variables. They use these associations to theorize about the role culture, economic, or social arrangements play in people's psychological functioning. There is no cultural analysis of any cultural group in this research; cultures are presented through different nations, and a set of measurable variables represents each nation. The psychological functioning of people is given by a set of variables that reflect not individuals but countries.

A major pitfall of this type of ecological-level research is called *ecological fallacy* or a wrongful conclusion about the relations among variables at the individual level, which are built on the relations discovered at the ecological/country level. In this example, researchers discovered that countries with high individualism tend to have populations with high SWB scores. These relations were established on an ecological level. It would be an ecological fallacy to say that highly individualistic people tend to be happier than less individualistic ones. The last statement is made at the individual level and cannot be based on the data obtained at the ecological level.

Example 3. A cross-cultural psychological study at the individual level

Chirkov, V. I., & Ryan, R. M. (2001). Parent and teacher autonomy-support in Russian and U.S. adolescents: Common effects on well-being and academic motivation. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32*(5), 618–635.

The goal of the study: To investigate if support for adolescents' autonomy is universally beneficial to their well-being and academic motivation across the United States and Russia.

Research questions: (a) Does the level of autonomy support in Russia and the United States differ? (b) Does autonomy support have the same effect on students' self-determined motivation in Russia and the United States?

Method: Researchers surveyed 236 high school students from Russia and the United States with standardized questionnaires. Researchers developed questionnaires based on the self-determination theory of human motivation to assess autonomy support from teachers and parents and students' academic motivation and well-being. Bilingual psychologists forward and back translated them to ensure linguistic equivalence. Russia was chosen because it is considered to be a more authoritarian country than the United States. It is believed that in authoritarian countries, individuals are allowed less freedom to express themselves, and they are expected to follow the prescriptions of the authorities. The researchers used statistical analysis to establish the measurement invariance of all scales used in the study and used correlation analysis to test their hypotheses.

Results: A comparison of the mean scores of the autonomy support scale indicated that Russian students saw their social context as less supportive of autonomy than Americans saw it. Parents' and Teachers' Autonomy Support scores were lower in Russia. But despite this difference, the associations between autonomy support and academic motivation demonstrated that in both countries, the more adolescents see their parents and teachers as supportive of autonomy, the higher their self-determination in their academic studies is. Researchers also discovered that support from parents statistically predicted positive psychological well-being in students in both countries. These results supported the hypothesis that autonomy support promotes students' self-determined motivation and mental health in the cultural community with high authoritarianism and not only in the country with low authoritarianism. The authors concluded that teachers and parents in both countries should support the autonomy of their students if they want them to be mentally healthy and self-determined in their motivation.

Comments: This is a cross-cultural study conducted on the individual level: The units of analysis are people, not countries. Two countries represent cultures, and researchers did not conduct a cultural analysis of the meaning of autonomy support in Russia and the United States. The only proxy for such analysis was the statement that the United States is a more egalitarian country; hence, it is more supportive of autonomy. Russia has a more authoritarian culture that has a tendency to suppress people's freedom and autonomy. The researchers conducted thorough tests of the constructs' equivalence and measurement invariance. All the scales were originally developed in the United States and were 'imposed' on the Russian participants. Statistical analysis was used to answer the research questions. The researchers compared the psychological constructs as if they were similar entities in both countries. Hence, the psychological universality was an underlying assumption that was supported by the equivalence testing. The statistical correlations supported the claim of the positive role of autonomy support.

Example 4. A monocultural cultural psychological study

Rae-Espinoza, H. (2010). Consent and discipline in Ecuador: How to avoid raising an antisocial child. *Ethos, 38*(4), 369–387.

The study aimed to investigate parenting practices and beliefs in Ecuador's largest city, Guayaquil.

Research questions: (1) What is the cultural model of the long-term parenting goals of Ecuadorian parents? What are the practices aimed at reaching these goals? What are the meanings of these goals and practices?

Method: The researcher spent a hundred hours observing household parent-child interactions. She did ethnography – naturalistic observations accompanied by interviews with the parents.

Results: The researcher first analysed the cultural model of parenting: what it means to raise a good person and what qualities such a person must possess. She introduced the concepts of the social versus antisocial person from the point of view of the Ecuadorian cultural community. 'Social' means maintaining social order in the community. This maintenance of social order is considered to be the essence of the cultural notion of a good person. Correspondently, an antisocial personality is "a failure to fulfill activities intrinsic to cultural notions of personhood" (p. 371). The author reported that developing a social personality is the primary goal of good parenting in this community. Then, she discussed different practices for reaching this goal, including discipline, control, and permission. She stated that many forms of parenting practices when parents fulfil any request from a child, could be labelled as *permissiveness* and condemned as an unacceptable form of parenting from the Western point of view. The author argued against such a judgement by exploring the meaning of this permissiveness for Ecuadorian parents. She discovered that for these parents, such *acquisitiveness* (the term that the author prefers to use) is a way to develop social personality, whereas, according to local beliefs, rejecting a child's requests will only promote antisocial characteristics in one's personality. Ecuadorian parents discipline their children by removing them from desirable social activities and interactions, thus, again, highlighting the importance of positive social engagements.

Comments: This article was published in a psychological anthropology journal, a discipline close to cultural psychology. By all attributes, this is a typical cultural psychological study. Although the author did not articulate her notion of culture, her discussions about the cultural beliefs about parenting and the cultural models of childrearing goals convey that she treats culture as an intentional and intersubjective reality. The researcher tried to understand the meaning of the goals of parenting practices from 'within' the parents' perspectives – she

implemented an *emic approach*. She did not use standardized measures and built her study on observing behaviour, interviewing people, and then trying to *understand* and *interpret* these results. The author strongly argued against *Western ethnocentrism* regarding 'proper parenting' and supports the importance of a non-judgemental approach to the parenting practices of various cultural communities.

Example 5. A comparative cultural psychological study

Shweder, R. A., Jensen, L., & Goldstein, W. A. (1995). Who sleeps with whom revisited: A method for extracting the moral goods implicit in the practice. In J. J. Goodnow, P. J. Miller & F. Kessel (Eds.), *Cultural practices as contexts for development* (Vol. 67, pp. 21–39). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

The goal of the study: Sleeping arrangements in different cultural communities are a 'classic' anthropological problem. Scholars strive to describe how members of different cultural communities arrange their sleeping and answer *why* they make these particular arrangements. The researchers of this study wanted to inquire into the moral principles of cultural communities by analysing how their members justify these arrangements.

Method: This study was conducted in India and the United States. Researchers asked dozens of family members from both countries to make sleeping arrangements for seven family members: father, mother, son 15 years old, son 11 years old, son 8 years old, daughter 14 years old, and daughter 3 years old, in sleeping spaces of one, two, three, or seven rooms. They also asked participants why they selected their arrangements. Based on the analysis of these data, they extracted several moral criteria that these cultural communities developed for this practice in particular and for their lives in general.

Results: The most informative was the request to arrange for the family to sleep in three rooms. This is how their participants accomplished this task: *Indians:* (1) All females; (2) father and son 8 years old; and (3) son 15 years old and son 11 years old. *Americans:* (1) Mother and father; (2) all sons; and (3) all daughters. Based on interpreting these results, researchers extracted the following moral principles.

Indian principles: (1) Incest avoidance: sexually mature relatives of different sexes do not sleep together; (2) care for the dependents: young children do not sleep alone; (3) female chastity anxiety: girls and young women do not sleep alone; and (4) hierarchical deference for males: mature males do not sleep with other males who must defer to them because there is an implication of disrespectful familiarity.

American principles: (1) Incest avoidance; (2) the sacred couple: husband and wife always sleep together; (3) respect for an individual's privacy: individuals should

sleep alone as much as conditions allow. The authors discuss the origin and implications of these principles for these communities.

Comments: This is not a typical cultural psychological study. It used a comparative (cross-cultural) design and implemented a standardized quasi-experimental procedure. Nevertheless, this study is cultural psychological because it tried to delve into the meaning of different sleeping practices and to link these meanings with the moral principles of these communities. The researchers *interpreted* sleeping arrangements to *understand* the underlying moral principles.

Example 6. A monocultural indigenous psychology study

Hwang, K.-K., & Han, K.-H. (2010). Face and morality in Confucian society. In M. H. Bond (Ed.), *The Oxford handbook of Chinese psychology* (pp. 480–498). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

The study aimed to analyse the Chinese concept of 'face' from historical, philosophical, moral, and empirical perspectives.

Method: The authors used diverse methods, including historical, ethical, and sociological analyses. They used the results of empirical studies that utilized indigenously created questionnaires to understand the psychodynamics of the 'face'-related regulation of behaviour in school.

Results: The concept of 'face' reflects the social reputation "that has been deliberately accumulated by a person through efforts and achievement" (p. 481). It also represents a person's level of morality, including their community's trust in their honesty, fairness, self-discipline, and other moral qualities. This concept is deeply rooted in Confucian ideology and philosophy and is a significant determinant and regulator of many forms of social interactions. People should 'keep up' and 'protect' their face; they can 'lose face' or 'make face.' Chinese psychologists differentiated two aspects of people's personal orientation towards face: 'a protective face orientation' – a concerted effort to not lose one's face, and an 'acquisitive face orientation' – a tendency to try to improve one's face. In addition, they discovered stable personality variations related to this face-related differentiation. They investigated factors related to seniors and young people 'having face' and 'losing face.' They discovered that senior participants "most feel they 'have face' when their children are morally upright and successful in their careers." College students "most feel they 'have face' when they do well in their academic performance, followed by being morally upright." For both groups, one's moral deficiency was the most important factor related to 'losing face.' The second most important factor for seniors was their children's moral deficiencies; for youngsters – it was their parents' moral deficiencies (p. 490–491).

Comments: The concept of face is tightly related to maintaining morality, interpersonal cohesiveness (parents-children mutual moral responsibility), and social dependency. It is also evident that the concept of face is an intentional and intersubjective cultural phenomenon in a particular cultural community, where all members believe in its existence and importance. Members of the community internalize this belief to differing degrees and use it to regulate their social behaviour. However, 'face' works as a regulator only in a particular community where people accept and understand this idea of face and believe in its importance. This is an example of a monocultural cultural/indigenous psychological investigation.

Glossary

Comparative study in cultural psychology is a cultural psychological study conducted in a comparative mode to understand the differences in cultural models and the meanings of cultural practices in different communities.

Country/ecological level cross-cultural research is the research where countries or cultural/ethnic communities constitute units of the analysis.

Cross-cultural psychology is the study of similarities and differences in individual psychological functioning in various cultural and ethnocultural groups; it is the study of the relationships between psychological variables and sociocultural, ecological, and biological variables, and the ongoing changes in these variables.

Cultural psychology (by Shweder) is the study of how cultural traditions and social practices regulate, express, and transform the human psyche, resulting less in the psychic unity of humankind than in ethnic divergences in mind, self, and emotion. Cultural psychology is the study of the way subject and object, self and other, psyche and culture, person and context, figure and ground, and practitioner and practice live together, require each other, and dynamically, dialectically, and jointly make each other up.

Culture-specific human mentality (by Shweder) is a configuration of mental processes people acquire in their cultural communities.

Equivalence in cross-cultural research *Construct equivalence* – the comparability of the meaning of the phenomena included in a study across cultural communities; *linguistic equivalence* – similarity of the linguistic meaning of the psychological questionnaires and tests translated into different languages; and *measurement invariance* – the psychometric invariance of the instruments designated to measure the constructs.

Etic and emic positions of researchers, introduced by Pike (1967), apply to the stance of a social scholar towards their object of investigation. *Etic* is an 'outside' stance when researchers impose their concepts, criteria of evaluation, a priori designated units of observation, and some equivalent measures on an object of study. *Emic* is an 'inside' stance when a researcher looks at an object of enquiry from 'within' the system where this object is located. All tools for a study – concepts, criteria, units of observations, and measurements – are selected based on the nature and qualities of this system.

Forward and back translation is a set of procedures that aim to ensure the linguistic equivalence of psychological instruments.

Indigenous psychology is "a system of psychological thoughts and practices rooted in a particular cultural tradition" (Yang, 2000, p. 245).

Individual-level cross-cultural studies are studies where individuals constitute units of the analysis.

Interpretation is grasping and explicating meanings of symbolic and intentional things and humans' actions and verbal statements. Interpretation applies to intentional and symbolic things and situations when something stands for something else. Elucidating the meaning of 'something else' is a goal of interpretation. *Understanding* is a result of interpretation. Interpretation and understanding are the main intellectual analytical tools/methods of cultural psychology and other interpretative social sciences: interpretative anthropology and sociology.

Monocultural study in cultural psychology is a study of the mutual constitution of culture and human mentalities conducted in one cultural community.

Questions

1. In your opinion, do culture and psychology studies belong to the first (physiological psychology by Wundt) or second (ethno-social psychology by Wundt) discipline of psychology? Justify your answer.
2. Reflect on the attributes of cross-cultural psychology as the first discipline of psychology. Do you see strengths or weaknesses in such a position?
3. To the best of your understanding, how do cross-cultural psychologists justify their quantitative approach to studying culture and psychology?
4. How do you understand construct, linguistic, and measurement equivalence in cross-cultural research?
5. Why is cultural psychology called an interpretative science, whereas CCP is not?
6. Why do cultural/indigenous psychologists consider CCP's search for equivalence a weakness of this science?
7. Why are understanding and interpretation considered the main analytical tools for CP? Why do cultural psychologists not consider statistical analysis appropriate for culture and psychology studies?

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Note

1 **Volkerpsychologie** from German *volk* – people and *psychologie* – psychology.

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4 Evolution, culture, and the emergence of modern humans

Chapter content

- The chapter reviews various hypotheses about human evolution and the role Culture has played in this process. Its primary goal is to examine whether Culture is the result of biological evolution or if it is a principal contributor to gene-culture co-evolution.
- A brief survey of human evolution, its timeline, and the close relatives and ancestors of *Homo sapiens* is provided.
- The primary challenge of studying human evolution is its unobservable nature and the limited amount of evidence available that can be used to infer the mechanisms of human evolution.
- Two groups of hypotheses about the mechanisms of human evolution are outlined. The first group is clustered around the ideas of human sociobiology; it emphasizes the primary role of biological evolution in the emergence of human social, mental, and cultural traits. In the theories of evolution that have a sociobiological background, Culture is considered a product of natural selection. The second group emphasizes the active role that Culture has played in the evolution of human cognitive and sociocultural attributes.
- Evolutionary psychologists have elaborated upon applying ideas of human sociobiology to the evolution of human mental and behavioural capacities. They hypothesize that genetic selection determined the emergence of content-specific psychological mechanisms that produce adaptive phenotypic traits, including cultures.
- Representatives of the second group highlight that cultural and biological evolution are mutually responsible for the evolution of humans. The chapter presents the *shared intentionality theory* elaborated by Tomasello and his colleagues.
- The shared intentionality theory proposes three mechanisms that sequentially evolved and led to the emergence of modern humans. These mechanisms are *individual*, *joint*, and *collective intentionality*. It states that Culture co-evolved with collective intentionality; together, they shaped modern humans.

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In modern science, becoming human is considered from two perspectives: evolutionary or *phylogenetically*,[1] and developmentally from birth to death or *ontogenetically*.[2] The phylogenetic approach is elaborated upon by evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, and psychologists; in turn, ontogenetic research is conducted by developmental scientists, psychologists, and anthropologists.

Within both approaches, Culture is the crucial factor that influences the development of humans as the species *Homo sapiens* and as individuals. The purpose of this chapter is to review the phylogenetic approach and to highlight how human sociality, cognitive capacities, and Culture co-evolved during evolution, and how this co-evolution led to the development of modern humans and societies.

The phylogenetic understanding of the evolution of humans and culture

Human beings have evolved as a unique species; their brains, minds, and psychological functions have distinct characteristics with no analogy in the animal world. Humans have consciousness; they possess language and other forms of symbolic representations of reality and communication. They think rationally, and they have the capacity for abstract thinking and imagination. People create the human-made world of sociocultural institutions; they produce art, institute religion, and perform scientific research. This uniqueness leads to a plethora of questions. How have all these capacities evolved? What factors were responsible for causing these unique developments in people's mental and behavioural functioning? What role has Culture – this uniquely human-made world of material artefacts, ideas, and social institutions – played in the emergence of humanity? Has Culture been the determining factor of human evolution, or is it simply its result? These are the fundamental questions that scientists have been trying to answer for centuries to understand the natural history of human psychological and sociocultural development.

A short survey of human evolution and a statement of the problem

The fossils of *hominoids*, a superfamily that includes humans, apes, and their ancestors, date back 20 million years. Palaeontologists have traced the various species of *hominids* or *hominins* (ancestors of modern humans) back about 5–8 million years (Dunbar, 2016; Lewin & Foley, 2004; Wood, 2005). At that time, the lineages of humans and great apes separated. Before the emergence of modern humans (*Homo sapiens*), there were six known species of pre-modern humans: *Homo neanderthalensis*, *Homo heidelbergensis*, *Homo erectus*, *Homo floresiensis*, *Homo antecessor*, and *Homo ergaster*. There are also 11 known species of archaic and transitional *hominins, including australopithecines*, that lived prior to or together with pre-modern humans (Wood, 2005) (see Figure 4.1). In addition to Africa, where humans evolved, fossils of hominins have been discovered in Europe, Indonesia, India, and China.

The last species of the genus *Homo*, *Homo neanderthalensis*, which occupied most of Europe, lived alongside modern humans and went extinct about 28,000 years ago. It is believed that our species, *Homo sapiens*, evolved around 200,000 years ago in Africa. Its representatives are usually called *anatomically modern humans* (or *archaic H. sapiens*) because they possessed all the biological and anatomical features of modern humans. Scientists continue to debate whether they were cognitively and behaviourally the same as modern humans. However, the majority of scholars agree that behaviourally modern humans that had the cognitive and cultural traits of our contemporaries emerged around 50,000 years ago (Chase, 2006; Tomasello, 2014). Palaeontological evidence reveals that modern humans share their evolutionary history and genetic heritage with great apes (chimpanzees, bonobos [pygmy chimpanzees], gorillas, and orangutans). These great apes and humans share some anatomical, physiological, and mental features (Tomasello & Herrmann, 2010). Our closest relatives are chimpanzees and our second closest are gorillas (see Figure 4.1 for the genealogy of the human species).

Other than biological factors, what makes modern humans a distinct species? Moreover, how and why are they so different from great apes and pre-modern



Figure 4.1 The timeline of the evolutionary relatives of modern humans. (This figure is based on Wood (2005) and Dunbar (2016).)

humans? What is the essence of these divides? The difference lies in the dialectical interconnectedness of human sociality, cognitive, and behavioural abilities that co-construct a new form of reality for humans to live in; this reality is arbitrarily created, symbolic, conventional, and normative. This new reality is called Culture. The important questions then are as follows: At what point in the evolution does Culture enter the picture, and why did it evolve at that time? Was Culture the cause or the result of humans' profound cognitive abilities? Ultimately, how and through what mechanisms did humans' cognitive and linguistic abilities, complex social organizations, and cultures emerge during evolution? These questions constitute the focus of research of a large interdisciplinary community of evolutionary scholars: palaeontologists, biologists, anthropologists, archaeologists, psychologists, and philosophers.

Box 4.1 'In Focus' feature. The challenges of investigating human evolution

Modern scientists agree that evolutionary processes are invisible but powerful forces that shape the biological life on our planet. However, nobody has ever directly observed, recorded, or examined human evolution because this would be impossible due to the duration of the evolutionary processes, as they take thousands or even millions of years. The anatomical and behavioural traits that evolutionary scholars examine emerged in the far-away past; therefore, nobody could have witnessed their developments or brought records of this to us. As such, modern researchers can only infer or *retroduct* (that is to say, hypothesize causal mechanisms of an event based on the empirical evidence) these evolutionary forces by analysing the existing evidence and by applying their deep knowledge of biology, geology, climatology, and other relevant disciplines and by fuelling their understanding using their creativity and imagination. The available evidence includes but is not limited to fossils, tools, and other artefacts; the results of comparative studies of humans and great apes and other hominids; investigating modern hunter-gatherers societies; recordings of geological, ecological, and climatological markers of past millennia; and the results of genetic and linguistic analyses. Thus, all the statements about human evolution are more or less well-supported hypotheses, and they could be falsified if new evidence comes to light or if new discoveries are made. (Consider the recent discovery of *Homo naledi* by South African palaeontologist Lee R. Berger (Berger & Hawks, 2017) and *Denisovan* in Siberia (Krause et al., 2010).

The application of evolutionary thinking in psychology has taken different forms, and it has led to the development of various theories based on similar empirical data (Caporael, 2001; Laland & Brown, 2011; Plotkin, 2004).

(These theories are discussed in the main text of the chapter.) The primary theories/hypotheses about the evolution of human psychology, behaviour, and culture are *human sociobiology* (Wilson, 1975), *human behavioural ecology* (Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett, 2002; Cronk, 1991), and *human ethology* (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989/2017), *evolutionary psychology* (Barrett et al., 2002; Buss, 1995; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), *social intelligence theories* (Dunbar, 2016; Emery, Clayton, & Frith, 2008), and various forms of cultural evolution theory: *memetics* (Dawkins, 1976), *the dual inheritance theory* (Boyd & Richerson, 1985, 2005; Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Pagel, 2012) and *the gene-culture co-evolution hypotheses* (Durham, 1991). Within each theory/set of hypotheses, there is an arrangement of conjectures and suppositions of various mechanisms and conditions that propelled and are continuing to drive human evolution. All these constraints and diversities make the field of evolutionary thinking and research in psychology and related biological and social disciplines theoretically varied, challenging, and often controversial.

Hypotheses about human evolution and Culture

The scholars who try to understand the emergence of human cognitive and behavioural competencies and the role Culture has played in that process can be divided into several groups. Because this textbook aims to examine the role Culture plays in human psychological functioning, I will focus on the two main groups of scientists who differ in their treatment of human sociality and Culture in human evolution.

Evolution without Culture

Representatives of the first group believe that biological evolution was exclusively responsible for humans developing mental and cognitive abilities. Some of these researchers hypothesize that this form of evolution shaped human social and behavioural abilities and human traits either directly or through mediating mental mechanisms. In turn, they suggest that the evolution of these abilities and traits led to the emergence of Culture. In turn, scholars in the second group pay closer attention to Culture and introduce various mechanisms of how it might have participated in human evolution. They argue that evolution may have happened not only on the level of genes but also on the level of Culture; this evolution allowed the passing of information, new ideas, technologies, and patterns of behaviour from one generation to another beyond genetic selection (Laland et al., 2005; Mesoudi, 2016). These researchers identify Culture as an integral part of the mechanisms of human evolution. However, these scholars also differ in their understandings of Culture and the mechanisms through which it exerts its influence upon human behaviour.

Within the first group, many researchers were instrumental. The area of *sociobiology* and *human sociobiology* was developed by biologists following the seminal work of American biologist **E. O. Wilson** (1975, 2004) (for review, see Driscoll (2018) and Holcomb & Byron (2010)). The field of *human behavioural ecology* followed the ideas of human sociobiology; its researchers applied evolutionary biological models to study behavioural variations in humans (Nettle et al., 2013). It focuses on the empirical verification of primary predictions of evolutionary theory by observing humans foraging, mating, and performing other patterns of behaviour; these observations occurred mostly in pre-industrialized societies (Cronk, 1991). The area of *human ethology* is rooted in the works of Austrian biologists and ethologists **Konrad Lorenz** and **Karl von Frisch**, along with Dutch biologist **Nikolaas Tinbergen** (for review, see Burkhardt Jr. (2005)). These ethologists studied the behaviour of animals in their natural conditions to understand its adaptive functions. Austrian biologist **Irenäus Eibl-Eibesfeldt** (1979, 1989/2017) applied the principle of ethology to human social behaviour; thus, he developed a discipline of *human ethology*.[3] *Evolutionary psychology* is also an application of human sociobiological thinking that aims to understand human mental and behavioural evolution. It was developed by American anthropologist **John Tooby** and American psychologist **Leda Cosmides** (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997, 2013). (For more on evolutionary psychology, see the section "Evolutionary psychology and culture"). According to the representatives of the first group, Culture is the product of the biological evolution of human cognitive mechanisms and social and behavioural traits. It serves as an adaptation that helps humans survive in their environments. These theorists and researchers believe that Culture was never, or only minimally, involved in shaping the dynamic of human evolution (Laland & Brown, 2011).

Culture in human evolution

In turn, the evolutionary scholars in the second group agree that human beings' cognitive, mental, social and behavioural traits are the results of the interactions of genetic and cultural inheritance systems. Based on these propositions, they consider cultural evolution, together with biological evolution, a significant factor in the emergence of modern humans. Thus, the ideas of *cultural evolution* (Mesoudi, 2016), a *gene-culture co-evolution hypothesis* (Durham, 1991; Gintis, 2011), and *the dual inheritance theory* (Boyd & Richerson, 2005) unite most of the representatives of this group (Laland & Brown, 2011). The central proposition of cultural evolutionists is that the variations in gene composition do not exclusively determine the variations of human behaviour in populations. They argue that these variations are also determined by the diversities of cultural ideas, technologies, and practices, or simply by Cultures.

There are various directions of thinking within the second group; I will mention the key ones. *Memetics* is a hypothesis about cultural evolution that is built on the idea of

the *meme*, a term coined by English evolutionary biologist **Richard Dawkins** (1976). Dawkins proposed that cultural information – ideas, symbols, images, styles, and tastes – is packed in units, which he labelled memes. These memes can spread from one person to another, in turn disseminating cultural information from one place to another. Memes are considered to be "analogous to a gene as the unit of cultural, as opposed to genetic evolution" (Aunger, 2007, p. 509). The followers of this idea hypothesize that memes can self-replicate, mutate, and respond to selective pressures. Another cluster of scholars is united under two overlapping frameworks: *dual inheritance* and *gene-culture co-evolution theory*, both of which ultimately refer to the same set of ideas. The initial creators of these theories were Italian-American population geneticist **Luca Cavalli-Sforza** and his American colleague **Mark Feldman** (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981) together with American anthropologists **Robert Boyd** and **Peter Richerson** (Boyd & Richerson, 2005; Richerson & Boyd, 2005).

The main premise of the gene-culture co-evolution theory is that both genetic and cultural evolution are locked in continuous loops of interactions and mutual influences. Specifically, social learning and Culture are shaped by biological predispositions that limit the amount and the specifics of the social and cultural information that an individual can perceive, process, store, and retrieve. In contrast, cultural practices may create a demand that can alter human genetic make-up and, consequently, lead to the emergence of biological and behavioural traits that are adaptive to that cultural requirement. The best-known example of such a co-evolution is the development of lactose tolerance in adults in dairy producing farming cultures (Laland & Brown, 2011, p. 177). Adult humans, in general, are intolerant to the lactose found in cow's milk. If we were to feed milk to the world's adult population, the majority of individuals would experience sickness and diarrhoea because they do not have enough of a particular enzyme that is needed to break down the sugar lactose in milk products. However, in some populations in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East that have practised dairy farming for centuries, the proportion of lactose-tolerant adults is nearly 90%; in contrast, in non-dairy farming populations, this number is only 20%. These results have been interpreted as reflecting that the cultural practice of dairy farming created pressure that led to the selection of genes for lactose digestion.

Recently, a new theory has been developed that fits well into the second group. American psychologist **Michael Tomasello** (who works at the Max Plank Institute for Evolutionary Anthropology in Germany) and his colleagues have labelled it the *shared intentionality theory* (Tomasello, 2006, 2014, 2019). This theory emphasizes that human sociality and Culture played crucial roles in the evolution of modern humans. Although this theory shares some premises with the above-described gene-culture co-evolution theorizing, it is still sufficiently distinct from them. One primary distinction of this theory is how it treats Culture. Other cultural evolution theorists try to reduce Culture to a set of relatively simple packages of information like, for example, memes. Subsequently, they study their frequencies using complex mathematical models.

(Box 4.2. summarizes various definitions of Culture by evolutionary researchers.) In contrast, Tomasello's hypotheses suggest that the social arrangements and cooperation in early humans led to the evolution of human cognitive abilities, communication, and Culture. He traces these developments from apes through pre-modern humans to modern humans. His interpretation of Culture uncovers its profound connectivity to both human sociality and human social cognition, which makes his interpretation quite suitable for cultural and sociocultural psychologists. In addition to this advantage, Tomasello combines phylogenetic and ontogenetic approaches in a natural and logical sequence of the mechanisms of human evolution and development wherein Culture plays a central role (Tomasello, 1999, 2019).

Box 4.2 'In Focus' feature. Diversity in understanding the notion of culture

Many evolutionary biologists, anthropologists, and psychologists endorse the cultural evolution/co-evolution hypothesis. Because of this orientation, these theorists aim to conceptualize Culture. There is vast diversity in its understanding. According to evolutionary psychologists, "culture is the manufactured product of evolved psychological mechanisms situated in individuals living in groups" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 24). Proponents of memetics interpret Culture as a set of memes, where a meme is understood as "a unit of cultural information that replicates itself in human minds and is transmitted by imitation and teaching" (Barrett et al., 2002, p. 386). For cultural evolutionists, "culture is information capable of affecting individuals' behavior that they acquire from other members of their species through teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission" (Richerson & Boyd, 2005, p. 5). Similar definitions come from evolutionary anthropologists. According to Alvard (2003), "It is fair to say that a consensus has been reached among evolutionary anthropologists to define culture minimally as socially transmitted information" (p. 136). Similarly, Henrich and McElreath (2003) suggest that "culture [is] socially learned information stored in people's brains" (p. 124). Another definition of Culture within the co-evolutionist approach is that it is a human-made phenomenon that "incorporates almost everything in a context of culturally defined meanings, values, and beliefs. It becomes a ubiquitous and inescapable framework for everything we perceive, think, or do" (Caporael, 1997, 2007; Caporael & Baron, 1997; Chase, 2006, p. 6). The shared intentionality theory interprets Culture as collectively intentional, normative, and conventional models and practices that regulate and structure people's behaviours in a group (Tomasello, 2014). Depending on how researchers understand Culture, its mechanisms and the dynamic of the gene-culture co-evolution are conceptualized differently.

Evolutionary psychology and Culture

For evolutionary psychologists, the starting point of the arguments about the evolution of humans' unique behavioural and cognitive abilities was the propositions of sociobiology. This theory suggests that many forms of human behaviour, such as incest avoidance, male promiscuity, female coyness, rape, and hostility towards strangers, are *genetic adaptations* that resulted from *genetic selection* (Mameli, 2007). This genetic selection, also referred to as *biological evolution*, occurs when the differences in a particular phenotypic (observable) trait that brings better fitness for an organism are attributed to the genetic differences this organism has that can be transmitted to subsequent generations (Mameli, 2007). Because of this selection, a gene acquires *inclusive fitness*. Genetic adaptations are the anatomic-physiological (such as the construction of an eye) and behavioural (an individual's mate preference and choice) traits that emerged as useful adaptations and that were subsequently transmitted to and established in all representatives of a species. Sociobiologists and scholars who work in this tradition use the metaphor of a "*gene's eye view*" for their gene-centred approach to evolution. This metaphor means that genes are the primary agents of evolution and, consequently, that the process of evolution is interpreted from a gene's 'point of view': "What decisions would a gene make to facilitate its survival and reproduction?" (Caporael, 2001, p. 609). As a factor of evolution, Culture has almost never entered the sociobiological discourse because, according to this approach, biological evolution directly shapes the social behaviour of humans.

Cosmides and Tooby made an important contribution to the understanding of the emergence of human social cognition and other mental attributes. They followed the logic of sociobiologists, adapting their arguments to understand the emergence of Culture and the uniquely human mental and behavioural traits. Thus, these scholars founded *evolutionary psychology*, the discipline that aims to examine these adaptations and uncover the evolutionary/biological bases of human mental make-up (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997). In their influential chapter, *The psychological foundations of culture* (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), these scholars proposed the *integrated causal model* that includes eight hypotheses about the evolution of the *psychological mechanisms* that determine the emergence of Culture. Psychological mechanisms are the adaptations that evolved in the *environment of evolutionary adaptedness* during the Pleistocene epoch (2 million to 10,000 years ago). Because of the adaptive pressures that existed during this epoch, many functionally independent cognitive, emotional, and motivational mechanisms – *modules* – appeared in humans. The human mind consists of evolved information-processing modules; together with the programmes that developed them, they were produced by natural (genetic) selection in the ancestral environment of evolutionary adaptedness to solve a variety of adaptive problems. Such problems

included competing with conspecifics (individuals belonging to the same species) for resources and mating partners, as well as communication, avoidance of dangerous and poisonous creatures, cooperation, and many others. According to this model, genetic selection did not work on the behavioural adaptations directly, as sociobiologists have suggested; rather, it worked to shape the psychological mechanisms that, in turn, regulate cognition and adaptive behaviours. The same psychological mechanism may generate a variety of behaviours that could be differentially adaptive in different environments. For example, a mechanism of fear of snakes may fully manifest itself in communities where snakes are rare, and people do not know how to handle them. However, this mechanism may be suppressed in communities where members encounter snakes frequently, and they learn how to handle them. Thus, these hypotheses continue the sociobiological line of arguments about the biological evolution of social behaviour, and they also introduce the evolved psychological mechanisms that mediate the genetic influence on behavioural traits.

Ultimately, these mechanisms, which are structured in content-specific ways, produce human cultures along with their particular behavioural practices, material artefacts, and linguistically shaped and transmitted symbolic mental representations. According to this approach, "culture is the manufactured product of evolved psychological mechanisms situated in individuals living in groups. ... human culture and social behavior is richly variable because it is generated by an incredibly intricate, contingent set of functional programs that use and process information from the world, including information that is provided both intentionally and unintentionally by other human beings" (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992, p. 24).

Within this account, Culture is conceptualized as an adaptation produced by biological evolution through a 'set of functional programmes.' As such, it is completely removed from the dynamics of evolutionary processes. Buss (2001) even talks about "the myth of culture as a causal explanation" (p. 968), which denies Culture any determining power in shaping human evolution.

The psychological mechanisms, or modules, that evolutionary psychologists have highlighted and investigated include but are not limited to mate preference (waist-to-hip ratio assessment), incest avoidance, cheater detection, parent-offspring conflicts, fear of strangers, fear of snakes, spiders, and heights; men's tendency towards rape (Thornhill & Palmer, 2000); and the tendency towards homicide and warfare (Buss, 2001). According to this hypothesis, the entirety of these mechanisms, which was described using a 'Swiss Army knife' metaphor, constitutes universal human nature (Buss, 2001; Pinker, 2002; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). The purpose of evolutionary psychology is to identify, describe, and empirically verify all the components of this nature (Cosmides & Tooby, 1997).

Sociobiological and related hypotheses about evolved psychological mechanisms have influenced the thinking of evolutionary psychologists. These ideas also

resonated with many social and cross-cultural scientists and psychologists. Some cross-cultural psychologists also hypothesize that the combination of evolved psychological mechanisms constitutes universal human nature. As a result, the goal of cross-cultural psychology has been announced as discovering this universal nature through intensive cross-cultural psychological research (Apicella & Barrett, 2016; Segall et al., 1998).

The founders of cross-cultural psychology wrote:

> So, many cross-cultural psychologists allow for similarities due to species-wide basic processes but consider their existence subject to empirical demonstration. This kind of universalism assumes that basic human characteristics are common to all members of the species (i.e., constituting a set of psychological givens) and that culture influences the development and display of them ....
>
> (Segall et al., 1998, p. 1104)

The 'onion peeling' (Poortinga et al., 1987) and the 'stratigraphic' hypotheses (Geertz, 1973, p. 37) have emerged to represent the relationships between the different levels of the psychological regulation of human behaviour: biological, psychological, social, and cultural. According to these hypotheses, human functioning is presented as an onion, where various levels of regulation wrap the core human psychological nature, similar to how an onion has layers. Conducting cross-cultural psychological research is analogous to 'peeling' such as onion, layer by layer, until researchers discover the human psychological core. By discovering such a nature, cross-cultural psychologists will be able to construct the pan-human psychology that is the ultimate goal of this discipline (see Chapter 3 on the goals of cross-cultural research).

Group living, human sociality, and Culture as factors of human evolution

In this section, I will examine the second group of theories that explicitly argue that human social organization and Culture are central factors in the emergence of human mental and behavioural competences. I will specifically focus on the *shared intentionality theory* of Tomasello and his colleagues (Tomasello, 2006, 2011, 2014, 2019; Tomasello et al., 2012; Tomasello & Rakoczy, 2003) and discuss how it explains the co-emergence of human cognitive and other mental abilities, including communication and Culture.

The theory of shared intentionality and three levels of sociocognitive regulation

The theory of shared intentionality proposes insightful hypotheses supported by vast comparative and developmental empirical data that shed light on the emergence and mechanisms of human sociality, cognition, communication, and Culture

in the evolution of modern humans. This theory's main proposition states that to survive, bands of early humans needed to cooperate. To cooperate successfully, early humans had to develop specialized mental and communicative skills. Human cooperative sociality and related cognitive and communicative abilities worked together to produce Culture – a new level of behaviour regulation. As a result of these processes, evolved modern humans inherited the ability to be social and cultural beings that can exist only in adaptively relevant social and cultural environments.

To enquire into the evolution of the human mental capacities that gave power to the emergence of Culture, I will begin by considering Tomasello's (2014) hypothesis about a hierarchy of cognitive regulations. Tomasello identified three levels of social-cognitive regulation of behaviour that emerged during the *hominin* evolution: *individual intentionality*, *joint intentionality*, and *collective intentionality*.[4] The consecutive development of these levels of regulation was responsible for modern humans emerging with their arsenal of intellectual capacities as well as for the emergence of Culture, which is a uniquely human form of organizing social arrangements and regulating collective and individual behaviours.

Level 1: Individual intentionality of great apes. According to Tomasello (2014), the starting point for developing the cognitive capabilities for social coordination in humans was the *individual intentionality* of the great apes. Individual intentionality is defined as an "individually self-regulated, cognitive way of doing things" (p. 9). By 'doing things,' the author means contemplating the way of undertaking actions under existing circumstances with the aim of achieving one's desired individual goals. Philosopher Tuomela (2007) called this form of regulation 'I-mode' functioning. When analysing the individual intentionality of great apes, one must consider their primary activity – foraging and competing with inmates for food. These primary activities are complemented by mate selection behaviours as well as the competition for mates, parenting activities, defence against predators, and communication.

As a form of behaviour regulation, individual intentionality consists of the following elements: setting goals based on the organism's needs, evaluating opportunities for achieving these goals under the existing circumstances, monitoring the performance of trying to attain these goals, and correcting one's actions if there are disturbances to the initial plan. Here is a slightly modified example from Tomasello's book *The Natural History of Human Thinking* (2014). A hungry chimpanzee is looking for food; it sees a palm tree with bananas and notices that there are no other competitors or nearby predators, such as leopards. Based on this evaluation, it moves towards the tree to pick some bananas. If a leopard appears, then the chimpanzee's plan will be immediately corrected. The primary goal will change from feeding to avoiding falling to a predator. Another scenario

may unfold if another chimpanzee appears also looking for food. The chimpanzee's individual self-corrected system executes all these regulations – individual intentionality – that include *cognitive representations*, *inferential* and *self-monitoring skills*, and *cognitive models*.

Cognitive representations are the core of self-regulating systems. They mentally represent the organism's needs, goals, and preferences, as well as the situations in which the behaviour is happening. Some of the cognitive representations that participate in a chimpanzee's behaviour regulation include being hungry, having a preference for bananas over other foods, seeing a palm tree, and observing that there are no competitors.

Inference and *self-monitoring skills* are in play when different circumstances get in the way of an organism achieving its goals. These skills allow the animal to process information about possible actions in the mental form – 'off line' – without executing them. In addition, these skills are responsible for comparing the actual outcomes of actions to the desired ones and for making the necessary corrections. Chimpanzees have sophisticated inferential skills and use them efficiently. For example, when food is out of reach, they can use various tools – sticks or rocks – to make this food accessible.

To use these cognitive representations and execute cognitive skills, an organism needs to have a guidance mechanism to manage the representations and inferences in particular situations. It is proposed that this guiding device is a set of *cognitive models* that an organism develops throughout its lifetime. Cognitive psychologists widely use the concept of a cognitive/mental model, and Tomasello has successfully applied it in his analysis. In this case, cognitive models are typifications or categorizations of the experiences an organism has accumulated during its lifetime. They are the generalized and schematized representations of the experienced situations that have been stocked in the organism's memory according to distinct categories or types: there are cognitive models for feeding, competing for food, avoiding predators, looking for mates, and so on. When a chimpanzee becomes hungry, a cognitive model for feeding actualizes. This typification of situations goes together with evaluating their relevance to the actual needs and intentions of an organism. A hungry chimpanzee sees a tree. The activated cognitive model for feeding allows it to evaluate if this tree is a banana tree or some other type. Subsequently, if this is a banana tree, does it currently have bananas; if so, how many are there, and how ripe are they? Because it can evaluate the relevance of situations and objects, the animal attends to the relevant and vital cues pertaining to its need, and it ignores all irrelevant information. The activated cognitive model filters the available information, and it allows the animal to focus on evaluating the relevance of the tree in its efforts to gratify its hunger. In this way, cognitive models take part in regulating an organism's attention by guiding it to relevant information and cues and away from irrelevant information and cues.

The mechanism of individual intentionality predominantly focuses on dealing with the physical world in relation to an organism's needs. It is considered a *one-layer structure* (in comparison with *dual-layer structures* in joint and collective intentionality; I will explain them later) that includes the cognitive representations of events and situations that are exclusively relevant to the well-being of an individual. Humans' ancestors inherited the ability to have individual intentionality, and it has successfully served its functions across millions of years of evolution. Modern humans continue to possess individual intentionality. Thus, they perceive and represent the world exclusively from their unique, individual perspectives: 'this is how I see the world,' 'this is what I want,' 'this is my goal,' and 'this is how I plan to achieve this goal.' However, the individual intentionality of modern humans is, in principle, different from the intentionality of great apes. Humans' intentionality emanates from their deeply social human minds that evolved to consider other humans as intentional agents. Because of this, all forms of individual intentionality in humans are ultimately social.

Does the intentionality of great apes serve a social purpose? While considering the cognitive abilities of great apes, it is crucial to recognize that they live in groups. This group living requires solutions to many of their social problems: mating, competing for food, helping other group members in various activities, and even collaborating. Social activity is one of the primary causes that led to the development of sophisticated intelligence in great apes and humans (see Box 4.3).

Cognitive psychologists have discovered that to coordinate social life, individuals must have a *theory of mind* of others. This theory represents the capacity of individuals to understand the intentions, desires, and goals of their group mates during their social activities. Do great apes, especially chimpanzees, have a theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1978)? Systematic research allowed Tomasello and his colleagues, as well as other scholars, to conclude that, yes, chimpanzees have theories of mind; however, in comparison to those of humans, they are rudimentary and simple. Chimpanzees are capable of visually perceiving other social agents, understanding their goals and intentions, and making inferences using perception-goal psychology. In laboratory experiments, chimpanzees demonstrated apprehension about what other social agents intend to do, and they demonstrated that they "perceive the world in a certain way and [have] certain goals of how [they] want the world to be" (Call & Tomasello, 2008, p. 191).

The emergence of the theories of mind in great apes shows how their cognitive development is far greater compared to lower-level animals; however, it is far from being comparable with the theories of mind that humans possess. Tomasello and his colleagues hypothesized that one of the factors that determine the nature of the theories of mind in chimpanzees is that these theories are related to the animals' primary mode of social functioning, that is, competition. In contrast, in humans,

their theories of mind relate to full-blown cooperation (Moll & Tomasello, 2007). This change in primary activities leads to a major difference between the cognition of apes and humans.

Level 2. Development of social cognition in pre-modern humans: Localized cooperation and joint intentionality. In order to understand the emergence of modern humans with sophisticated social cognition and complex societies endowed with Culture, Tomasello and his colleagues (Tomasello, 2014; Tomasello et al., 2012) suggested that it is necessary to consider the developments in early or pre-modern humans as it were these species that bridged the gap between the ancestors of great apes and modern humans. The development of Culture with its normative conventions and institutions required complex cognitive skills, which are different from the social skills of great apes that are rooted in their individual intentionality. The development of such skills needed special conditions and time. According to Tomasello and his colleagues, their development happened during the reign of pre-modern humans: *Homo erectus*, *Homo ergaster*, *Homo helmei*, and *Homo heidelbergensis*. These transformations happened in the middle Pleistocene epoch, between 2 million and 500,000 years ago (Foley, 2006).

The role of sociality in the evolution of hominins. Most scholars now accept that human beings evolved as social animals. Anatomically modern humans and their ancestors lived, functioned, and survived only in groups (Caporael, 2007; Caporael & Baron, 1997; Caporael & Brewer, 1991; Dunbar, 2016; Skyrms, 2004). Thus, the ancestors of modern humans had to be "*obligately interdependent* species," as Caporael (2007, p. 3) labelled this condition. Groups provide protection, and because of the division of labour, group life is more efficient and more productive than living alone and relying solely on one's own labour and skills. Because humans evolved within groups, they have faced the challenge of solving several vital tasks of social living (see Box 4.3). One of the fundamental tasks of group life is *cooperation*, which requires coordinating the efforts of multiple people towards particular goals and purposes (Bowles & Gintis, 2013; N. Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Sterelny, 2012; Tomasello, 2009). S*ocial (*or *group) cooperative coordination* is considered to be one of the main evolutionary tasks that are necessary for human beings to survive (Boos et al., 2011). This coordination can be defined as the systematic arrangement of people's actions for working together towards achieving a common goal. Without such coordinated cooperation, productive and secure group life would have been practically impossible because it would have turned into chaos.

Great apes cooperate; but, as philosopher Tuomela (2007) described it, they execute "I-mode cooperation" (p. 150). This means that their cooperative activities are guided by individual intentionality that does not take into account the

intentionality of other members of the group. For example, chimpanzees' hunting is driven predominantly by their individual goals (individual intentionality); it does not consider (or considers minimally and superficially) the goals and intentions of their group mates (chimpanzees do not consider others as intentional agents). Because of this individualistic mode of functioning, their cooperative hunting often fails. Evolving humans needed efficient cooperative expeditions to attain greater chances of success. Because of this, the demand for new social traits and thinking skills needed to emerge. According to Tomasello, this demand was met in the cognitive domain by the development of *joint intentionality*, which complemented the individual intentionality humans inherited from great apes. This form of intentionality tremendously extended the possibilities of socially regulating pre-human behaviours in groups.

> Out of the elements of these sophisticated processes of individual intentionality built for competition – understanding how particular goals and perceptions of others generate particular actions – in early humans evolved more sophisticated processes of *joint* intentionality, involving *joint* goals and *joint* attention built for social coordination.
>
> (Tomasello, 2014, p. 34)

In addition to joint intentionality, Tomasello (2011, 2016) proposed that early humans were in the process of developing more tolerant and pro-social personalities that suited enhanced cooperative activities better than the intolerant, individualistic, and dominance-prone personalities of great apes. Early humans also developed new motivation for their cooperative activities as well as cooperative communication. In particular, individuals became concerned with how their group mates evaluated their working and cooperative skills and whether these group members accepted them as cooperating partners. According to this hypothesis, because of its new, emerging personality traits and motivation, joint intentionality was the missing link between the great apes' social skills and the modern humans' ability towards symbolic, perspectival, and collective intentionality that gave raise to Cultures.

What is joint intentionality? Why is it effective? According to Tomasello, early humans grouped in relatively small, face-to-face bands, presumably of about 30–50 individuals. Within these groups, they formed smaller units for various cooperative activities, with foraging being the primary one (see Box 4.3 on the relations among sociality, size of groups, and human evolution). These bands were sparsely dispersed throughout vast territories, and they only contacted each other occasionally. For joint intentionality to develop, the size of the groups had to be large enough to provide a milieu for developing new social skills but not so large that it made the task of cooperation unmanageable.

Box 4.3 Definition and explanation. The human sociality, group size, and human evolution: Caporael and Dunbar's hypotheses

As mentioned, human beings evolved as social animals. Our ancestors lived, functioned, and survived in groups. An important aspect of group living is the size of the group in which humans function. Several evolutionary scholars have hypothesized that group size plays a significant role in human evolution.

An American evolutionary scholar Linnda Caporael suggested that group size as well as the tasks that individuals were involved in within these groups and the cognitive functions that regulate these tasks are the features that determined human psychosocial evolution (Caporael, 1997, 2007; Caporael & Baron, 1997). Based on empirical evidence, including ethnographic research of modern hunter-gatherers, the researcher identified three core groups: the *work/family group* that had an average size of five individuals, the *deme (band, tribe)* of around 30 persons, and the *macrodeme (macroband)* that was composed of approximately 300 individuals (Caporael, 2007, p. 12).[5]

The primary social unit within this taxonomy is the *work/family groups* that focus directly on maintaining the group's existence: feeding its members, protecting them, and providing an environment conducive to everyday functioning. The modal tasks of work/family groups focus on foraging, including hunting, fishing, and gathering, as well as direct interface with habitat, meaning facing and interacting with their environment.

Band or *tribe* is the next level of social organization. Bands organize families, coordinate work groups, accumulate the practical skills acquired by families and work groups, and generate common knowledge. Bands move from place to place. This social arrangement provided the background for the evolution of culture as the construction of a common social reality and the emergence of the sense of social identity.

Macrobands are formed through the regular seasonal gatherings of bands that occur to find mates, exchange gifts, share stories, gossip, perform rituals, and play games. Macrobands are identified by sharing a common language, history of origin, and customs. They are the playgrounds for the development of culture, including the primary "social imaginaries" (p. 13), such as social representations, group identity, stereotypes, and shared worldviews.

These core social groups are hierarchically organized. The processes and adaptations that evolved at the lower levels are incorporated and advanced at the higher levels of social arrangement. This hypothesis of core group configurations highlights that "humans evolved to be 'obligatory interdependent'" (p. 14) and that social arrangements, humans' mental abilities, and culture worked together in shaping the way humans are today.

A similar logic aimed at connecting groups' size with human psychosocial evolution was proposed by anthropologist and evolutionary psychologist Robin Dunbar (2016). Based on the *social brain hypothesis* (Dunbar, 1998) that suggests that the primary determinant of primate brain evolution was the complexity of their social lives (Humphrey, 1976), Dunbar proposed that the evolution of primates' intellectual capacities would correlate with the size of the communities in which they live. Moreover, he showed that there was an optimal group size that was conducive to the evolution of exclusively human cognitive capacities. He put forward the following hierarchy of human social arrangements based on their sizes: family with an average of five individuals, camp groups (or bands) of 30–50 individuals, clans/villages of 150 individuals, and tribes of between 500 and 2,500 persons. In his analysis, the magic number was 150. Out of all primates, the maximum cranial volume to neocortex ratio belongs to modern humans and is associated with the communities of 150 individuals. Coincidentally, this is the size of independent self-regulated and sustainable groups; for example, hunter-gathers villages (ancient and modern), companies in an army, modern Hutterites communities, and many other ancient and modern functional social units (Dunbar, 2016, Table 3.1).

Notably, there is no consensus among researchers about the size of the communities that gave rise to modern humans. However, it is universally accepted that the size of social arrangements played a crucial role in these processes.

Imagine a hunting party of 5–6 members searching for a game in a forest. The initial impetus for such an activity was that these individuals and their offspring became hungry, and this individualistic motive led some of them into the field. Prior to the creation of small groups, they would each hunt for small animals separately, perhaps trapping hares or monkeys. One can imagine that they might have started with these targets. Then, they might have noticed a herd of antelopes with several large stags. Upon seeing these stags, they decided to cooperate to kill one animal because it is nearly impossible for one person to kill such a large animal on their own. Such cooperation, if successful, would have provided these hunters with large quantities of high-quality meat that would have fed the entire group for an extended period. Thus, such hunting cooperation would have been seen as more beneficial for their individual and collective survival and superior to each of these hunters working on their own to catch small animals (Skyrms, 2004).

Let us now consider the mechanism of social and cognitive regulation of such joint cooperation. First, each of these hunters had their individual motives (hunger), individual-based representations, and corresponding cognitive models.

This machinery of individual intentionality was passed down to them from the common ancestors they shared with other primates. However, this form of intentionality would have been unable to help regulate complex cooperative hunting. Therefore, new and more sophisticated regulation was needed here, and it emerged in the form of joint intentionality.

The primary components of joint intentionality. The primary cognitive process that comprises joint intentionality is the development of *joint goals*. Tomasello describes this process as follows:

> (1) I must have the goal to capture the stag together with you; (2) you must have the goal to capture the stag with me; and, critically, (3) we must have mutual knowledge, or common ground, that we both know each other's goals.
>
> (Tomasello, 2014, p. 38)

The mutuality of knowledge about each other's goals, which is known in social philosophy as *intersubjectivity*, constitutes the essence of joint intentionality: You and I – We – jointly intend to capture and kill a stag and we share this understanding. Consequently, joint goals are the objectives that are intersubjectively shared among several individuals.

Such cooperation will inevitably require the distribution of labour: one or two individuals will be beaters; others will arrange to ambush and kill the stag. Through this labour distribution, each person will have a *specific role* during this hunting, and, correspondently, each will have a *particular perspective*. Members of the party need to know the roles others will be performing so they can imagine their perspectives and consider them when planning and executing their parts of the plan. Thus, in order for this hunting to be successful, individual perspectives along with related individual motives (I am hungry) and individual goals (I will get some meat) have to mesh with the roles and perspectives of other hunters (who are also hungry and want meat). Therefore, this individual cognitive regulation is transformed into a joint cognitive regulation where the individual cognitive representations are combined with cognitive representations of the goals, roles, and perspectives of other hunters. Consequently, the cognitive mental models of human beings began to represent two layers of regulation: an individual one and a joint layer that included multiple perspectives.

The third element of joint intentional regulation is *joint attention*. Attention is a cognitive ability that directs organisms towards relevant information and filters out irrelevant information. In a hunt, the target animal and its behaviours are important. For example, the fact that the bushes where hunters are hiding may have many ripe berries is completely irrelevant at this point (but it may be relevant to remember because berries are also part of these people's diet). Because the hunters have joint goals and are executing joint actions, the relevant information also includes the joint cooperative nature of this expedition. The cooperating hunters should be

aware of the focus of attention of their partners as they all watch for and become aware of the same target; in turn, they regulate the attention of the other hunters if the target makes a sudden move or, for example, if a predator that also hunts for the same stag (and may be dangerous to the hunters) appears.

The fourth element of cooperative activity regulation is *individuals' perspectives* within the joint cooperative activity. As mentioned earlier, because of the distribution of labour that was needed to hunt large animals, each hunter was assigned an individual role. Within each role, individuals acquire unique perspectives on the whole expedition. The idea of a cognitive perspective occurs in situations when two or more individuals attend to the same target, and they each have their unique individual visual perspectives. For example, the bush beaters and the hunters preparing to ambush have different visual perspectives because of the distribution of labour. On the other hand, hunters may each consider the same target with different meanings. For a veteran hunter, the killed animal may be seen exclusively as a source of food; in contrast, for a young hunter, this killing may also be a way to prove their strength and skilfulness. Thus, these two hunters will have different meaning perspectives during the same hunt. All the hunters have the same target, they set joint goals, they plan to execute joint actions, and they share attention. However, all these joint activities are performed from each person's individual perspective while taking into consideration the perspectives of others.

The double-layered structure of joint cooperation regulation. Now, we are ready to make an important conclusion. The regulative cognitive models of the joint cooperative activities of pre-modern humans have dual structures. They simultaneously combine *individuality* and *sharedness* (Tomasello, 2014, pp. 43 and 46). Individuality is represented by individualistic motivations, individual goals, as well as individual roles and perspectives; ultimately, it is arranged by the I-mode of functioning. Sharedness comes with joint goals, intersubjective understandings of the jointness of these goals, and joint attention that includes an understanding of others' roles and perspectives. However, as it follows from the above description, individual intentionality is subordinated to and controlled by the joint intentionality that emerges in a cooperating group. This dual structure is dramatically different from that of the one-layered composition of the cognitive models for the individual intentionality of great apes. In humans, it has a second layer of the socially created regulatory system. This social regulatory mechanism becomes an indication of the emergence of an exclusively human mentality and behaviour.

Consequences of the new form of sociocognitive regulation. There are several consequences of this new structure of sociocognitive regulation upon the development of early humans' minds and their social environment. First, the self-monitoring and self-regulation that accompanied individual intentionality are now complemented (and often overruled) by social (self-) monitoring, as pre-modern humans became concerned with how other individuals evaluate them as cooperative partners.

If others evaluate them positively, then it is highly probable that they will join them in forming another hunting party. To say it differently, people became concerned with what others think about their hunting and collaborative skills. Because of this, the success of any cooperative activity now has two aspects: instrumental – whether hunters caught a stag – and social – how good the other members of the party were in executing their roles. Thus, "the anticipated social evaluation of important others" (Tomasello, 2014, p. 47) becomes as significant an outcome of the cooperative activities for early humans as the actual material success of the expeditions is.

Second, a successful cooperative activity requires effective *cooperative communication*. Cooperation provides motivation to communicate with one's partners, regulate their attention, share experiences with them, and learn from them. Tomasello (2008; 2014) hypothesized that the environment of joint cooperative activity provided a fertile ground for human communication to emerge: first in gestures, then in spoken language, and finally in written language.

Third, the joint collaborative attributes and intersubjectivity give rise to a new form of relationships in groups. Group members create 'We-relationships' and 'We-intentionality' among themselves. These 'We-relationships' lay the groundwork for more sophisticated forms of cooperation, which will ultimately lead to the emergence of Culture. Tuomela (2007) called this form of regulation the *We-mode functioning*.

The emergence of nascent consciousness and the sense of self. Two fundamental human attributes started to appear during this period, initially in their nascent forms; subsequently, they reached their full-blown capacities in modern humans. These attributes are *consciousness* and a *sense of self*. Both of these exclusively human phenomena constitute enigmas for researchers that are as large as the phenomenon of Culture. This is not surprising because Culture and consciousness (together with self-consciousness) have co-evolved in a dialectical interdependent fashion.

Conscious awareness of the world and oneself is the most mysterious human mental phenomenon (Chalmers, 1996; Dennett, 1991; Searle, 1997). It is at the core of human mentality, and it is the primary regulator of human activities and experiences. *Consciousness* is the ability of an individual to be aware of the objects of their psychological functioning (the objects one sees, the sounds one hears, the thoughts that come to one's mind, etc.). In addition, consciousness allows an individual to be aware of the very process of this functioning (I see this picture, and I know that I see it; I can reflect on the picture and on the process of seeing it, and I can talk about this process and volitionally change some aspects of it). Seeing a picture is a first-order mental state. Subsequently, being aware that one is seeing a picture is a second-order or meta-mental state; in other words, it is a mental state about another mental state. My awareness – that it is 'I' and not anybody else who sees a picture and is aware of seeing it – is *self-awareness* and related to it, a *sense of self*. Here, the self is treated as a phenomenal centre of a person's awareness and experiences of the world and oneself from the first-person perspective. This leads

people to ask: How are the joint cooperative conditions responsible for the emergence of conscious awareness?

Social philosophers and consciousness theorists agree that the basis of consciousness is the ability of a person to reflect on oneself as if one were looking at oneself from the point of view of an outside observer; this includes considering one's thoughts and feelings from the outside. Therefore, the process of reflection and the ability to be reflective is at the core of consciousness. According to the hypothesis of American philosopher **George Herbert Mead**, the human mind, self-consciousness, and, ultimately, the human self are the results of individuals becoming objects to themselves because of their social relations to others. Specifically, human mental attributes arose because individuals incorporated the attitudes of others and used them as a 'mirror' to see themselves through the eyes of other people. As Mead suggested, the individual "becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved" (Mead, 1934/1962, p. 138). Specifically, my group mates developed attitudes towards me, and I became aware of these attitudes. These attitudes are initially external, meaning they belong to others. Later, these attitudes became internalized, and I started seeing myself through the eyes of my group mates, even when they were not present. Consequently, through internalizing the attitudes that others have towards me, I become aware of myself; my consciousness, self-consciousness, and sense of self start to develop.

Recall that pre-modern humans had been involved in several reflective activities that engaged others. As mentioned, in a cooperative hunt, an individual becomes concerned with how his teammates evaluate his hunting and cooperation skills. Because of this, the evaluative representations of others towards this person become incorporated into their cognitive model of hunting regulation: 'Others think that I am a good hunter; therefore, I am a good hunter.' This means that when others and their opinions about an individual start to enter a person's mind, they start to serve as a mirror for that person; they become aware of their self, and this self becomes an object of their thoughts and feelings. Once these processes emerged, the human nascent self and consciousness started to evolve. These processes were also facilitated by the evolution of cooperative communication when individuals had to worry about how clear their communication efforts were to the recipient; thus, they had to take the role of being a recipient of one's own message (Tomasello, 2014, pp. 57–58). This reflective turn in the emergence of cooperative communication also contributed to the development of self-awareness.

Conclusion. Let us summarize what pre-humans acquired during their evolution. They found themselves in a situation where only cooperative group activity could help them survive. Therefore, cooperation became an imperative mode of functioning. To make this cooperation successful, their cooperative actions had to be coordinated. The most challenging aspect of such synchronization was coordinating "one's own

perspective with the perspective of one's collaborative partner" (Tomasello, 2014, p. 78). This coordination happened through a system of joint mental activities and states: joint goals, joint attention, and the intersubjective sharing of one's perspective with others. The cognitive/mental models of regulation obtained a dual structure that combined the individual and the shared aspects of regulations. The emergence of cooperative communication added to the complexity of mental regulation, but it ultimately led to a more successful implementation of cooperative actions. The mechanisms of joint intentionality gave rise to consciousness and the awareness of self.

Why pre-humans with joint intentionality are still not fully humans. The question is: What is missing in the presented schema of behaviour regulation through joint intentionality that does not allow us to consider these early humans to be modern humans? According to Tomasello's hypothesis, there are substantial limitations in the joint intentionality regulative model. 'Jointness' of early humans embraces a narrow circle of immediate partners, and it does not go beyond their relatively small face-to-face groups. He called this the 'second-personal' mode of regulation: You (and others immediately close to me) and I jointly share common mental representations. This regulation is unstable, as it is driven by self-interested individuals who find cooperation foraging more beneficial than doing it alone. Once a hunting expedition is successfully completed, the network of joint intentionality among participating party's dissolves until the next expedition. Although this regulation is social in nature, it is still one step behind collective-based cultural regulation because, at any particular time, joint intentionality does not include all group members, only a fraction of them. The level of reflectivity of pre-humans was weak because of the small number of perspectives and attitudes of others that a person was required to incorporate and utilize. In addition, the communication of pre-humans was prelinguistic, as it was primarily based on pointing and pantomiming. Such communication did not allow them to communicate their intentional states in detail. Therefore, the level of intersubjectivity in these jointly regulated groups was weak. In sum, premodern humans made a huge leap from the individual intentionality of great apes, going from competitiveness and individualism to a socially coordinated regulation of cooperative actions and communication. It is fair to say that early humans developed the mechanism of *social* but not *cultural* regulation of behaviour. To move forward to become full humans, they needed to invent an intentionality that embraced all members of their group and uniformly regulated all behaviours and actions.

Level 3: The emergence of modern humans through collective intentionality and Culture

Before we start exploring the rise of modern humans, it is important to mention the phrase from *Encyclopedia Britannica* that the emergence of human Culture, including language and symbolically mediated ideas and beliefs, is among the

greatest unsolved puzzles in the study of human evolution (https://www.britannica.com/science/human-evolution/Language-culture-and-lifeways-in-the-Pleistocene). Simply said, we do not know why or how Culture and corresponding human cognitive capacities evolved and what factors (climate change, population size increase, changes in diet, etc.) triggered the development of the *Homo sapiens* species. Read several reasons for such a sobering statement in Box 4.1.

Tomasello (2014) offers his vision of how Culture and uniquely human cognitive capacities co-evolved through cooperative activities and collaborative communication. He uses rich empirical evidence and provides insightful hypotheses about how human society and Culture evolved. In addition, his understanding of Culture as intersubjective, collectively intentional systems of behaviour regulation corresponds well with the idea of Culture as a system of sociocultural models that guides this textbook. The basis of Tomasello's hypothesis about the evolution of modern humans is the idea that changes in population size, ecological conditions, and other factors led to a demand for a new form of social regulation that goes beyond second-personal regulation based on joint intentionality. It was hypothesized that human groups became bigger and had increased inter-group interactions and competition. These new social arrangements required new social regulations that had to be embraced by all members of a group at all times. Therefore, a new form of group-minded, all-encompassing sociocultural regulation needed to arise. However, the emergence of this form of regulation demanded that humans develop new social, cognitive, and mental abilities. The emergence of this regulation, which is called Culture, led to the development of humans' sophisticated cognitive, motivational, and personality faculties as well as to the creation of stable and enduring social institutions and, ultimately, the creation of societies. It is important to remember that linear causal thinking does not work in understanding these processes of human evolution. Culture, complex cognitive abilities, including an ability towards linguistic communication (language), and social structures co-evolved during dialectical interactions among each other. It was a systemic process of the emergence of humanity and not a linear causation from social to cultural to human mentality.

How modern humans evolved. The starting point for Culture to develop, according to Tomasello, was the process of changes in the social arrangements of late pre-modern humans. Their face-to-face groups, often called *bands* (up to 50 individuals), started growing into bigger units, known as *tribes* or *macrobands* (up to 300–500 individuals) (see also Box 4.3). This organization of intratribal coordination of bands, along with the between-tribal competition for resources, required new forms of social regulation. The basis for the emergence of new regulative mechanisms was joint intentionally, nascent cooperative communication, and specific cognitive, personality, and motivation traits, including emerging consciousness and a sense of self, that had developed in early humans. Late pre-modern humans, armed with these capabilities, faced the new problem of social regulation within and between

relatively large social collectivities. The creation of Culture addresses this demand. According to many scholars' accounts, this transition from pre-modern to anatomically modern humans happened around 300,000 to 200,000 years ago.

The principal shift that happened during this emergence was that the regulation of individuals moved from the 'second-personal' mode to a 'group-minded' mode. In this latter mode, more than several group mates need to be coordinated by joint intentionality; here, the group as a whole created normative collective regulatory mechanisms for all members. Tomasello hypothesized the basis of this group-based regulation by using the term *collective intentionality* (see Box 4.4).

Box 4.4 What is collective intentionality?

Collective intentionality is an important concept in social philosophy, sociology, and social psychology (Jankovic & Ludwig, 2018). The most succinct definition of collective intentionality is provided by philosopher John Searle (2006): "In addition to individual intentionality, which is described in the first-person singular forms such as 'I desire', 'I believe', 'I intend', there is also collective intentionality, which is described in the form, 'we believe', 'we desire', 'we intend'" (p. 16). Thus, collective intentionality is a group phenomenon where not just an individual but a group as a unit intends something. This means that the minds that constitute the group are "jointly directed at objects, matters of facts, states of affairs, goals or values" (Schweikard & Schmid, 2013). Collective intentionality is not only directed towards existing things; for example, we as a group intend to defend our village or to build bridges. Thus, it may create new things, for example, money, divorce, sexual assault, schooling, or government. In this constitutive function, collective intentionality is the foundation of social reality. As soon as collective intentionality emerged in human groups, a society and social institutions started forming.

This process of transforming social regulation into a sociocultural one included several aspects.

- The first characteristic of group-minded regulation is the development of *conventional cultural practices* (CCPs). Recall that in pre-human groups, joint intentionality and intersubjectivity dissolved as soon as hunting expeditions (or other cooperative activities) were carried out. Because of this, when a new party was formed, its members had to start developing a joint regulatory system all over again. For the sake of increasing the efficiency and transferability of social regulation, it seems logical that members of a hunting party might decide to preserve their experiences and techniques by creating norms and

practices that transcend one local party and apply to everybody in their tribe who is going hunting. Such a decision may apply not only to hunting but also to other forms of foraging, defence, cooking, parenting, and many other group activities. These CCPs indicate that 'we' (not 'I' and 'You,' but the whole group) decide to do things in the way that is conventional, most beneficial, and common to our group.

- Because of the emergence of CCPs, everybody knows that all others know these practices; thus, this creates what Tomasello labelled a "cultural common ground" (2014, p. 85). Cultural common ground is a symbolic space in a group within which its members know the CCPs, and they know that others know them too. This collective intentionality and intersubjectivity facilitate a higher order of 'We-mode' functioning that regulates all group activities.
- CCPs prescribe how to do things. Because the whole group shares these practices, they become normative. This means that it is expected that all members of a group (excluding children, people with mental disabilities, and outsiders) will do these things in the prescribed ways. Thus, the emergence of CCPs was followed by the development of *social norms* – which are the mutual anticipations that members of a group should behave in particular ways. These norms are impersonal (they are applied to every member of a collective, as they do not target particular individuals; they are agent-neutral), transpersonal (it is not that I require that you behave in a certain way; rather, the group demands to conform to group conventions), and generic (they are used as group-based 'objective' standards to evaluate everybody's behaviour).
- *Social norms* gain a strong motivating force in regulating members' behaviours. People not only become interested in following these norms and practices themselves but they also watch how others follow them because it is beneficial to all group members for everyone in the group to follow them. Deviations from these norms may create disturbances in the group's functioning; such deviations "should not be tolerated, and indeed, if individuals behave too differently, it signals that they are not one of us (or do not want to be one of us) and cannot be trusted. Group-minded individuals thus view nonconformity in general as potentially harmful to group life in general" (Tomasello, 2014, p. 88).
- Members of bands/tribes are judged by other members based on their adherence to the group norms. Correspondently, my self-monitoring and self-appraisal are based on applying these group norms and group expectations to my behaviours and my adherence to these norms. Based on this, my public status and reputation are established. Ultimately, my *public persona*, or how I am perceived by my group and who I am in the public's eyes, becomes a social product that is created by this collectivity (Tomasello, 2014, p. 90).

- CCPs that are regularly repeated ultimately transform into *cultural/social institutions*.[6] Take, for example, parenting. Based on the climate where a group lives, the resources it has, the food that is available to it, and other factors, members of a group develop the most beneficial ways for parents to take care of, feed, discipline, and entertain their children. (We will discuss these ways in the Chapter 7.) When all parents embrace these practices and norms in a community, a sociocultural institution of familial parenting emerges. Thus, parenting evolves from an instinct-driven child survival support to a sociocultural institution that is created by a collectivity and supported by its members. It exists as a motivating force for current and future parents. Similar institutions are created for all other aspects of communal life, including marriage and family, education, health care, political and governmental management, and many others. They make a new form of reality – *institutional reality*, a form of sociocultural reality that is "both objectively real and socially constructed" (Tomasello, 2014, p. 92).
- This new form of social regulation, including all mentioned components – CCPs, cultural common ground, social norms, and sociocultural institutions – was labelled *Culture* as a group-based, all-encompassing, socially constructed, regulatory mechanism of human behaviour. Because of the geographical distribution of late pre-modern humans and modern humans, various forms of Culture evolved, thus creating a diversity of *cultures*.
- After their emergence, cultures start evolving and accumulating their innovations. Thus, *cumulative cultural evolution* occurs naturally. When new members are born into a group, they do not need to create from zero hunting practices, cooking techniques, or child-rearing routines. These practices, techniques, and routines are all passed down to them by their parents and other senior group members. Children learn and internalize these techniques, and then they use them to the best of their abilities. At some point, after becoming socialized adults, they may invent new and more effective ways of doing things – thus moving the group culture forward in its evolution. The next generation of group members will learn these innovations and use them to their advantage. At some point, these future new members will invent something new, and the culture of their community will continue to evolve.
- Along the line of adherence to CCPs and social norms, the *group identification* of tribe members started developing. As the size of human collectivities increased from bands to tribes, it became important to identify one's tribesmen and women in order to arrange foraging, hunting, defence, and other collective activities. The primary markers of such group identities became behavioural practices: "people who talk like us, prepare food like us, and net fish in a conventional way – that is, those who share our cultural practices – are very likely members of our cultural group" (Tomasello, 2014, p. 83). This is how 'We' do

things here. Later, this sense of group identification was extended to include the ancestors of these people and the historical antecedents of their existence. In turn, this created a strong positive social identity: this is who 'we' are. As soon as groups became tight and relatively structured entities, they became the unit of evolution; one group has the opportunity to advance and succeed in surviving, while others may perish.

- *Cognitive representations* become rich and complex as they now include individual, second-personal, and group-based expectations, norms, and evaluations. People's inference and self-monitoring skills must also become complex because of the group-normative prescriptions that they must monitor. Ultimately, a person's cognitive models must incorporate the group's practices, norms, expectations, attitudes, sanctions, and values. Thus, the mental models of modern humans become reflections of, in Tomasello's terminology, their cultural common ground. Therefore, they are saturated by cultural content, and, because of this, they become (socio) *cultural mental models*.
- A new and elaborated form of *conventional linguistic communication* emerges within the frameworks of collective intentionality and group-based intersubjectivity (Tomasello, 2008). Among pre-modern humans, communication was local, meaning that it was intended to solve practical issues at hand. For cultural communities bonded through collective intentionality, communication developed as a convention for all people and for all occasions. Conventional communicative practices are known to all members of a group, and they are used in a broad variety of situations. This convention first occurred in the forms of gestures exchanged and simple vocalizations; later, it was elaborated into language, both oral and written. The emergence of language was revolutionary for the development of human cognitive abilities and the advancement of sociocultural institutions and Culture.
- Because of these more sophisticated forms of reflection that were needed for collective social norms and linguistic communication, *human consciousness* and the *self* were developed into full-blown abilities, and they became central points of the human mental regulation of behaviour. Ultimately, as a consequence of all these transformations, full-fledged *Homo sapiens* emerged.

This rise of modern humans' Culture, together with humans' unique mental capabilities – language, symbolic thinking, meta-representations (representations of first-order representations and a capacity towards abstraction) – happened about 50,000 years ago (Foley, 2006). The evolution of modern humans was also accompanied by new technological innovations, such as the emergence of agriculture, the invention of the wheel, new weaponry, and many other advances. It also went together with the emergence of the arts: singing, dancing, drawing, and painting, as well as the development of religion.

Box 4.5 The slippery slope of Social Darwinism

When considering the evolution of cultures, be aware of the danger of *Social Darwinism*, which was developed in the 19th century by Herbert Spencer, Thomas Malthus, and Francis Galton. These scholars and their followers unjustifiably applied the Darwinian idea of natural selection to cultural and social groups, nations, and states, declaring that some societies/cultures are more fit than others. As a result, these cultures are considered to be more advanced, more sophisticated, and, ultimately, better than others. These ideas justified colonialism, racial prejudice, discrimination, and the exploitation of the 'less developed' societies by the 'more advanced' ones.

Each culture that exists in our world has evolved and survived because it fits well within the environment and conditions of the communities that have created it. Recall the sufferings and deaths of white European Arctic explorers who, despite having vast knowledge of their own cultures, were unable to survive in the frigid environment where Inuit and other Northern Aboriginal people have thrived for thousands of years. In terms of living successfully in the Arctic, these Northern cultures have proven to be more advanced than the European/white ones. The issue of *relativism* is also relevant here. Every culture should be judged against the history, ecology, and conditions within which it has developed. Because of this, cultural communities, especially those who live in vastly different conditions, cannot be compared with one another.

Culture-gene co-evolution

In this second cycle of hominin evolution, the evolutionary pressures related to pre-modern humans surviving in large groups and new environments led to the natural selection of physiological, mental, and behavioural traits that ultimately formed the nature of modern humans. Following are some examples of this co-evolution.

As mentioned earlier, the survival of early humans depended on their successfully completing cooperative activities in different domains of their lives, especially foraging. These cooperative activities required that these early humans had control for and inhibition of their individualistic and non-cooperative impulses. To execute this control, the large frontal lobes with a sophisticated neocortex evolved; they perform a regulatory function that restrains impulses coming from the more ancient areas of the brain. In addition, the same regions of the brain manage attention and participate in planning and executing complex actions (Singer, 2006).

The emerged second-personal (based on joint intentionality) and cultural (based on collective intentionality) forms of mental and behavioural regulation required

complex mental representations that were able to symbolize other people and their intentions. They also demanded the ability for a person to reflect on one's own actions and the ability for meta-representations and abstraction. It is believed that several layers of association areas in the neocortex developed to manage these requirements (Singer, 2006).

The demand for a more sophisticated vocalization that would be suitable for articulated communication and speech production led to the emergence of a new anatomy of the throat, including specifically human vocal cords and the larynx (Chase, 2006).

As discussed earlier, both joint and collective intentionality incorporate the capability towards joint attention and the ability to coordinate one's partner's attention by following their gaze. Several scholars, including Tomasello and his colleagues (Kobayashi & Hashiya, 2011; Tomasello et al., 2007), have proposed the hypothesis that the large area of white sclera around the iris of human eyes emerged to make it easier for others to follow the directions of one's gaze and, correspondently, their attention. The eyes of apes and lower monkeys have little, if any, white areas around the iris; in turn, this makes following their gazes much more difficult.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we reviewed one of the most challenging topics mankind has encountered: how have humans evolved? To this end, we have asked, What is Culture? And what role has Culture played in human evolution? We examined two approaches to answer these questions. The first is based on the biological mechanisms of human evolution, while the second emphasizes Culture-gene co-evolution mechanisms. Evolutionary psychology represents the first approach, and the shared intentionality theory illustrates the second one. The sociobiological understanding of human evolution hypothesizes that human mental, social, and communicative capacities evolved because of biological evolution or the genetic selection that leads to genetic adaptations. Evolutionary psychologists argue that because of adaptive pressures during the Pleistocene epoch (about 2 million years ago), various psychological mechanisms evolved to solve hominins' adaptive problems. Subsequently, these mechanisms worked together to produce Culture as a high-level adaptation of groups of humans who lived in particular geographical and ecological niches. Therefore, according to this approach, modern humans evolved because of the biological evolution of psychological mechanisms. Culture did not participate in this process and was developed by hominin groups to adapt to the environments in which they lived.

The second approach to human evolution, which includes several Culture-gene co-evolution theories, suggests that Culture participated directly in the process of human evolution. The social living of our human ancestors created adaptive

pressures to develop the mental, communicative, and behavioural traits that were selected; subsequently, these were genetically transmitted to offspring and, ultimately, shaped modern humans. According to this approach, Culture also participates in evolution through the mechanisms of social learning. This means that humans have particular traits and capabilities not because these traits were transmitted to them through genes from their ancestors but because they learned them from their community's knowledge, skills, and practices through imitation, teaching, and other forms of social learning.

The shared intentionality theory is the most recent and most psychological hypothesis within the Culture-gene co-evolution approach. After analysing available evolutionary literature, experiments, and other sources, Tomasello and his colleagues articulated a step-by-step process of the phylogenetic development of humans. Culture is understood as the collectively intentional, normative, and conventional models and practices that regulate and structure people's behaviours in groups. In this regulative role, Culture played a central role in the emergence of modern humans. Because of the emergence of Culture, humans developed sophisticated mental and behavioural capacities. One of the main capacities of evolved modern humans is using language and other symbolic forms to represent the world and communicate about it. Importantly, the emergence of Culture and language allowed humans to create a new form of reality for themselves: *sociocultural reality*. This reality transforms the existing natural world into collectively intentional things and creates new collectively intentional things. Thus, humans' lives unfold in the human-made sociocultural reality that determines everything that happens in their lives. Consequently, it is impossible to understand why people do, think, and feel the way they do without analysing the realities that have shaped them and, hence, their cultures.

Glossary

Adaptation is phenotypic and/or behavioural traits or mechanisms that were created by natural selection to solve the problems of reproduction and survival; hence, they aim to enhance the fitness of an organism. Adaptations are inheritable and transmitted across generations by genes. This term also describes the process of evolvement of these mechanisms during biological evolution.

Adaptively relevant environment: "A central part of evolutionary theory is that there is a fit between the characteristics of any species and the environment in which it lives, and that this has been shaped over evolutionary history by the process of natural selection. … It follows from this process that for any particular species there is an environment to which it is best suited to live, and equally others where it cannot or can only do so with difficulty (i.e., zones of adaptation and maladaptation). Another outcome is that the traits of any organism are best understood in terms of the particular environment in which they evolved. Thus, for

example, the thick fur of a polar bear and its color are explicable in the context of a cold, snowy landscape" (Pagel, 2002). For humans, social groups, Culture, and the symbolic environment form their adaptively relevant environment.

"Archaic *Homo sapiens* [is] an older term for hominids with larger brains and more modern crania that appear in the fossil records about 500 kya [thousand years ago] in Africa and Europe, and somewhat later in eastern Asia" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A4). Other synonymous terms are 'pre-modern humans' and 'early humans.'

"Australopithecines: a genus (*Australopithecus*) of extinct hominids that lived from 4.2 mya [million years ago] to about 1.8 mya. Australopithecines were characterized by bipedal locomotion, robust teeth and jaws, and ape-sized brains" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A4).

Biological evolution: "Biological evolution, stripped to its barest essentials, is nothing more than the temporal changes in the genetic makeup of populations" (Pagel, 2002). Biological evolution is a genetic selection that occurs when differences in a particular phenotypic (observable) trait brings increased fitness to an organism; such differences are attributed to the genetic differences that could be transmitted to following generations (see Adaptation). Biological evolution includes three processes: *variation* (some phenotypic traits vary within a population; for example, diversity in birds' plumage), *selection* (the variants that provide the best fit of individuals to their environments are selected; this means that the organisms with the fittest traits survive), and *retention* (survived individuals passes on their genes that are responsible for the fittest variant to their offspring). See also Natural selection.

"Cultural evolution the idea that Darwin's theory of evolution – comprising variation, competition and inheritance – applies to cultural change, where inheritance derives from social learning rather than genetic transmission" (Mesoudi, 2016, p. 18). Cultural evolution is an acquisition of behavioural or phenotypic traits based on information, skills, or forms of behaviour that an individual learns from other members of their group. This process of *cultural/social learning* is also called *cultural transmission*. Researchers (Wood, 2011) differentiate between *vertical transmission* (from parents to children), *oblique transmission* (from members of an older generation to individuals of a younger generation), and *horizontal transmission* (from individuals in the same generation to one another). Based on the *dual-inheritance* or *gene-culture co-evolution theory*, traits that evolved through the demands of Culture can be inherited and passed on to the next generation by genes (for example, humans gaining lactose tolerance).

"Culture (in the evolution theories) is information stored in human brains that is acquired by imitation, teaching, or some other forms of social learning and that is capable of affecting behaviour or some other aspect of individual's phenotype" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A6). Culture is cumulative and it shows signs of change and improvement across generations.

Cognitive model (in individual intentionality) is the typification or categorization of all the organism's experiences accumulated during its life.

Cognitive map is a form of cognitive model that represents a situation in which organism is prepared to function, including "a mental representation of the location of objects in space and time that allows for efficient navigation" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A5).

Dual inheritance theory (DIT) (see also **gene-culture co-evolution):** "A theory which states that Culture and biology are separate but interacting processes affecting human

behavioural response. The interaction between the two can produce results that are predicted by neither process on its own" (Barrett et al., 2002, p. 385).

Environment of evolutionary adaptedness (EEA) is the ancestral environment in which selection pressures form an adaptation. "The past environment(s) in which currently observed adaptations were shaped" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A6). According to evolutionary psychologists, "the EEA refers to the evolutionary conditions under which human mental abilities evolved, and hence to the selective processes that shaped the human mind" (Pagel, 2002).

Evolutionary psychology: "Evolutionary psychologists generally assume that the attributes of the species they study (in this case, humans) have evolved through natural selection. Specifically, evolutionary psychologists assume that the brain circuitry and processes underlying human behavior include features maintained from our primate ancestry and modifications that were selected because, at the time they evolved, they led to adaptive behavior. It is thus sometimes said that the human brain houses an 'adapted mind'" (Pagel, 2002).

Fitness: "The capability of an individual to reproduce so that its genes are represented in the next generation. Fitness is measured as the proportion of genes contributed to the next generation by an individual relative to the contributions of others" (Wood, 2011, p. 251).

Gene-culture co-evolution theory: "Human characteristics are the product of gene-culture co-evolution, which is an evolutionary dynamic involving the interaction of genes and Culture over long time periods. Gene-culture coevolution is a special case of niche construction. Gene-culture coevolution is responsible for human other-regarding preferences, a taste for fairness, the capacity to empathize and salience of morality and character virtues" (Gintis, 2011, p. 878).

"Genetic variation phenotypic differences between individuals that result from the fact that they have inherited different genes from their parents" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A8).

"Genotype is the genetic composition of an organism" (Barrett et al., 2002, p. 385).

"Heritability [is] the fraction of the phenotypic variation in the population that is the result of genetic variation" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A8).

"Hominids [is] any member of the family Hominidae, including all species of *Australopithecus* and *Homo*" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A9).

"Hominoids [are] members of the superfamily Hominoidea, which includes humans, all living apes, and numerous extinct ape and humanlike species from the Miocene [an epoch from 20 to 5 mya], Pliocene [an epoch from 5 to about 3 mya], and Pleistocene [an epoch from about 3 mln to about 12 thousand years ago] epochs" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A9).

Homo erectus ('upright man') is an extinct species of the genus *Homo*. It lived from about 1.8 million years ago to 50–70,000 years ago. Often the early phase, from 1.8 to 1.25 (or 1.6) million years ago, is considered to be a separate species, *Homo ergaster ('working man')* (New World Encyclopedia; http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Homo_erectus).

Homo ergaster ('working man') is an extinct hominin that lived in Eastern and Southern Africa from about 1.8 million years ago to about 1.3 million years ago. It is one of the

earliest known members of the genus *Homo* and, although it is unclear what genetic influence *H. ergaster* had on later hominids, it is widely proposed to be the direct ancestor of such later hominids as *Homo heidelbergensis*, *Homo sapiens*, *Homo neanderthalensis*, and Asian *Homo erectus* (New World Encyclopedia; http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Homo_ergaster).

***Homo floresiensis*:** "Remains of one of the most recently discovered early human species, *Homo floresiensis* (nicknamed 'Hobbit'), have so far only been found on the Island of Flores, Indonesia. The fossils of *H. floresiensis* date to between about 100,000 and 60,000 years ago, and stone tools made by this species date to between about 190,000 and 50,000 years old" (Smithsonian Museum; http://humanorigins.si.edu/evidence/human-fossils/species/homo-floresiensis).

Homo heidelbergensis was named after the city of Heidelberg, Germany, where the first fossils were found. "This species lived between 300,000 and 600,000 years ago. These humans evolved in Africa, but by 500,000 years ago, some populations were in Europe. They lived and worked in co-operative groups, hunted large animals and made a variety of tools, including stone hand axes and wooden spears set with stone spearheads" (Australian Museum; https://australianmuseum.net.au/learn/science/human-evolution/homo-heidelbergensis/).

Homo neanderthalensis *(the Neanderthals)* was named after the Neander Valley, Germany, where the skull was discovered. "Neanderthals were our closest evolutionary relatives. Their ancestors left Africa before modern humans, venturing into Europe as far back as 500,000 years ago, and were still there when our ancestors embarked on the same journey about 70,000 years ago. Neanderthals and modern humans actually lived alongside each other in Europe for several thousand years before Neanderthals vanished some 30,000 years ago. Their disappearance is one of the most enduring mysteries in all of human evolution. Neanderthals were shorter than modern humans and had barrel chests, stocky limbs, and large noses—traits that were well suited to the frigid climes of Europe during the last Ice Age" (Retrieved from https://genographic.nationalgeographic.com/neanderthals-article/ on November 2022).

Homo sapiens or 'wise man.' The term was introduced by Carl Linnaeus in 1758. The only survived species from the genus *Homo*. Modern humans belong to this species.

Human behavioural ecology follows the ideas of human sociobiology and applies evolutionary biological models to study behavioural variations in humans (Nettle et al., 2013). It focuses on the empirical verification of primary predictions of evolutionary theory by observing humans foraging, mating, and performing other patterns of behaviour; these observations occurred mostly in pre-industrialized societies (Cronk, 1991).

"Human universals [are] features that characterize humans all over the world" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A9).

Intentionality means the 'aboutness' of an organism's mental states. Mental states are directed towards and represent (are about) internal states or external objects or events. These states include needs and goals, sources of food, terrain, other animals, and individuals. Intentionality is a fundamental attribute of the mentality of some animals and of the human mental states, including consciousness. Psychologist Franz Brentano(1874/1973), who introduced this term to psychology, commented, "No physical

phenomenon exhibits anything like it [intentionality]. We can, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena that contain an object intentionally within themselves" (p. 89).

Joint intentionality is the ability of humans to imagine and understand the perspectives and intentions of other human beings. According to the **shared intentionality theory** (Tomasello, 2014, 2019), joint intentionality emerged within cooperating groups of pre-modern humans. This form of intentionality has three primary features: joint goals, joint attention, and regulation of individual perspectives based on the mutual understanding of these goals and perspectives of others. In modern life, joint intentionality is discussed in relation to groupings such as child-mother or husband-wife interactions; it is also used to define interactions in work or sports teams.

Collective intentionality. According to the shared intentionality theory, collective intentionality is the set of cognitive skills that enables modern humans to create sociocultural normative conventions and institutions. These conventions allow members of a group to coordinate their group activities and to execute social control over them. All members of a group know these cultural common grounds and they all know that other members also know them. Collective intentionality lies at the basis of modern humans' cooperative coordination, social cognition, communication, language, and morality (Tomasello, 2014, 2019).

"Memes [is] a term coined by Richard Dawkin to refer to units of cultural information (beliefs and values) transmitted by imitation and teaching" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A10).

"Mental organ [is] a term coined by evolutionary psychologists to refer to special purpose modules that solve particular, circumscribed problems such as keeping accounts in social exchange" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A11).

"Modern *Homo sapiens* Human beings that first appeared in the fossil record 100 kya [thousand years ago]. Their bodies share some important derived features with present-day humans but not always the cultural traditions, symbolic behavior, and complex technologies of later people" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A11). (A synonym: *anatomically modern humans*.)

"Natural selection [is] the process that produces adaptation (See **Adaptation**). Natural selection is based on three postulates: 1) the availability of resources is limited; 2) organisms vary in the ability to survive and reproduce; and 3) traits that influence survival and reproduction are transmitted from parents to offspring. When these three postulates hold, natural selection produces adaptation" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A12).

Ontogenesis (from Greek *ont* 'being' and *genesis* 'origin') is the development of an individual organism from the earliest stages (the fertilization of the egg) to maturity (final adult form) (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008).

"Phenotype [are] the morphological and behavioural traits displayed by an organism as a result of the interaction between genotype and the environment" (Barrett et al., 2002, p. 387).

Phylogenesis (from Greek *phulon* 'race' or 'tribe' and *genesis* 'origin') is the evolutionary development and diversification of a species or a group of organisms (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008). In psychology, this term is used to describe the evolutionary emergence of the mental capabilities of the human mind together with the specifically human sociocultural environments.

"Social intelligence hypothesis [is] the hypothesis that the relatively sophisticated cognitive abilities of higher primates are the outcome of selective pressures that favored intelligence as a means to gain advantages in social groups" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A15). This is also known as the Machiavellian intelligence and the social brain hypotheses (Barrett et al., 2002, pp. 386 and 388).

Sociobiology and human sociobiology: Human sociobiology aims to explain the role natural selection plays in shaping human social behaviours and societies. "Sociobiology is closely related to behavioral ecology, which can be defined as the study of behavior as an adaptation to an animal's environment; sociobiology can be defined as the part of behavioral ecology that is concerned with adaptation to the social environment" (Pagel, 2002).

"Theory of mind [is] the capacity to be aware of the thoughts, knowledge, or perceptions of other individuals. Theory of mind may be a prerequisite for deception, imitation, teaching, and empathy. It is generally thought that humans, and possibly chimpanzees, are the only primates to possess a theory of mind" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A16).

"Traits [are] characteristics of organisms" (Boyd & Silk, 2003, p. A16).

Universal human nature is a system of universal mental and behavioural traits that exist in all people all over the world and that constitute their essential characteristics.

Questions

1. In your opinion, what direction of thought about Culture and human evolution sounds more probable: the sociobiological approach, including evolutionary psychology, or the gene-culture co-evolution theory, including the shared intentionality theory? Articulate the main differences between these two approaches and justify your answer.
2. In your own words, explain the concept of 'cultural evolution.'
3. Is Culture an adaptation of or the human-made environment that evolved together with modern humans' cognitive and mental capabilities? Explain your answer.
4. Highlight the main differences among the individual, joint, and collective forms of intentionality of the shared intentionality theory.
5. How do evolutionary psychology and the shared intentionality theory differ in explaining the emergence of human morality, social cognition, and other attributes?
6. What evolutionary advantages did joint intentionality brought to pre-modern humans over the individual intentionality in apes?
7. Why pre-modern humans equipped with joint intentionality were not fully modern humans?
8. What are the main advantages of collective intentionality and intersubjectivity?
9. According to the shared intentionality theory, what is Culture?
10. What advantages for studying human psychology does the theory of shared intentionality bring?

Recommended Reading

General reviews on human evolution:

Boyd, R., & Silk, J. B. (2003). *How humans evolved* (3rd ed.). New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company.

Lewin, R., & Foley, R. A. (2004). *Principles of human evolution*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

General reviews of evolutionary principles in psychology:

Laland, K. N., & Brown, G. R. (2011). *Sense and nonsense: Evolutionary perspectives on human behaviour*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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On evolutionary psychology:

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Notes

1 *Phylogenesis* (from Greek *phulon* 'race' or 'tribe' and *genesis* 'origin') is the evolutionary development and diversification of a species or a group of organisms (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008). In psychology, this term is used to describe the evolutionary emergence of the mental capabilities of the human mind together with the specifically human sociocultural environment.

2 *Ontogenesis* (from Greek *ont* 'being' and *genesis* 'origin') is the development of an individual organism from the earliest stages (the fertilization of the egg) to maturity (final adult form) (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008).

3 The founder of the attachment theory, British psychologist John Bowlby (1969/1982), was strongly influenced by ethologists in his thinking about the evolutionary roots of child-parent attachment.
4 *Intentionality* means the 'aboutness' of an organism's mental states. Mental states are directed towards and represent (are about) some internal states or external objects or events: needs and goals, sources of food, terrain, other animals, or individuals. Intentionality is a fundamental attribute of the mentality of some animals and of the mental states, including consciousness, of humans.
5 In her classification, Caporael also included dyads, when two persons work together; but for the purpose of the current presentation, where the focus is on large groups of people, I excluded this arrangement from the analysis.
6 *Social/cultural institution* is "a fairly permanent cluster of social usages. It is reasonably enduring, complex integrated pattern of behaviour by which social control is exerted and through which basic social desires or needs can be met" (Winick (1966), Dictionary of anthropology, quoted in (Foley, 2001, p. 171)).

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5 A history of ideas about the sociocultural regulation of human behaviour

Chapter content

- This chapter posits that *historicism* is an integral approach to studying sociocultural phenomena and institutions. The chapter focuses on the sociocultural regulation of human behaviour and the history of hypotheses, concepts, and theories about its mechanisms.
- The analysis starts by reviewing the contribution of German philosophers and scholars, including their concepts of *objektiver geist*, *subjectiver geist*, *volksgeist*, and *völkerpsychologie*.
- The French input includes contributions of Durkheim and his concept of *les représentations collectives*, Moscovici, and his notion of *les représentations sociales*, and Bourdieu and his theory of *structure*, *habitus*, and *practice*.
- Subsequently, the Anglo-American tradition of sociocultural thinking is discussed by presenting the works of Sumner and his concepts of *folkways* and *mores*, as well as Schutz and his conceptual framework of *cultural patterns of the group life*, *systems of typification and relevance*, *schemas of interpretation and expression*, and some others.
- The final group of analysed scholars include American cognitive anthropologists D'Andrade and Shore, who independently elaborated upon the *theory of cultural models*. The chapter discusses their concepts of *intersubjectivity*, *internalization*, *public and internalized forms of cultural models*, *foundational schemas*, and *conventional mental models*, among others.
- The chapter ends by summarizing the analysed ideas, and it concludes that there is consilience among these diverse thinkers in addressing how communities' cultures and social arrangements regulate people's mentalities and behaviours.

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The previous chapter analysed the natural history of the sociocultural regulation of human behaviour. Using the theory of shared intentionality, we deconstructed how Culture has emerged and, through collective intentionality, how it became the primary regulator of emerging humans' social behaviours. Because of Culture, humans constructed and then embraced a new form of reality. This reality is composed of and saturated by meanings assigned to everything that they do and see. Subsequently, we can talk about Culture as the sociocultural mechanism of people's functioning within a newly constructed reality.

Historicism is a central intellectual tool of the sociocultural approach to understanding human functioning. This principle states that it is impossible to fully comprehend various collectively intentional things (marriage, the penitentiary system, democracy, and thousands of others) without first analysing their intellectual history – who, when, where, and why invented these institutions and how they have evolved over the years. Therefore, this chapter surveys the intellectual history of the ideas about the sociocultural form of behaviour regulation. On the following pages, we review the eminent intellectuals who contributed to our current knowledge of how cultural meanings and social interactions, institutions, and regulations emerged and participated in people's lives. These ideas will be analysed geographically by country and chronologically by time to provide a comprehensive picture of how philosophers, social scholars, and researchers articulated their propositions to explain how the actions and experiences of people are not exclusively their individual enterprises; rather, they are the products of their communities, which are involved in their socialization, guidance, and control. These ideas underlie the *theory of sociocultural models*, which allows us to understand the relationships between Culture, the human mind, and behaviour.

Why is it significant to employ historicism in sociocultural psychology?

One of the first scholars who pointed to historicism in social sciences was the Italian philosopher and historian **Giambattista Vico** (1668–1744). He suggested that understanding something, especially in a social domain, is knowing it "through causes." Thus, "we can be said fully to know a thing if, and only if, we know why it is as it is, or how it came to be, or was made to be, and not merely that it is what it is, and has the attributes it has" (Berlin, 1976, p. 13). Therefore, the importance of the historical approach in social and psychological sciences came.

There are several reasons why historicism is important for social sciences. First, various sociocultural phenomena are not tangible, like rocks, clouds, trees, and animals – things that were produced by cosmic, terrestrial, or biological evolution. These things emerged without the influence or involvement of humans or their social arrangements. In contrast, sociocultural occurrences are human-made products. Communities of people react to ecological conditions, different climates, and

resources by creating diverse forms of social living, forming corresponding institutions, developing new technologies, and constructing their unique ways of life. From a historical perspective, to follow how these institutions and phenomena have come into being and how they have evolved into their modern forms is to understand their essence, understand their ways of being, and ultimately, acquire power over them.

Second, the historical approach is a potent antidote against the reification of sociocultural events and occurrences. In Chapter 2, we talked about the reification of Culture. We demonstrated that Culture is a product of human making, not one of divine nature or another nature that works outside of human powers. As such, if humans have created it, they can change it. Historicism reveals how a particular phenomenon has been constructed and shaped by communities of people, thus demonstrating that everything sociocultural that surrounds people, including humans themselves, has a human-made nature and can be changed.

A third advantage of the historical approach is that it points to the conditions and factors that have contributed to the emergence and evolution of particular ideas, institutions or sociocultural forms. It highlights that these emergencies and changes are not random events with no traceable objective causes; rather, they are the results of particular configurations of economic, political, intellectual, and technological developments that happened at a specific time and in a particular place. This argument points to the fact that social phenomena can be studied scientifically and that methods of science, although modified for the phenomena of interest, can and should be used by social scientists.

Finally, analysing the history of the ideas about social phenomena and finding their congruence provides evidence that these ideas are valid. Suppose that, at different times, scholars from different countries and disciplines came up with similar viewpoints and understandings of various forms and aspects of social life. In that case, there is a high probability that these viewpoints reflect the real nature of that phenomenon, and thus, they should be seriously considered by modern researchers. This approach to knowledge validation, called *consilience*, was first suggested by 19th-century English philosopher and polymath **William Whewell** (1794–1866), who introduced it as one of the ways to "test the truth." In general terms, consilience means bringing together facts, ideas, and concepts from diverse independent sources and converging them into one valid theory (see (Wilson, 1999) for an application of consilience in science).

Concerning the sociocultural regulation of human behaviour, the historical approach aims to uncover the intellectual developments about understanding societies and communities' role in regulating human activities and mental functioning. It justifies and validates that the ideas of sociocultural thinking in psychology and the social sciences have their forerunners and a rich conceptual and theoretical background. Ultimately, it validates these ideas for modern social and psychological science scholars.



Figure 5.1 Historical and conceptual map of the ideas of sociocultural regulation of human actions.

The structure of the chapter

The historical and conceptual account is grouped into three sections based on the geographical locations of the reviewed scholars: Germany, France, the UK, and the USA (Figure 5.1).

In this analysis, I will focus on the four primary components of sociocultural regulation: (1) what exists 'out there,' meaning the regulatory processes that exist within the communal/public/externalized/social space; (2) what exists 'in here;' specifically, the mental structures and processes that are formed and function in the minds of members of the community under the influence of the regulatory processes outlined in (1); (3) how the public (1) and mental (2) aspects interact with each other; in other words, the mechanisms that enable the sociocultural and mental aspects to work together; (4) the functions that the syntheses of the sociocultural and mental aspects execute and the way they do this. Not all of these components are represented in each of the analysed theories found below; therefore, the descriptions of sociocultural regulation will differ from one representative to the next in terms of their completeness.

The German tradition

German philosophers, social scholars, and intellectuals have a long history of thinking about, conceptualizing, and understanding the sociocultural contexts of people's lives and the roles these contexts play in regulating people's lives and actions. This history can be traced back to the 18th and 19th centuries to the works of philosopher

Johann Gottfried Herder (1744–1803), linguist **Wilhelm von Humboldt** (1767–1835), philosopher and psychologist **Johann Friedrich Herbart** (1776–1841), anthropologist **Adolf Bastian** (1826–1905), and some other intellectuals (see more in (Berlin, 1976; Jahoda, 1992; Kalmar, 1987; Klautke, 2013b; Koepping, 1983). German scholars were among the first in Europe to develop a conceptual framework for the sociocultural analysis of people's lives and actions. In this section, I will focus on two concepts – *objektiver geist* and *volksgeist* (see Box 5.1 for the meaning of these terms).

Objectiver geist

The concept *objektiver geist* was introduced by philosopher **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel** (1770–1831) in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) (Redding, 2020). Hegel believed in the heuristic power of the term *geist* as spirit, and he widely used it in his writings. In addition to *objectiver geist*, he also proposed the ideas of *subjectiver geist* and *absolut geist*.

Box 5.1 Definition and explanation.

Objektiver geist and **volksgeist** have nearly the same meaning, as both refer to the *collective mind*. In German, *geist* means 'ghost' or 'spirit,' or less literally, 'mind,' 'mentality,' or 'consciousness.' *Objektiver* means 'objective' or outside of the subjectivities of individuals (i.e., *subjectiver geist* refers to the subjective minds). Therefore, the first concept means objective mentality/mind or objectivated/externalized mentality.

In turn, *Volks* represents a 'crowd of people' and, later, an 'ethnic group.' Referring to Herder, who introduced the term *volksgeist*, Jahoda (1992) wrote that "a *Volk* is characterized by shared language and historical tradition which shape the mentality [*Volksgeist*] of its members" (p. 76). Thus, *volksgeist* can be translated as the 'collective mentality of the community of the people.' in addition to these terms, German scholars also created the notions of *volkersseele* (the soul of the people) and *volkscharacter* (people's collective character). These concepts reflect ideas similar to the mental commonality of the collectivity of people.

The objective spirit is the configuration of the intersubjective and reciprocal understandings that community members have about the world, other people, and themselves. These intersubjective understandings are represented in the public space (as such, they are 'objectified;' hence, he uses the adjective 'objective') through the arrangements of people's interactions, their rituals, and customs, as well as the society's cultural institutions, such as family, law, religion, and government. These cultural institutions exist publicly and objectively – out there in the

world. In turn, *subjectiver geist* denotes individual consciousness and corresponds to people's mental conceptions of the world. In Hegel's writings, *absolute geist* is revealed through arts, religion, and philosophy, and it constitutes an awareness by the spirit (human consciousness) of its rational subjectivity (Morris, 1991, p. 190).

The objective spirit constructs the social context or the matrix where the subjective spirit or individual self-conscious minds exist. According to Hegel, individual consciousness is essentially a social product that emerges because of the continued interactions among individuals that are structured and guided by the objective spirit. Hegel's writings mark the first time that the concept of collective consciousness (*objectiver geist*) emerged and was articulated as the primary force in shaping individual minds (*subjectiver geist*).

One of the scholars who borrowed the concept of objective spirit and used it to develop the philosophy and methodology of the human sciences was the philosopher **Wilhelm Dilthey** (1833–1911). Dilthey's aim was to build the human sciences (which he defined as sciences that study human-made phenomena (society, culture, history) and humans themselves (psychology)) systematically and consistently, similar to how the natural sciences had been elaborated. He aimed to identify the bases of knowledge for the human sciences (what human scientists should study) and to develop a methodology for this domain of scientific inquiry (how they should do their research). He used the concept of *objektiver geist* to address both of these objectives (Dilthey, 1994).

What is the objective mind?

According to Dilthey, members of a community develop their style of life as well as their forms and rules of social interactions; they develop laws, customs, arts and sciences, and many other collective products. Dilthey borrowed Hegel's term, objectiver geist, to label these objectified and publicly available manifestations of communal creations.

In Dilthey's understanding, the objective mind is the product of the history of the community. Because of this, it represents an enduring extension of the past into the present – "in this objective mind, the past is a permanently enduring present for us" (p. 155). In this way, people, their everyday lives, and their communities are all the products of their history.

Dilthey paid particular attention to the objective spirit's role in enculturating children. The self of the child is developed through the nourishment it receives from the objective consciousness. The child's family is the primary form of the objective mind and the child is immersed in it very early, even before learning to walk and talk.

Ultimately, Dilthey concluded that the objective mind opens "the possibility of knowledge in the human studies" (p. 155). This means that human sciences researchers should target the objective minds of communities as the cornerstone of their inquiries into people's sociocultural and mental worlds.

Objective mind and the methodology of human sciences

To address the methodology of human sciences, Dilthey introduced the term *life-expressions* (Dilthey, 1994, p. 153; de Mul, 2004).

Box 5.2 Definition and explanation.

Dilthey understood **life-expressions** to be all forms of people's activities and their products that are manifested and can be the objects of a scientific investigation: routinely executed actions and rituals, written and spoken utterances, everyday conversations, the products of people's actions, culturally contingent arrangements and decorations of spaces, and various artifacts: art, religious beliefs, philosophical writings, laws, and many others. These life-expressions constitute facts that human sciences researchers can explore to enquire into people's collective and individual minds.

He defined these as the manifestations of people's mental lives (see Box 5.2) and argued that they could only be understood within "the articulated order in the objective mind" (p. 155), where they were developed and used. Therefore, to understand these expressions and their meaning, human sciences researchers must consider the objective mind domain to which these expressions belong and interpret them against a background of the structured features of that common sphere (p. 155). Dilthey used greetings as an example. Greetings have different meanings in different situations. With whom, in what situations, and how a person uses a handshake, a bow, and other greeting rituals are structured and prescribed by the objective mind that the community has assigned to that domain and situation. If the objective mind has assigned high importance to elderly males with high status, then a community member's greeting to them will be different from the greeting one gives to a colleague, brother, or friend.

Consequently, if one violates these prescriptions, it will be deemed a manifestation of disrespect. Greetings are life-expressions, and the objective mind infuses meaning into them and as a result, signifies "a certain mental attitude toward other people" (p. 156). The objective mind prescribes what form of greeting (and what corresponding meaning) is appropriate for a particular context and situation. To understand what a person is trying to convey by a form of salutation, it is necessary to know the order and sense of the acknowledgment prescribed by the objective mind. Therefore, Dilthey was convinced that the objective mind stands between the expression (a firm handshake) and what is expressed (trust and confidence). As such, it should be the starting point of research in the human sciences.

Volksgeist

Philosopher **Johann Gottfried Herder** (1744–1803) introduced the concept of volksgeist into German political, social, and philosophical communities (Smith, 2005). Together with linguist **Wilhelm von Humboldt** (1767–1835), Herder applied the idea of volksgeist to societal and nation-building issues (Berlin, 1976; Jahoda, 1992). At the end of the 18th century, following German unification, the country's intellectuals started their quest to form the German nation. They used the concept of the *volksgeist* for this purpose. Later on, philosopher and psychologist **Moris Lazarus** (1824–1903) and his colleague philologist and philosopher **Heyman Steinthal** (1823–1899) used this concept to build their understanding of the social and socio-psychological sciences and to examine what later would be recognized as the sociocultural regulation of people's actions as well as the relationship between Culture and people's minds. These scholars also introduced the concept of *völkerpsychologie*, which is the discipline that aims at studying volksgeist. In turn, **Wilhelm Wundt** (1832–1920) elaborated his version of völkerpsychologie by presenting it as one of the sub-disciplines of the science of psychology that should complement physiological (experimental) psychology. In the 20th century, völkerpsychologie was reincarnated in cultural anthropology, ethnopsychology, cultural psychology, and psychological and cognitive anthropology (Danziger, 1983; Diriwächter, 2004, 2012).

Near the end of the 19th century, the time in which psychology was emerging as an independent human science discipline, it developed in two directions. The first, related to Wundt's physiological (experimental) psychology, can be labelled the individualistic way of thinking in psychology. According to this conceptualization, the person is treated as an isolated monad that acts upon their individual motives, cognitions, and affects. Correspondently, psychologists must focus on examining the structure and dynamics of individual minds. At the same time as this individualistic thinking was occurring, some scholars in Germany and later in other European countries and the US treated the individual as a part of the larger social universe. They considered that people act not only based on their individual and idiosyncratic inclinations but also, and maybe even more, because of the social and cultural prescriptions that exist in their communities (their volksgeist). This collective mentality exists independently of people's individual mentalities, but it is also embedded in each of them. Therefore, according to Lazarus and Steinthal, to fully understand human psychology, besides considering individual subjectivities, researchers must examine the content of the corresponding volksgeist. In addition to forming human mentalities, volksgeist unites the members of communities and brings them together into coherent societies and nations. Therefore, this line of thought suggests that this collective mind should constitute the primary object for historical, human, and social sciences, including psychology and that the goal of these sciences should be to discover the "laws of the development of the folk spirit" (Klautke, 2013b, p. 297).

Following such an understanding, most commentators agree that voksgeist is a precursor to the notion of *kultur* (German) and, consequently, of the modern idea of Culture in both its formative (shaping the mentalities of people) and regulative (regulating the mental and behavioural activities of people) functions.

Following Hegel, many scholars saw the difference between *objectiver* and *subjectiver geist*, or between the collective and individual minds. Lazarus, Steinthal, and their followers struggled to unambiguously conceptualize and reconcile these two interrelated parts of the geist of the community: Its ideational component resides in the community members' minds (opinions, concepts, understandings, and ideas), while the objectified forms of the collective mind, which include language, literature, religion, laws, and various elements of "practical life," exist in the public space. Ultimately, most commentators (Jahoda, 1992; Kalmar, 1987) have agreed that the collective mind has two components: The intersubjective/public and the intrasubjective/mental. Lazarus and Steinthal did not differentiate between these two components conceptually and did not introduce special terms for each of them.

To address the questions about the nature of volkgeist and the medium that connects the two parts of *Volksgeist*, Lazarus and Steinthal suggested that volksgeist has a systemic, interactionist, and dialogical nature. They considered volksgeist not as a substance with a particular content but as an activity (*thatigkeit*) (Kalmar, 1987, p. 681). Wundt (1916) explicitly suggested a medium for connecting the ideational and public aspects of the collective consciousness, which he found in "the reciprocal action of many" (p. 3). Wundt argued that the collective mind is created and maintained through the interactions of *volks* and that these everyday social interactions between the members of a community constitute the vehicle for communal meanings, ideas, prescriptions, and values to exist and execute their functions.

To summarize the ideas around objectiver geist, volksgeist and other related concepts, it is important to highlight several viewpoints. The collective mind (regardless of how it is labelled) has several functions. First, its existence promotes the unity and harmony of collective functioning (Jahoda, 1992, p. 148). That is why this concept first emerged and was used for German nation building: The collective spirit unites people into a nation; it brings them a sense of belonging and the experience of seeing their community, society, or nation as 'We' and 'Us.' Second, as Kalmar (1987) noted, "each individual Geist is largely determined by the group Geist to which it belongs" (p. 679). Thus, a person's socialization into the collective mentality of the community shapes their mind, self, cognition, and other mental faculties. Next, the collective mind works as a repository of knowledge and skills accumulated by the communities' older generations that younger members can use to guide them and resolve the problems in their lives. This objective mind is also the source of children's socialization and mental development. German thinkers emphasized that the collective mentality exists independently of individual mentalities but continuously interacts with them. The concept of the collective/objective mind has

important methodological implications. To understand the "life-expressions" of people, human science researchers must examine the collective mentality within which these expressions occur. Hence, sociocultural psychologists need to first focus on the collective mind to fully understand the area they are studying and then move to examine people's individual consciousness.

The French tradition

In France, social sciences have had unique development trajectories (Heilbron, 2004). French scholars such as **Voltaire** (1694–1778), **Montesquieu** (1689–1755), **Rousseau** (1712–1778), and others worked to understand the nature of political, social, and cultural institutions and events, their relationships to people's mentalities and behaviours, and their roles in the history of nations. In 1756, **François-Marie Arouet Voltaire** invented the term *l'esprit des nations* (the spirit of nations); he used it to explore the history of different civilizations and to conduct their cultural comparisons (Voltaire, 1759). Many 19th-century French human and social sciences scholars were aware of the German conceptual innovations in the domains of cultural studies, sociology, social philosophy, and corresponding disciplines. They followed the developments of the ideas of volksgeist and völkerpsychologie and implemented them in France (Klautke, 2013a). The French 'founding father' of modern sociology, **Émile Durkheim** (1858–1917), was well-informed about these German conceptual advances. In fact, from 1885 to 1886, he had a one-year internship in Germany and wrote several reports and reviews of Wundt's works. Ultimately, Durkheim borrowed "what Wundt had called the 'folk soul,' often misunderstood as a 'metaphysical' definition of national character,' [and] presented [it] as 'collective representations'" (Klautke, 2013a, p. 313).

Durkheim's social facts and collective representations

Durkheim focused on establishing the science of sociology as an empirical discipline, articulating the object, and units of its inquiry, differentiating it from other social fields, predominantly psychology and formulating its methodology. Two concepts that form the core of Durkheim's theoretical thinking on these issues are *social facts* and c*ollective representations*. A social fact "consists of ways of acting, thinking, and feeling external to the individual, and endowed with a power of coercion by reason of which they control him" (Durkheim, 1895/1938, p. 3). According to Durkheim, everything we observe and hear on the streets, read in books and magazines, watch on TV, see on the Internet, observe on campus, and in other institutions are all social facts, meaning that these manifestations are public and exist in communal spaces. Social facts make-up social reality, and they are the object of sociology. These facts also regulate people's actions by controlling them. Following Durkheim's quotation above, social facts include the ways of thinking and feeling

that exist outside individual minds and have coercive powers over individuals. But in Durkheim's theorizing, it remained unclear how these facts can control people's behaviours and what the mechanisms of their powers of coercion are.

To address these mechanisms, Durkheim turned to the psychological concept of *representation* (Box 5.3). As mentioned above, he was familiar with the idea of volksgeist, but decided to get away from its metaphysical connotation. Instead, in 1898, he suggested the concept of les *représentations collectives* or *collective representations*, separating this notion from the psychological concept of individual representations. Durkheim's idea of collective representations can be presented in the following way (1924/1974). Associated individuals form societies and develop a system of shared representations of the world around them. These shared representations belong to all members of society and regulate their social lives. Collective representations guide people's interactions and as a result, community members develop the fabric of social life. According to Durkheim, these collective mental products override the individual mentalities of the participating individuals. Thus, they may be examined as independent social phenomena. Because he was a sociologist who wanted to differentiate sociology from psychology, Durkheim saw in the notion of collective representations the essence of the social composition of communities and the object of sociological research that allows researchers to avoid reducing 'social' to 'mental.'

Box 5.3 Definition and explanation

A **representation** is "that which stands for or signifies something else" (https://dictionary.apa.org/representation). The mental representations in the mind of a person stand for the objects and phenomena that this person encounters. Sociologists define **collective representations** as "the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a collectivity and that are not reducible to individual constituents. ...collective representations help to order and make sense of the world ... [They] inhibit and stimulate social actions. Their force ... comes from them being within all of us and yet external to the individual" (Scott & Marshall, 2009).

Durkheim theoretically examined the dialectical relations between collective and individual representations. He highlighted that collective representations are generated by the actions of and interactions among the "individual minds that form the society." Therefore, individual minds constitute the collective mind, even though he argued that the latter "surpasses" them. In turn, collective representations penetrate individuals' minds and form their mental variants according to societal prescriptions. Durkheim emphasized this dialectic by indicating that "while society transcends us it

is immanent in us, and we feel it as such. While it surpasses us it is within us, since it can only exist by and through us" (1924/1974, p. 54). (See Box 5.4 for the example of the dialectics between collective and individual representations.)

Box 5.4 How collective representations work in education

To examine the collective representations concept further, let's take a university campus as an example. Higher education as a social institution exists because all participating parties – students, instructors, staff, parents, governmental policymakers, and members of society – share the same ideas about the value of society members attaining a university education. By coming together and sharing the same ideas, attitudes, and expectations about education, these people construct collective representations of higher education. In addition, they externalize them in education laws, institutional regulations, norms, and values; they objectify these representations in material artifacts such as campuses, their buildings, labs, and libraries, as well as in how students and professors act and interact on campuses. Guided by these collective representations, members of educational communities work in a coordinated manner to make higher education happen. Collective representations and their products constitute social facts and are open to investigation independently of what students, instructors, and policymakers think about them. Simultaneously, collective representations of higher education enter the minds of members of the educational community, including junior undergraduates, international students, and some others; in this way, they build their mentalities. Therefore, such representations become the primary mechanisms controlling the actions of university community members. Hence, on the one hand, the collective representations of education transcend the individual representations of members of educational communities, and they exist independently of them in the public sphere. On the other hand, they penetrate the minds of all participating parties and, in turn, unite them into becoming a cohesive educational community where they act together to make education happen.

Following this dialectic of collective and individual representations, Durkheim argued that collective representations "are not sociological phenomena in the strict sense of the word. They belong to two realms at once; one could call them sociopsychological" (1895/1938, pp. 8–9). Thus, collective representations are both social, as they belong to the communal realm, and psychological, as they belong to the mental realm of individuals.

In summary, according to Durkheim, the symbiosis of the collective and corresponding individual representations executes several functions.

Society is interested in order, structure, and uniformity in actions and thoughts across all its members; collective representations bring cohesion and coherence to the social lives of the members of the community.

Society is interested in keeping this uniformity intact; therefore, it functions to control people's behaviours. People's actions are controlled through collective representations. This regulation is executed by providing direct enforcement of the "right and approved" activities, but even more so by generating "collective sentiments" (shared emotions) that represent "the voice of the collective." In Durkheim's opinion, "collective sentiments" have a tone quite different from that of purely personal affects. Therefore, the messages of these internalized societal "voices" become crucial for people to execute them (Durkheim, 1924/1974, p. 58). Think about feeling frustrated toward yourself when you come late to a lecture or miss one because you slept in. Similarly, consider the pride a student would experience if they received a good grade on a challenging exam. These sentiments are generated because the students would have violated or followed the university's regulations that are rooted in the collective representations about the primary values behind a university education: Students must work hard and be punctual.

Durkheim (1924/1974) called collective representations a "storehouse of intellectual and moral riches" (p. 54). By this, he means that collective representations are a repository of communal knowledge, skills, and technologies that allow new community members to learn and use them for their needs. Collective representations about education include ideas about what constitutes a good university education – the transmission (lectures) and generation (research) of knowledge, fair and equal access to all sources of education for all students, regardless of their gender, age, nationality, religion, and other attributes. They also include the sets of knowledge and skills that should be transmitted to students. These skills and knowledge are reflected in the university's programs, course outlines, library catalogues, the composition of their research labs, and so forth.

Collective representations form social facts that constitute the social reality in which people live. Social reality exists because people think about it and aim at it through their actions and interactions. This reality exists independently of each group member and is objectively real for them. It is also real because of its controlling and coercive powers, as discussed above.

Moscovici's social representations

French social psychologist **Serge Moscovici** (1925–2014) continued the Durkheimian line of thinking about the social regulation of people's mentalities and behaviours. As a social psychologist, he was more interested than Durkheim was in studying human psychology and reconnecting *social* and *mental* without reducing the former to the latter or vice versa. In 1961, Moscovici published his study about the

meaning of psychoanalysis in different segments of French society during the 1950s (Moscovici, 1961/2008). He discovered that Catholics have different social representations of psychoanalysis compared with Marxists. In this study, he coined the concept of *les repréntations sociales*, or *social representations*, that various social groups develop regarding particular social objects (scientific theories, technology, political figures, etc.). Moscovici stated that social groups develop social representations to "anchor" these social objects into their existing worldviews and to provide tools for communicating about and behaving toward them.

What are social representations?

Moscovici provided several definitions of social representations, which can be summarized as follows. Social representations consist of shared systems of values, ideas, and practices. The primary function of these systems is to collectively elaborate on social objects (political figures or new technology) in the community; these representations classify and name these objects and, ultimately, bring them to existence. The second function of social representations is to bring order into the material and social worlds in which people live. This order allows people to orient themselves in that world and subsequently, to master it. Finally, their third function is to enable communication among community members. Social representations supply members with a code for social exchange, without which productive social interactions are impossible.

Moscovici (2001) continuously stressed the dual nature of social representations, suggesting that they have both social and mental elements. Social representations are social because they are "impersonal" "in the sense of belonging to everyone" and because "they are the representation of others, belonging to other people or another group." Nevertheless, he stated that social representations are also personal representations because people feel affectively that they belong to their egos (p. 153). In other words, social representations exist in the public space, and people internalize them and experience them as part of their selves. Consequently, Moscovici connected social and mental elements through social representations and announced their inseparable unity.

Finally, according to Moscovici, social psychology aims to study social representations in their social and mental components. He is considered the founder of the European school of social psychology, the discipline built around the concept of social representations (Farr, 1998).

Bourdieu: Structure, habitus, and practice

Pierre Bourdieu (1930–1989) was one of the greatest social thinkers of the 20th century. He was an anthropologist, sociologist, philosopher, and intellectual who developed a deep understanding of the fabric of social and cultural reality as well as the mechanisms of its functioning.

The dialectical unity of objective and subjective in social regulation

Bourdieu aimed to understand how social reality is constructed and how it regulates people's actions. Bourdieu categorized the existing approaches to these questions as *objectivism* and *subjectivism*.

According to him, objectivism claims that social reality exists in the form of specific structures – economic, political, and social – that are objectively independent of the will of the people in a community. For example, Marxism (a representative of objectivism) states that capitalists and workers enter specific economic relations independently of their understanding of these relations and their desire to do so. Therefore, the capitalist mode of production and the relationships between classes objectively force people to behave in a particular way independently of their will and motivation.

Box 5.5 Definition

Sociologists define **a (social) structure** as a relatively stable pattern of prescribed relationships among people within social institutions; examples include family, church, school, business, government, and many others.

In turn, *subjectivism* – represented by existentialism, social phenomenology, and the interpretative social sciences – emphasizes that social life and agents' actions are controlled by individuals' desires, beliefs, and judgments that give individuals relative freedom to choose their own lives and destinies. However, Bourdieu was convinced that such a dichotomization does not reflect how social reality and its mechanisms work. He argued that objectivists discount human subjectivity as a constituent of social reality; in contrast, subjectivists overlook the material and social formation of people's conceptions, representations, and values and their inevitable constraints caused by external conditions and structures (Bourdieu, 1977).

Bourdieu proposed that social researchers should consider the objective and subjective constitutive poles of social reality in their dialectical unity, arguing that they continuously co-construct each other. Thus, he was not focused so much on what is 'out there' (objective structures) or 'in here' (subjective representations, experiences, and meanings) in social regulation but on how what is 'out there' is related to what is 'in here' and, consequently, how this confluence of objective and subjective determines what people do. Bourdieu (1977) focused on what he conceptualized as *structures*, *habitus*, and *practices*. (See Box 5.5 for a definition of *social structure*.) For example, churches are characterized by prescribed and strictly controlled relations between parishioners, the clerkship, and the deity. When joining a church, you must obey these relationships and thus, the structure of this social



Figure 5.2 Interaction among *structure*, *habitus*, and *practice* (by Bourdieu).

institution influences your behaviour inside that church. Social structures cannot work without individuals who possess the specific mental dispositions that make them susceptible to the powers of the structures. Therefore, for the church to influence parishioners, they must be believers and churchgoers; if a person does not believe in God, the structure of the relationships in the church has no power over them. Bourdieu called such beliefs or mental dispositions *habitus*. In turn, *practice* is the result of the interactions of structure and habitus; it refers to the habitual social actions a person undertakes within a social institution. For example, if you believe in God and regularly attend mass prescribed by the church, your church attendance becomes a practice. Thus, to explain this practice, a researcher must examine a church's structure, parishioners' faith, and beliefs (their habitus), and the interactions between the structure of the church relationships and the religious habitus. The dialectics of Bourdieu's thinking emphasize that social structures affect people's behaviours through the mediation of habitus that generates practices that reproduce the social and material conditions and structures that engender the habitus, which brings about another cycle of practices (see Figure 5.2. for an illustration of these relationships).

What is habitus?

The idea of habitus constitutes the core of Bourdieu's theory of the social regulation of human practices. To continue the example of churchgoers above, their habitus is their faith in God. This faith allows these individuals to recognize the power of God in their lives, to acknowledge the role of the church in their relationships with God, and to determine what to do and how to behave in terms of their religious and

secular lives. According to Bourdieu, habitus is the mental disposition – internalized mental representations of the structures within which a person lives – that allows a person to recognize and interpret the power of those structures (the power of the church) and to generate corresponding practices (become a faithful parishioner) that enable this person's effective functioning within a particular institution (the church).

Attributes of habitus. Teachers and trainers instil a particular set of ideas upon members of a social institution and then this set is appropriated by individuals. These ideas become adopted as a "durable [internalized and ingrained in one's self] and transposable [usable in a variety of situations] disposition" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 52) and, thus, transform into habitus. During a child's socialization, community members externalize their habitus during their interactions with the child and thus, transmit their dispositions to them. These socializing agents use practices, sayings, proverbs, stories, and other means to convey to the child the structures and habitus of that community. Therefore, by learning and internalizing the externalized habitus, the child learns about the society in which they live and becomes a full-fledged community member.

Bourdieu emphasized that habitus is the product of the history of the community. Because of this, community members, the bearers of this habitus, are historical figures that represent the past projected into the present. Subsequently, history produces the habitus that generates the practices that develop history for future generations. Therefore, habitus carries itself into the future and continues the structures that generated this habitus in the past: "Habitus is embodied history, internalized as a second nature" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 56).

The system of habitus is learned and accumulated by an individual throughout their lives, constituting their *cultural capital*. The higher this capital, the more aspects of the world, including various objectified cultural forms (literature, art, philosophy, etc.), a person is able to notice, attend to, understand, and appreciate.

Habitus generates the *practical knowledge* of how to act in a particular situation to ensure that this action does not interrupt the existing social order and produces the outcomes desired by the individual. This knowledge is, in many cases, taken-for-granted and automatic. It gives a person a "feel for the game" (Bourdieu, 1990, p. 66) that allows them to experience social competence and a sense of reality without being fully conscious of the determinants of such feelings.

Doxa and doxic experience. Related to the concept of habitus is the notions of *doxa* (Bourdieu, 1977) and the *doxic experience* (Bourdieu & Eagleton, 1992).

Box 5.6 Definition

Doxa (Greek) means common belief or popular opinion. This term is at the root of such terms as *orthodoxy* (adherence to an accepted, believed-to-be-correct doctrine or creed, especially in religion) and *heterodoxy* (adherence to beliefs that contradict the accepted orthodoxy).

According to Bourdieu's understanding, doxa and the doxic experience are synonyms that denote a fit between social structures, the situation in which a person finds themselves and the habitus that a person uses to classify and interpret the encountered structure and situation. Bourdieu clarified that "when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies), the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call doxa" (1977, p. 164). The doxic experience generates "the sense of reality" and "the sense of limits" of what can be done and said in a particular situation. For example, a person born and raised in a community knows what people in that community do and think, what is appropriate and inappropriate to say and do when, for example, a conflict emerges. This means that this person has a near-perfect fit between the established categories and structures of conflicts among people in that community and this person's mental dispositions that were developed to deal with these relationships. Using their habitus, a person recognizes, appreciates, and accepts the existing structures and relationships. Thus, this person develops a doxic experience.

In contrast, when they move to another cultural community, where the fit between its social structures and the person's habitus is not as strong, then the doxic experience disappears. A person feels lost, uprooted, and desperate to find assurance in the social reality in which they find themselves (we will discuss this situation about immigrants in the Chapter 11). The doxic experience is vital for a person to maintain their perception of the stability of social reality. Because of this, society is interested in preserving the congruence between existing structures and the habitus that people use to interpret them. Governments use various means, including numerous forms of propaganda and multiple ideologies and discourses (political, economic, medical, etc.), to maintain such congruency and the related doxa.

A summary of Bourdieu's ideas about the sociocultural regulation of human actions

The triad of *structure*, *habitus*, and *practice* constitutes the system in which these elements continuously interact, co-construct, and reproduce each other. This system executes several functions. First, it constructs social reality in its material, structural, mental, and behavioural forms. Second, it takes unsocialized children and develops them into members of society capable of freely and successfully functioning in it and reproducing its structures, institutions, and conditions. Ultimately, socialized individuals continuously maintain the existence of their local sociality and their social world. Third, this system ensures that individuals have the ability to achieve their goals successfully and satisfy their needs within the existing social order.

Eventually, it regulates the community members' individual and collective activities, creating a coherent and functional society.

Anglo-American contributions

British philosophers John Locke and John Stuart Mill are considered the forefathers of the sociocultural movement in English-speaking countries. **John Locke** (1632–1704) announced the ideas of the cultural determinism of human cognition, the ways of behaviour, and the habits of the heart. He noticed that when speaking to a person born in a different country, a speaker, if he wants to achieve understanding, must account for the cultural framework of his cognition and act toward his partner accordingly (Jahoda, 1992, p. 18). **John Stuart Mill** (1806–1873) was concerned with establishing the moral sciences, including psychology. He proposed the discipline of *ethology*, which is based on observing people's everyday habits and behaviours to understand how their characters are formed. He also concluded that national and cultural influences strongly determine people's characters; he argued that these influences need to be accounted for by students of ethology (Cahan & White, 1992; Jahoda, 1989).

Folkways and mores by Sumner

In his book *Folkways* (1906/1959), American sociologist **William Graham Sumner** (1840–1910) aimed to conceptualize and explain what we now label the sociocultural regulation of people's behaviour. To do this, he introduced the terms the *folkways of the in-groups* and *mores*.

Folkways are the uniform and imperative ways of acting that have been established in a group over generations to satisfy people's needs. These folkways become the habits and customs of the group. To be successful in various domains of their lives, the members of a group must behave in particular ways.

Folkways are developed and function unconsciously, similar to animal instincts. Their purpose is to satisfy people's needs and interests; notably, they do this in ways that community members consider moral and right. When group members reflect on their folkways, realize their effects on their lives and transform them into doctrines, folkways become *mores* (Box 5.7).

Box 5.7 Definition and explanation

Mores are the essential or characteristic customs and conventions of a community (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008). Synonyms include *customs*, *conventions*, *ways of life*, *traditions*, *practices*, or *habits*.

Concern about the welfare of an individual is a *folkway*; in turn, an ideology of individualism is *more*. For group members, mores are true, and have absolute authority. They include both permissions of what to do as well as restrictions and taboos of what not to do. Children learn mores at an early age "by traditions, imitation, and authority" (p. 3). Sumner explored the nature of folkways and mores and made several insightful comments about their systemic characters: "It appears as if there was a 'mind' in the crowd which was different from the minds of the individual which compose it;" and then, "it seems as the crowd had a mystical power in it greater than the sum of the powers of its members" (p. 19). Sumner reiterated the ideas of his European counterparts that even though "the mind of a crowd" comprises many individual minds, it has the power to influence people's behaviours that are not found within individuals. Thus, for the first time in American social sciences, Sumner announced the insightful ideas of the *mind of the crowd* and its influence on individual minds.

Schutz's ideas about sociocultural regulation

Alfred Schutz (1899–1959) was an Austrian-American phenomenological philosopher and sociologist. He aimed to investigate how ordinary people's everyday lives are organized and what makes these lives orderly and coherent. To express it more academically, Schutz aimed to examine the phenomenology of people's life-worlds and the construction of social reality through people's everyday lives. Thus, he examined the psychosociocultural regulation of people's actions. Inspired by Sumner's concepts of *folkways* and *mores*, Schutz (1944) introduced and analysed the term the *cultural pattern of the group life* together with the *folkways of the in-group* (Schutz, 1964).

Schutz's approach is similar to that of European scholars. Specifically, he stated that cultural communities develop their particular ways of dealing with the issues and hurdles in their communal existence (i.e., cultural patterns (folkways) of the group life). We have already discussed numerous examples of such patterns: How to greet people, how to resolve conflicts, how to date and marry a person, how to communicate with your in-laws, how to manage your family, and many more. These patterns emerged historically and constituted the "social heritage" of communities, which work as a repository of the skills and knowledge accumulated by the ancestors and which are available to all group members for personal use. These folkways are taken for granted by group members because they view them as the natural and appropriate ways to deal with things. In addition to assisting in managing everyday issues, these folkways serve essential but less visible functions in forming people's mentalities and regulating their actions. In addition, Schutz provided unique contributions to understanding the sociocultural regulation of behaviour by these patterns.

Here is the list of Schutz's conceptual innovations. Cultural patterns work as *systems of typification* and *relevance*; they supply people with *schemas of interpretation* and *expression*. They accumulate the knowledge and wisdom of a community by forming its *social stock of knowledge*. Regarding people's everyday interactions, he introduced the concepts of the *reciprocity of motives* and the *reciprocity of perspectives*, followed by the *reciprocity of understanding*. He also highlighted the role that *collective intersubjectivity* plays in regulating people's actions.

Cultural patterns as systems of typification and relevance

According to Schutz, each cultural pattern emerged as a response to the typical problems of group life (for example, what is the demarcation line between men's and women's duties in the home and community; how to worship the divine; how to maintain one's honour, and many others) and it provides solutions to these problems for typical group members. Therefore, a cultural pattern works as the *system of typification*. In many cases, these patterns work as the framework for solving problems; this gives individuals a certain degree of freedom to adjust them to their particular situation. For example, a cultural pattern prescribes how to treat guests – be hospitable, prepare good food, and entertain them. But in a particular family, there can be variations of how to be hospitable – what food to cook and how to entertain guests.

When confronting a problem or situation, people are motivated by their goals. For example, when a person wants to marry another person, they have particular reasons for this aim; thus, this person has a unique perception of what a potential partner should be, including their appearance, affluence, ability, and desire to have family and children, and other features. Schutz labelled this selectivity of the attention of individuals as *relevance* (Schutz, 1970b). In addition to individuals' idiosyncratic relevances, the community's folkways serve as the *system of collective relevances (and irrelevances)* by prescribing to the community members what aspects of the environment are essential to the existence of the group (and to them) and what aspects are not. To continue the example about marriage, the community may prescribe what features potential partners should have: beauty or affluence, social standing or the feeling of love, age or childbearing potential (for women), etc. Thus, the communal system of relevances works as the *social matrix of attention* (Campo, 2015).

This system of collective relevances also sets the goals for peoples' communal strivings and designates the values and moral codes that justify these goals. Thus, the system of relevances also serves as the *social matrix of motivation* (Schutz, 1970b). In some communities, it is desirable to strive to accumulate money and become rich; in others, the harmony of social existence is more significant than affluence.

Schemas of interpretation and expression

Schutz stated that the cultural patterns of the in-group serve as *schemas of interpretation* and *schemas of expression*. Please recall that interpretation is the process of deciphering symbols and apprehending the meaning that is infused into them (for example, interpreting the meaning of a national flag on a battlefield, the meaning of the colour of a bride's wedding dress, the symbolism of the cross for Christians, and millions of other examples). Communities create meanings for everything that surrounds them; they also construct symbols and assign meanings to them also. For the coherence of a community, people must interpret the world and its elements similarly; thus, communities provide members with lenses through which they perceive and evaluate the importance of things, events, situations, and other people in their surroundings. For example, the people in North Korea perceive their leaders as gods who must be worshiped; in contrast, in Canada, the Prime Minister is understood to be an elected official who must do his job well to remain in office. North Korea's and Canada's collective schemas of interpretation construct different meanings of their leaders and shape their citizens' perceptions of them decidedly differently.

After interpreting a situation or a phenomenon in a socially prescribed way, a person may act. North Koreans may stand at meetings with their leader and clap their hands for a lengthy period to demonstrate loyalty and please him. In contrast, Canadians may start criticizing their prime minister and decide to vote either for or against his party. However, in both cases, a member must act in a way that brings them and society the desired outcomes, which will simultaneously be acceptable to in-group members. According to Schutz, such a purpose is achieved by applying a schema of expression, which is a receipt "for handling things and men in order to obtain the best results in every situation with a minimum effort by avoiding undesirable consequences" (Schutz, 1970a, p. 81). If the citizens of North Korea want to live relatively freely (not being incarcerated) and well, they must interpret the leader as a god and must demonstrate devotion, obedience, and admiration of him. Thus, a citizen's loyalty brings the desired personal outcome and is perceived positively by other citizens. In Canada, if citizens want to continue living in a democratic and prosperous country, they must support democracy through the fair elections of officials at different levels of governance. I expect that readers have noticed the conceptual similarity between Bourdieu's habitus and Schutz's schemas of interpretation and expression. These are fundamentally the same phenomena that have been labelled differently.

Reciprocity of positions and understanding

After introducing the schemas of interpretation and expression, we now move to Schutz's comprehension of the nature of the relationships among community members. He wanted to understand how social interactions unfold so that they

co-construct a coherent everyday world for these people. Because community members have acquired the same schemas of interpretation and expression, they know how their compatriots interpret various events, elements of the world, symbols, other people, and themselves. A community member knows what is in other people's minds and correspondently, other people also know what is in that community member's head. Based on this *intersubjectivity*, community members develop what Shutz called "We-relationship" that is based on reciprocity of understanding and positions (see Box 5.8 for the example of a We-relationship).

Box 5.8 Definition and explanation. An example of a *We-relationship*

Imagine a situation when you enter a bank to do a transaction (to deposit or withdraw money to or from your account). Your act is guided by the system of relevances of money and banks in your cultural community and the corresponding schema of expression related to your purpose of going to the bank. When a bank teller sees you entering the bank and putting your hand into your pocket, they know you will pull out a wallet with a bank card, not a gun. In turn, you do your part: Take out your card, approach the teller, and do the transactions you need to complete. The interaction goes smoothly and without awkwardness. Why? According to Schutz, this is because your intentions, system of relevance, motivation, and schema of expression related to banking correspond to the teller's system of relevances, motivation, and schemas of interpretation. Yours and the teller's schemas are congruent and you perfectly understand each other without either of you needing to provide unnecessary explanations. Thus, in this case, and many other cases in our everyday lives, the *reciprocity of understanding* occurs. Moreover, if you decide to work as a bank teller, you will interpret such situations and act toward customers exactly as the teller in our example has acted toward you. Schutz called such a situation a *reciprocity of positions*. These reciprocities of understanding and positions construct 'We-relationships,' which constitute the very social fabric of the communal life of people and make their existence successful and harmonious.

In conclusion, Alfred Schutz provided an insightful and conceptually rich framework for analysing the sociocultural regulation of people's everyday lives. Every group possesses and correspondently supplies its members with cultural patterns of group life. Members of the group internalize them and then they use them to build their relationships. These internalized patterns allow them to interact in their everyday lives seamlessly and through these interactions, people maintain the social order and the social reality of their everyday worlds. The core concepts of Schutz's analysis are the intersubjectivity, mutuality, and reciprocity of the schemas of categorization, interpretation, understanding, actions, motivation, and relational positions.

This mutuality is the glue that provides people with social cohesion and works as the context within which their constitutive relationships unfold. In addition, the schemas that constitute this mutuality and reciprocity form people's mentalities and construct their selves, identities, cognition, and emotion.

The ideas of cultural models in American cognitive and psychological anthropology

One of the primary postulates of cognitive anthropology is that human cognition is only partially derived from the individual's experiences, personal contemplations, and thinking. Scholars in this field state that human cognition (and the related linguistic furnishings of people's thoughts) is fundamentally cultural (Bender & Beller, 2011, 2013; D'Andrade, 1989, 1995). One approach to studying the cultural content of people's cognitive/mental representations is the *cultural models school* (Quinn, 2011). This approach is consistent with the agendas of cognitive sociology (Zerubavel, 1997) and cultural sociology (Alexander, 2003; DiMaggio, 1997). The primary proposition of these approaches states that societies and cultures form and then supply their members with schemas, scripts, or models about the world in which these people live. Through these models, communities provide their citizens with the necessary knowledge about the world, other people, and themselves – recipes for categorizing and understanding their specific sociocultural environment and then acting in manners befitting this environment.

D'Andrade's version of the cultural model's theory

Cognitive anthropologist **Roy D'Andrade** (1931–2016) and his colleagues brought the term *cultural model* into cognitive anthropology and beyond (D'Andrade, 1995; D'Andrade & Strauss, 1992; Holland & Quinn, 1987). Quinn and Holland (1987) defined cultural models the following way: "Cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it" (p. 4). Other terms that express these same ideas are *folk models* (D'Andrade, 1987), *cultural schemas* (Nishida, 1999), and *cultural scripts* (Goddar & Wierzbicka, 2004; Wierzbicka, 1996, 2002).

D'Andrade highlighted the *intersubjective* nature of cultural models, the necessity of *internalizing* them so that they become the regulators of people's experiences and actions and, correspondently, their *implicit nature*. In appropriating the term, the *intersubjectivity of cultural schema*, D'Andrade suggests that members of a group do not simply share these schemas but that "everybody in the group knows the schema and everybody knows that everyone else knows the schema and everybody knows that everyone knows that everyone knows the schema" (1987, p. 113).

Intersubjectivity and collective intentionality (D'Andrade, 2006) constitute the social ontology of cultural models, or how cultural models exist in a society.

I want to remind readers that in sociocultural psychology, internalization constitutes the primary mechanism of how sociocultural becomes mental (see Chapter 6 on the sociocultural approach to human development). D'Andrade subscribed to the classical understanding of internalization as the process of making cultural representations, schemas, and models part of one's mental organization. Internalization happens through several stages (see Table 5.1). When cultural models/schemas are internalized, the members of a group act on them without being fully aware of their content. These models exist implicitly – they are taken-for-granted, meaning that members of the group successfully use these models, but they "cannot provide a reasonable description" of them (D'Andrade, 1987, pp. 113–114).

Table 5.1 Stages of internalization of cultural/social representation (or cultural models) by D'Andrade (1995, pp. 227–228)

Stages of internalization	*Description of the stages*
4. The internalized representations instigate actions, impose strong emotions, and structure worldviews.	"At the final level, the system of cultural representations is not only internalized, it is highly salient. The cultural system not only guides but instigates actions and the entire system is invested with emotion. Thus, believing that Jesus died for man's sin, the believer is filled with anxiety about his own sins and driven to try to atone for these sins in prayer and deeds, and filled with relief and joy at evidence to be saved."
3. Individuals know, understand, and believe in inducted cultural representations.	"At the third level, individuals hold their beliefs to be true, correct, or right. At this level, cultural representations structure the behavioral environment of social actors and guide their actions. When the proposition that Jesus died for man's sin is acquired at this level, the individual feels a sense of sin and is concerned to perform the actions necessary to achieve redemption. At this level, cultural representations can be said to be *internalized*."
2. Individuals know and understand cultural representations, but they do not believe in them; they are "cultural clichés."	"At the second level of internalization, cultural representations are acquired as *clichés*; the individual honors the descriptive or normative claims more in the breach than in the observance. Spiro uses the example of people who say they believe Jesus died for their sins, but who have no sense of sin. "When a cultural system is acquired at this level, it is, as Edward Sapir put it, 'spurious' (Spiro n.d.a)."
1. Acquaintance with the main components of the system or doctrine.	"At the first and lowest level, the individual is acquainted with some part of a cultural system of representations without assenting to its descriptive or normative claims. The individual may be indifferent to, or even reject, these claims."

Shore's version of the theory of cultural models

Brad Shore (born 1945) is an American cognitive and psychological anthropologist who developed his version of the cultural model theory. Shore's version is similar to that of D'Andrade and his colleagues; however, it has several distinct features that set it apart (Shore, 1996). He defines cultural models in the following manner: "... a particularly powerful way of thinking about culture [is] as public artifacts 'in the world' and as cognitive constructs 'in the mind' of members of a community." He continues, "cultures are best conceived as a very large and heterogeneous collection of *models*. ... To the extent that they are public artifacts, cultural models are out in the world, to be observed by outsiders as well as experienced by locals" (p. 44). As mental representations, cultural models are inscribed in the minds of community members (p. 47).

Box 5.9 Definition and explanation. An example of a cultural model

Imagine a situation in which, before your next vacation, you read in a guidebook that in many Asian countries, guests must take off their shoes before entering a house, a temple, and many other private or public buildings. In this case, you have just learned the *public form of a cultural model* created for regulating people's visits. It is public because you, as an outsider to these communities, learned about them from a publicly available source, and can directly observe such a practice. You might also have learned this information from your friends or colleagues from these countries. In turn, you acknowledge this information and do your best to follow this custom. However, you do not internalize it and have few feelings about its importance. In contrast, members of these communities learned this practice from their parents and families, and they have followed it since their childhood. They live their lives by endorsing this practice as a morally right and respectful way of entering houses. These members are guided by the *internalized form* of the same cultural model or, as Shore labelled it, by a "conventional mental model."

One of the primary features of Shore's approach is that he has differentiated the public and mental forms of cultural models. He articulated that cultural models in *public forms* consist of social institutions (family and schooling), cultural conventions (greetings scripts, style of eating, ways of sleeping arrangement), public artifacts (the architecture of buildings, pottery, pieces of art, ways of dressing), collective knowledge and skills (why you go to a river to fish, how to feed a baby, how to repair a tool, how to solve a conflict with a neighbour), and collective memories (memories of droughts, successful hunting expeditions, or wise leaders).

Most of these aspects are observable by outsiders and can be recorded and examined. Shore differentiates the public forms of cultural models from their *mental representations* in the minds of the group members. *Conventional mental models* are representations of the cultural models in the minds of the community members. (See Box 5.9 for an example of these models.)

Shore also distinguishes between *foundational schemes* and *special-purpose models*. Foundational schemas are the overarching principles and values that guide individuals in many domains of their lives. In turn, special-purpose models regulate the experiences and behaviours of people in specific domains, such as parenting, education, work relationships, and others. The foundational schemas provide the background for the special-purpose models. An example of a foundational schema in most Western societies is *individualism*, which is a doctrine about the value of the individual over the community. This high-order foundational schema combines and structures the special-purpose models in that community. Parenting in an individualist culture prescribes practices to focus on the individuality of a child, their uniqueness, and rights to choose and guide their behaviour. Because of the foundational schema behind parenting practices, they differ from parenting practices in a non-individualist culture.

Another important conceptualization concerns mental models. Shore distinguishes *personal mental models* from *conventional mental models*. Each person has a unique life history and personal experiences of various events, environments, and people. These experiences are stored in the minds of individuals, and they serve as people's personal mental models. These models allow individuals to interpret the world in their unique manners. In addition to these models, every member of a cultural community learns and internalizes the communal cultural models (or cultural conventions) that are transformed into their conventional mental models. These models are not the individuals' creations; instead, they are public pieces of knowledge and practices that all community members borrow for individual use. Conventional mental models constrain people's attention, prescribe what should be attended to, categorize and assign meaning to events, and eventually, guide people in their actions. Together, personal and conventional mental models constitute the intrasubjective world of an individual's mental life.

According to Shore's conceptualization, a community's system of cultural models executes several functions. Cultural models are the repository of collective knowledge, skills, practices, and scripts for regulating people's collective and personal lives. This knowledge is stored in externalized and instituted forms, such as libraries, books, museums, works of art, and architecture. It is also stored as social conventions for diverse behaviours, including dating, marrying, parenting, teaching, and many other practices. In addition, it exists as the values and moral codes by which people live. Children learn and internalize these models, making them the mental regulators of their lives, actions, and experiences. These internalized models

categorize the world and regulate the individual's attention and cognitions; they interpret everything that happens around them; they prescribe what motivation to execute in one situation and what emotion to experience and display in another. Finally, they provide the repertoire of appropriate actions and scripts to execute them. D'Andrade's and especially Shore's ideas about cultural models strongly influenced the content and structure of the theory of sociocultural models.

Conclusion: Remarkable consilience of the ideas

It is not difficult to notice the similarity of the ideas expressed across countries, different disciplines, and different times. This remarkable consilience of the examined perspectives on the sociocultural regulation of people's behaviour provides strong evidence that such regulation systems exist and that they are real and powerful forces that determine and guide people's conduct. Although each of the scholars analysed above named their concepts differently and had various emphases within their systems, they all expressed nearly the same understanding of the sociocultural regulation that executes control of people's conduct. The conducted analysis unpacked more than just the mechanisms of regulation. The stock of sociocultural regulatory systems comprises the *sociocultural reality* of the communities in which people live. It is real because it exists independently of the cognition and will of individual persons; consequently, it exists independently of what these people know about this reality and even independently of whether or not they accept it. Finally, social reality is real because it has a strong causal power to direct and control people's actions, cognitions, and experiences.

Sociocultural regulatory systems are the products of a community's history; they can be understood in their human-made, anti-reifying nature by conducting a historical analysis of the constituted models. These systems bring the past to the present and because they are maintained and reinforced in the present, they also determine the future of communities. Therefore, to examine these models, one should implement both time-based (historical) and space-focused (geographical and cross-cultural) analyses of these systems.

Unanimously, the reviewed thinkers stated that the sociocultural regulative systems are the repositories of the communal language, knowledge, habits, technologies, customs, values, moral norms, styles of thinking, appropriate emotions and motivations, styles of communication, and many other communal achievements. Therefore, individual members are not required to invent their unique ways of cooking, parenting, or doing anything else; instead, they borrow such prescriptions from the communal stock of knowledge provided by their ancestors, and they successfully implement them to excel in their daily activities. Later, they may improve these prescriptions; the cumulative nature of culture makes it possible for it to develop and advance to better suit the evolving needs of community members.

All the reviewed scholars agree that the social mechanisms are uploaded into members' minds, which happens during the socialization and enculturation of children. A critical function of every cultural community is to carefully monitor the transmission of the communal stock of knowledge and the regulative mechanisms to new members. As a result of this enculturation, children develop their identities, sense of self, and personhood.

Sociocultural regulative systems exist and evolve because of the continuous flow of people's everyday interactions and relationships. Members of communities co-construct these systems through their daily lives; in turn, these systems govern the actions and experiences of these members. This mutual continued co-construction of the sociocultural world makes its ontology, in principle, different from the ontology of the natural world.

Because social regulative systems form and supply content to individual mentalities, recognizing them leads to critical methodological implications. To understand the individual's mind and to inquire into why people do, think, and feel the ways they do, researchers must consider the embeddedness of the individual's mind within their corresponding sociocultural realities. Before inquiring into people's behavioural and mental peculiarities, psychologists must consider the *collective mind/collective representations/social representations/cultural patterns of the group life/cultural models* within which these minds were formed and in which they now function. Focusing on the sociocultural environment of people's functioning constitutes the fundamental proposition of the sociocultural movement in psychology (Kirschner & Martin, 2010; Rosa & Valsiner, 2018; Valsiner & Rosa, 2007).

To differing extents, most analysed scholars acknowledged the existence of the two poles of sociocultural regulation: the public and the mental ones. The complex dynamic of their interactions generates forces for people's social and mental functioning.

Additional functions that the regulative systems and their mental components execute include:

- Categorizing the world, other people, and oneself; the regulative systems provide the linguistic furnishing of this categorization and create the cultural glossary of terms that are relevant to various domains of life.
- Establishing the relevance and importance of these categories.
- Providing the interpretive lenses that guide the extraction of the communal meanings out of the established categories.
- Inserting into people's minds the values, moral codes, and ethical principles that should regulate their lives and actions within their community.
- Prescribing the feelings people should experience and how they should express them when diverse events occur in communal life.

- Setting people's goals in life and prescribing what motives they should cultivate to achieve these goals.
- Forming and supplying a repertoire of practices that can be used for achieving one's goals.
- Assigning a system of sanctions, including rewards and punishments, to control people's behaviours.

The theoretical propositions, assumptions, and functions extracted from this analysis constitute the framework of the *theory of sociocultural models* (Chirkov, 2020). This theory is used throughout this textbook to provide a common theoretical framework through which to analyse the cultural aspects of human psychology and behaviour: human development, parenting, developing self and personhood, and many others. It is important to note that the sociocultural approach constitutes a significant area of research in modern psychology. This historical review confirms that this direction of thinking has strong and elaborated roots that should be explored further and incorporated into modern psychologists' conceptual and methodological arsenals.

Glossary

Absolute geist (German; *absolute spirit*) in Hegel's writings constitutes an awareness of the spirit (human consciousness) and its rational subjectivity. This awareness is represented in the arts, religion, and philosophy.

Consilience is an intellectual act of bringing together facts, ideas, and concepts from diverse independent sources and converging them into valid theories.

Conventional mental models (as defined by Shore) are internalized cultural models that are considered cultural conventions. Individuals do not create these models; rather, they are public pieces of information and meanings borrowed from communal stocks of knowledge for individual use. Conventional mental models focus individuals' attention, prescribe what they should attend to, categorize events, bring sense to these events, and eventually, guide people in their actions.

Cultural model, theory of There are two main versions of the theory of cultural models: One created by D'Andrade and his colleagues and a second devised by Shore. These versions are similar in many propositions, but they also have critical differences. D'Andrade's school of thought is expressed in the following definition "Cultural models are presupposed, taken-for-granted models of the world that are widely shared (although not necessarily to the exclusion of other, alternative models) by the members of a society and that play an enormous role in their understanding of that world and their behavior in it" (Quinn and Holland (1987) p. 4). According to Shore, "a particularly powerful way of thinking about culture: As an extensive and heterogeneous collection of 'models,' models that exist both as public artifacts 'in the world' and as cognitive constructs 'in the mind' of members of a community"... to the extent that they are public artifacts, cultural models are out in the world, to be observed by outsiders as well as experienced by locals" (p. 44). Because they are cognitive constructs, cultural models are inscribed in the minds of community members (p. 47).

Cultural patterns (folkways) of the group life (as defined by Schutz) are the communal ways that people use to deal with the tasks and hurdles in their social existence.

Doxa (also **doxic experience)** was defined by Bourdieu in the following manner: "When there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization … the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call doxa" (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 164). Doxa happens when a person's habitus perfectly fits the situation in which this person finds themselves. As a result, this person feels that the sociocultural environment around them is a stable and trustworthy reality.

Folkways of the in-groups (as defined by Sumner) are the uniform and imperative ways of acting established in a group to satisfy people's needs. These folkways become the habits of the people and the customs of the group. To be successful in various domains of their lives, members of a group must behave in these ways. **Mores** are the folkways that have been reflected upon; as a result, their effect on communal life is understood by the members of a community.

Foundational schemas (as defined by Shore) are an overarching set of social and moral principles and values that guide the actions of members of a society in many domains of their lives. These schemas provide a background for the special-purpose models.

Habitus is the central element of Bourdieu's conception of the psychosociocultural regulation of practices. It refers to the embodied cognitive and motivational dispositions that categorize the world and structure people's perceptions of it; it works as an interpretative lens that enables individuals to make sense of the world, of other people, and of themselves, and it allows them to differentiate what is right from what is wrong, what is beautiful from what is ugly, and so forth. Habitus also generates the actions and practices that connect these interpretations to the existing structures, particular situation and their conditions; it secures the person's ability to achieve their goals within the community.

Historicism is a doctrine about considering history when interpreting and comprehending social and cultural phenomena.

Intersubjectivity (as defined by D'Andrade) is a situation when "everybody in the group knows the schema, and everybody knows that everyone else knows the schema, and everybody knows that everyone knows that everyone knows the schema" (D'Andrade, 1987, p. 113).

Life-expressions were defined by Dilthey as all forms of people's activities and their products that are manifested and that can be the objects of a scientific investigation: people's written and said words, their actions and rituals, the products of their actions, and various of their artifacts, including art, religious beliefs, philosophical writings, laws, and many others. These life-expressions constitute facts that human sciences researchers can utilize to investigate people's collective and individual consciousness.

Methodological multiplism is an approach in which researchers utilize any method that is relevant to investigate their problem and the object of their enquiry.

Objectiver geist (German; *objective spirit*), as defined by Hegel, is the configuration of the intersubjective and reciprocal understandings among community members about the world, other people, and themselves. These intersubjective understandings are represented in the public space (they are 'objectified' – hence, comes the adjective 'objective') through the arrangements of people's interactions, their rituals and customs, and the community's cultural institutions, such as family, courts, religion, and government.

Objectivism (according to Bourdieu) claims that social reality exists in the form of the economic, political, and social structures that exist objectively and independently from people's will.

Personal mental models (as defined by Shore) are the cognitive interpretive schemas that are constructed during individuals' lives and experiences. These models allow individuals to interpret the world in their own unique manners.

Practice (as defined by Bourdieu) refers to the customary and routine way of acting within a social institution, such as a church. It is the result of the interactions of structures and habitus.

Public forms of cultural models (as defined by Shore) consist of public artifacts, social institutions, and cultural conventions that are observable by outsiders and experienced by insiders.

Reciprocity of perspectives and understandings (as defined by Schutz) is a situation when what is understood to be happening on the side of an agent is the same as what is understood to be happening on the side of their communicative partner.

Les reprÈsentations collectives (French; *collective representations)* (as defined by Durkheim) are "the ideas, beliefs, and values elaborated by a collectivity and that are not reducible to individual constituents. … collective representations help to order and make sense of the world … [They] inhibit and stimulate social actions. Their force … comes from them being within all of us and yet external to the individual" (Scott & Marshall, 2009).

Les reprÈntations sociales (French; *social representations*) (as defined by Moscovici) consist of the shared system of values, ideas, and practices in a community. The primary function of these systems is to collectively elaborate on the social objects in the community; these representations classify and name these objects and ultimately, bring them to existence. The second function of social representations is to produce order in the material and social worlds in which people live. This order allows people to orient themselves in that world and finally, to master it. Their third function is to enable communication among the members of a community. Social representations supply members with a code for engaging in social exchanges, without which productive social interactions are not possible.

Schemas of interpretation (as defined by Schutz) are the cognitive structures that assist people in interpreting events, situations, and other individuals in their surroundings.

Schemas of expression (as defined by Schutz) are the receipts "for handling things and men in order to obtain the best results in every situation with a minimum effort by avoiding undesirable consequences" (Schutz, 1970a, p. 81).

The sociocultural approach states that people's mentalities – cognition, motivation, emotion, self, identity, goals, attention, and many other mental processes – and behaviours are not people's individual creations. These processes, states and behavioural acts emerge within and are regulated by the prescriptions – volksgeist, collective and social representations, habitus, cultural patterns of the group life, and cultural models – developed by sociocultural communities. Sociocultural psychology aims to examine these prescriptions and understand their roles in shaping people's mentalities.

Special-purpose models (as defined by Shore) regulate the experiences and behaviours of people in specific domains, such as parenting, education, work relations, and others.

Structure (social structure) is a relatively stable pattern of relationships among people within social institutions, for example, family, church, school, business, government, and many others.

Subjectiver geist (German; *subjective spirit*) denotes individual consciousness and it corresponds to the modern philosophy of the mind.

Subjectivism (according to Bourdieu) emphasizes that social life and the actions of agents are controlled by individuals' desires, beliefs, and judgements that give individuals relative freedom to choose their own lives and destiny.

System of relevance (and irrelevance) (as defined by Schutz) is a communal system of motivation that prescribes to members of the community what aspects of the environment are essential to the existence of the group (and to them) and what aspects are not. It directs people's attention (i.e., it is the social matrix of attention). It also sets the goals for peoples' communal strivings and it designates the values and moral codes that justify these goals.

System of typification (as defined by Schutz) categorizes the typical problems of group life and provides typical solutions for a typical member of a community.

Systemic causality is a form of causality that determines the functioning of sociocultural mechanisms of regulation. It means that through social interactions, individual minds construct cultural models/collective minds, which, in turn, influence individual minds. The enriched individual minds continue co-constructing cultural models; so this circle of co-construction maintains this system of regulation. See also Bourdious's interdependence of structure, habitus, and practice.

Volksgeist (German; *spirit of the people*) is the social and cultural prescriptions for cognition and actions in communities. This collective mentality exists independently of individual mentalities, but it is also embedded in each individual's mentality.

Völkerpsychologie (German; *ethnopsychology*) is the discipline that aims at studying *volksgeist*. Currently, it is replaced by cultural psychology, cultural and psychological anthropology, ethnopsychology, and some other social disciplines.

Questions

1. Why do social scientists use historicism to examine social phenomena?
2. What new ideas does the sociocultural approach bring to psychological thinking?
3. Why is Germany considered the cradle of the sociocultural movement?
4. Define *volksgeist*? Why is volksgeist important?
5. How did the French social scholars advance the idea of *volksgeist*?
6. What is habitus? According to Bourdieu, what role does habitus play in regulating social practices?
7. How did Schutz contribute to our understanding of the sociocultural regulation of human conduct?
8. Summarize the primary ideas of the cultural model's approach developed by the American cognitive anthropologists.

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6 Culture and human ontogenetic development

Chapter content

- The primary focus of this chapter is to present sociocultural theories of human development. The chapter starts by listing major theoretical approaches to and specific theories of human ontogenetic development.
- Special attention is paid to Vygotsky's theory that introduced sociocultural thinking to the developmental sciences.
- Subsequently, Tomasello's shared intentionality theory is based on and extends Vygotsky's theory of child development. It includes phylogenetic, comparative, and developmental evidence to support its main propositions.
- According to Tomasello's theory, when they are born, humans inherit two sets of genetic endowments that guide their development. One, they share with apes, our closest phylogenetic relatives, and another, unique human predispositions that lead to the evolution of human forms of cognition and sociality.
- Human propensities require a "species-specific ontogenetic niche for human development" to unfold and Culture constitutes this niche.
- This cultural developmental niche consists of a system of sociocultural models that normatively regulate the behaviours of parents and other caregivers towards children. These models also contain the tools, knowledge, and skills that children must learn during their development.
- Human ontogenetic development unfolds through the acquisition and practicing of three constitutive processes: individual, joint, and collective intentionality. The joint and collective forms of intentionality constitute the bedrock for specifically human mental capacities, enabling them to unfold.

Visualize a baby who is lying in a crib and making various sounds. In the coming months and years, the baby will start walking and speaking, beginning to understand more and more about what is going on in the house, and joining adults in participating in everyday activities. As babies develop, many remarkable changes can be detected.

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They will begin having their own opinions about things, and they will become conscious of how other people perceive them; they will start discussing different topics – both that are discussed at home as well as those they heard about elsewhere. Soon, their parents will start asking their opinions on different matters, requesting that they provide a rationale for their actions. Gradually, these individuals who were so recently cooing babies will emerge as intelligent, curious, and engaging little persons. What a miracle these changes are! So many wonderful and amazing transformations have happened within this little human being. For decades, the greatest minds have tried to uncover the essence of this miracle and to understand what forces drive these remarkable changes during a human being's early development. Some notable scholars who have investigated this issue include Jean Jacques Rousseau, Erick Erikson, John B Watson, James Mark Baldwin, Sigmund Freud and his daughter Anna, Lev Vygotsky, and Jean Piaget. These and many other bright minds worked hard to uncover the enigma of the child's transformation into a conscious, agentic, moral, and linguistically capable adult and made many important discoveries.

Developmental scientists focus on different aspects of human development – neurophysiological, environmental, social, and sociocultural, as well as cognitive, moral, and affective. In this chapter, I will address only one feature of the dynamics and intricacies of human development. Specifically, I will focus on the role the sociocultural environment plays in child development (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1 Definition and explanation. Why is it scientifically challenging to study the mechanisms of human development, and why is a science of human development needed?

The answer to this question is straightforward: Human development is based on a set of processes that are invisible (most of the time) and unnoticeable by a child's parents, teachers, or even researchers. Science is required when the object of interest constitutes an enigma or puzzle that is not solvable by simple observation and layperson thinking. Science is needed when the human mind must penetrate the surface and appearance of events and dig deep into the essence of things. Human development is precisely this puzzle that needs science to be solved. By observing a growing child, talking to them, and doing various activities together, caregivers perceive amazing transformations in this child both mentally and behaviourally. However, these transformations are only a visible tip of the iceberg that represents mechanisms and processes of human development. How do we get into this 'iceberg' and understand what is happening beneath the surface? This is exactly the question for the scientific inquiry, which aims to penetrate the walking and talking of the child and get to the mechanisms behind these activities and the dynamics of their development.

Theoretical approaches to understanding the mechanisms of human development

Several theoretical approaches aim to understand the mechanisms[1] of human development: *the nativist approach*, *the behaviourist explanation of human development*, and *the cross-cultural approach to human development*. In addition, there are two crucial developmental theories: the *Piagetian theory of cognitive development* and *the sociocultural theory of human development by Vygotsky*. Let us examine these approaches and theories in turn. (Some non-Western approaches to human development are discussed in Box 6.2.)

The nativist approach

Representatives of the *nativist approach* claim that human abilities and the pathways of their development are innate and predetermined by humans' genetic make-up – by their inherited developmental programmes. The processes of development are the result of these genetic programmes unfolding. In this case, development evolves as a process of the maturation of human inherited capabilities, including language, rational thinking, and morality. Nativism has a long intellectual history dating back to the philosopher **Immanuel Kant** (1724–1804), psychologists **Karl Bühler** (1879–1963), and **Stanley Hall** (1846–1924) (Karpov, 2005). Modern neo-nativists include Noam Chomsky and Steven Pinker. Chomsky is well known for his theory of universal grammar (see Chapter 9 which suggests the innate biological predisposition of the human brain to be receptive to and to be able to grasp the grammar of any language). This approach is related to the evolutionary psychologists' idea that evolutionary evolved psychological modules/mechanisms are responsible for the development of human capacities.

The behaviourist explanation of human development

It is based on applying the main postulates of the behaviourist theories that suggest that human behaviour and its development are shaped by constellations of reinforcements, rewards, and punishments. This approach can be traced back to **John Watson** (1878–1958)**, Ivan Pavlov** (1849–1936)**, Edward Thorndike** (1874–1949), and **B.F. Skinner** (1904–1990). Behaviourist developmental theorists believe that by purposefully arranging and shaping the schedules of reinforcements and punishments, parents, teachers, and education experts can mould a child into a person with any configuration of psychological characteristics and behaviours. The founder of behaviourism, John Watson, expressed this idea in the following way: "Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world to bring them up in, and I will guarantee to take any one at random and train him to become any type of specialist I might select (Watson, 1925, p. 82). Thus, for behaviourists, the child's mind is a 'blank slate;' in turn, caregivers and teachers may inscribe on this slate whatever they want.

Cross-cultural approach to human development

This invites researchers to refrain from the current ethnocentric focus on child development that exists in Western countries and extend their developmental research to non-Western cultures and communities. This approach aims at studying culturally different child-care practices and their relations to becoming human. It is also called *comparative developmental psychology* because it focuses on performing comparative analyses of the practices and trajectories of human development that exist in various cultural communities. Within this approach, researchers use the term 'culture' with a small 'c' as they refer to the diversity of 'cultures:' Chinese, Indigenous, Arab, West-European, etc., and they examine the unique practices of raising children in these cultures. Cross-cultural developmental scholars focus on the following topics for their research: family, parenting styles and practices, attachment, cognitive and moral development, prosocial behaviours, aggression, self-regulation, and some others. They examine these topics within diverse cultural communities to find psychological universals and the culturally specific aspects of becoming human.

Piagetian theory of cognitive development

It is also known as *the constructivist approach to child development* (Karpov, 2005). According to the Swiss developmental psychologist **Jean Piaget** (1896–1980), child mental development (primarily cognitive) happens because of the child's continued exploration of and interactions with the physical world. Two processes – *assimilation* and *accommodation* – form the mechanism of cognitive development. The quest for cognitive *equilibrium* continuously drives the child's actions towards examining the world and its cognitive apprehension. The child needs to know what is out there, how it works, how it moves, and what is inside. New features of the world, new facts, and gaining knowledge about it create a cognitive *disequilibrium* that needs to be addressed. In turn, an equilibrium of understanding of the world develops through the processes of assimilation and accommodation. Here are examples of these two processes:

Assimilation

The child sees a dog for the first time → Disequilibrium arises → Dad calls it 'Doggie' → The child develops a mental schema that an animal on four legs with tail and fur is a 'doggie' → *Assimilation* of the new knowledge about the world into the child's mind has taken place → Cognitive Equilibrium is reached: Now, the child knows what this animal is.

Accommodation

The same child sees a cat and calls it Doggie because it fits their cognitive schema of a dog → Dad corrects them saying, "no, this is a cat, not a dog;" he also explains the differences → Disequilibrium arises → Changes to new schema of a "doggie" take please → Some animals on four legs with tail and fur are also cats; cats are smaller, their heads is smaller, their tails are different, etc. → *Accommodation* of the existing cognitive schemas has taken place → Equilibrium is restored.

Through the dialectical interactions of assimilation and accommodation, a child reaches a relative equilibrium between his or her cognitive schemas and the world. Therefore, children "construct" their mental worlds to fit the world around them.

Piaget also proposed that the child's cognitive development goes through four stages:

Stage 1: the sensorimotor stage (from birth to 2 years);
Stage 2: the preoperational stage (from 2 to 7 years);
Stage 3: concrete operations (ages 7 to 11 years)
Stage 4: formal operations (12 years and up).

These stages constitute a sequential progression of the child to a more adequate and more elaborate representation of the world; as a child advances, they gain a greater ability to understand and manipulate that world through developing more sophisticated mental schemas and operations.

Sociocultural theory of human development

The origin of this theory is predominantly associated with Russian Soviet psychologist **Lev Vygotsky** (1897–1937). This cultural psychological approach puts Culture and the social interactions between children and adults at the centre of human development. Within this theory, Culture (with capital C) is understood as the exclusively human and universal human-made environment with normative regulatory mechanisms that constitutes the undeniable part of the existence of the members of *Homo Sapiens*. According to Vygotsky, the child continuously interacts with this socio-symbolic world and these interactions are mediated, first, by adults and subsequently, by their peers. Social interactions constitute the vehicle through which knowledge, traditions, modes of thought, prescriptions for actions, and many other achievements of the child's cultural community are transmitted to the child. When these modes of thought and other prescriptions are internalized by the child, they make the basis of their mental development. The caring and loving adults that surround the child assist in transmitting the knowledge from the cultural domain of a community into the mental domain of the child. By learning and internalizing this cultural communal knowledge, the child develops their cognitive, moral, and self-regulatory capacities. Through this learning, the child is socialized and enculturated into the world of their community; ultimately, they are able to become a full-functioning member of it.

In the years after Vygotsky's death, the development of this line of thinking has become known as the *Neo-Vygotskian approaches;* these approaches emerged both in Soviet Russia and outside of its borders.

Vygotsky's sociocultural theory of human ontogenetic development

In his programme of research, Vygotsky aimed to explore the development of higher mental functions (HMF) in children. According to Vygotsky, HMF are comprised of

intentional attention, logical reasoning, a sense of self and self-regulation, speech, communication, and some other functions that depend on the presence of human society and language to emerge. He was interested in how children learn to read, speak, and count, as well as how their volition and self-regulation come into existence. Although Vygotsky mostly focused on children's cognitive development, ultimately, he aimed to understand the formation of fully-functioning rational, conscious and volitional individuals (Kozulin, 1990; Vygotsky, 1978; Wertsch, 1985).

Vygotsky's sociocultural theory focuses on the *process* and not on the *product* of a child cognitive development. This theory aspires to understand the *mechanisms of the development* of higher mental functions. Because this development unfolds in time, the researcher applied the notion of the *genetic* or *developmental* method to outline the evolution of these mental functions and the dynamic of the causal processes that led to the emergence of the adult mind.

THE LAW OF CULTURAL DEVELOPMENT

At the core of Vygotskian theory is the "general genetic law of cultural development." He explains it as follows:

> Any function of the child's cultural development appears twice or on two planes. First, it appears on the social plane, and then on the psychological plane. First it appears between people as an interpsychological category, and then within the child as intrapsychological category. This is equally true with regard to voluntary attention, logical memory, the formation of concepts, and the development of volition. We may consider this position as a law in the full sense of the word, but it goes without saying that internalization transforms the process itself and changes its structure and functions. Social relations or relations among people genetically underlie all higher functions and their relationships.
>
> (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 163)

The above quote reveals the essence of Vygotskian thinking about human development. All mental processes first exist in the social (sociocultural) plane among members of the child's community: in the ways they perceive and categorize events, things and other people; how they think about and practice various activities; and the tools they use to perform these practices and activities. These members have a common language and they use specific words for naming multiple things, events, and situations. They do various things in specific, socially acceptable ways. This stock of communal knowledge constitutes the source for the child's socialization and development. Children learn and internalize these external regulatory processes through their interactions with adults; subsequently, children transform them into their internal mental regulatory operations. Representatives of the Vygotskian and Neo-Vygotskian versions of this theory inquire into and examine the conditions and specific mechanisms that lead to the occurrence of such transformations.

INSEPARABLE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN 'SOCIAL' AND 'CULTURAL'

Although Vygotsky did not explicitly explain his understanding of Culture, it is obvious that the social interactions he describes, among people on the "social plane," are not spontaneous random encounters. They are structured cultural practices that are primarily organized by means of language and cultural meanings (Van der Veer, 1996). Vygotsky called these uniformed and structured social interactions the "mature cultural forms of behavior" (Vygotsky, 1979, p. 151). "The word social when applied to our subject has great significance. Above all, in the widest sense of the word, it means that everything that is cultural is social. Culture is the product of social life and human social activity" (p. 164).

As Vygotsky held such a conviction about the inseparability of social and cultural, he began to use these two terms together (hence *sociocultural*) to describe the environment in which humans function.

> Culture creates special forms of behavior, changes the functioning of mind, constructs new stories in the developing system of human behavior... In the course of historical development, social humans change the ways and means of their behavior, transform their natural premises and functions, elaborate and create new, specifically cultural forms of behavior.
>
> (Wertsch & Tulviste, 1999, p. 19)

This theory highlights the interconnectedness of the social and cultural aspects of people's lives and it emphasizes the primacy of the sociocultural patterns and practices that exist in a society in the mechanisms of mental development of children.

TWO LINES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT

Child development is propelled by sets of interacting forces – biological, psychological, and sociocultural. Vygotsky distinguished between the "natural" and "sociocultural" lines of development. The *natural line of development* unfolds based on the elementary inherited developmental programmes responsible for the emergence of the "rudimentary" forms of perception, attention, reasoning, and memory. The natural line of development is mostly directed by the same genes that humans share with apes. In turn, the *cultural line of development* transforms these elementary forms into higher mental processes. HMF are qualitatively different from elementary psychological processes because they are cultural products; in contrast, elementary mental processes are products of biology.

MECHANISMS OF DEVELOPMENT: INTERNALIZATION AND MEDIATION

The primary mechanism of the development of HMF is the process of *internalization*. According to Wertsch (1985), "Vygotsky viewed internalization as a process whereby certain aspects of patterns of activity that had been performed on

an external plane come to be executed on an internal plane" (pp. 61–62). Here is Vygotsky's example of internalization (Vygotsky, 1979, pp. 160–161). The child starts by performing actions and interactions that are regulated by elementary psychological processes. For example, the child stretches a hand towards an attractive but unreachable toy. In this case, the child's attention is regulated by salience and the attractiveness of the toy; the stretched hand is the result of a natural and unmediated grasping movement with the aim of possessing an object. When the child's mother enters the scene, she interprets the child's hand movement as a pointing gesture and gives the toy to the child. Soon, the child understands that by stretching their hand towards a toy, they may direct her mother's attention towards it and, ultimately, get it. Once this occurs, the child's grasping movement transforms into a communicative act directed towards others. Later, the child consciously uses the pointing gesture to communicate with others by directing their attention to various items of interest to the child. Ultimately, the child starts using the index finger as a pointer to help him or herself regulate their attention while, for example, reading a book or describing a picture. Thus, the finger becomes a tool for self-regulating one's attention. As a result, the HMF of voluntary attention is born.

It is important to highlight two corollaries from this example. First, internalization unfolds from action to thought. Initially, the child was involved in the activity of grasping; once this activity was mediated by an adult, it was transformed into a communicative act. Subsequently, this communicative act for others was moved into the mental plane of the child, and it became an internal mental function of self-regulated attention. Therefore, another thesis of Vygotsky's theory states that child development starts with activity in the physical world, which is mediated by adults, and it is followed by the emergence of mental regulative functions.

Another corollary from the above example is that the essential aspect of the mechanism of the development of HMF is *mediation*. This means that the child learns to use cultural tools to mediate their mental processes of thinking and self-regulation. There are numerous examples of cultural tools. They can be physical tools – a toy, a pencil, a spoon, a cup, an index finger – or symbolic – words, numbers, then at school, chemical formulas, musical notes, and many others. According to Vygotsky, the core of the development of HMF is constituted by a child learning to use the cultural tools that initially exist in the sociocultural contexts among adult members of a community as the intrapsychological regulative tools to manage one's own mental (cognitive) life.

THE ZONE OF PROXIMAL DEVELOPMENT

The *zone of proximal development* is another important concept of Vygotsky's theory of ontogenetic development. As was outlined above, there are both natural and cultural lines of child development. If, at some point early in their life, the child is left alone without assistance from any adults, then only the inherited developmental programmes will guide this child's development. Under the guidance of these programmes, the child

may reach a certain level of physical and mental development. However, if this child lives in a cultural community surrounded by adults who care about and focus upon this child's progress, he or she may reach a higher level of development compared to the level reached by a child who evolves only with the natural line of growth. Vygotsky labelled the difference between the developmental level achieved because of natural programmes and the developmental level that is achieved due to the involvement and instruction of adults using various cultural tools in the *zone of proximal development:* "the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p. 86). According to this understanding, at a particular point in their development, a child should face tasks that they cannot do without the assistance of adults; however, with their help, the child can achieve the desired result. This concept has guided educational scholars in constructing age-appropriate but stimulating educational programmes.

In conclusion, the Vygotskian theory of child sociocultural development looks for the driving forces of development that exist outside of the individual's mind and into the sociocultural schemas, models, and recipes that exist in the child's social environment. Through the child's interactions with this environment, regulated by adults, the child transforms from a biological being into a sociocultural being. According to followers of Vygotsky, this transformation constitutes the essence of human development. Unfortunately, because of his early death, Vygotsky did not decipher all the mechanisms and conditions of this development and accumulated enough empirical evidence to support his theory. As such, this empirical support has been provided by his followers within various streams of the Neo-Vygotskian approach. One of them, the *shared intentionality theory* by Michael Tomasello, is the focus of our next sections.

Box 6.2 'In Focus' feature. Non-Western theories of human development

Theoretical approaches and specific theories of human development mentioned so far are all originated and practiced in Western countries and cultures. It is logical to ask, what about non-Western thinking about how the child becomes a grown-up with a mature soul with developed cognitive capacities. American educational psychologist Murray R. Thomas (1988) edited the book on the topic of Oriental theories of human development. This book is a collection of essays on teachings about human development from Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, Shinto, and Islamic religious and philosophical traditions. By using scriptures and foundational texts of these traditions, contributors to this book extracted main ideas regarding human development, its driving forces, ultimate purpose, stages of growth, and proper techniques to guide it.

The authors of this volume went even further. They surveyed and interviewed representatives of these traditions who live and work in modern times. Researchers were interested in what ideas, knowledge, and practices (sociocultural models of human development) their respondents hold about children's development. Researchers were also interested in the origin of these models, more specifically, in how strongly existing models of development reflect the traditional teachings and if they deviate, why.

Let's consider, for example, Hindu tradition, which is the oldest recorded set of ideas about human development. According to this tradition, the primary force of human development is a person's *karma* or accumulation of good and bad deeds in previous lives. Personal karma as well as karma of one's parents determines the person's character, moral tendencies, and trajectories of his or her development. An important role in a child's developmental trajectory plays the *caste* into which he or she is born. The ultimate purpose of one's life is to attain *moksha* or the state when the individual soul joins the Eternal Mind or *Brahman*. This merging of souls brings the state of eternal happiness or *nirvana*. People's earthly life is the preparation for this event, and the child's development is the foundation for making one's life pure and perfect for reaching the ultimate destination. Consequently, children should be studious and knowledgeable, especially in *Vedas*, the collection of sacred knowledge; they must be disciplined, dutiful, and obedient; also, humble, unselfish and self-sacrificing, even-tempered, chaste, free from desire and aversion, exempt from hate and pure in speech and thoughts (p. 42). To achieve these goals, Hindu developmental teaching prescribes specific behaviours that should cultivate these virtues. Among them are continued pursuit of true knowledge through studies under the guidance of the teacher; display of respect towards one's teacher by appropriate greeting, positive attitude, offering gifts, and obedient behaviour; proper behaviour towards one's parents as well as other living beings (animals) and ill individuals; a respectful way of talking and listening others, and abstaining from lying, gambling, looking at and touching women, and from doing injury to living creatures (pp. 43–44).

As the surveys and interviews demonstrated, modern Indians (answers were collected from residents of suburbs of New Delhi, the capital of India) pretty strongly deviate from the traditional developmental guidance. In contrast with the traditional teaching, respondents believe that all children are initially good and that they are corrupted by their social conditions and environment. Children's cognitive development strongly depends on their efforts and partly on their heredity. All these deviations from the Hindu teaching, where most everything in the children's life is predetermined by his or her karma or inherited propensities, the researchers explained by the Westernization of Indians and their focus on preparing their children for successful lives in the modern world.

The mechanisms and dynamics of becoming human: A Neo-Vygotskian approach of Tomasello

Michael Tomasello, an American-German developmental psychologist (Tomasello, 1999, 2008, 2014, 2016, 2019), developed the *shared intentionality theory*, which was introduced in Chapter 4. This theory is potent because the author has applied its primary ideas, which were elaborated upon in the phylogenetic version of his theory, to human ontogenetic/life-span development. Through this application, Tomasello established a powerful connection between these two lines of human emergence. Importantly, by using various experimental, developmental, and comparative studies: from apes to modern humans and from newborn babies to mature human beings and members of society. Tomasello and his team substantially enriched the empirical bases of sociocultural thinking and moved this line of theorizing to a higher level of theorizing and elaboration.

Following Tomasello's approach, we will focus on four aspects of child development. First, it is important to articulate what specific human mental capacities must be developed in the child – capacities that raise them far above our ape ancestors. Second, we will discuss what capabilities and potentials children possess when they enter the sociocultural world of their communities. Third, we will examine the nature of the sociocultural world that children inhabit; subsequently, we will aim to uncover what particular elements of this world are crucial for child development. Finally, we will discuss the mechanisms of interactions that exist between this world and the child, as well as the dynamics of the development of uniquely human mental capacities.

What fundamental human capabilities must be developed in the child?

Before we start to analyse the above-mentioned aspects of child development, it is important to remind readers what specific human capabilities must be cultivated in the child. To become a grown-up human being and a mature member of the community, the child must become an individual with consciousness, a sense of self and agency; they must think rationally and have the abilities of reflection and abstraction. The child has to master the language of his community and become a good communicator with other community members. This is the core of exclusively human mental capabilities. Child mental development unfolds within the following developmental domains: *cognitive* – a set of skills to adequately understand reality, to contemplate and make decisions related to various problems, to acquire new knowledge, and to create new knowledge and invent new things; *language use and communication* – a capacity to the talk local language and other languages, to skilfully use language to express ideas, to listen to other people, and to enjoy the linguistic and other symbolic representations of various realities (reading books, viewing pictures and cartoons, listening to music, etc.); *social* – the capacity to

get along with other people, to understand one's social status, to accommodate others' interests and concerns, to solve conflicts and to negotiate solutions; and *moral development* – a competence to understand, respect, and follow the ethical norms of 'right' and 'wrong' in one's community, to contemplate moral decisions, and to behave in a way that supports the peaceful, respectful, and cooperative nature of people's social arrangements. Each cultural community has its own language and moral code, patterns of cognition, and social networking. Thus, Tomasello also introduced the concept of *cultural learning* as the overarching domain that embraces all of the above trajectories of child development within a particular cultural context.

The newly born child's predispositions and potentialities – inherited developmental programmes

As we discussed in the previous chapter, every human being is equipped with two layers of genetic predispositions and traits. The first layer is responsible for the emergence of the set of skills that both great apes and humans have. These are the basic skills of managing the environment, space, and objects, differentiating some quantities, and creating primitive tools (Tomasello, 1999). The toddler's mind is not a blank slate; rather, it is a system of cognitive programmes they have that are similar to the ones that great apes have: "cognitive skills … for dealing with space, objects, tools, quantities, categories, social relationships, communication, and social learning" (Tomasello, 1999, p. 7). Toddlers can see objects, assess the distance to them, target these objects for grasping, follow moving objects, and even infer some causal relations between them. Socially, they react to human closeness and the human face, respond to the human voice and touch; they can smile; they try to imitate some actions, experience emotions, and through crying, they demand that their needs be satisfied.

The second layer of inherited predispositions consists of uniquely human propensities towards social cognition and towards creating and maintaining sociocultural realities (see Box 6.3 for an experimental examination of this hypothesis). The ape-like developmental programmes start functioning automatically when the child is born. However, in order for the specific human predispositions to kick in, the child needs to reside in a sociocultural environment and spend time with concerned and engaged adults. Once the child encounters these conditions, the cultural line of development is ignited. These cultural potentialities include the abilities to learn and to understand the symbolic representations of reality, beginning with gestures and language; to understand others as intentional agents like oneself, to take the perspectives of other people, to use language for communication; the ability to moral judgement, among others. When these exclusively human predispositions are absent (in the case of chimpanzees), individuals cannot become humans. When they are thwarted (in autistic children), these children cannot become fully-functioning healthy persons.

The sociocultural context of child's development

> Organisms inherit their environment as much as they inherit their genomes .... Human beings are designed to work in a certain kind of social environment, and without it developing youngsters (...) would not develop normally either socially or cognitively. That certain kind of social environment is what we call culture, and it is simply the species-typical and species-unique 'ontogenetic niche'[2] for human development.
>
> (Tomasello, 1999, pp. 78–79)

To become fully functioning human beings, children cannot be born into forests, mountains, or water; they cannot be born into a herd of deer, a family of bears, or a pack of wolves. Rather, human babies must be born into their species-specific niche, which is the *human cultural community*. They need this developmental niche to become human beings, just as baby fish need water to become fully-functioning fish and baby birds need air space to fly to become fully-functioning birds.

Box 6.3 'In Focus' feature. The cultural intelligence hypothesis

Tomasello and his team (Herrmann et al., 2007) tested the hypothesis of humans' specialized proclivity towards social and cultural regulatory processes (social learning, communication, and 'theory of mind'). Researchers were interested in predispositions that allow humans to develop unique cognition that does not exist in other species of animals, including apes. The proposed *cultural intelligence hypothesis* states that early in their ontogeny, children have "specialized skills for absorbing the accumulated skillful practices and knowledge of their social group" [what is culture, VC] (p. 1360). Because of these skills, children and later adults become capable of developing complex and uniquely human cognition and corresponding skills that allow them to learn knowledge, tools, and technologies that exist in their community.

Method

Researchers administered a battery of tests to 106 chimpanzees, 32 orangutans, and 105 human children of 2.5 years of age. All three groups had a relatively equal number of males and females. The standard testing tasks were related to two domains: physical and social. The physical domain included tasks that assess space orientation, quantities discrimination, and causality comprehension. The social domain had tasks that evaluate social learning, gesture communication, and the skill to understand the intentions of another individual (theory of mind).



Figure 6.1 The proportion of correct responses on tasks in physical and social domains by human children, adult chimpanzees, and adult orangutans. (This figure is a modified version of Figure 1, p. 1362 from the article.)

Results

Figure 6.1 illustrates the results of this study. Across all tests in the physical domain, humans and chimpanzees performed equally successfully and significantly better than orangutans. In the social domain, children significantly outperformed both species of apes.

Conclusion

1 Two-year-old children who have not been exposed to written language and formal schooling have skills in the physical domain similar to chimpanzees. This mental equipment to deal with the physical world probably can be traced back six million years to the common ancestors of humans and apes.
2 Social skills and cognition of humans, even as young as 2.5-year-old, demonstrate their readiness to be involved in the species-specific ways of living in cultural groups. Children are predisposed to communicate with others, learn from others, and read their minds in a more sophisticated way than the apes can. These skills evolved much later in evolution after hominids diverged in their phylogenetic development from the common ancestors with apes. This happened probably when complex forms of cooperation during hunting, gathering, and other collective activities formed adaptive pressures for social skills to support these activities efficiently. Finally, the authors concluded that their cultural intelligence hypothesis has been supported. Specifically, humans have two heritage lines of their cognitive development. One, which is the oldest, allows them to manipulate the physical world similar to apes. The second represents a species-specific trajectory of evolution that equips them with specialized skills to operate in cultural communities with individuals similar in their mental composition.

The dynamics and mechanisms of child development

Human offspring take the longest amount of time to become adults or at least to become capable of independent functioning. Typically, children become reasonable and understanding persons between the ages of six and eight years, and they can be considered independent by the middle of their teenage period. Rare species on Earth take 15–16 years to begin independent life; only humans require this long of a timeframe. Why? According to sociocultural theories of human development, the answer is straightforward: The development of human cognitive and social competencies requires continued interactions with the sociocultural environment, which is a time-consuming process. The human-made environments are vast and complex. It requires time to interact with even a part of them and to extract the hidden knowledge, skills, meanings, and normative prescriptions from them. Let's use the shared intentionality theory to understand some aspects of this process and consider why it takes so much time.

In applying his shared intentionality theory to ontogenetic development, Tomasello follows the same three primary stages in becoming human that he hypothesized in his analysis of phylogenetic development: *individual intentionality*, *joint intentionality*, and *collective intentionality*. Starting with their birth and continuing until approximately nine months of age, the child is driven by individual intentionality; this means that the child sets their own goals (not consciously, of course), executes efforts to reach them, uses different means for this achievement, and experiences satisfaction when accomplishing such tasks. From around ten months of age to approximately three years, the child practices joint intentionally. Subsequently, after that time, the child enters the cultural world and starts cultural learning through the development of collective intentionality. After six or seven years of age, the child is equipped to join the cultural world of adults and start their acquisition of communal heritage.

Entering the social world: Acquiring joint intentionality

According to the shared intentionality theory, the primary cognitive capability that emerges in babies at around nine months of age is the ability to understand that others are human beings like themselves who have intentional and mental lives like their own (Tomasello, 1999, p. 5). This theory suggests that this *ability to perceive others as intentional agents like oneself* is the pivotal capacity that propels babies into gaining other forms of social and cultural learning. Developmental psychologists have concluded that at around 7–8 months, the child starts to experience oneself as an animate being who can make changes in the world, make things happen, and experience the reactions of this world to him or herself. At this time, the child's *proto-self* emerges as the centre of these actions and experiences. At around nine months, the child realizes that others are also animate

beings who can influence objects in the world. The researchers argue about the sequence of these emergencies. Some say that the child first discovers their own intentionality and then understands the same about other people; in contrast, others suggest that the child first realizes that others have their own goals and that they can intentionally make changes in the world and, subsequently, they discover this same capacity in themselves and starts to experience that they are a human being like others. Nonetheless, the majority of researchers agree that these two fundamental identifications with human beings and with oneself emerge around the age of nine months and that they change the nature of child development from the natural to the cultural line of development (following the terminology of Vygotsky).

The basis for this ability to perceive others as intentional agents like oneself is found in the concepts of *gaze following* and the *joint attention* between the child and the caring adult. While playing with the child, if the adult turns their attention to a nearby toy, the child will follow this gaze and join their parent in looking in the same direction. This indicates that the child starts to perceive the other as an agent who can intentionally manipulate their gaze direction and attention. The child realizes that they can follow another person's attention (gaze) and join the adult in this activity. Although this might seem trivial to the unaware observer, Tomasello and other developmental psychologists consider this acquisition of the ability to join attention to be crucial as the child progresses to a cultural human being. Why? They argue that it opens the door to the exclusively human type of cooperative coordination, where joint goals and jointly coordinated actions follow joint attention to achieve these goals. These new acquisitions lead to the development of joint intentionality.

Two other propensities that emerge at around 9–12 months of age are *understanding another person's perspective* and *coordinating one's and another's perspectives*. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the concept of perspective is a unique perceptual and mental view of things, events, or people. Every person, including the child, holds their subjective perspectives of things in the world. People also realize that there are multiple perspectives regarding the same event and that other perspectives may be different from their perspectives. Thus, mature adults hold a representation of their personal vision of a situation or event, and they are aware of and able to imagine and represent other people's perspectives. Such representations and understandings are the basis of human communication and cooperation. Tomasello (2018) explains, "perspective-taking requires that a subject imagine more than one way of perceiving or understanding a given entity or situation; there can be no such thing as a single perspective on something without at least the possibility of other perspectives on it" (p. 64). He called it "imagining what another sees and know" (p. 64). Even partaking in such a simple game as rolling a ball between the child and the adult provides a training ground

for understanding and exchanging perspectives. Specifically, first, the child is the sender of the ball, and the ball is rolling away from the child to another person. Subsequently, the child becomes the receiver of the ball, and they must catch the ball that is moving from the partner. This exchange of perspectives continues as long as this game lasts. As soon as this basic understanding of the existence of another perspective is established, a whole chain of variations can be practiced: *exchanging perspectives* (I am rolling a ball to you, and you are catching it; then, you are rolling the balls and I am catching it); *coordinating conflicting perspectives* (a child says this is a cat; a mom says this is a beautiful Russian Blue cat; they discuss the difference between their perspectives, and the child finds that their mom sees more than simply a cat; she sees a cat of a particular breed and finds it beautiful). Another important difference that happens at this period is that the interactions between the child and adults move from the dyadic form to the triadic structure. In this triadic act, the child and adults cooperate (share attention and negotiate perspectives) regarding the objects of their mutual interest. This focus on the object as a third party in their interactions further supports the child's developing joint intentionality.

The start of self-concept development. Understanding others as intentional agents and the ability to consider their perspectives contributes to another important mental feature of the child – the self-concept or the "Me." By following the attention of adults, child notice that they also attend to the child themselves. By taking the adults' perspective, children acquire an opportunity to look at themselves and refer to themselves as others see them. This is a remarkable moment for the emergence of the child's self ('I'-self) and self-concept ('Me'-self). In addition, children are able to monitor adults' emotional attitudes towards themselves. And these emotional attitudes expressed by others add an evaluative component to the child's emerging self-concept. As a result, children start not only to see themselves through the eyes of others, but they are also able to judge themselves based on others' attitudes. ("I am a girl;" "I am my mom's happiness;" "I am good and loveable"). Later in life, based on their emerging self-concept, the processes of self-identification with one's family, gender, ethnicity, and other categories continue to develop the child's multiple self-identities.

During the period between nine months and about three years of age, the child practices a newly emerged form of regulation: joint intentionality and joint intersubjectivity. From this point on, it is not only their individual goals and intentions that matter; rather, the goals and intentions of others should be considered, and this understanding should also regulate their actions. Tomasello labelled this the "*dual-level structure of shared intentionality*" (Tomasello, 2018, p. 46). Box 6.4 articulates Tomasello's summary of the phenomenon of joint intentionality in ontogenetic development.

Box 6.4 Definition and explanation. Joint intentionality as a form of social regulation

Joint intentionality

"Motivation: The motivation to socially affiliate and bond with other individuals (especially adults) by sharing/aligning psychological states (emotions, goals attention, knowledge) with them.

Cognition: The cognitive capacity to create a joint agent "we" with other individuals, creating the possibility of taking the perspective of others, including recursively (aka the dual-level structure), and relating to others second-personally as equals" (Tomasello, 2018, p. 305).

Entering the Cultural world: Acquiring collective intentionality

The joint intentionality and intersubjectivity allow the child to develop a sophisticated form of social regulation. At this point, the child comes to the understanding that others hold different perspectives of objects and events, that others know that the child also has a unique perspective on the world and that (when the verbal conversation becomes possible) they can negotiate these perspectives with those around them. These understandings and negotiations are based on the cooperation of two or more people who progressively create common ground together. After three years of age (which is often called 'the three-year revolution' because of the important changes in child behaviour regulation), the child enters the world of collective normative intentional things in which there is not just an interpersonal common ground but also a cultural and communal one. This collective common ground is shared with all members of the community. To profess in this process, children need to acquire the skills of regulating their actions based on collective intentionality.

Entering the Cultural world

By mastering joint intersubjective regulation and learning to understand other people's perspectives, a new world of collective intentionality and intersubjectivity opens up for the developing child; this occurs when they are about three years old. They come to realize that many things, events, and practices exist, but their parents have not created them; rather, these concepts existed before they were born, and all members of their community perceive and practice them in similar ways. For example, everyone organizes birthday parties and invites their family and their friends. In turn, everybody knows what to do when this event happens – buy a gift,

eat cake, be joyful, and have fun. Everybody in the child's community does these things and, importantly, everybody expects that others know these rules and that they will behave the same way. Similar dynamics exist with picnics, church services, sleepovers, and many other events.

In addition to these events, the child discovers the *cultural dimension of things*. Specifically, the child starts to understand that things around them are the products of collective intentionality. After the age of three, they discover and learn what Tomasello labelled "the intentional affordances of artifacts" (1999, p. 84); other scholars, for example, Michael Cole, called this the 'ideal' dimension of cultural tools. In addition to their natural physical and sensory-motor properties, all cultural artifacts have usage and meanings that were created and infused into them by their designers. Thus, intentional/ideational affordance is the purpose of an artifact and practicing its use makes it applicable to the members of the cultural community. The book, for example, is heavy, has a firm hardcover or a pliable softcover, and can be bulky; however, in addition to these physical properties of a book, a book also stores knowledge, ideas, and stories for those who can read. This intentional affordance of the assemblage of sheets of paper has to be discovered by children, learned with the help of adults, and then used to extract all the fun and knowledge that books have to offer. In addition to having cultural tools and objects, this intentional dimension exists in any practice (family dinner, teeth brushing, hair combing, nose picking, winking, and hundreds of others).

Cultural learning: Imitation, guided instruction, collaborative learning. The first step in cultural learning is *learning through imitation*. Toddlers begin imitation activities around 9–12 months of age. By imitating their parents in their use of different artifacts (books, a vacuum cleaner, toothbrush, mirror, bookmarks, cosmetics, etc.) or performance of various practices (mom does make-up, dad brushes his teeth, the family buys groceries, the family visits the doctor, etc.), the child enters the "'intentional space' of the user" (Tomasello, 1999, p. 84) of cultural tools and things. At this stage, the child infers the purposes of tools and practices and learns how to use them. And here is the importance of these behaviours: The child is not simply mirroring the adult as some smart chimpanzees are able to do. Because children have already learned to take other people's perspectives, they learn *through* adults by placing themselves in the 'shoes' of the adults and endorsing their perspectives by using various cultural tools (Tomasello, 2018, p. 134). As a result, the cultural meaning of the artifact becomes available to these children, and they turn into cultural beings.

Imitative learning is followed by *direct instruction* by adults on how to use cultural objects and tools and how to perform practices (starting at 3–4 years). Only humans are motivated to actively teach and train their offspring (this is what scissors are, and this is how you should use them), and human children are receptive to

this teaching. They understand that their parents transmit not only their personal opinions, but they also communicate "generic cultural information" (p. 147). This information is generalizable and can be used in a wide range of situations and occasions. Children realize that adults transmit universal, reliable, and generalizable knowledge and skills that can be trusted and that should be used when functioning in the cultural community. This is what "we" know, and this is how "we" do things. The primary feature of instructed learning is that children completely trust adults and the information that they convey to them. Children also trust that this knowledge is valid, reliable, generalizable, and culturally important (Tomasello, 2018, p. 151). Later, children may become suspicious of some instructions and expertise, and they may demonstrate caution using them.

During instructed teaching and learning, a remarkable process of *internalization* is taking place. Readers will recall that internalization is the intimate process of incorporating learned knowledge and skills into one's self-regulation, which in turn becomes taken-for-granted guidance for the child's actions. The internalization of cultural knowledge creates the basis for normative social regulation based on the "voice of the cultural group as a whole" (Tomasello, 2018, pp. 152–153). Tomasello extended such an interpretation of internalization by proposing a mechanism of internalization. He suggested that internalization is a role-reversal imitation of adults teaching their children cultural things (for example, how to use scissors). Internalization happens when children start teaching other children the same cultural things and then teaching themselves. Tomasello's suggested that this process is fundamentally based on role-reversal in the instruction process. In this role-reversal imitation, "... individuals are able to freely substitute one agent for another in anything that they learn [and this] enables children to self-govern their own actions from the perspective of others or the cultural group" (Tomasello, 2018, p. 153). In particular, first, children imitate adults by teaching a sibling; subsequently, they may imitate themselves teaching others by placing themselves in the position of learners (self-teaching). These flexible role-reversals transform self-regulation step-by-step and incorporate cultural knowledge and norms into children's self-systems.

The third type of learning that, according to Tomasello, contributes to children successfully entering the cultural world of adults is *collaborative learning*, which starts at 5–6 years of age. In imitative and instructed learning, children learn from an authoritative knowledgeable adult. In collaborative learning, two or more peers of relatively the same age play a game or explore an idea or toy together without an authority figure present. Here, intersubjectivity among partners is symmetrical; they co-construct knowledge, rules, or norms and, consequently, internalize them. They may play out and co-construct the knowledge that they have learned from adults, which is tested, practiced, and individualized in collaborative learning,

Linguistic communication. The acquisition of *language* and the ability for *linguistic communication* is another remarkable process that emerges around one year of age and continues through all the following stages of development. Children's linguistic communication is a natural extension of their gesture communication, primarily pointing. At around 12 months, the child can point and express three motives by this gesture. They may request help from an adult; they may express information about something, or they may state an attitude about an issue or object. The underlying nature of these communicative acts of sharing knowledge, emotions, and attitudes towards an item or idea is to request cooperation regarding an issue. Quite close to the emergence of gesture communication, linguistic communication starts by learning and using the first words. First words are vocal; later ones are written symbols that have referents (objects, things, events that they refer to). Both these words and these symbols are used to label things and then manipulate them to convey various intentions, ideas, and emotions. Words are acquired and then used in cooperative communicative acts between the child and the adult. The success of this acquisition is based on the child's joint attention skills and their understanding of the partner's *communicative intentions*. Communicative intentions are the adult's intentions in directing the child's attention – what they want the child to attend to. The other processes that the child acquires during joint and collective intentionality periods are attention manipulation, perspective-taking, and role-reversals, all of which participate in and contribute to linguistic communication shaping. Children acquire words and then linguistic constructions – utterances, questions, narratives, discourses, etc. – by understanding their referents, grasping their instrumental functions (how they can be used to achieve various cooperative goals), and determining their opportunity for expressing various perspectives. In addition to conveying individual perspectives of communicative partners, language importantly conveys cultural knowledge, prescriptions, norms, and attitudes. Thus, by learning a language and using it, the child enters the collectively intentional world of their linguistic community. Language is the primary gate into this community.

Tomasello's summary of the collective intentionality stage of development is presented in Box 6.5.

Box 6.5 Definition and explanation. Collective intentionality

"Motivation: The group-minded motivation to affiliate with and care for social group by respecting and conforming to (aligning with) its conventions and norms.

Cognition: The cognitive capacity to form a group-minded 'we' and so to participate in conventions, norms, and institutions, and to view these things from 'objective' and normative perspective" (Tomasello, 2018, p. 305).

Development of morality: Learning to differentiate 'right' from 'wrong'

Tomasello understands morality pretty broadly: "Morality is how we work things out with others by means *other* than power and authority" (2014, p. 157). For small children, this means dealing with other people cooperatively, helping them, sharing things and resources, and considering others' interests and perspectives. Later in their development, children learn and internalize cultural moral norms and become moral cultural beings who understand things like justice, fairness, kindness, politeness, and many other ethical categories.

The three forms of intentionality, which were identified and studied by the shared intentionality theory – individual, joint, and collective – are explicitly present in the development of the child's morality. *Individual intentionality* determines the expression and protection of the child's self-interests. Often, such behaviours are interpreted by adults as a child's egoism. Yes, to a large extent, children are driven by their self-interest and are often egoistic.

Joint intentionality gives the basis *the second-person morality*. It emerges when interactions with others become more articulated and when the child develops an understanding of others as intentional agents like oneself. Tomasello and his colleagues (see for review Tomasello & Vaish, 2013) conducted many experiments where they investigated toddlers' cooperation and commitment, sympathy and helping, equality, and sharing. According to Tomasello and his team, these are the building blocks of toddlers' second-person morality. The foundation of this type of morality is *cooperation* – working with others not to achieve one's selfish goals but to work together to get better results that cannot be achieved by working alone, as well as for the sake and pleasure of being with others. Experiments of Tomasello's team demonstrate that even toddlers are collaborative, social, and cooperative. These qualities are based on children's understanding that their cooperative activities are inherently joint. This means (going back to joint intentionality) that the child understands that without others, they cannot achieve their goals and that others also need this child's participation to get what they need or want. Helping behaviour and sympathy towards others clearly demonstrate their intrinsic nature (Warneken & Tomasello, 2008). This means that they perform these actions not because of rewards that they may get for executing particular actions but because this is their natural tendency, and they cannot act differently. Even more, rewards for being helpful may destroy the child's intrinsic helping motivation, and they may stop performing these actions.

An important shift in children's moral development is a transition to collective intentionality and, based on it, *the norm-based morality* or morality grounded in accepted cultural ethical norms. Cultural norms are general (they work across various situations) and accepted by the majority of community members. Everybody knows these norms, and everybody knows that others know these norms too

(collective intersubjectivity). Norms are opinions of the group or community and are usually represented in people's minds as *generalized others* (everybody in our community does like this, so you should also do). This means that something the child does is bad not because their mom does not like this but because everybody does not like and does not do this. There are two primary indicators that children between three and six years old have internalized cultural norms. They start demanding that others follow the norms, and they start experiencing *shame* and/or *guilt* when they or others violate these norms. They also may experience *pride* when they successfully meet the normative expectations of others.

These stages of moral development are presented in Table 6.1.

Cultural universality and specificity in child development

All three stages of development that are based on developing and utilizing individual, joint, and collective intentionality are universal across cultures. Callaghan and colleagues (2011) tested this hypothesis by replicating experiments on social-cognitive skills development (as part of the larger cross-cultural developmental

Table 6.1 Stages of moral development according to the shared intentionality theory

Stages of moral development	*Motivation*	*Manifestation*
Individual intentionality.	Self-interest and protection of self-interest.	Actions or plays are focused on receiving personal rewards and benefits, sometimes at the expense of others. Usually, such behaviour is interpreted as a child's self-centeredness or even egoism.
Joint intentionality: the second-person morality.	Cooperation with others to achieve joint goals; intrinsic motivation of being together with others and working with them and for them.	Cooperation and commitment, sympathy and helping behaviour, equality and sharing.
Collective intentionality: the norm-based morality.	Social motivation to follow norms and be accepted by others; the regulation through internalization of *generalized others*.	Demanding that others follow the rules; experiencing guilt and/or shame when oneself or others violate the norms; experiencing pride when meeting normative expectations of others.

Source: Based on Tomasello, 2016 and Tomasello & Vaish, 2013.

project) in Canada, India, and Peru. Researchers studied children's understanding of intentions and attention of others, their ability to share intentions and attention, and their skills to comprehend and use symbols (pictures). The general conclusion of this study was that by the age of 24 months children from these three countries reached nearly the same level of socio-cognitive skills. The researchers also discovered that the trajectories of this development were different in different samples. For example, Canadian children were much better at manipulating symbolic stimuli and reached this level of development sooner than their counterparts from India and Peru. But, for example, for the task on collaboration (joint intentions and attention), children from India and Peru were slightly better than Canadians.

An important conclusion based on this and related studies is that during early child development, it is necessary for children is to live in and be embedded into their cultural environments and have regular, consistent and caring relations with adults. The specifics of these relations – parenting styles, presence, or absence of stimulating environments, the extent to which parents are centred on their children, and some other conditions, play some but not crucial roles in children's maturation. They may change their developmental trajectories, but the ultimate developmental results will be similar. In all cultures, children start understanding others, learn the language, start talking and conversing with adults, and develop their sense of self at approximately the same age. Thus, it is logical to assume that the three stages proposed by the theory of shared intentionality build the basis for cultural appropriation and that the content and sequence of these stages are universal. Only after the age of seven or eight, children are ready and equipped to start learning the knowledge, skills, customs, and regulations of their cultural group. Before this time, they were 'universal' cultural beings (meaning that they developed propensities and skills to accept any culture), and after the age of seven, they start to learn and internalize their own culture and develop into specific cultural beings – representatives of their cultural community.

Conclusion

The shared intentionality theory is an advanced version of the Neo-Vygotskian sociocultural approach to child development. This theory incorporates evolutionary and comparative data to highlight that human beings are "biologically adapted for engaging in their species-unique forms of sociocultural activity" (Tomasello, 2018, p. 304). Through the emergence of joint and collective intentionality, together with the corresponding social cognitive skills and motivations, children develop the basis for unique human mentality, including consciousness, the sense of self, reflexivity, and other exclusively human mental and behavioural attributes.

Glossary

The behaviourist explanation of human development applies the main postulates of the behaviourist theories, which suggest that constellations of reinforcements, rewards, and punishments shape human behaviour and its development.

The cross-cultural approach to human development aims at studying culturally different child-care practices and how they relate to becoming human. It is also called *comparative developmental psychology* because it focuses on performing comparative analyses of the practices and trajectories of human development that exist in various cultural communities.

The cultural intelligence hypothesis states that humans possess a specialized proclivity towards social and cultural regulatory processes (social learning, communication, and the 'theory of mind').

The developmental niche: The human developmental niche consists of a set of regulative mechanisms that guide parental behaviours according to the prescribed communal models for parenting in a culture. These models and theories create environmental settings wherein the child's inherited social, cognitive, and cultural predispositions are able to successfully unfold. Tomasello called Culture the "species-typical and species-unique 'ontogenetic niche' for human development" (Tomasello, 1999, p. 79). In Chapter 7, we will discuss the developmental niche approach developed by American cross-cultural developmental researchers Super and Harkness (1986; 1996).

The mechanism of human development is a set of causal processes of diverse natures (genetic, neurophysiological, psychological, social, and cultural) that determine and guide the development of the child's mind, body, and behaviour at every moment of their life. Written accounts of these mechanisms, together with the empirical evidence that support these accounts, constitute the *theories of human development*.

The nativist approach representatives claim that human abilities and the pathways of their development are innate and predetermined by humans' genetic make-up – in other words, by their inherited developmental programmes.

Natural and cultural lines of development (by Vygotsky): The *natural line of development* unfolds based on the elementary inherited developmental programmes responsible for the emergence of the "rudimentary" forms of perception, attention, reasoning, and memory. In turn, the *cultural line of development* transforms these elementary forms into higher mental processes.

The Piagetian theory of cognitive development states that a child's mental development (primarily cognitive) happens because of the child's continued exploration of and interactions with the physical world. Two processes – *assimilation* and *accommodation* – form the mechanisms of cognitive development. The quest for cognitive *equilibrium* continuously drives the child's actions towards examining the world and its cognitive apprehension.

The sociocultural theory of human development by Vygotsky places culture and the social interactions between children and adults at the centre of human development. According to Vygotsky, the child continuously interacts with this socio-symbolic world. These interactions are mediated, first, by adults and, subsequently, by their peers. The child's social interactions constitute the vehicle through which knowledge, traditions, modes of thought, prescriptions for actions, and many other achievements of the child's cultural community are transmitted to the child.

Intentionality (for a general definition, see the Glossary in Chapter 4): In the context of ontogenetic development, *individual intentionality* occurs when the child sets his or her own goals, executes efforts to achieve them, uses different means for these achievements, and experiences satisfaction when accomplishing such tasks. *Joint intentionality* is built on the child's ability to perceive and understand others as intentional agents like him or herself. *Collective intentionality* occurs when the child's behaviours are regulated by communal cultural norms. With collective intentionality, there is not just an interpersonal common ground (as there is in joint intentionality); rather, there is cultural and communal common ground. This is the collective common ground that is shared with all members of the community.

Internalization: According to Wertsch (1985), "Vygotsky viewed internalization as a process whereby certain aspects of patterns of activity that had been performed on an external plane come to be executed on an internal plane" (pp. 61–62). In turn, Tomasello suggested that internalization is based on the role-reversing imitation.

Questions

1. Why do the mechanisms of human development constitute a scientific problem that requires a scientific approach to investigate the issue?
2. List the main three theoretical approaches and two theories of human development. Provide their descriptions.
3. What are the main differences between the theories of child development presented by Piaget and Vygotsky? List and explain at least three differences.
4. Explain the idea of the cultural intelligence hypothesis and present its empirical evidence.
5. What are the primary premises of Tomasello's shared intentionality theory?
6. Why is it labelled the "shared intentionality" theory?
7. What is the primary feature of joint intentionality?
8. What is the main difference between joint and collective intentionality?
9. Describe the main manner in which children participate in cultural learning.

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Notes

1 Some readers find the term *mechanism* confusing and controversial. Some may think of Descartes's machine metaphor where he used various mechanical devices to illustrate how the human body works. After Descartes, many scholars use various mechanisms (for example, hydraulic pumps, watches, telephone lines' relays, or computers) to illustrate how the human body, brain, or mind works. However, these mechanical metaphors have very little to do with the idea of mechanisms in the modern philosophy of science. In this interpretation, a *mechanism* is a system of interrelated processes (that can be neurophysiological, mental, or sociocultural in nature) that work together to bring to life (cause) a particular behavioural or experiential phenomenon. Therefore, *the mechanism of human development* is a set of causal processes of diverse natures (genetic, neurophysiological, psychological, social, and cultural) that determine and guide the development of a child's mind, body, and behaviour at each moment of their life. Written accounts of these mechanisms together with the empirical evidence that support these accounts constitute *theories of human development*.

2 The term *niche* conveys the idea of the environment that is most suitable and comfortable for child development (from Latin *nidus* 'nest'). This is the environment that best suits the child's needs and provides conditions for their healthy development and successful socializing into the adult community.

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7 Socialization and enculturation

Chapter content

- The main focus of this chapter is to examine the processes of children's enculturation and socialization within their communities. These two processes constitute the primary mechanisms by which cultural knowledge is transmitted from the community into the child's mind.
- This chapter continues to elaborate on the theory of sociocultural models and the shared intentionality theory. It goes into greater detail regarding their applications to children's enculturation and socialization.
- The specifics of the *primary* and *secondary* forms of enculturation/socialization are discussed.
- It introduces the idea of the *sociocultural models of childhood* and the roles these models play in shaping the parenting children receive through the *sociocultural models for parenting*. In turn, several important components of the SCM of childhood are identified and described.
- The chapter examines two theoretical frameworks regarding childhood and parenting: *The Developmental Niche Framework* by Super and Harkness and the *Cultural Models of Parenting* by Keller.
- Finally, it analyses how peers influence child development, and we discuss informal sociocultural learning and formal schooling.

In the previous chapter, we considered the sociocultural mechanisms of children's sociocultural and mental development. Now, we will examine in more detail how these mechanisms function in different cultures and how various societies secure the development of their children in the desired direction. In this chapter, we will investigate the processes of *enculturation* and s*ocialization* and will consider how parents and communities control these processes. In addition, we will discuss the *sociocultural models of childhood*, the *sociocultural models for parenting,* and their participation in the dynamics of enculturation and socialization.

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The primary concepts for this chapter are *enculturation*, *socialization*, the *sociocultural models of childhood*, the *sociocultural models for parenting, education, and schooling*.

Box 7.1 Definition and explanation. Etymological definitions of *enculturation* and *socialization*

In the term **enculturation,** *en-* means 'entry,' *cultur* means 'culture,' and *-ation* means 'process.' Hence, the term refers to *the process of entering culture*. It was introduced in 1948 by American anthropologist Melville J. Herskovits.

The term **socialization** has various derivates, including *social*, *socialized*, and *socializing*. Etymologically, it signifies *the process of becoming social*. It means and is related to the notion of being sociable, of being able to mingle with others, of understanding others, and of enjoying being with others. This and related terms were introduced throughout the 19th century. *Socialization* is "the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1989, p. 130).

Enculturation is different from *acculturation*. **Acculturation:** The Latin prefix *ad* that means *to* or *towards* was transformed into English as *ac*. Hence, acculturation is the process of moving towards culture. In our modern understanding, acculturation typically refers to second-culture acquisition.

Main concepts

Enculturation is a set of processes through which individuals learn and assimilate the meanings and symbolism of different aspects of their sociocultural reality and the practices that maintain these meanings. S*ocialization* is related to enculturation. It is a set of processes through which individuals become members of a particular society by entering its social institutions, learning social roles, and absorbing the social activities related to them. (See Box 7.1 for etymological definitions of these concepts.)

As we discussed in previous chapters, in understanding the sociocultural regulation of human behaviour and experience, there is no *cultural* without *social,* and there is no *social* without *cultural*. This means that, on the one hand, cultural meanings and practices are maintained by and through social interactions. On the other hand, the purpose of these social interactions, their objectives, and their scripts are provided by collective systems of knowledge, communal meanings of various events and prescribed rituals; in other words, they are provided by communal cultures. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret enculturation and socialization as two aspects of the process of entering and learning the human sociocultural world.

For example, in a traditional patriarchal community, a girl child learns the cultural meaning of being a girl/woman in this community (being a hardworking household 'manager,' being attractive to men, being humble, being respectful of men, being a good breeder, etc.). Simultaneously, she learns her position within her family and community; for example, her social status – is she equal to other members of the community? Does she have the same rights? – and her social role – what is she expected to do at home, in the community? She must also learn many related social practices, for instance, how to talk to other members of her family and community, including men, women, elders, and peers; when to stay silent, when to speak and how to speak; how to resolve conflicts; and how to negotiate specific arrangements, and many others. These social interactions will always be regulated by the fact that she is a girl and by the meanings, her society has assigned to her gender. Thus, a girl's social activity will continuously be cultural. Therefore, to develop into a full-fledged member of her community, a girl must learn both sides of this process. Specifically, she must assimilate the systems of meaning of being a girl/woman while also acquiring a social position and social roles within these systems of meaning. She must learn the appropriate practices that are guided by these meanings, and consequently, she must execute these gendered cultural practices to be accepted by her community.

The *sociocultural models (SCMs) of childhood* represent how a cultural community perceives children. They incorporate knowledge, meanings, beliefs, and practices about various aspects of being a child within a particular community. We will discuss such aspects of these models, as how they articulate the nature and essence of children, their value, and the phases and dynamics of their development, as well as those of their designated primary caregivers. The *SCMs for parenting* are inherently related to the models of childhood because parents and parenting exist only when there are children who need to be cared for. Therefore, the SCMs for parenting are the systems of prescribed actions used to care for children and regulate their activities; they instruct parents how to feed, educate, discipline, and entertain their children. The *SCMs of education* and *schooling* are systems of ideas and practices that communities develop regarding their children's education. Here, *education* is understood in broad terms of learning the knowledge, skills, and practices that are relevant to the existence and sustainability of communities. In turn, *schooling* is related to learning reading and writing in systematic ways and, subsequently, acquiring knowledge from books and other symbolic mediums. Such formal schooling exists in specially structured places, typically *schools*.

Primary and secondary enculturation/socialization

Many developmental psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists differentiate several phases of enculturation/socialization. Specifically, they discuss the *primary*, *secondary*, and sometimes *tertiary* forms of these processes.

Primary enculturation/socialization is the initial phase during which children encounter their social world for the first time. This is the most profound form of enculturation that shapes them into conscious human beings with a sense of self and identity, and it forms them into a member of a community. All the processes we discussed in the previous chapter – joint and collective intentionality, understanding other people's perspectives, the development of self, and some others – happen during primary socialization. S*econdary enculturation/socialization* happens when the already enculturated young individuals enter various segments and institutions of their community and learn new SCMs. Children go to school, attend church, take part in sports games, play with their peers, and more; through these interactions, they learn myriads of new models that regulate the actions of people in the community. Finally, *tertiary enculturation/socialization* happens when individuals who are fully enculturated in their own culture enter a new cultural community that is different from the initial one and start learning and internalizing the sociocultural world of that another community. This form of enculturation/socialization is often labelled *acculturation*. (We will discuss acculturation in Chapter 11.)

The sources of primary socialization are children's principal caregivers, together with the environment and contexts within which the interactions with these caregivers happen. Usually, the principal caregivers are children's parents and close relatives. Sometimes, these caregivers are replaced by professional caregivers (in orphanages) or parent substitutes (in foster homes). In any of these cases, these primary caregivers are children's gatekeepers to the sociocultural world of their community. First, they transmit to them the conventional cultural practices (for example, how to greet other people, when to say "hello" and "thank you") and related goals and motivations (why it is important to greet people and to say thank you). Caregivers also communicate knowledge about children's community and about various events, things, and tools that exist there, (for example, the name and the function of the stove, refrigerator, TV set, vacuum cleaner, parks, playgrounds, and birthday parties, among many others). Furthermore, primary caregivers convey moral norms to the children they care for – what it means to be a good boy, a good girl, and a good person, how to do the right things, and many other ethical issues.

SCMs are filtered during enculturation/socialization. Primary caregivers are unable to transfer the communal SCM intact and in their original and pristine forms. Caregivers transform these models according to their understandings of them, which depend on the caregivers' socio-economic status, ethnic background, gender, and many other social and economic factors. For example, caregivers teach the child how to eat, where and at what time to go to bed, how to use the bathroom, when and how to play with toys, why people go shopping, what to do when guests come, and many other things. Moreover, they also determine what aspects of these cultural things will be emphasized and how to communicate and transmit them to the child. Less-educated parents will talk about reading and watching TV differently

from college-educated parents even though they live in the same cultural community. Thus, the children of these groups of parents will internalize different aspects of the models of literacy, schooling, and learning. Economically challenged parents will deal with, talk about, and act towards food differently than will economically sound parents. As a result, the meaning of food and the practices of what to buy, how to cook it, and how to eat it will be different between these families. Such filtering happens in every domain of children's lives. As a result, children in different groups all learn the corresponding SCM; however, they learn them in a context-specific, biased, and filtered way.

Children do not choose who their parents are or into which sociocultural community they are born. It is inevitable that the child will internalize the world of their primary caregivers and that they will perceive this social world as *the* world. Because of this, the results of primary socialization/enculturation will stay with children for the rest of their lives, and they will influence the consequent secondary and tertiary stages of the growing children's culture learning, internalization, and socialization.

The processes of enculturation/socialization are accompanied by various forms of emotional attachment to and identification with children's primary caregivers and other frequently-seen individuals (Siegel, 2012). The successful internalization of SCMs happens only if there are relatively strong emotional ties between children and their corresponding enculturating adults. These attachments serve as a basis for the development of children's selves and their social and personal identities. Children identify themselves with a person whom they adore, trust, and like to be with. Through these and related processes, primary socialization builds the foundation of the social aspects of children's personalities.

Primary enculturation and collective intentionality

The mechanism of primary socialization/enculturation is the shift from a regulation based on joint intentionality to a regulation rooted in collective intentionality. During the period of joint intentionality, parents constitute the primary authority for the child. Everything they say or do is considered to be the ultimate truth. For example, the child may learn that their mother becomes angry when they spill juice on the floor. During the period of joint intentionality, according to the child's perception, it is the mother who sets this rule of not spilling juice, and thus, the child must obey it. As the regulation of the child's behaviour shifts to collective intentionally, the child starts to understand that parents are guided by universal norms that also govern the behaviours of other people in their community. Let us continue with the example of spilling juice on the floor. At the age of five or six years, the child notices that not only does their mother become angry at this event, but also their grandparents, neighbours, and the parents of their friends become angry when someone spills juice on the floor. Thus, the child understands that the rule of not spilling juice

on the floor is not the child's mom's invention. All adults around the child support and follow this rule. In this way, the child recognizes that there is a *cultural* norm of dealing with juice that everybody shares in the community. This recognition marks the change in the child's mental regulation from intentional to collective (cultural) intentionality.

This recognition of cultural norms creates an essential representation in the child's mind. The American philosopher and social psychologist **Herbert Mead** labelled this representation the *generalized other* (which we discussed in Chapters 2 and 6). The formation of the representation of the generalized other constitutes an essential component of sociocultural regulation through collective intentionality. Before the development of this representation, the child tries not to spill juice because their mother does not allow this. After the process of primary enculturation, the child understands that nobody in their community intends to spill juice; in turn, if they do this, the regulator will be the phrase from the mom: "Think what our neighbours/grandparents/your friends will think about you spilling juice all over the floor." In this case, the "neighbours, grandparents, and friends" are the "generalized other" that now start regulating the actions of the enculturated child through their representation in the child's mind. For the socialized child, the reminder that "nobody in our community spills juice on the floor, so you should also stop doing this" will work as a powerful regulator of their actions. This happens because "the life of the whole community [gets] into the conscious life of the separate individuals" (Mead, 1934/1962, p. 256).

What is transferred to children during primary socialization?

First of all, children learn language, which is the universal medium for interpersonal communication, the medium and mechanism for transmitting cultural meanings, and the tool for structuring children's thoughts, motivation, and emotions and communicating them to others. By using language, children learn and incorporate various elements of SCMs. Together with language, the child learns the vocabulary, terms, and expressions that are used in different domains of their lives.

Through socialization, children learn basic cultural practices – how to hold and use a spoon, how to tie their shoes, how to use toilet paper, and myriads of other essential cultural habits and customs. While learning these practices and skills, caregivers explain to children why these actions should be executed in particular ways. Two of the common explanations are, "This is how our ancestors or grandparents always did these things" and "this is how we do things in our community." Children learn that sanctions (rewards and punishments) may follow if they succeed or fail to properly follow cultural norms and rules. During primary enculturation/socialization and by using language, children learn the meanings and significance that are assigned to other people (men and women, people of different races, healthy and ill

individuals, friends, and strangers), events (holidays, weekends, friend visits, and birthdays), situations (being lost in a store, being approached by a stranger, being given a gift or a compliment (see Box 7.2), and oneself (being a boy or girl, being a person of a particular ethnic group, being a person with particular mental and physical features and abilities).

Box 7.2 Case study: Enculturation in action

My friend told me about the following episode: "I was buying groceries. A 4ish-year-old boy said, "I like your shirt." I had a brief interaction with him. As I was walking away, I heard his dad explain to him something like, "It's nice of you to compliment him. You feel good when people compliment you. Now, he feels good since you complimented him."

By internalizing the cultural norms regarding children's gender, ethnicity, physical habitus, and academic achievements, among other features, they develop their Me-selves, which are the self-concepts that lay the groundwork for children's personal and social identities.

Primary enculturation starts a vital process of *gender socialization*, which occurs when the biological sex of the child is transformed into the cultural phenomenon of gender. Boys and girls start learning their corresponding gender-related identities, the meanings behind them, and the matching cultural practices (for example, boys do not cry, girls always help their moms, and many others). More differentiated gender socialization continues during the second phase of enculturation. By entering the world of adults, children learn that men and women occupy different social roles in the community and that they have dissimilar tasks and duties to perform.

Thus, primary socialization/enculturation serves several functions. It constructs sociocultural reality for the child and brings this communal reality into the child's consciousness. It supplies the child with knowledge about the world and with skills for dealing with this world. Representations in the form of *generalized other* becomes one of the mechanisms for regulating the child's behaviour. This regulation is called *sociocultural regulation*. Primary enculturation/socialization facilitates the development of the child's self, both its 'I' and 'Me' aspects; correspondently, it enables the child to construct their personal and social identities. In short, primary socialization develops and shapes the backbone of the child's human mentality.

Secondary socialization introduces children to the world of adults. This set of processes unfolds when they move outside the safe haven of their homes and start learning about and internalizing various segments of the community. Secondary socialization occurs primarily at school, when spending time with peers and friends, and in various communal institutions (sports clubs, churches, parks, stores, and

many others). Through secondary socialization, the child learns new roles and identities (the role of a student, a friend, an athlete), the corresponding practices of what to do and what not to do in these roles, and the systems of meaning related to these roles.

During primary socialization, children are relatively passive in acquiring cultural meanings and practices. Throughout secondary enculturation/socialization, they are more proactive in learning about various institutionalized SCMs and have opportunities to accept or reject them. At this stage, children are actively involved in making sense of the world around them and, through this learning, becoming accepted by other people and fitting into the community.

Secondary socialization/enculturation is also accompanied by affective attachments. However, they are typically not as strong as during the primary one. Because of this, it is easy for children to bracket out the products of secondary socialization, to keep them less personal, and to be less attached to them. For instance, teachers are less important to children than their parents are, and children's attachments to their teachers are less strong than those to mom and dad. Children soon learn that they will relinquish teachers, coaches, and other authority figures at the end of a certain term, only to meet new people in these same roles.

Sociocultural models of childhood and for parenting

For enculturation/socialization to achieve its objectives, each community constructs two distinct sets of models. There are models of childhood and models for parenting. SCMs of childhood shape the value and importance of children in a community. Parents internalize these models and they guide their parental behaviours. SCMs for parenting prescribe how parents should care about their children within the boundaries of the communal models of childhood.

Why are the SCMs of childhood necessary?

Human parenting is not a natural behaviour that is bound to go in the right direction effortlessly because of the guidance of nature (Traig, 2019). Parents are not preprogrammed by their genes to be good and responsive caretakers. Some scholars have analysed animals' parenting behaviours and have strived to understand human parenting through these lenses (Allport, 1997), which can be considered an interesting enterprise. However, without including Culture in this picture, such accounts may be seen as too sociobiological (see Chapter 4 about sociobiology). The majority of sociocultural developmental researchers agree that communities take naturally occurring events and processes, such as sexual intercourse and conception, pregnancy, childbirth, and caring for the child and their development, and they wrap them up into layers of meanings, beliefs, rituals, and regulations that transform

these natural events into cultural things. Even human sexual organs are "domesticated" by cultures, making them cultural products (Cormier, 2015). Consequently, for parenting to become a social institution that serves the needs of the community, it must be transformed into a cultural phenomenon. This means that it must be structured and regulated by communities and then learned, internalized, and followed by parents. The SCMs of childhood and for parenting perform exactly this function of regulating the relationships between parents and their children within the demands and requirements of their community.

The models of childhood reflect the communal representations of the value of children, their nature, the stages of development, and other communal knowledge and beliefs about children. In turn, the models for parenting prescribe what parents should do with their children and how parents should treat them and prepare them for adult life in the community. These prescribed parenting practices are related to and determined by the SCM of childhood. For example, if a community represents its children as curious and autonomous learners of communal practices and customs, then parents will be prescribed not to teach children directly about these things as they will instead expect that their children will execute such learning independently. In contrast, if children are represented as 'empty vessels' that need to be filled with knowledge and skills by adults irrespective of the desires of the children, then parents will be required to teach, stimulate, and entertain their children from a very young age.

Sociocultural models of childhood and their components

Following the previous discussions, in order to nurture well-fitted members of their society, children must be enculturated into the communal SCMs of the world, and their parents must be enculturated into their community's SCM of childhood and for parenting. Cultural developmental sciences aim to extract, describe, and analyse these models. American developmental anthropologist David Lancy did this in his book *The Anthropology of Childhood* (2015). He examined numerous models of childhood from diverse cultures and suggested the following components of these SCMs: Valuing children, understanding the nature of being a child and the phases and dynamics of their development, child-care agents, and parenting practices to control and regulate children's behaviours. This chapter will also present Super and Harkness, Gaskin, and Keller's versions of these models and their components.

Components of the SCM of childhood

Valuing children. By considering the concept of childhood cross-culturally, Lancy (2015) introduced two foundational models of childhood that are embraced across the world through different modifications. He labelled them *neontocracy* and *gerontocracy*.

Neontocracy means the ruling or power of children. In contrast, gerontocracy is centred around the beliefs and values of ancestors and elders who rule and control the community (see Box 7.3 and Figure 7.1).

Box 7.3 Definition and explanation. Etymological definitions of *neontocracy* and *gerontocracy*

Neontocracy (*neon* (Greek) – new; *kratia* (Greek) -*cracy* – power or rule) means the power of newborns or children. In neontocratic societies, children are the main focus of parents and communities. ***Gerontocracy*** (*geron* (Greek) – old man) means the power of old. Such a model is centred around ancestors and elders, while children are positioned at the margin of communal concerns.

Within neontocracy, children are at the centre of the family, kin, and community. Many activities performed by adults are centred on and structured around their children and their wellness, both physical and mental. In the case of gerontocracy, children are not the primary focus of the community; rather, they are positioned at the periphery of families' and communities' attention until they are of a particular age. According to Lancy, different cultural communities endorse one or the other of these foundational models, which structure the particulars of the communities' models of childhood and for parenting.

Many scholars agree that the modern Western world endorses ideas and practices that focus upon and revolve around children and youths (Lancy, 2017). It is easy to see Disneyland and Disney World parks as landmarks of neontocracy in American society. The whole family has a primary objective of providing enjoyment for its children. As such, they go on a pilgrimage to these parks to indicate their commitment to doing as much as they can for their children. In neontocracy, after the child is born, adults are immediately concerned with their stimulation,



Figure 7.1 Structures of neontocracy and gerontocracy. (Modified from Lancy, 2015, p. 3)

education, entertainment, achievements, well-being, self-esteem, and many other aspects of the child's development that go far beyond the child's basic needs and material comfort. They invest their time and resources to meet these needs at the highest possible level.

But it has not always been this way. To the great surprise of many of us, considering the child as a cherished treasure is a relatively recent idea in the Western world, and it is not universal cross-culturally. Mostly based on analysing art, historians of childhood discovered that in the Medieval Ages in Europe, children were mostly ignored; they were non-existent beings (Lancy, 2015, p. 5) or were treated as small adults (Ariès, 1965; Heywood, 2001). These scholars proposed that the concept of childhood and the corresponding attention focused on children as human beings emerged in the Western world only over the past few hundred years, beginning with the ideas of philosophers such as John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and further developed as a result of the significant poetry of William Blake and William Wordsworth and the influential novels of Charles Dickens.

There is numerous historical and ethnographic evidence (Lancy, 2015; Traig, 2019; Zelizer, 1985) that in different epochs and cultures, children were seen as either unworthy creatures that could be disposed of or as commodities that must be used for one's benefit and profit. Therefore, the spectrum of valuing children is wide, ranging from intentional infanticide and/or religious sacrifice to seeing them as a commodity and, finally, considering them as God's gifts and blessings that must be highly valued.

The nature of the child and phases of their development. Lancy stated that in the majority of peasant societies across the world, the communal SCMs of child development include at least two developmental phases. First, there is the *infant-toddle stage* (till 5–6 years old). At this stage, the child lacks proper speech and understanding, does not have coordinated locomotion, and is closer to animals than to adult humans. The second stage is the *semi-adult stage*, in which the child is treated as a smaller and less competent adult.

During the first stage of their development, children are mostly ignored (except, of course, to support their basic needs). Viewed as being similar to animals, at this stage, children are perceived as nearly worthless. In some societies, the infant may be considered to belong to two worlds: The world of humans as well as either the world of spirits and ancestors or the world of evil and demons. This provides a more sophisticated interpretation of the nature of the infant and, consequently, of the practices that can be used to care for them. When this *two-worlds model* stresses the angelic side of infancy (*Little Angels sub-model*), children are perceived as pure, innocent, and without any stains of sin. Because they have this nearly divine nature, infants and toddlers may be sacrificed to pacify the gods, and they may be seen as intermediaries between the world of the ancestors and spirits and the world of adults. Therefore, adults are affectionate towards them and respect them.

Another version of the two-worlds model highlights the half-human and half-demonic nature of infants. If the child is born with deformities or with mental or somatic problems, the demonic aspect is highlighted. This suggests that demons possess such a child; they are a witch or were born because of a violation of taboos (for example, as a result of incest). In any of these cases, they must be put to death. The infanticide of 'demonic' children prevents evil forces from entering the family and community. The same reasoning for protecting the healthy child and their family from demonic forces underlies certain special practices of caring for infants, for example, baptizing them, swaddling, avoiding eye contact with them, carrying them in a particular way, and burying them separately from the communal burial grounds.

In many peasant communities across the world, during *the pre-adult stage*, when children start talking, walking, and acquiring various skills, they become associated with profit and commodity. In many communities, children either work at the household or are sent for an apprenticeship to learn a trade to become profitable to the family that way. Girls can be useful as cooks, babysitters, or farmworkers in the household, or they can be married off at an early age. Depending on the wealth of the husband, the latter can also be helpful to the family. Even though girls may lead to potential profitability for their families, because their marriage may require a dowry (which in some cases can be very expensive) and the fact that they leave their family to live with their new in-laws, in many communities, they may still be considered to be of less value than boys are. As a consequence, the practice of girls' infanticide was and is performed in some societies (Box 7.4).

Box 7.4 'In Focus' feature. Girl infanticide

Girl infanticide is a practice that has existed in China (Mungello, 2008), India (George, 1997), Pakistan (Karimjee, 2014), and some other countries and communities. It has economic and cultural roots. This practice enforces devaluing women, and many scholars consider it as 'gendered violence.'

Who is in charge of childcare and upbringing? Nearly universally in all cultures, *mothers* are considered the most important person for the child, especially during the first years of the child's life. They nurse their infants, and they continuously carry, care for, and protect them. Almost all communities around the world consider mother's milk the best food for children and they strongly encourage the practice of breastfeeding. However, in some communities, cultural models may prevent mothers from breastfeeding, and they may encourage other forms of feeding

infants (Box 7.5). Different cultural models prescribe different ages when mothers should stop nursing their babies and begin to wean them off breast milk.

Box 7.5 'In Focus' feature. Some prescribed practices of breastfeeding

As we discussed above, human communities transformed the physiological process of lactation and nursing into a cultural phenomenon. There are numerous beliefs for and against breastfeeding with regard to how it relates to child development (Maher, 1992). Among others are the following: When using wet nurses, the milk of a brunette is better than that of a redhead; women with small breasts were not considered adequate; and mannerisms and racial characteristics were transmissible through milk (Baumslag, 1986); there was a fear of the 'evil eye' (a malevolent glare that is believed to be a curse associated with witchcraft) that may result from breastfeeding in public; breastfeeding has also been associated with sagging breasts. Positive social and cultural beliefs were also identified in many cultures, including associating breast milk with intellectual development and good child health (Wanjohi et al., 2016). In addition, there are numerous taboos and rituals about what mothers can and cannot do during this period of life.

In rural Mexico, because lactation uses women's irreplaceable body substances, children incur debts to their mothers and must attend to their wants in old age (Lancy, 2015, p. 56).

In the majority of non-Western societies, after children start talking and walking, they leave the mother's protection and are embraced by the broad circle of caregivers and ultimately, by the community. An African proverb beautifully describes this stage "it takes a village to raise the child." This means that during this phase, in addition to the parents, the whole community is responsible for taking care of the child. Developmental anthropologists coined the term *alloparents*, which refers to the extended family and the community members who participate in child care. Following the analysis of 186 samples of non-Western societies, Weisner and Gallimore (1977) discovered that nearly 40% of infants and up to 80% of toddlers were cared for not by their mothers but by other people, mostly family relatives and siblings. There are several reasons for the emergence of collective parenting. First, the use of alloparents frees mothers to work at home or return to their jobs. In addition, this relative freedom from the child allows mothers to prepare for their next pregnancies. In addition, as some ethnographers have noted, the practice of alloparenting protects children in the case of parents' deaths, and it increases their chances of survival if they become orphans. Some researchers mentioned that with such a practice, children become relatively emotionally independent from their

mothers, and they learn the social skills of fitting in with a network of kin and community (Lancy, 2015, p. 124).

Among alloparents, *fathers* and *grandparents* constitute other important figures in child care. In many cultures, it is accepted that the fathers' primary contribution to childrearing happens at conception (Lancy, 2015, p. 145). After the child's birth, in many communities, the father stays at a distance from his infants and toddlers. In many societies, they are not allowed to be present at their child's birth, and they are required to stay away from their wives and babies during nursing. Some reasons for such taboos include the worry that fathers may break sex taboos of not having sex with their nursing wives and that they may threaten their children. As such, fathers may not be allowed to pick up their children, interact with them, or play with them. Surprising to many of us in the Western world, in some communities, fathers may perceive their children's urine, faeces, and even skin as being polluted; because of this, they will avoid touching and picking up infants. Typically, the fathers' major involvement with their children is, of course, providing provisions for all family members. They supply their family with food and other necessities. Although fathers may not interact with their children directly, their presence is still beneficial for their offspring. In many societies, children without recognized fathers are stigmatized and bullied. Similarly, fathers are often held higher social status in a community than are childless men simply because they have children (Lancy, 2015, p. 149). Communities develop a variety of SCM of fathering that bring much diversity to this institution (Roopnarine, 2015; Shwalb, Shwalb, & Lamb, 2013).

Grandparents are also important figures in child-rearing. This is not only the case when parents are present in the family, but also when grandparents receive a legally-assigned parenting role over their grandchildren (custodial parents). Evolutionary biologists recently discovered that the presence of grandmothers increases the reproductive success of their children and the survival of their grandchildren. Specifically, using demographic data from mostly rural and premodern communities in Finland and Canada, they discovered that having grandmothers in the family allows their children to breed earlier, more frequently, and more successfully (Lahdenperä et al., 2004). In addition, the researchers discovered that having grandmothers at home was associated with higher survival rates of their grandchildren (Chapman et al., 2021). The mechanisms of such relationships have to be considered further. Typically, grandmothers are past their reproductive age, often do not do work outside the house, and are likely healthy and fit enough to provide child care. Many communities consider that grandmothers may even be better than mothers at looking after toddlers and often real-life events reflect this. Grannies may be indispensable during children's illnesses or other critical episodes in families. Nonetheless, depending on where the corresponding cultural models prescribe the grandparents

to live – in the family home with their children and grandchildren, independently, or in nursing homes – their ability to serve as children's caretakers may vary.

There is also a history that includes various professional alloparents in our and other societies. This includes nurses, babysitters, tutors, coaches, teachers, and therapists, among others. These individuals serve different functions during different periods of child development, and their involvement is also regulated by the corresponding SCMs that work in agreement with the parenting models.

Regulating children's behaviours. Parents and communities are interested in developing in children social and moral qualities that these communities need in their members for successful functioning. Typically, they want children to be obedient, restrain their emotions and desires, think for themselves, be social, model the mature behaviour of adults, and demonstrate various other forms of desirable behaviours. However, children are not robots; as such, they do not always act the way their caretakers want them to behave. To solve the universal problem of regulating children's undesirable behaviours, every SCM of child-rearing has mechanisms for managing children's behaviours. Roughly, these regulations can be divided into two groups: using sticks and using carrots. Some stick-based practices are mild; for example, teasing, mean joking, shaming, inflicting fear, and restricting favourable activities. In turn, they may rise to the level of physical punishment, including gentle spanking and harsh corporal punishment – and everything in between. In contrast, carrot-based practices include rewarding, prizing, moralizing, and reasoning with children.

Anthropologists report that many communities use various methods to verbally regulate the behaviour of children, even those that are very young (Lancy, 2015). The purpose of such verbal punishments is to infuse in children the feelings of humiliation, embarrassment, and, in older children, shame and guilt. The emergence of children's ability to experience these moral social emotions is the product of cultural evolution (Tomasello, 2016). These emotions evolved in humans in the social environment to regulate the social and, consequently, ethical and moral behaviours of people. These mechanisms are the essence of our sociality and our humanity (Rochat, 2009). Many communities use these practices to induce communal morality in children through multiple techniques. For example, a child who has been or is misbehaving (not sharing treats, boasting, being too aggressive, etc.) is subjected to rough jokes or is "made fun of in community-wide stories" (Lancy, 2015, p. 194); adult family members discuss and condemn a child's behaviour (primarily some misdeeds) in their presence without interacting with the child; adults discuss this same issue in front of non-family members and even in public settings. Other methods include teasing, shaming, provocation (the child is provoked to become angry and then they are punished for having angry emotions and behaviours), and infusing fear by warning children that if they misbehave, some harmful beings like monsters or wild animals will take them away. More positive practices

of punishment include playing on children's love for their parents, saying things like: "When you behave like this, you make your mother/father sad;" excluding misbehaved children from their favourite social activities or banning their beloved plays or toys (video games, TV, cartoons watching, etc.). Popular practices used by modern parents include reasoning and negotiation with their children; here, they explain to their children why their behaviours, emotions, reactions, etc. are bad or inappropriate. These reasoning practices have proven to be effective in regulating children's complex behaviours and for preparing children for future peer-to-peer and pupil-to-teacher interactions and negotiations.

Using physical punishments is another technique that is either added to verbal regulations or used alone to discipline serious violations of norms. In different cultures, these punishments may include but are not limited to scalding, applying skin irritants, spanking, beating, and slashing with a knife (Lancy, 2015, pp. 196–197). Communities that practice physical punishments take them for granted and justify their use by arguing that pain is a powerful means of instruction, that it helps guide the child's attention, that it is necessary for the child's growth and survival, or that harsh treatment of children prepares them for the difficulties of life. Notably, in our modern world, many communities forbid or frown upon physical punishments, and some use them only sporadically and reluctantly.

Popular 'carrot' tactics include prising children, rewarding them with money, toys, extra playtime, access to their favourite activities, and many other methods specific to the child and their environment.

So far in our analysis of parenting, we have been reflecting mostly on non-Western and developing cultural communities. The modern world of parenting is also diverse and may be controversial for parents. It is likely that many readers have heard about or even read a book written by Amy Chua, a successful American lawyer of Chinese descent who has two daughters. In *Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother* (2011), Chua describes her parenting model (aka, being a Tiger Mom) and practices and reflects on the corresponding models that exist in Euro-American families. Another bestseller titled *Bringing Up Bébé: One American Mother Discovers the Wisdom of French Parenting* is written by Pamela Drukerman (2014), an American journalist who had a baby in France. This work reflects on the model, practices, and results of French parenting. In *There's No Such Thing as Bad Weather: A Scandinavian Mom's Secrets for Raising Healthy, Resilient, and Confident Kids,* Linda McGurk (2017) a Scandinavian woman, describes her attempts to introduce the Scandinavian model of parenting in the US. In a more academic collection of research – *Japanese Fame of Mind: Cultural Perspective on Human Development* (Shimizu & Levine, 2001) – Japanese developmental scholars analyse various aspects of the Japanese sociocultural models of parenting and compare them to the American ones.

Now, we will move from descriptive ethnographic and anthropological studies of child development to two conceptualizations of the idea of the sociocultural models

of childcare and development: Super and Harkness's developmental niche approach and Keller's conceptualization of early child development.

Modern developmental theories that utilize the ideas of sociocultural models theory

Super and Harkness's developmental niche theory

One of the first systematic conceptualizations of the cultural environment for child development was elaborated upon by American cultural developmental psychologists **Charles Super** and **Sara Harkness**. Their theorizing was based on their studies of child-rearing practices in African communities, Malaysia, Bangladesh, India, and the U.S. The primary concept of their approach is the *developmental niche,* which consists of three components: (1) *parental ethnotheories* or *parents' cultural belief systems about child development and upbringing*; (2) *culturally regulated customs, traditions,* and *practices* of child care and child-rearing, and (3) the *physical and social settings* in which the development takes place (Harkness & Super, 1996a; Super & Harkness, 1986, p. 552).

At the core of the developmental niche are *parental ethnotheories*, a concept that is widely used in cultural and cross-cultural developmental psychology (Goodnow & Collins, 1990; Harkness & Super, 1996b; Keller et al., 2006; Sigel, McGillicuddy-DeLisi, & Goodnow, 1992). To survive and to successfully function, communities need healthy, knowledgeable, and socially-capable members who share the same moral values and who practice the same traditions and rituals. Children must become such members within six or seven years of their births; thus, it is in the interest of the community as a whole to guide and regulate their upbringing. This guidance comes in the form of belief systems about parenting that have been created by communities and transmitted to parents. As a result, all parents in a community know and share the same understandings and exercise similar practices in parenting their offspring. Parental ethnotheories are sets of ideas, knowledge, values, and understandings about the nature of children, the structure and mechanisms of their development, and the justifications and meanings of various practices and behaviours related to caring for and educating children. Harkness and Super do not differentiate between the public and internalized aspects of parental ethnotheories, even though such a distinction implicitly exists in their descriptions of these theories. Many researchers who have adopted these ideas about parental cultural beliefs also use the notion of *cultural models of parenting* and *development* (Goodnow & Collins, 1990; Harkness et al., 1996; Keller, 2007; Keller et.al., 2006).

According to Harkness and Super, these belief systems depend on the ecological environment (*physical settings*) in which communities live: Urban settings or rainforests in the tropics, the available natural resources, the types of neighbouring tribes or communities (whether they are aggressive and war-like or peaceful and

cooperating), as well as the history of the community in terms of its migrations, wars and conflicts, droughts and famines, and many other conditions. *Social settings* describe where, with whom, and how the children in a community spend their days. The primary setting for early child development is the household; later in the child's life, their home is complemented by communal spaces, including schools, churches, and other places.

The third element of ethnotheories is *parental practices*, *customs*, and *traditions* of child-rearing, which are the typical ways by which adults address the primary needs of their children and work to achieve their children's socialization goals. This includes how caregivers feed, entertain, educate, and discipline their children, the techniques they use to develop the personal qualities that the community considers necessary, and the methods by which adults teach their children the proper behaviours, basic beliefs and values of their community. These practices are often taken-for-granted and because of this, they do not require justification. Parents and all community members know that "This is how we treat our children here," "This is the right way to teach my child," and "This is how all members of our community discipline their children." Parents who do not follow these prescriptions may be considered 'incompetent,' 'incapable,' 'irresponsible,' or even 'stupid' and 'unfit.'

Box 7.6 presents an example of a developmental niche that exists in a Mayan village in Mexico.

Box 7.6 An example of a developmental niche: Settings, a parental ethnotheory, and the parental practices of Mayan people in Mexico

American developmental researcher Suzanne Gaskin provided this example based on her 1980s ethnographic work in a village of Mayan Indians in Yucatan, Mexico (Gaskin, 1996). In presenting this example, I use direct quotes and rephrase Gaskin's ethnographic accounts from pages 346–357 of her work.

Physical setting

The people live in a village that has existed for several hundred years and has about 800 inhabitants. The researcher studied families who "live in compounds of about 50 x 50 meters square. Within the compound, there are typically one or two houses, a garden area, a pen for pigs, fruit trees, an area for clothes washing and drying, and an area of bushes used as a latrine."

> "The houses themselves vary in size (from 3 x 4 meters up to 4 x 8 meters), shape (oval or rectangular), and quality. House floors are usually packed dirt. There are two doors, on opposite sides of the house, providing most of the light in the house. One end of the house is used as the kitchen

area, with three large stones forming a fire pit hearth, a small low table with stools for making tortillas and eating, a higher counter for storage and workspace, water storage containers, and pots and utensils hung from the sticks of the wall. The rest of the house is used for other daytime activities and becomes the bedroom at night when hammocks are hung throughout the house. Bathing is done in an inconspicuous area of the house or in a small structure in the compound. In every household in the village, food (whether it is beans or meat) is cooked over a hearth with a wood fire and eaten with tortillas, and everyone sleeps in a hammock."

(pp. 346–347)

Social setting

Households usually contain a nuclear family of a husband, a wife, and their offspring (up to 12 children). Many compounds house three generations of extended family: elderly parents, their married son and his wife, and their children. The socialization of children is strongly influenced by the activities the children are expected to perform when they become adults. Men work in the fields to grow corn, beans, and squash. During the agricultural season, men go to their fields six days a week and work from sunrise to sunset. They may also leave the farm to sell produce and livestock or to work for wages elsewhere. Women may work in the fields, but they are mostly responsible for running the house and the yard. They must prepare corn for grinding and make tortillas for their families. They also wash their families' clothes and take care of the livestock and the garden. Women's work is constantly interrupted by the demands or needs of their children. The women also supervise the work and caretaking responsibilities of the older children.

Men's work requires them to be good at timing; they must know when to burn and plant and be diligent about working enough in the face of no immediate pressure. Women's work requires them to have perseverance, to attend to and coordinate the activities of the members of the compound, to anticipate their needs, and to adjudicate when necessary, between arguing kids. In turn, these male and female qualities have to be cultivated in their children.

The villagers are very fond of and dependent on their children. Most people feel that every child is a blessing and a helping hand. Children are found in public in great numbers whenever anything interesting is happening. Otherwise, they are usually found hard at work in their compound, in the field, in the nearby jungle, or at school most of the day. Most of the children attend the local grade school, at least for a few years, where they learn basic literacy and

are introduced to Spanish (the villagers' native language is Yucatec Maya). Few children continue school past the sixth grade because they must leave the village to do so. Children are taken to all social and religious events; there are few adult activities from which they are excluded as onlookers.

Parental ethnotheories. The stages of development

Parents identify several stages of child development by their ability to perform essential motor, mental, and behavioural activities. Age is less relevant in this periodization.

a. "*Very Little Babies*" – just infants.
b. "*Lap Babies*" – when babies get control of their heads and backs and start sitting on the lap or hip, they become exposed to the outer world.
c. "*Scooter Babies*" – children become mobile.
d. "*Upright Babies*" – after 12 months, they start walking; at this period, babies become noticed by their parents as persons; they are commented on and more speech is directed towards them; they start understanding this speech and they may obey some directives.
e. "*Talking Babies*" – by 18–24 months, they start talking. This happens spontaneously without special teaching.
f. "*Beginning-to-Start-Understanding Children*" – "when children can follow simple instructions to do a task and consistently follow directives." This occurs between ages 2 and 4; no explicit teaching occurs, as children just imitate others.
g. "*In-the-Process-of-Understanding Children*" – "Children at this stage (around 4–6) can now do some things very competently, although they cannot be expected to show much judgment or reasoning ability;" they 'go behind' older siblings and learn from them and help them. Children's chores start being determined by sex.
h. "*Having-Reached-Understanding Children*" – Some time between the ages of 10 and 12 years, children no longer need supervision to do their chores. Taking responsibility for a task and the ability to complete it independently without supervision indicates to parents that a child now 'understand[s]' and has 'learned to work.'
i. "*Becoming-Adult Children*" – In their mid-teens, children finish their transition to adulthood. "They take on the most physically demanding or organizationally complex jobs, working side by side with their parents as true partners. Start preparing themselves for mating: grooming and a personal appearance become important. Boys acquire much freedom: they have

their own field to harvest; they may vote in town meetings, contribute to town projects, and may serve in town police; they decide for themselves how and where to spend their free time and money. Girls have less freedom, but their social world is also expanding, and they discuss their new experiences with sisters, neighbours, or friends" (p. 354).

Beliefs about children's development

In this culture, children develop naturally and gradually, and there are only very subtle changes between the periods. They are described as "coming out' or "beginning to come into being."

In terms of many characteristics, including intelligence, talent, and dispositions, children are thought to be influenced almost completely by innate forces that are beyond both their own and their parents' ability to change or control. "That's just his [or her] way of being," parents frequently say. "Because parents believe that development just happens, that children move to a new stage by themselves, they do not feel the need either to take the direct initiative to teach children who fail to meet some developmental ideal or to feel anxiety about their responsibility for it" (p. 355).

Beliefs about socialization and socialization practices

"It is expected by parents that children will learn to perform all the tasks, as well as the motivations behind them, they will need to become good corn farmers and household managers, good citizens within the community, and good servants to God [the ultimate socialization goals]." (p. 356). Achievement of these goals is accomplished gradually and continuously, with minimal formal instruction or testing of children's limits and abilities [parental practices].

Children obey parental authority unquestioningly [a goal of disciplining]. "Many parents feel that the only way that they can assert that authority is through the use of threats and occasional use of force. Corporal punishment is therefore quite common, although many parents (especially mothers) express a dislike for hurting their children" [disciplining practices].

> The common wisdom is that if your children are not afraid of you, they will not obey you [a communal belief about the nature of obedience]. The ideal method of sustaining their fear is to threaten often and impressively but follow-through only when absolutely necessary [another disciplining practice]. This leads to a style of interaction between many parents and their children of testing and asserting limits endlessly.
>
> (p. 356)

"A parent who beats his children regularly is not well-regarded in the community, but a parent who allows his children to defy his authority on some important issue and go unpunished is even less well regarded" [the communal regulation of parenting].

> In seeming contradiction to the strong emphasis on respect for authority, parents give children a lot of control over making decisions that influence their immediate and future well-being. Parents retain authority for making sure that children's work is done and done well, that they demonstrate proper respect for those above them and proper responsibility for those below them, and that they no cause trouble in the larger community. Children [starting at 6–8 years of age, "In-the-Process-of-Understanding Children"] are given the authority to decide many other issues for themselves, such as whether they continue going to school, whether they want to take medicine when they are sick, whether they wear their shoes when going out into the jungle, and, when older, whether they will drink too much or how they will spend their money [belief and practice of balancing children's obedience and autonomy].
>
> (pp. 356–357)

Conclusion

This example illustrates the idea of the 'species-typical and species-unique ontogenetic niche for human developmental' in a particular cultural community, and it represents the developmental niche framework with its main components.

Keller's theory of child development

German cross-cultural developmental psychologist **Heidi Keller** and her team developed a similar conceptualization of the regulation of child development and parenting (Keller, 2007, 2009; Keller et al., 2006). This group of researchers examined African villagers as well as urban families in several countries, including Germany, Greece, and the USA. They identified communal *cultural models* that consist of clusters of ideas that organize the social relations around children's development. These models "define *socialization goals*, which are specified in *parenting ethnotheories*. Parenting ethnotheories provide the ideational framework for [parenting] *behavioral strategies*" (Keller, 2007, p. 102; emphases in italics added). Specifically, Keller and her colleagues recognized two primary cultural models for child development. The first cultural model focuses on promoting the socialization goal of autonomy and independence of the child. They labelled it the *independent cultural model*.

The second is the *interdependent cultural model* that emphasizes the child's relatedness to his or her community and the natural embeddedness of the existence of children into the social fabric of their community. Depending on what model a community emphasizes, parents use different practices to raise their children: they talk to them, play with them, teach them, and discipline them differently.

Keller describes the independent cultural models for child development as follows:

> The healthy model of parent-infant relationships [according to this model] consists of separated individuals interacting with each other [the social setting for child development]. Parents assign the infant an equal role for the flow of interactional exchanges as expressed in turn-taking following a (quasi) dialogical structure (Keller, 2003) [parental practice and its meaning]. Infants are seen as having their own will (Ainsworth, 1977) and are attributed an agency that expresses preferences, needs, and desires from early on (Keller et al, 2004) [meanings assigned to the child]. Parents refer to infants' cognitions and emotions emphasizing individual abilities and cognitive skills, self-confidence, self-expression, exploration, discovery, and personal achievement (...) [parental practices for child training]. The caregiver should be able to see things from the baby's point of view (Ainsworth et al, 1978) [another requirement for parental practices]. This model is reflected in child-centeredness of Western developmental science. German, Greek, and Euro-American mothers prize individual efforts, self-actualization, expressiveness, and autonomy in children, and see optimal growth as an achievement of their children [the socialization goals].
>
> (Keller, 2007, pp. 111–112; comments in square brackets are added)

The following is an example of an interdependent cultural model for child development and his or her upbringing that was created by the African ethnogroup Nso in Cameron

> Among the Nso, the child is considered to be a sacred being, who is a gift from the gods (*woon-ah nyuy*). Some children are believed to be reincarnated ancestors, so that the immortality of the soul comes with the birth of children. Generally, the child is seen as a blessing for the family, symbolizing the "walking stick" or the "firewood of their parents" and a shield against mortality... [the meanings assigned to the child at his or her birth; this system of meanings is a component of the cultural parenting belief system]. The child is initiated into his or her ancestral home by customary rituals and symbolically assigned gender identity and sex role [the practices, customs, and traditions related to the early period of child development]. After the birth and naming of the child, everybody in the community has an obligation to be involved in his or her

> care and social development, because childcare is a communal responsibility (Nsamenang, 1992) [one of the important requirements for children's interdependent development].
>
> With consideration of the first part of the above quotation, it is obvious that the birth of a child is not considered merely a biological event; rather, first and foremost, it is a cultural and spiritual phenomenon that is filled with rich meanings that are shared by the whole community.
>
> Breast milk is a baby's most cherished food. It is believed that if a child is not breastfed it can never possess the necessary potentialities to function well in a social milieu [a practice/custom of child feeding]. The infant sleeps at the mother's back, and the mother faces the door to prevent the infant from being harmed by *arim* (malignant spirit) [another practice along with its reasoning]. This is the most precarious period for infants, when they need the most care [a cultural belief about periods in the child's development]. Protective and magical measures are taken, like wearing amulets and the rites of *vidzee ver wan* (not raising the child away from the lineage) [rituals and practices that are saturated with spiritual meaning]. There are institutions in place to monitor conformity with the norms, which regulate as individual's behavior and link members together in a spirit of oneness [communal cultural customs to regulate people's adherence to this system of beliefs and practices].
>
> (Keller, 2007, p. 110; comments in square brackets have been added)

These examples illustrate how different communities create different sets of ideas and practices for child-rearing. Within each of these sets, there is a diversity of parental theories and practices. In turn, cross-cultural and cultural developmental psychologists study their content and consider how parents use them to care for their children.

Other socializing agents: Peers and school

Peers as socializing agents

For many years, parents remain the primary authority figures for their children because parents have power over their children's behaviour and their mental and physical lives. Parents are the key transmitters of sociocultural models as well as the enforcers and regulators of these models. Because of parents' power and authority over their children, the relationships children have with their parents are *vertical*. They are directed either top-down (from the parents to the child: rules, demands, and requests), or bottom-up (from the child to the parents: appeals, wishes, refusals, etc.). These are important relationships that teach children about obedience to and respect for authority, as well as other aspects of vertical relationships that exist in any cultural community.

However, to become fully human, children need to experience and be able to handle more than just vertical relations. Children must also learn how to establish and maintain *horizontal relationships*. These are defined as relationships of children with other individuals who do not have power and authority over them; such people are more or less equal to children in terms of their skills, abilities, and knowledge. The primary institution for developing the skills for horizontal relationships is peer groups. Peers are typically other children of a similar age such as siblings, neighbours, and friends; these peers are in a relatively similar position towards adults and their authority, and they have no legitimate authority over other children. Typically, peers are socially equal.

What do children learn from each other? Researchers suggest that peer relationships allow children to acquire skills of forming joint attention, regulating emotions, inhibiting impulses, understanding cause-and-effect relationships, training linguistic competence, learning through imitation, and some others (Hay, Payne, & Chadwick, 2004). Peer groups establish their own rules for games, build practices to follow these rules, and create sanctions to maintain them. Peer groups are cultural microcosms that are ruled by children themselves, not by adults. Through these microcosms, children learn the ideas of fairness and justice, cooperation and competition, winning and losing, and many other important sociocultural and interpersonal phenomena that they often cannot learn from parents. In comparison to similar practices and phenomena from the adult world, these peer-created concepts are their "own;" children invent and follow them not because adults have told them to but because the children have decided together to do this. In many cultures, peer groups consist of children of different ages. Therefore, older kids teach younger children; they often serve as role models and have some level of authority over the younger kids when adults are not around.

An important medium of peer relationships is *play*, which can take many different forms. From a young age, children enjoy playing with their peers, and they value this companionship. Structured play may occur in the form of a game with preestablished rules that may have been created by adults or a game where children themselves develop the rules.

Children's play is one of the important mediums for transmitting culture. There are several channels through which play serves this function. The first channel is playing with toys or other artifacts either alone or with peers. These toys and various artifacts that surround children (architecture, art, written records, tools, and technology) are cultural products. This means that they are loaded with cultural knowledge about the world in which children live. Think about dolls of different sexes, dollhouses, toy cars, figurines from cartoons and movies, and many others. By playing with these toys, children inevitably learns about what these toys represent; in turn, they learn their functions and reproduce these functions after seeing the real things in action (for example, driving a car or using kitchen utensils).

Toys and other cultural artifacts are the "external memory/storage" (Donald, 1991, p. 309) of cultural information. This means that communities store collective knowledge, practices, and narratives in various artifacts so that this information is available to be passed down to future generations of its members. By playing with toys, the child decodes this information (sometimes with help from parents and peers) and then learns and internalizes it. Special types of toys are toy tools (a plastic hammer), scaled tools (a small but real hammer), and real tools (a real adult hammer). The child learns their purposes and functions by correctly playing with or using them. Such toys make cultural learning more explicit.

Another channel of transmitting cultural information through children's play consists of children playing games that have been labelled *make-believe*, *pretend*, *socio-dramatic*, or *fantasy* games. Such games emerge after children observe adults' customs (shopping, cooking, or dining) or social institutions (schools, hospitals, courts, police actions, hunting expeditions, war battles); subsequently, children reproduce these customs or institutionalized practices in their games. To have fun playing these games and to play them correctly, children must learn by observing adults or older siblings doing tasks or by watching cartoons or movies that reflect these customs/institutions' purposes, procedures, and the sequences of their execution. By reproducing them in their games, children exercise these cultural customs in the safe environment of playgrounds and homes, and they prepare themselves for later executing them in the real adult world. Sometimes, children develop games that have their own rules, procedures, sanctions, and other cultural attributes. In these cases, children work as culture creators; they learn to develop and negotiate rules and to follow them and ensure other children follow them to maintain the integrity of the game. The make-believe and autonomous games may be mixed up, and they may overlap, which creates a rich field for culture transmission and learning.

Sociocultural learning and schooling

At the beginning of this chapter, I emphasized that through enculturation/socialization, children learn the sociocultural models that exist in their communities. Specifically, the aims are for children to decipher cultural codes and the meanings of cultural things and events, to learn their social positions and their corresponding roles in communities, and to explicate the logic, scripts, and dynamics of interpersonal interactions among members of their community. In developmental literature, the transmission of this information is labelled *informal/observational/practical sociocultural learning*. In addition to this form of learning, in almost every society, there exists *formal learning* or *schooling,* such as that which is taught at Western schools. These two forms of learning – sociocultural learning and formal schooling – are connected but different forms of teaching and training children to live in their communities.

Sociocultural learning penetrates every phase and step of the child's enculturation/socialization. Parents, alloparents, peers, community members, and many others are the agents of this form of learning. Notably, sociocultural learning happens in every place and at every moment of the child's life.

For many non-Western cultural communities, the following features of the models of sociocultural learning typically exist (Lancy, 2015). First, many of these communities perceive children as autonomous learners. This means that the parents and communities at large believe that children will learn many aspects of their communal life on their own just by observing what adults do, imitating what they have observed, and then being engaged (pitching in) in executing the functional actions of communal life (Paradise & Rogoff, 2009). The second feature is related to the first one and prescribes the behaviour of parents or alloparents: they do not explicitly teach children about what is going on around them; in contrast, they expect that children will comprehend this on their own. Adults will name things and may comment about them; however, there are no special pedagogical practices, as in regular schools, that are aimed at educating children. Pedagogical activity in informal learning is not intended and it is not prescribed by the corresponding sociocultural model. Children learn first by being involved in the adult world, by observing it, and then, by participating in it. This type of learning is not separated from the life of the household and community. The common denominator of these two features of sociocultural informal learning is that this learning is embedded in the everyday practices that are relevant to adults and children. Because of this, children are highly motivated to learn; their curiosity is high and well satisfied, and they are free to choose the objects of their learning and the pace and methods of it. The outcomes of such learning allow children to immediately participate in the lives of their families and communities, where they apply their new knowledge and skills. In addition, this skilful participation in the adult world is accompanied by feelings of competence, engagement, and belonging. Such experiences produce strong motivation for children to continue to learn and to be involved. Children like this type of learning; instead of being bored, they are continuously curious, motivated, and proactive.

As mentioned above, the primary medium for children's informal learning is observation. To be successful, children cultivate their observation skills of attending, memorizing, and being mindful of what they have observed. Some guidance from adults is needed to learn these skills. There are many ethnographic descriptions of how Aboriginal peoples in North America structure the observation and attention of the young ones. For example, adults send children to a bush and then ask them to describe for them the specific details of the trees, grass, and rocks. Children must report on these facts and then be guided for future trips.

The model of informal sociocultural learning reflects the understanding that children are not empty vessels that need to be filled by knowledge from adults;

rather, they are intrinsically motivated and proactive learners. Their learning and its results have direct and natural connections to the lives of these children and those of their families and communities. This applied aspect brings another incentive to be engaged and to learn the practices. Importantly, in many communities, people feel that direct teaching is not necessary for such sociocultural learning. Rather, they feel that this learning is a natural process that happens with minimal intervention from adults (consider the example in Box 7.6 about Mayan villagers).

Formal schooling stands out in sharp contrast to informal sociocultural learning in terms of several substantial features (Lancy, 2015, pp 206–207). This form of education emerged after the alphabet, enumeration, and written languages were invented. The first mentions of formal schooling date back to Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia, around 2,000 years BC. (Box 7.7 presents a brief history of schooling in China and other East-Asian countries.) The formal school is about literacy and access to numbers and actions with them, letters and words, books, pictures, maps, and other symbolic linguistic and graphic artifacts and, correspondently, to the knowledge and the wisdom that are encoded in them. In addition, formal schooling introduces sciences and their applications. Religion played a substantial role in the emergence of formal schooling – monasteries, temples, and churches have run religious schools. Formal schooling opens children up to another layer of human cultures that is different and much broader than the culture of their communities. This layer relies less on explicit and practical features and more on the symbolic written forms that need to be decoded by literate individuals. Thus, formal schooling educates and trains such decoders. In schools, children learn to read and write, and by using these skills, children open the worlds of science, art, literature, history, religion, and the richness and depth of human civilizations.

Formal education has several levels, from introductory to more advanced schooling to the highest level of university education. Because more and more spheres of human activities require knowledge from books and other symbolic documents, formal schooling has become prevalent around the world.

- The SCMs of formal schooling are based, more implicitly than explicitly, on the idea that children are empty vessels that adults (parents, teachers, educational authorities) must fill with the knowledge and skills of people far beyond their nearby communities.
- This education goes top-down, from adults to students; there is typically little to no inherent engagement or intrinsic motivation on behalf of students.
- This form of education happens in particular spaces (schools and classrooms); it is highly structured, and it requires strict discipline. Such an environment is very different from the environments of informal sociocultural

learning, where children are free to be or not be engaged. Because of the structured and confined environment of schools and classrooms, many educators report that in formal schooling, children lose their intrinsic motivation to learn.

- As such, they need to be motivated and disciplined by other means to stay engaged in academic activities. For centuries, various forms of incentives and punishments have been used to keep children engaged and controlled. Therefore, the topic of education motivation has emerged as an important feature of the SCMs of schooling (Stipek, 2002). Recently, educators have started implementing positive changes, such as including play during learning and trying to evoke intrinsic motivation in students (Ryan & Deci, 2000).
- Often, formal schooling requires the attention and involvement of parents to help children learn from it and succeed. But if parents believe that learning happens naturally with no or little involvement on their side, then they refrain from checking children's achievements, supervising their homework, and attending parent-teacher conferences. In addition, many parents may believe that it is teachers' responsibility to educate their children and refrain from being involved in their children's education. This attitude may create the impression that these parents do not care about their children and that they have a position of non-interference. However, in fact, some of these parents are simply following their traditional SCMs. Finding such a mixture of the traditional and modern SCMs of education is relatively frequent in many developing countries that have recently implemented Western-style formal schooling (Flinn, 1992).

In different cultural communities, there exist *SCMs of teaching and learning* that implicitly or explicitly regulate the behaviours of educators, students, parents, and community members at large (Li, 2012). First, there are models of teaching: They prescribe what teachers should do to teach students properly. Then, there are models of learning: These specify what students are expected to do to learn the material. A widely accepted SCM of teaching is called a *teacher-centred model*. According to this model, teachers are the people in authority, and therefore, students must be respectful of and obedient to them. Teachers use this power to keep students in order and to deliver material in a top-down manner, from the teachers to the students. According to this model, there is little to no bottom-up communication in the form of students asking questions or having discussions with teachers. It is important to note that in many traditional societies, children who ask questions are considered immature and rude. Students must memorize what their teachers deliver, primarily by root learning, and then correctly reproduce that material. In this model, strict discipline and obedience to school rules are strongly enforced, and there is typically heavy homework and frequent exams.

Box 7.7 'In Focus' feature. SCMs of schooling in China and other East-Asian countries

A good example of the evolution of formal schooling and the emergence of the SCM of education can be found by examining China and some other East-Asian countries (Lee, 2018). In China, establishing centralized and hierarchical governments in 200 BC with numerous bureaucrats required many literates and educated individuals to take jobs that served their country. In addition, governmental jobs were considered very prestigious and well-paid. Because of this, early in the country's history, schools became important gateways to such positions, and schooling became an important issue in most families. In addition, the earliest testing and examination systems for these governmental positions were invented and broadly used in China; they kept students and their families on their 'tiptoes' to ensure that applicants are prepared for these exams. Therefore, formal education is held in very high respect among Chinese people. Moreover, Chinese families have been very motivated to send their children to the best schools and to support them in their schooling in every possible way. (In modern China, some parents [usually mothers] take breaks from their jobs to assist their children during high school graduation exams and the time of university entrance examinations.) Thus, having a dedication to education, working hard, and having strong persistence in academic work has become ingrained in the psyche of the majority of Chinese people. This dedication leads students in multiple grades from mainland China and neighbouring countries (including Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan) to succeed frequently in international academic competitions in math and science (Martin et al., 2016a, 2016b). These foundational SCMs of schooling are rooted in the governmental structures and policies and they determine specific cognitive, affective, and motivational features of the Chinese and East-Asian education models. These features, in their turn, define and regulate the behaviour of teachers and students. Cross-cultural educational psychologists study these aspects and their consequences for children's academic success and mental development (Li, 2002, 2012).

An alternative SCM of teaching and learning has been evolving in Western countries since the beginning of the 20th century. It is frequently labelled *student-* or *learner-centred education/learning*[1] (Brandes & Ginnis, 2001). (Recall that the Western world embraces neontocracy or children-centredness.) This model of education shifts the focus of educational agency from the teacher to the student. It aims to provide young people with the knowledge and skills that enable lifelong learning. According to this model of education, teachers' roles are transformed into being the facilitators of students' independent acquisition of knowledge. Team-based projects,

field trips, excursions, international trips, and experiential learning are some of the new teaching practices dictated by student-centred education. When this model is correctly executed, it enhances students' motivation and creativity, and it makes students the owners of their education process and its results. It is believed that this model better fits the emerging societal and technological demands that exist in both developing and developed societies (Schweisfurth, 2013) in educating and training active lifelong learners who are relatively independent in their thinking, creative and self-determined in pursuit of their educational goals.

Conclusion

The indoctrination of children into their culture happens through enculturation and socialization – two inseparable processes that drive the child's sociocultural and mental development. Researchers differentiate between the primary and secondary phases of enculturation/socialization. Each phase plays its role in transforming the child into a conscious adult and full-fledged member of the community. Enculturation/socialization is guided by the SCMs of childhood and the SCMs for parenting that are dialectically connected. These models are historically developed, and in the Western world, they primarily reflect a movement from *gerontocracy* to *neontocracy*. These models are rooted in the ecological and economic conditions of the lives of community members and reflect the manner in which these members have adapted to their environments. The SCMs of childhood and for parenting include components that designate the roles of caring adults (including *alloparents*), the value of children, the phases of their development, and the methods of regulating children's behaviours. Developmental researchers Harkness, Super, Keller, and their colleagues have developed conceptual frameworks and theories to formalize some of the aspects of children's development. They brought to cultural developmental sciences the concepts of developmental niche, parental ethnotheories, the cultural models of child development, socialization goals, and parenting practices, among others. In addition to the strong influence of parents and alloparents, peers play an important role in children's development as this allows them to develop horizontal relationships and their regulation. Other important components of enculturation are informal sociocultural learning and formal schooling. They differ in many aspects, but each introduces children to the communal and societal cultures in their own unique and specific ways.

Glossary

Acculturation the Latin prefix *ad* that means *to* or *towards* was transformed into English as *ac; cultur* means *'culture,' and -ation* means *'process.'* Hence, acculturation is the process of moving towards culture. In a modern understanding, acculturation means second-culture acquisition.

The developmental niche: The human developmental niche consists of a set of regulative mechanisms that guide parental behaviours according to the prescribed communal models for parenting in a specific culture. These models and theories create the environmental settings wherein the child's inherited social, cognitive, and cultural predispositions successfully unfold. Tomasello called Culture the "species-typical and species-unique 'ontogenetic niche' for human development" (Tomasello, 1999, p. 79). Super and Harkness proposed that the developmental niche consists of three components: (1) the *parental ethnotheories* or *parents' cultural belief system about child development and upbringing*; these theories are related to the (2) *culturally regulated customs, traditions,* and *practices* of child care and child-rearing as well as to the (3) *physical and social settings* in which the development takes place (Super & Harkness, 1986, p. 552; Harkness & Super, 1996a, p. 2).

Enculturation: The prefix *en-* means 'entry,' *cultur* means 'culture,' and *-ation* means 'process.' Hence, enculturation is the process of entering a culture.

Gerontocracy means the power of old (*geron* (Greek)- old man; kratia (Greek) -cracy – power or rule). This way of thinking is centred around ancestors and elders; in turn, children are positioned at the margins of society.

The independent cultural model of parenting (by Keller) focuses on promoting the socialization goals of autonomy and independence of the child.

The interdependent cultural model of parenting (by Keller) emphasizes the child's relatedness to his or her community and the natural embeddedness of the existence of children into the social fabric of their community.

Neontocracy means the power of newborns or children (*neon* (Greek) – new; *kratia* (Greek) -*cracy* – power or rule). In contrast to gerontocracy, children are the main focus of society.

Primary enculturation/socialization is the initial phase during which the child encounters their social world for the first time. This is the deepest form of enculturation that shapes the child into a conscious human being with a sense of self and identity and makes them a member of the community.

Secondary enculturation/socialization happens when the already-enculturated young individual exits the home and enters various segments of their community to learn new SCM.

Socialization has various derivates – *social*, *socialized*, and *socializing*. Etymologically, it means *the process of becoming social*. It means and is related to the notion of being sociable, being able to mingle with others, understanding others, and enjoying being with others. This and related terms were introduced throughout the 19th century. *Socialization* is "the comprehensive and consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a society or a sector of it" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966/1989, p. 130).

Sociocultural models of childhood are the sets of knowledge, meanings, beliefs, and practices about various aspects of being a child in a particular community. These models include but are not limited to valuing children, understanding the nature of being a child and the phases and dynamics of their development.

Sociocultural models for parenting are the systems of prescribed practices to care for children and to regulate their activities: They instruct caregivers how to feed, educate,

discipline, and entertain their children. Parenting practices are related to and mostly determined by the SCM of childhood. These models include but are not limited to practices of feeding, sleeping, teaching, and disciplining children; they may also include who and when must care for children.

Sociocultural models of education and schooling are the systems of ideas and practices that communities develop regarding children's education. Here, education is understood in broad terms of learning the knowledge, skills, and practices that are relevant to the existence and sustainability of communities. Schooling is related to learning reading and writing in a structured way, and it occurs in specially structured places, mostly in schools.

Questions for students

1. This chapter argues that enculturation and socialization are not independent process; rather, they are interconnected aspects of child development. What are the arguments for this proposition? Do you agree with this assessment?
2. What are the differences between primary and secondary enculturation/socialization?
3. Explain the differences between neontocracy and gerontocracy in relation to child development.
4. This chapter states that the SCM of childhood and the SCM for parenting are dialectically related. Please explain how they are related.
5. List and describe the components of the developmental niche approach by Super and Harkness.
6. Explain how Keller advanced the developmental niche approach.
7. Why do many scholars consider peer socialization to be an important part of children's development?
8. What are the differences between informal sociocultural learning and formal schooling? What are their objectives and purposes?

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Note

1 The term *student-centered learning* was introduced by humanistic psychologist Carl Rogers (1983). Maria Montessori (the founder of Montessori schools) was also a strong supporter of this type of education.

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8 Personhood, selfhood, and identity in and across cultures

Chapter content

- This chapter aims to unpack the concepts of *person* and *personhood*, *self* and *selfhood*, as well as *identity* in terms of their relationships with Culture.
- It discusses the phenomenology of the self and its two levels: *experiential* and *narrative*.
- The chapter provides examples of three intensively researched sociocultural models of the person and the self: Indian, Buddhist, and Western.
- There is a reflective account of the structures of the self: Independent versus Interdependent and the Tripartite framework approaches.
- This chapter also examines human identity, another challenging and never fully resolved topic. The section on this topic examines *ego-* and *personal identities* as well as *ethnic*, *national*, and *cultural identities* and their interrelations.
- The existence of multicultural selves and identities reflects the continued migration of the human population and the globalization of many human spheres and institutions. The chapter discusses *hyphenated*, *multicultural*, *hybrid*, and *diasporic identities*; it also examines the challenges and pathologies of their maintenance.

The ultimate purpose of a human being's existence is to become a person who is aware of the world and oneself, a person who understands, reflects upon, and acts based on moral principles, and who demonstrates the uniquely human cognitive capacities that are in principle different from the ones that animals have. Being a person is inextricably related to having a self and an identity. The emergence of both elements is related to culture or the sociocultural environments in which a person lives. But what is a person? What are a person's self and identity? How are personhood, selfhood, and identity shaped by different cultural communities? These are challenging questions, and we will discuss them in this chapter.

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In the previous chapters, we discussed the pervasive power of Culture to shape and regulate people's experiences and behaviours. These discussions may have created the impression that people are simply the puppets of their cultures and that the corresponding sociocultural models pre-program everything that they think and do. However, this is not the case. To some extent, people are controlled by their sociocultural models – otherwise, it would not be possible for them to live coherent and coordinated communal lives or, consequently, for people to survive (we discussed the evolutionary consequences of the emergence of Culture in Chapter 5). However, there is another side to this dependence on culture. Culture also creates persons out of individuals; it equips them with self-consciousness and identities, and these qualities allow people to be relatively independent of the culture that crafted them. In turn, persons with mature selves may transform themselves and the cultures of their communities. Therefore, they may become the agents of cultural change. Thus, one needs to ask, where does this power for this independence and culture change come from? At this point, we must turn to the notions of the *person* (and correspondently, *personhood*), the *self* (and correspondently, *selfhood*), and a person's *identities* (see Box 8.1 for definitions of these concepts).

Box 8.1 Definition and explanation. Quotations and commentaries about the nature of the person, the self, and identity

About the person and personhood …

Personhood (the suffix *-hood* denotes *a condition* or *state of being*) is a condition or state of being a person. Similar **selfhood** is a condition or state of having a self. (https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/personhood).

> … To be a person in the full sense you have to be an agent with a sense of yourself as an agent, a being which can thus make plans for your life, one who also holds values in virtue of which different such plans seem better or worse, and who is capable of choosing between them.
>
> (Taylor, 1985, p. 257)

Commentary: In this quotation, Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor highlights the indispensable relationship between being a person and having a self/a sense of self. He emphasizes that the sense of personal agency is the primary attribute of the person's self in both the 'I' and 'Me' functions.

This sense of agency gives the person the power to construct plans for future actions, evaluate them based on a system of values, and choose a path to follow among various possibilities.

> Persons [are] embodied, reasoning, and moral agents with self-consciousness and self-understanding, as well as social and psychological identity, who have unique capabilities of language use and are distinctively culture capable.
>
> (Martin et al., 2009, p. 9)

Commentary: In this definition, Canadian psychologists Martin, Sugarman, and Hickinbottom outlined the basic parameters of being a person. These parameters include, but are not limited to, having a physical body and using the attributes of the self (mostly reflective ones) to execute reasoning and moral agency. A person has a repertoire of identities, is linguistically capable, and can generate culture.

About the self and selfhood ...

> Few ideas are both weighty and as slippery as the notion of the self. By 'self' we commonly mean the particular being any person is, whatever it is about each of us that distinguishes you or me from others, draws the part of our experience together, persists through changes, or opens the way to becoming who we might or should be. From knowledge of what the self truly is people have hoped to gain greater happiness, deeper fulfilment, liberation from fetters or restraints, better relations with other people, or ways to achieve power over them. Selfhood thus matters to us both as individuals and as social creatures, shaping our personal existence and our relations with those lives we somehow share.
>
> (Siegel, 2005, p. 3)

Commentary: In the opening sentences, American historian Jerrold Seigel equates the self with the person. Subsequently, he talks about the self as being a particular phenomenon within a person. The self makes the person different from others (it gives them a sense of personal identity and distinctiveness); it unites their inner experiences into a coherent whole (a sense of personal unity and sameness); the self makes us feel that we are always the same person, despite the changes and discontinuities that occur in people's lives (a sense of personal continuity). It provides people with power and agency for change (a sense of personal agency). In Western culture, striving to understand one's self, or who the

person truly is, is the route to happiness. This allows a person to free oneself from various ties and bonds and build better relationships with others. The self needs to be realized to bring people a feeling of deep completion. In the Western world, the self forms its citizens' existence as individuals and society members.

> According to Hallowell (1959:52) [an American anthropologist], the self is that part of consciousness that comes into play when a human being begins to take him- or herself as an object. As such, it is an experiential datum that, unlike the Freudian 'ego,' can be directly described and talked about by actors, not merely deduced or postulated from psychological or cultural theory.
>
> (Hollan, 1992, p. 284)

Commentary: American anthropologist Douglas Hollan describes the self as part of our conscious experience flow. In this interpretation, a person's "I-Self" turns its attention to oneself; as a result, this creates the experience of "Me." Hollan also differentiates the self from the ego: The self is the experience, while the ego is the construct that researchers create to account for some forms of mental.

> In the assertion that the human being has a self, Mead simply meant that the human being is an object to himself. The human being may perceive himself, have conceptions of himself, communicate with himself, and act toward himself.
>
> (Blumer, 1966, p. 535)

Commentary: American sociologist Herbert Blumer was a student of American philosopher Herbert Mead. In this quotation, Blumer emphasizes the capacity of a person's 'I-Self' to reflect on oneself to generate the 'Me-Self.' As a result, the human being can execute cognitive, communicative, and behavioural actions towards him- or herself.

On identity ...

> Personal identity is about what it is like to be uniquely me as I am for myself .... My personal identity, who I am for myself, is different from my social identity, who I am for others.
>
> (Benson, 2001, p. 89)

Commentary: Irish psychologist Ciaran Benson highlights the primary features of personal identity; specifically, he emphasizes people's uniqueness, that people are different from others, and the self-representation of this uniqueness to

oneself. He also acknowledges the difference between personal identity and social identity, which is shaped by the presence of others.

> Social identity [is] that part of individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership.
>
> (Tajfel, 1974, p. 69)

Commentary: This is the classical definition of social identity formulated by British social psychologist Henri Tajfel. Tajfel and his colleague John Turner developed social identity theory.

The Structure of Personhood and Selfhood

A starting point: The human individual

A starting point to analyse the triad of *person-self-identity* is the human *individual*. (The word *individual* comes from the Latin words *in* meaning 'not' and *dividuus,* meaning 'divisible;' hence, an individual is something *indivisible*). The human individual is a corporeal biological organism of a particular sex with specific psychophysiological attributes; they are touchable and visible and occupy a place in space at a particular time. Each individual exists separately from other individuals and is distinct from them.

As a representative of the species of *Homo Sapiens*, all human individuals are genetically predisposed to acquire consciousness, rationality, and other exclusively human mental characteristics. Through enculturation and socialization, the human individual ultimately transforms into a *person*. This transformation is accompanied by the person acquiring a sense of self, a sense of identity, and related to them, a sense of agency, responsibility, justice, and many other features essential for the human being to flourish in society. Therefore, being a person is a quality the human individual obtains by living and functioning in a community within a particular culture.

Differentiating the conception of the person from the experience of being a person

It is essential to differentiate a person's *conception* from the *experience of being a person*. The conception of a person relates to how the community, as a social whole, thinks about being a person in that community and, correspondently, how community members talk about and act towards each other based on this conception. This is a *cultural conception* or a *sociocultural model of personhood* (we will discuss some of these models later in this chapter). This model of personhood works as the blueprint for developing a person; however, this conceptualization may be (and usually is) different from how members experience being persons in their community.

The experience of being a person relates to how an individual perceives him or herself; this is a person's awareness and sense of being a person or, in other words, the *experience of personhood*. It includes having a sense of oneself with particular traits and attributes, motives, and feelings (i.e., personal identity). This experience also relates to the feelings of self-sameness, self-continuity, and agency.

Moreover, it is also a person's sense of social identities, including their ethnic, national, and cultural identities. These two sides of being a person – the conception of a person and the experience of being a person – should not be confused in the cultural analysis of personhood and selfhood. Communities develop their understandings of personhood and selfhood; children are born into these understandings and enculturated into them. Subsequently, they build their distinct senses and representations of themselves as persons. These senses and representations may differ from the sociocultural models imposed upon them and all community members.

Becoming a person means first developing one's self and the related sense of the self and identity; therefore, in the following sections, I will discuss the concept of the self.

Phenomenology of the Self (on phenomenology, see Box 8.2). Consciousness is the most characteristic feature of humans as representatives of *Homo Sapiens*. Consciousness is awareness of our existence and being in the world. We consciously experience the flow of images, ideas, memories, feelings, and intentions representing the external (physical and social) and our internal (mental) worlds. These ideas and images enter the field of our conscious experience every morning when we wake up, and they go away when we fall asleep at night or lose consciousness. Consciousness is also given to us through our ability to reflect on our thoughts, feelings, memories, and actions by making them the objects of our attention and contemplation. Being aware of our conscious experiences is another aspect of our conscious lives. The human self is the central focal point of our conscious experience and its primary structuring element.

Box 8.2 Definition and explanation

Phenomenology is the domain of philosophy that focuses on human consciousness and the conscious experience. The word *phenomenology* comes from the Greek words *phainómenon*, which is 'that which appears,' and *logos*, which is 'study, treatise, discourse.' Hence, *phenomenology* is the study of a phenomenon or what appears. Phenomenology investigates how our experience of the world is structured. For example, it considers how people experience love, hate, and anger, how they perceive and experience nature, pieces of art, or other objects or events. Phenomenology examines the conscious experience of different things from the first-person perspective. Phenomenology of the self is a way of examining people's selves (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Zahavi, 2009).

Phenomenologists differentiate two levels or stages of experience of the self: the *pre-reflective* or *experiential* and *autobiographical* or *narrative*. The pre-reflective sense of the self exists without any contemplations from people: We just experience the flow of perceptions, thoughts, and emotions (psychologist William James called this flow "a stream of consciousness"). In contrast, the narrative mode of the experience of the self is structured by language that allows a person to label and describe various aspects of this experience; it is also configured by interactions with others with whom persons exchange their experiences of the self. Moreover, the sense of the self is formed along the cultural prescriptions of one's community regarding how one should understand and think about oneself. This sense of the self includes developing a story (narrative) about oneself that is organized by language and culture. The human self develops through these two interdependent stages.

The pre-reflective/experiential self

Our consciousness has a structure determined by internal (the inherited capacities of the conscious mind) and external (the nature of the phenomenon that the mind is conscious of) determinants. One of the primary features of consciousness is that it is given to each person individually; thus, each person sees and interacts with the world from their here-and-now location. Phenomenologists call this location the *first-person perspective*. The experience that a person's perceptions, thoughts, and feelings are given exclusively to them is labelled *first-person givenness*. The first-person perspective designates the centre of my conscious experience; it is the point of departure for my perceptions, thinking, remembering, and feelings when interacting with the world. The first-person givenness indicates that this perspective and these thoughts and memories belong exclusively to me; it is *my* perspective, and nobody else can access it except *me*. Another significant feature of conscious experience is that a person knows that their first-person givenness of the world remains their today, and it will stay such tomorrow, next month, next year – any time. This *temporal continuity* of the person's conscious experience is its another feature. Philosophers introduced the concept of *the pre-reflective sense of the self* or *the experiential self* to label the first-person perspective/givenness and the temporal continuity of this perspective, along with some other features of our consciousness, which we will discuss later (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Zahavi, 2009).

The experiential self is a structural element of human consciousness. This self is not an entity (in the same way in which the heart, brain, or liver are); instead, it is a process of conscious experience from the perspective of the person located in a particular place and at a specific time. It is a process of experience a person has as they see trees and flowers, prepare for coming exams, remember last week's party, and feel sad that that fun time was over. The pre-reflective sense of the self is the centre of the individual's lived experiences of the world and the sense that it is me

and not somebody else who uniquely exists and functions in that world. *Selfhood* (a condition of having a self and a sense of the self, see Box 8.1) is a universal feature of being a person (Smith, 1978).

An essential dimension of the sense of the self is the sense of agency. This is the sense that it is 'I' who initiates and performs actions, 'I' who actively explores the world, and 'I' who makes changes to my environment. The sense of agency is the sense that the person is the centre of actions towards their environment, body, mind, and life. Together with the first-person givenness of experience (the sense that 'I' own my experience), the sense of agency exists at the pre-reflective level, and it creates a potentiality for the person's self-determination and psychological autonomy (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008) (see Box 8.3 on autonomy). These properties correspond to the higher-order narrative structure of the self. For self-determination to become actual in a person, many factors must be met. These include having the habit of reflexivity and the skill to psychologically distance oneself from the ongoing experiential activity of consciousness (Chirkov, 2017).

Box 8.3 Definition and explanation.

The term **autonomy** dates back to Ancient Greece. *Auto* means 'self,' and *nomy* (from *nomos)* means 'law.' Hence, autonomy means to be governed by self-developed laws. Psychological autonomy refers to a state of a person's existence when their thoughts, feelings, motivations, and actions are determined by their moral norms and convictions, self-generated values and principles, and uniquely personal self-regulation mechanisms. It is a state of a person when they are relatively independent in their mental life from direct determination forced upon that person by external (demands and expectations of other people as well as social norms) and internal (unreflected emotions, motivations, unjustified fears, and irrational thoughts) factors and conditions (for more on psychological autonomy, see Chirkov, 2011; Ryan et al., 2012).

In addition to the fact that we see, think, and act from our first-person perspective, another significant aspect of the self is that we are always aware that we are doing these things. This *self-awareness* and, related to it, the *reflexivity of our consciousness* are two other fundamental dimensions of consciousness. Self-awareness also has both pre-reflective and high-order reflective or narrative forms. Pre-reflective self-awareness means that I am not only consciously experiencing images, thoughts, memories, and feelings, but simultaneously, I am automatically and unthinkingly aware that I have them and that they are mine. When I start intentionally reflecting upon these experiences, verbally structuring them, and reporting them to others, I am elaborating a higher order of self-awareness that is part of the

autobiographical/narrative self. A person with a developed reflective sense of the self can initiate mental or physical acts and simultaneously be aware of them and reflect upon the initiation, duration, and consequences of these acts. Such a person can also reflect upon themselves as the performer of such actions; in turn, they can be either proud or ashamed of what they have done. This unity of the agentic and reflective capacities of our conscious self was labelled initially by William James and later by Herbert Mead as the "I-Self" and the "Me-Self." These are not two separate selves but two sides of the self – two complementary functions (agentic and reflexive) of human consciousness.

Autobiographical or narrative self

The pre-reflective experiential self is the starting point of a person's self development. It guides the individual into the next level of its formation. The processes that support the construction of the new level of the self are learning a language as a tool for naming various experiences of the self, interacting with people who share their experiences, and entering a culture with its SCMs of personhood and selfhood. An indicator that a person is approaching the level of narrative self is when one starts asking oneself and others, "Who am I?" Subsequently, they start to seek answers to this question. At this level, a person starts creating particular configurations of experiences of the self; these configurations are fully reflected upon, stretched in time, and incorporate more than just the dimensions of the experiential self. Psychologists label this configuration of the self the autobiographical or narrative self (Bruner, 2002; Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008; Schectman, 2011; Snow, 1990).

> The [narrative] self is constructed in and through narrative self-interpretations. When confronted with the question 'Who am I?' we will tell a certain story and emphasize aspects that we deem to be of special significance, to be that which constitutes the *leitmotif* of our life, that which defines who we are, that which we present to others for recognition and approval.
>
> (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2008, pp. 200–201)

At the narrative level of the self, an individual strives for and acquires their identity, mostly the personal and social aspects of this identity. This acquisition transforms an individual into a full-fledged person.

In his analysis of the human self, British philosopher Rom Harré (1998) identified another form of experience of selfhood to go along with the experiential self with its first-person perspective and givenness dimension. He suggested that a person has the sense that they possess unique attributes. These attributes include biological characteristics (gender, age, a particular body, its shape, physical strength, race), mental characteristics (the capacity to think, to remember, to

imagine), personality (to be outgoing, friendly, introverted, anxious) and some others. Harré labelled this form of experience of selfhood *Self 2* (According to his understanding, Self 1 is what we have called the experiential self). Self 2, also labelled by other scholars the *personal self*, is the experience of an idiosyncratic arrangement of a person's biological, mental, personality, and social attributes. This form of experiencing the self constitutes the basis for forming the individual's *personal identity*.

Ultimately, during the development process, the human individual acquires both elements of selfhood: the experiential self and the narrative self. Correspondently, one acquires the personal self and identity.

Sociocultural models of the person and self

Because of the critical functions that the self executes in peoples' lives – being the agent and coordinator of thoughts and actions, being the 'mirror' of a person's existence – communities cultivate and domesticate the selves of their members. When organizing these people's social and mental lives, cultural communities cannot let this central 'commander' of the person's life be unstructured, undisciplined, and, thus, unruly. Therefore, all cultural communities have developed SCMs of and for the self and person. In this section, I analyse the SCMs that have been developed in the Indian civilization, the Buddhist philosophical and religious tradition, and the Western culture.

In Chapter 1, we differentiated SCMs into a model *of* and *for* something; here, it is essential to distinguish between the SCMs *of* the person and self and the SCMs *for* the person and self. First, the models *of* the person/self present the communal understanding of what the person and their selves are, how they are structured, and how they function. In turn, the models *for* the person and self prescribe different methods, techniques, and practices that people use to work with their selves, self pathologies, and other self-related phenomena that may require cultivation, change, modification, or treatment.

South Asian philosophical models of selfhood, personhood, and identity[1]

Sages of South Asian civilizations (in this section, we discuss the Hindu and Buddhist religions) were the first among other civilizations to make the human consciousness and the self an object of their contemplation and intellectual scrutiny. Their analysis of selfhood and personhood went far beyond describing the phenomenal experiences of individuals. Following their highly sophisticated metaphysical and spiritual conceptions of the world, they focused on the nature of human beings, their position in the universe, the role consciousness plays in humans' lives, and their connection to the higher divine powers that pervade, animate, and structure that universe.

The Hindu philosophical model of the self

I start this model with the concept of *jīva*, which is mostly understood as the life force represented on the individual level. The closest Western interpretation of this concept is the 'soul full of life.' This metaphysical idea designates the experiencing, desiring, and suffering entity filled with life energy. Nearly interchangeably with *jīva,* Hindu sages also developed the concept of *ātman,* which means the soul or self. But *ātman* is not the self in the Western understanding that was presented above. Hindu teachings intentionally frame it as a concept that transcends the conventional understanding of a phenomenal or material self and ego. The closest Western interpretation is an individual's 'soul.' The *ātman* "is identified with spirit, being formless, immutable and absolute" (Morris, 1994, p. 79), and it is related to human existence.

Indian sages recognized the highest level of existence as *brahman* (literally "the breather"), which denotes an ultimate transcendent reality. A foremost interpretation of the early philosophical texts, the *Upaniṣad*s by the philosopher Śaṅkara postulates "that there is one and only one being in existence – the absolute (*brahman*), an impersonal 'spirit' or soul that is fundamentally the only reality" (Morris, 1994, p. 76). *Ātman* is the individuated aspect of that reality, and therefore, in their essence, *brahman* and *ātman* are identical. To merge one's *ātman* with *brahman* constitutes the goal of Hindu religious life, named *mokṣa,* which means 'union,' 'salvation,' or spiritual liberation.

Hindu philosophers also recognized the phenomenal self (*Ahaṁkāra*), which connotes the 'I-Self,' referring to self-consciousness and the personality as known to the individual and displayed to the outer world. The Indian sages saw this self as being trapped in the bondages of desires and suffering, saturated with egotism, and they argued that it could not lead the person towards spiritual emancipation. In describing this self/ego, Paranjpe (1998) used the metaphor of a moth trapped inside the cocoon of its own creation, similar to the ego trapped inside the tenets of the mentally-constructed reality of its own making (p. 169). The phenomenal self is irrelevant to understanding and pursuing the highest orientation in Hindu life, *moksa*. According to Hindu teachings, *moksa* can be achieved through developing a proper understanding of a person's real self, *ātman*, and its connection with *brahman*.

The Hindu philosophical model for the self

The orthodox Hindu model prescribes several paths by which a person may become liberated. These paths form a central theme of the *Bhāgavadgītā,* and they enjoy a distinct contemporary relevance in the 20th-century discussions of Hindu teachings (*Bhāgavadgītā* ("Song of God") is the holy scripture Hinduism composed about 200 BCE).

These are called different forms of *yoga*. *Yoga* is a general term that indicates any spiritual practice conveying liberation. The word *yoga,* in its various meanings, expresses an association with effective hard work ("to yoke"), and one with the goal of achieving a union with the ultimate ("to unite"). Yoga is variously listed as three (and sometimes four) paths (*margas*) for reaching *mokṣa*: *jñāna* (knowledge or wisdom); *karma* (ritualism or other work); *bhakti* (devotional surrender); and *rāja* (a "kingly" synthesis of yoga traditions). *Jñāna yoga marga* is the way of knowledge or wisdom. Sages discussed obtaining religious and philosophical wisdom through scriptural, philosophical, and contemplative traditions. In turn, *karma yoga marga* is the way of righteous action. This means practicing the correct ritual actions or conducting oneself ethically according to one's dharma (truth, duty and responsibilities, and religious law). To follow *karma yoga marga,* a person must act without regard for the ego's satisfaction and without a selfish desire to gain a potential reward or avoid a punishment. People on this path must refine the intentions behind their actions and conduct themselves with a spiritual orientation in whatever task they undertake. *Bhakti yoga marga* is a path of devotion and self-surrender to a god or goddess. *Bhakti* means "sharing;" the term conveys the state of being unconditionally attached, dedicated to, and in love with a personal form of the divine. In response, devotees receive grace, protection, and a personal relationship with their chosen god or goddess – and, ultimately, they develop a blissful union. The fourth path, *rāja yoga marga,* is connected with a particular school of classical philosophy, which is also called "Yoga." Yoga (with the capital 'Y') as a school of philosophy emphasizes philosophical-psychological teachings (Rao & Paranjpe, 2008). Interpreters of Yoga philosophy consider three levels of union: the body with the mind, the mind with consciousness, and the individual self (*ātman*) with higher Consciousness-as-Such (*brahman*). The ultimate goal of *rāja yoga* is to achieve salvation through non-attachment to the empirical world, the world of desires and the empirical self. The eight-fold path prescribed on *rāja yoga marga* includes showing ethical self-restraint (*yama*), adopting habits for spiritual growth (*niyama*), perfecting a posture for meditation (*āsana*), developing techniques of disciplined breathing (*prāṇāyama*), achieving meditative withdrawal from sense-objects (*pratyahāra*), concentrating on the spiritual core of the mind (*dhāraṇa*), further contemplating the essence of an object (*dhyāna*), and finally, achieving a trance-like deep meditational state (*samādhi*) (Morris, 1994, pp. 88–89).

To summarize, in presenting their understanding of consciousness, Indian sages went far beyond the phenomenal self. They developed a system of metaphysical concepts that should guide the lives of their followers to enable them to achieve *moksa*. They directed them away from mundane life to reach the ultimate salvation by merging the Real Self (*ātman*) with the Cosmic Absolute (*brahman*). Some scholars (Dumont, 1985) see striving to unite *ātman* with *brahman* as a manifestation of the Indian version of individualism: Through these teachings, a person is guided to

renounce the social world of everyday life and instead focus on their internal dispositions and self-analysis through meditation, reading scriptures, and other psychophysical practices.

Some may assume that this metaphysical Hindu world image is the way of the past and that only a rare person in modern India knows and follows these teachings. Contrary to this assertion, Sudhir Kakar, an Indian developmental psychologist and psychoanalyst (Kakar, 2008; Kakar & Kakar, 2007), emphasized that despite its metaphysical and deeply philosophical character, this worldview is deeply entrenched in the everyday worlds of ordinary people in India and it gives them structure and meaning in their lives. Ultimately, this internalized model of the world and the place humans have in it forms and maintains the South Asian Hindu mentality, sense of self, and identity even though they are not fully aware of its sources. On the other hand, despite the denial of the significance of the phenomenal or material self in the Indian foundational sociocultural model of the person, some South Asian scholars (Bharati, 1985) have highlighted that this self exists, is structured, and plays a vital role in the everyday lives of Indian people. This self should also be examined and reflected upon.

The Buddhist philosophical model of 'No-Self' (anātman or atman)

Buddhism is a religion that emerged in South Asia between the 6th and 4th centuries BCE. This set of teachings and the establishment of the early community, including monastic institutions, is attributed to **Siddharta Gautama**. The foundational story of this tradition is the narrative of this South Asian prince renouncing his family and responsibilities to pursue enlightenment; this story is known and retold by Buddhists across Asia and around the world. By engaging in the practices of meditation, he achieved his aim and received the title *Buddha* (meaning "enlightened-" or "awakened-" one). Since its emergence, Buddhism has spread across Asia and to other continents, becoming one of the largest world regions. (Buddhists comprise approximately 7% of the world population)

The earliest system of Buddhist teachings – having a central place in all forms of Buddhism around the world – is that of the Four Noble Truths. The first truth is about the ubiquity of suffering (called *dukkha*, discomfort, unease, or suffering); the second truth is about the cause of suffering (identified as *taṇhā,* craving); the third truth is that suffering can cease (*nirodha*, cessation); and, finally, the fourth truth describes the path that leads to the elimination of suffering (the *Noble Eightfold Path*).

Buddhism's primary premise is to eliminate people's suffering and help them reach the state of awakening, liberation, and happiness: *nirvāṇa,* literally "blown-out" as in the extinguishing of a candle flame. Cravings (*taṇhā)* of the self bring suffering to people's lives. Human selves have attachments, emotions, conceptions,

expectations, and attitudes that bring them pain, distress, and misery. To avoid these miseries, people must abandon their attachments to their selves as these are the primary source of these unrests. Buddhism teachings were in contradistinction to the prevailing Hindu philosophies of the time, as they deny the essential and permanent human self. The Buddha announced the idea of *anātman*, 'non-self,' or 'no-soul.'

Early Buddhist teachings describe people's sources of suffering directly related to their concepts of identity and personhood. This philosophy teaches that a person's sense of the self is created by a nexus of mental states and processes, including sensations, emotions, desires, expectations, attachments, and thoughts. Identifying with these states and processes gives rise to anxieties, fears, uncertainties, sensual cravings, unproductive thoughts, and other impulses that create suffering for individuals and others around them. Suffering is endemic to the human experience because we crave constancy, the fulfilment of individual desires, and permanence in a world that is marked by change, interconnectedness, and impermanence. Because the sources of suffering are connected to and orchestrated by the self, Buddhists suggest that it is both logical and necessary to eliminate this ultimately false idea of selfhood and to acquire liberation from its confining ties.

According to the Buddha's teachings, nothing is permanent either in the world or inside the individual. Existence is impermanent, transient, and in continuous flux. For Buddhists, the idea of the stable and essential human self is an illusion (Morris, 1994, p. 58), and people's attachments to this illusion generate their suffering. To achieve salvation, one must deny the existence of self and accept the doctrine of *anātman,* 'non-self.' In turn, there are five interrelated psycho-physical processes: identification with the body and its sensations, one's thoughts, choices, and habits, and ultimately, with consciousness itself. These five processes are characterized by their dynamism and flux. The self is a conventional label for patterns of these processes, and there is no reality or ultimate truth behind it. Because it is trapped in the illusion of the permanent, conscious, bounded self that falsely suggests its essential nature, people's consciousness is cocooned by a chimera of the self; because of this, people are unable to avoid suffering and achieve the state of awakening and liberate themselves from suffering.

The Buddhist philosophical model for 'No-Self'

The core set of teachings found in the Four Noble Truths culminates in the *Eightfold Path*. This path includes eight practices that gradually lead one away from suffering. Some interpreters of Buddhism (Harvey, 2013) group these eight practices into three categories: *ethics*, *meditation*, and *wisdom*. Right ***ethics*** includes correct speech, actions, and livelihood. Right ***meditation*** incorporates cultivating effort, meditation, and concentration. And right ***wisdom*** contains refining purposes and views.

The interpretation of these ethical and conduct guidelines is different across regional and historical forms of Buddhism. These distinctions are most pronounced when they are observed across monastic- and lay-communities of religious practice.

Some Buddhist scholars and practitioners interpret the teaching of *anātman* not as an actual denial of the self but as a path of detachment from the mundane world based on the understanding that everything is impermanent and changing. The existence of the relatively stable self is a topic of Buddhist scholars' continued discussions. Still, in some traditions of Buddhism (for example, Theravada Buddhism prevalent in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia) (Collins, 1990), there are practices for reaching a liberated state of consciousness by eliminating the sense of self and everything related to it: This includes the idea of physical individuality, personal traits and attributes, and the "I-Self" as the centre of the experience. In addition, such practices involve rejecting the phenomenological experience that a person's actions and mental states emanate from 'I,' followed by abandoning the idea of 'I am.' The ultimate goal of these practices is to make the illusory 'I' disappear.

In summary, Buddhism is a unique system in terms of its worldview and its discussion of human selfhood. It takes the self as the subject of extended meditative and philosophical enquiry. It also fundamentally rejects the ultimate existence of the self in whatever form it is conceptualized: material, phenomenal, or transcendental. Mistaken ideas about the self are understood as the sources of individuals' suffering. Therefore, they should be eliminated. Buddhism has developed practices to eradicate suffering, including the Noble Eightfold Path, which emphasizes the related tasks of ethical action, contemplative practice, and philosophical enquiry. This tripartite approach supports individuals in rejecting a false sense of the self and achieving *nirvana*. Many scholars of Buddhism highlight the individualistic nature of this tradition's philosophical standpoint, meaning that individuals must rely only on themselves to achieve their salvation in their own way; as such, the devotees do not need intermediaries to develop and be responsible for their spiritual destiny (Lukes, 1973, p. 94).

The Western sociocultural models of and for personhood, selfhood, and identity

Western civilization refers to a particular set of ideas, values, and norms developed over several centuries in Western Europe, then spread to other countries in North America, Australia, New Zealand, and others. These ideas concern the individuals, their attributes, the type of relationships that should exist between a society and its members, the type of governance of communities, and many other aspects related to the existence of human beings in the sociocultural world. These values and ideas are traced to the Ancient Greeks and Ancient Romans, the Judo-Christian religion, and the intellectual movements of the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and modernity. They are distinct from the values of other civilizations and cultures.

Starting with the cradle of Western civilization in Ancient Greece and Ancient Rome, philosophers, theologians, scholars, and numerous thinkers have been deeply concerned with understanding the human nature which they saw in people's consciousness, rational minds, selves, and identities. Consequently, their primary focus was on the individual, the living being who is endowed with these properties. For millennia, these thinkers have been aiming to understand the nature of personhood and the essence of the human self that transforms the individual into the person (see Morris, 1991; Seigel, 2005). These concerns and engagements have laid the groundwork for the foundational sociocultural model of the West – *Individualism* (see Box 8.4 on the nature of individualism).

The Western SCM of self

Jerrold Seigel, a historian of philosophy who wrote one of the most comprehensive works on the philosophical history of the concept of the self (2005), identified three dimensions along which the analysis of the self unfolded in the European context. They are (1) the bodily or material, (2) the relational, and (3) the reflective dimensions. Altogether, these three dimensions constitute the Western understanding of the person's self.

The first dimension is rooted in the fact that we are corporeal individuals who have bodies with numerous functions, needs, and propensities. The person cannot be whole if they do not experience, reflect upon, and contemplate their body and, related to it, their earthly existence. Thus, "our selves on this level … are housed in our bodies, and are shaped by the body's needs" (Seigel, 2005, p. 5). Modern psychology reflects this dimension by studying the *embodiment* of our cognition, our minds, and our selves (Varela et al., 1991). The relational dimension of the self is rooted in the circumstance that every individual lives in a community alongside other people; in turn, this social living imposes on them shared values and norms as well as collective (social) identities and values. These collective attributes shape *who* the person is within that group of people. A person's sense of self and identity (the answer to the question "Who am I?") are constructed by the group, and it is not the person's choice or their own making. "In this perspective, our selves are what our relations with society and with others shape or allow us to be" (p. 5). Despite the reality that the foundational model of individualism is prevalent, the Western model of the self emphasizes the social origin of selfhood, and it has a long tradition of studying the mechanisms of such developments.

The third, reflective aspect of the self is built upon the person's capacity to turn their attention to the world and to their existence in that world; this enables the person to make these aspects the objects of their contemplations, analysis, and if possible, self-development. The person reflects not only on their body and social relations but also on their conscious self by mentally distancing oneself from corporeality, sociality,

and consciousness – and making these concepts the objects of examination and regulation. "On this level the self is an active agent of its own realization, establishing order among its attitudes and beliefs, and giving directions to its actions" (p. 6).

Box 8.4 The Western foundational model of individualism

Western individualism is focused on the individual; it is concerned with developing their rights, freedoms, and capabilities. Therefore, according to this ideology, societies and communities must aim to support individuals' rights and liberties. American anthropologists considered the UN Universal Declaration of Human rights (1948; https://www.un.org/en/about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights) (which is rooted in the ideology of individualism) to be ethnocentric and adverse to many societies and cultures that do not endorse this ideology (see The Executive Board, 1947). Individualism does not mean selfishness, egoism, or creating a confrontation with society. Rather, while focusing on the individual, this foundational model invites one to respect other people and their rights and freedoms and to exercise one's autonomy and liberty while still considering the autonomy and liberty of other individuals. The ideology of individualism is the foundational sociocultural model regarding the relationships between the person and the collective (community or society). Because of its foundational nature, this model has been applied beyond philosophy to politics, economics, education, health care, and other social institutions.

The main features of individualism are (based on Lukes, 1973 and Roland, 1996):

- The human individual has an *intrinsic and undeniable value*; they possess a dignity that others must respect.
- The human individual is *self-determined*. Individuals own their thoughts and actions and resist having their behaviours and cognitions determined by agents and causes outside their control.
- The human individual deserves *privacy,* which is a space (physical or psychological) in which the person is left alone by others to do and/or to think about whatever they choose.
- The human individual predisposes *to self-development*. This invites people to harmoniously cultivate their individuality and uniqueness and consolidate all their powers into a coherent whole.
- Society should be subordinate to the needs, interests, and rights of its members.
- Society should be built out of the self-interests of individuals. Relationships among people and between them and their societies must be built on consenting and contractual principles (laws), which should be respected by all.

The third dimension emphasizes the agentic and reflective aspects of the self, and it highlights the ability of a person with a mature self to implement changes in their environment and/or within themselves. This classification of the self is widely used in the modern psychology of the self (Baumeister, 1999; James, 1892/1961). The Western SCM of self has different interpretations, and scholars emphasize and discuss this model's nuances and implications (Johnson, 1985; Neisser & Jopling, 1997; Sampson, 1988). In Box 8.5, I discuss the Independent versus Interdependent conceptualization of self that has been popular in cross-cultural and cultural psychology.

The Western SCM for self

The Western tradition also has a rich tradition of developing SCMs *for* the self, its development and enhancement. Foucault (1988) has creatively labelled these types of models as the "technologies of the self" (in the terminology of the TSCM, these are "the technologies *for* the self"). Such self-transforming technologies first appeared in the philosophical schools of Stoicism and other ancient philosophies, starting in the 3rd century BCE, in the prayers and meditative practices of Christians of different denominations, and then in the modern movements of self-growth, mindful meditations, and some other practices of self-reconfiguration (Brown et al., 2015; Cooper, 2012; Hadot, 1995; Irvine, 2009; Seddon, 2005). The pivotal core of these practices is the human reflective self, which is invited to do its job in special conditions and under the guidance of a master. The aims are to distance oneself from the flow of ongoing experiences, to reflect upon their different aspects, and then to decide to transform the parts of the self that stand in the way of self-development to have a better, fuller and more virtuous life.

In conclusion, the Western tradition regarding the self differs vastly from Hinduism and Buddhism. It denies the metaphysical and immaterial approaches to the self that are practiced in these traditions and that were also practiced in the early ages of the Western approach. Instead, the Western tradition focuses on the phenomenal and material self that is embedded in people's everyday lives. The individual, their self, and its development are of the utmost importance for communities and societies. Despite the primacy of the individual over the social world, the Western model still highlights the social and cultural embeddedness of personhood and selfhood. As with the other SCMs of a person and the self, the Western model includes systems of practices for self-cultivation and refinement.

Box 8.5 'In Focus' feature. Independent versus interdependent self-construal approach

Since its publication in 1991, the article "Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation" by American psychologists Hazel Markus and Shinobu Kitayama has been influential among cross-cultural and social psychologists (Markus & Kitayama, 1991). It has been intensively used in discussions of and research on the role culture plays in shaping people's representations of their selves, the relationships between individuals in different cultures, and how these representations shape people's mentalities.

The primary notion of the proposed approach is the "self-construals of the self, of others, and of the relationships between the self and others" (p. 224). These self-construals are one's personal conceptions of oneself, which could be defined as the representations of the self to oneself or self-representations. Self-construals also include one's representations of others and representations of the relationships between oneself and other people. The authors proposed the existence of two forms of self-construals: *independent* and *interdependent*. The independent construal emphasizes the uniqueness of the individual who has a distinctive pattern of mental and personal attributes. Such an individual is self-sufficient and autonomous, and they act based on internal inclinations and motives; they must become independent from others and detached from their contexts. In contrast, the interdependent construal suggests that the focal point of individual experience is the "self-in-relation-to-other," the relationship with others, and the mutual interdependence between them. The self is considered interdependent with the social context, and the behaviours of people are organized by their perceptions and representations of the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others (p. 227).

Markus and Kitayama also suggested that these construals are unevenly distributed in the world. Specifically, they argued that independent self-construal dominates most of the Western countries of Europe and settlers' communities in North America and Australia. In contrast, the interdependent construal of the self is prevalent in non-Western countries, predominantly in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Aboriginal communities of North America and Australia. Consequently, these authors differentiated the world's cultures into two groups based on their dominant construal: *independent* and *interdependent cultures*. They aimed to discuss these two self-construals and demonstrate their essential role in structuring and managing the psychological processes of cognition, emotion, and motivation.

Markus and Kitayama positioned these two construals of the self as the fundamental and overarching mental schemata that structure and organize the individuals' self-systems and mental processes. In turn, the authors provided rich empirical data to support the organizational role of the self-construals in the psychological functioning of people in different cultures. Specifically, they showed that people with independent self-construal process information, think, feel, and motivate their actions differently from people with interdependent self-construal.

In the three-plus decades since Markus and Kitayama's article was published, this dichotomous categorization of the self has been popular among cross-cultural and social psychology scholars (see Cross et al., 2011 for a review). Subsequently, researchers have developed questionnaires to measure self-construals (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Singelis, 1994), and they have intensively used them in various cross-cultural studies (see Levine et al., 2003). Several Western scholars of culture have also endorsed this dichotomization of the conception of the self. For instance, Shweder and Bourne (1991) articulated the Western 'egocentric' self in contrast to the Indian 'sociocentric' one. Marsella (1985) and some other researchers recognized the non-Western self as 'unindividuated' and the Western one as 'individuated.'

Reflection on and critique of the independent vs. interdependent self-construal approach

Despite its popularity, Markus and Kitayama's approach has been criticized on several grounds from the cultural psychological and anthropological points of view as well as from the cross-cultural psychological position (Gregg, 2007; Kirmayer, 2007; Matsumoto, 1999; Spiro, 1993; Vignoles et al., 2016).

The primary concerns with this and related approaches include the dichotomization of world cultures, the corresponding cultural models of selfhood and personhood, and the associated self-representations. The critical scholars highlighted the unjustified overgeneralization of the relatively simplistic models of the self – West has independent cultural conceptions and representations of the self, and East (and South) has interdependent ones – to large geographical areas. In reality, the cultural models of the self are diverse in both the West and the East (consider the South Asian models of selfhood and personhood discussed above; also, the tripartite approach to self that is discussed later). As such, most of these models include both independent and interdependent self-construals in different proportions. Many also have other dimensions (Vignoles et al., 2016). Consequently, some Westerners can perceive themselves as interdependent, while some Asians may possess strong

independent selves (these are examples of cultural studies that support this proposition: (Ewing, 1991; Hollan, 1992; Holland & Kipnis, 1994; Mascolo, Misra, & Rapisardi, 2004; Mines, 1988; Sinha & Tripathi, 1994; Takano & Osaka, 2018). Going back to the nature of the self, all representations of the self must include the independent and agentic components (because the pre-reflective self-givenness of experience and the sense of agency are inherent to any self) as well as the interdependent and relational ones (because any narrative self is a social product that emerges in the context of a person's social relationships).

Some critics of the independent/interdependent self-construal approach have pointed to the remnants of a Western ethnocentric, even colonial point of view in this and similar approaches, where "the autonomous, conscience-directed individual was the crowning creation of Western civilization and that non-Western peoples were submerged in family and tribal relationships, their behaviour not governed by conscience but by sensitivity to social shame" (Gregg, 2007, p. 4).

Almost all critics commented on the authors' poorly articulated conceptualizations of different aspects of the problem of culture and the self. Spiro (1993) noted that Marcus and Kitayama used different meanings of the self in different parts of their essay. He highlighted that these authors do not sufficiently differentiate the sociocultural conceptions of the self and the person (the product of the collective efforts that publicly exists in the community) from the mental representations of the self (that exist in the minds of the community members). Because there are blurry boundaries between these two forms of self existence, it is challenging to discuss the relationships between Culture and the self.

In conclusion, many scholars in various social disciplines are becoming critical of dichotomization in studying culture and people's mental organization. They invite students of culture to endorse the indigenous approach and study the cultural conceptions of the self as they exist in various cultural communities. Consequently, they suggest studying the mental construction of people's selves and self-representations that are driven by these conceptions.

The tripartite framework of the self

As proposed by American transcultural psychoanalyst Alan Roland (Roland, 1987, 1988, 2011) and cultural anthropologist Richard Shweder and his colleagues (Shweder et al., 2003), their conceptualization of the person's phenomenal self is more elaborate but less known than the Independent and Interdependent self-construals approach. Despite disciplinary differences in these

scholars' conceptual and methodological approaches,[2] they independently devised a similar three-componential structure of the self (Roland labelled it "the intrapsychic mental structure") that includes *familial*, *individualized*, and *spiritual* selves. After analysing Indian communities, Shweder extracted three moral themes or, as he called them, "ethics" – *autonomy*, *community*, and *divinity* – and he designated corresponding selves to each of these ethics. Initially, both these scholars discovered this self-structure in India. Subsequently, Roland validated it in Japan and the United States, and ultimately, he suggested that its nature is universal.

The three-self mental structure

Roland (1988) commented that *the familial self* emerges in hierarchical familial, communal, and societal (the caste system) relationships. It makes understanding and functioning in such networks of relationships not only possible but also enjoyable and successful. This self has also been labelled by other researchers as 'interdependent,' 'collectivistic,' 'social,' 'communal,' and 'sociocentric.' The familial self works through feelings of intimate connectedness and interdependence with members of one's extended family and/or other important social groups, as well as through attitudes of deference and obedience to those higher in the hierarchy. It is related to how people perceive the world and its objects in a highly contextual and symbolic way. Individuals' self-esteem is associated with the We-self regard that comes from being associated with having a high family reputation or a high reputation of other social groups with whom a person is involved; in turn, one's self-ideal is based on following the rituals, social etiquette, and traditions of social relationships (p. 8). Moreover, Shweder and colleagues (2003) also emphasized a strong sense of duty towards others, a sense of hierarchy, and a feeling of interdependence within this community ethics (p. 106).

The individualized or *autonomous self* is the most prominent self found in Americans, but it is also present in the self-structures of Indians. According to Shweder and his colleagues, this type of self is based on the ethics of autonomy, and it is "characterized by [the] inner representational organizations" (Roland, 1988, p. 8) that are tied to the individualistic mode of functioning, personal interests, desires, and preferences (Shweder et al., 2003, p. 104); to actions that are efficient, mobile, and highly adaptable to extra-familial relationships (Roland, 1988, p. 9); and to representations that are tied to rationalism, self-reflection, and oriented towards abstraction. The individualized self achieves its esteem by cultivating initiative, a sense of distinctiveness from others, and self-determination. Relatively abstract values and principles structure its self-ideals. Finally, cultivating this component of self is "oriented toward the ongoing self-creation of one's own self-identity … through the exploration and realization of inner potentials in various activities and relationships" (p. 9). Shweder et al. articulated the idea that

in India, the autonomous self is related to a person's discovery of their personal *dharma,* which is one's obligation towards others. Indians obtain *dharma* based on their caste, social status, gender, and age. These types of duties and obligations are assigned to an individual, and a person must discover their individual *dharma* by using the autonomous mode of functioning.

The *divine* or *spiritual self* is present to differing degrees within every person through their beliefs that a sacred order is immanent in the world, that godliness permeates or interpenetrates the human social order as well as the natural world and interacts with both, that there are important communicative exchanges going on all the time between persons and the realm of divinity. (Shweder et al., 2003, p. 109)

Both Roland (1988) and Shweder with his colleagues (2003) suggested that the spiritual self penetrates other components of the Indian self (especially the familial self) and that it may serve as the main battleground through which individuals strive for their individuation, psychological autonomy, and ultimately, their self-cultivation and enlightenment. As the person becomes increasingly involved in realizing their spiritual self, they still relate to others and fulfil responsibilities, but without intensely looking to these others for the fulfilment of wishes and esteem and without having the desire to be needed. When viewed psychologically, the concept of detachment can be considered an increasing involvement in one's spiritual self and a loosening of the powerful emotional bonds in one's familial-social relationships (Roland, 1988; p. 307).

After proposing his ideas related to Indians, Roland applied his tripartite framework to Japanese and Americans (Roland, 1996) and subsequently suggested that this framework can be considered relatively universal. In turn, he used it to conceptualize and examine people's selves in other countries. Shweder and colleagues (2003) suggested that justifying this self conceptualization can benefit people in other cultural niches. They also concluded that the tripartite framework is relatively universal because these three forms of the self are present in most cultures and cultures differ in the level of emphasis and salience they have of a particular component in their conceptions of the self. For example, both authors suggested that in the West, people possess the same three aspects of the self; the individualized autonomous self is the focus of cultivation, whereas both the familial and spiritual selves are in the relative background (of course, some sub-cultures within the Western civilization may differ from this profile (Hollan, 1992)). However, in Hindu communities, the familial and spiritual selves are the most important for members to cultivate; there, the autonomous individualized self is still acknowledged, but it is not given primacy and importance outside of the spiritual domain (Roland, 1988).

In summary, this section presented a typology of selves different from the dichotomous conceptualization of the self, which splits it into independent and interdependent self-construals. The tripartite framework avoids some of the weaknesses of dichotomous categorizations. It does not split cultures into groups; instead, it

suggests that they have different configurations of people's selves and different meanings of various self pathways. This framework does not consider a direct correspondence between the cultural conceptions of the self and peoples' idiosyncratic configurations of their internal selves. It accepts and discusses possible variations of the compositions of people's phenomenal selves and individuals' autonomy in shaping such configurations.

People's identities within cultural contexts

The term 'identity' is traced back to French *identité* (14th century), derived from Medieval Latin *identitatem*, which means 'sameness.' In early English, the term was *idemptitie*. All these words mean 'sameness,' 'oneness,' and the 'state of being the same' (https://www.etymonline.com/word/identity). Identity makes things or beings what or who they are, making them different from other things or beings.

Psychologically speaking, identity as sameness and oneness primarily works subconsciously by bringing to the person the feeling of self-congruency, wholeness, integrity, and ultimately, sanity: "I know who I am, and I am who I am all the time." Psychoanalysts believe that the integrating function of the ego constructs this sense of sameness and oneness. (Hence, the ego-psychology is a branch of psychoanalytic psychology.) Psychoanalyst **Erick Erikson** (1902–1994) labelled this sense of one's identity *ego-identity:* "... ego-identity could be said to be characterized by the actually attained but forever-to-be-revised sense of reality of the Self within social reality" (Erikson, 1968, p. 211). Such a connotation of identity is almost identical to the dimensions of the *experiential self* that was discussed above. Psychologists and psychotherapists study ego-identity and its relation to people's mental functioning (Marcia et al., 1993). The ego-identity disruption seriously harms people's mental functioning (Marcia, 2006).

Other forms of identity work on the conscious level. The term *personal identity* has several connotations. Often, this term is used synonymously with the notions of 'a sense of the self' and 'a sense of who you are.' But more commonly, personal identity is interpreted as a feeling of being a person of a particular gender and age, having specific physical and mental attributes, and being capable of doing particular things and having different attributes from others. This interpretation is similar to the concept of the *personal self*. It is a person's personal biopsychological composition. For example, a woman may think: "I am a young female who is caring and eager to help others," or "I am an extraverted and outgoing person." In short, "Personal identity is about what it is like to be uniquely me as I am for myself" (Benson, 2001, p. 89).

Social identities are categories that communities develop to classify members based on their roles and statuses in that community. When a person is admitted to a university, they acquire the social identity of being a 'university student;' when an individual is hired for a job, they is identified as an 'employee;' when a child is born, the man and woman who conceived the child become 'parents,' and

correspondently, each becomes a 'mother' or a 'father.' Social identities are social facts, and they are a part of the corresponding SCMs of the community. They are relatively broad and schematic categorizations of people. Each identity provides space for individuals to specify and particularize their understanding of who they are within each category.

The subjective aspect of social identity is called *a sense of social identity* (Verkuyten, 2018), which is a person's experience of being a student, an employee, or a parent after these corresponding social identities have been imposed upon them. Despite acquiring such a social identity, a person may not feel like a university student. Similarly, a man may not have a sense of fatherhood despite his child being born and being categorized as the father by his community.

There can be continued tension between assigned social identities and people's sense of these identities. A community may designate a person as having a disability and requiring continued assistance. In contrast, that same person may not feel that they are disabled; rather, this person might identify themself as a person with a rich and interesting life and someone that requires little assistance. Developing a sense of social identity is one of the domains in which people exercise agency and autonomy. For instance, Jewish people who immigrated from Soviet Russia to the West after 1970s have often been called 'Russians' because they speak the Russian language. Many of these immigrants resisted this identity, and they instead developed the identity of being Jews (or Soviet Jews). People may resist imposed social identities and, in turn, they may reinterpret and modify their understanding of their social categorization. This can be a serious problem for second-generation ethnic minority immigrants who were born in the country to which their parents immigrated many years ago. These second-generation immigrants rightly receive a national identity of being Canadians, Americans, or Australians, along with a corresponding sense of national identity. On the other hand, because they are members of a visible ethnic minority, people in their communities may still categorize them as 'immigrants' or simply 'outsiders' and might treat these people accordingly. Thus, these immigrants may be forced to either reject their national identity or form a hyphenated identity, such as Indian-Canadians, Chinese-Americans, or somebody else. Typically, Canadian Aboriginal people are identified by the Government of Canada as being the "Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" (https://www23.statcan.gc.ca/imdb/p3Var.pl?Function=DECI&Id=59224). Notably, this name includes both their ethnic and national identities.

Ethnic, cultural, and national identities

Ethnic, cultural, and national identities are forms of social identity. They reflect the membership of people into particular groups or communities. In Chapter 2, we discussed ethnicity and categorized *ethnie* – or ethnic community – as a

community of people with the following seven features: a collective name, a history and/or a myth of common descent, a distinct shared culture, an association with a specific territory, common physiognomic features, and a sense of identity and solidarity (for more information on the challenges of delineating ethnicity and ethnic groups, see (Phinney, 1996; Zagefka, 2009)). Thus, one's ethnic identity reflects being part of a particular ethnic group and sharing most, if not all, features of its *ethnie*.

Another side of this coin is a person's *sense of ethnic identity*, or how a person experiences their ethnicity: (1) what the meaning of this identity is to the person, (2) how salient or central this identity is for personal identification (the salience of ethnic identity), (3) how strong it is (the strength of ethnic identity), and (4) how proud or ashamed a person is of their ethnicity (the valence of ethnic identity).

As follows from the definition of *ethnie*, ethnic identity includes the notion of *cultural identity*, which means that a person is not only a member of an ethnic group but also that they have particular cultural features. Specifically, the primary cultural attributes of an ethnic group are language and religion. Cultural attributes also include a certain mentality – a particular perception of the world, other people, and oneself; certain attitudes towards multiple things in society, such as, for example, women, time, interpersonal space, and justice; and particular practices of, for instance, eating particular foods, drinking particular drinks, being dressed in a certain fashion, and so forth.

Here are some examples of cultural identities: being a vegetarian, an atheist, an environmentalist, a liberal or conservative, a human rights activist, or a computer nerd. These cultural identities reflect people's belonging to particular social groups that may transcend ethnic groups' boundaries. Through membership in groups like these, a person develops a particular worldview and acquires certain practices, specific values and moral norms, and a sense of identity by being its member.

As we discussed in Chapter 2, the *nation* is a political construction that arises when a particular ethnic group claims its sovereign status (for example, the Aboriginal peoples and Quebecois are nations within Canada, while the Scots and Welsh are nations within the United Kingdom). Nations can be arranged as nation-states that have borders, governments, armies, their own money, and some other attributes. Correspondently, national identity or nationality refers to having membership in a nation-state; typically, this is symbolized by being a citizen of this country and having a passport. Because ethnic groups underlying nations, national identity may coincide with ethnic identity: For instance, the Japanese national identity (of being a citizen of Japan) corresponds to being an ethnic Japanese. Notably, the nationals of Canada and the United States may have numerous ethnic identities, so their national identity does not necessarily correspond to their ethnic identities.

Hyphenated, bicultural/multicultural, and other forms of multiple identities

A label of *hyphenated identity* is applied to people who were assigned by a society or by themselves dual ethnic categories (Anglo-Welsh), dual ethnic and national identities (Ukrainian-Canadians), or dual national identities (Mexican-Americans). Keep in mind that hyphenated identities are often imposed identities; persons may shape their sense of identity and experience this duality distinctively – often different from the imposed categorization.

As one may expect, for individuals with hyphenated ethnic/national identities, there are four strategies for ethnic individuals' self-categorization. Hutnik (1991), who studied immigrants, identified four forms of their identity construction. Immigrants may endorse both their home and host ethnic/national identities (an *acculturation strategy*: "I am a Chinese-Canadian"); they can continue to endorse their home country or ethnic identity while rejecting their host culture identity (a *dissociative strategy*: "I am still a Chinese"); they may experience the opposite configuration, and develop a host culture identity and reject their home country or ethnic identification (an *assimilative strategy*: "I am a Canadian"); finally, bicultural individuals may reject both their home and host country identifications (a *marginal strategy*: "I am neither Chinese nor Canadian; I am a citizen of the world") and announce that they have a *cosmopolitan*[3] *identity*. As categories of self-categorization, these categories reflect how ethnic minority individuals *think* about themselves and not necessarily how they *experience* their identities. The researcher discovered relationships between these strategies and the adaptation of ethnic minority immigrants. For example, those who take on a dissociative strategy are less well integrated than those who take on an assimilative strategy.

In addition to hyphenated identities, researchers have also used the terms *bicultural* or *multicultural identities*. A group of identity researchers (Benet-MartÌnez et al., 2002) introduced two related constructs: *cultural frame switching* and *bicultural identity integration (BII)*. Cultural frame switching is a hypothesized mechanism that suggests that when two identities coexist, they become salient depending on circumstances. For example, among Indians, an Indian-Canadian person feels themselves to be an Indian; in turn, among European Canadians, this same person feels like a European Canadian. By moving from one group to another, the cultural frame switching allows that person to feel 'at home' in both groups. Two (or more) cultural identities may be compatible or incompatible; BII measures this. BII refers to bicultural individuals' sense of how their identities correspond or clash. When two different ethnic identities are compatible, they have a high level of bicultural integration. Such individuals do not see their cultures as mutually exclusive or conflicting. When bicultural persons perceive their cultures as incompatible, their BII is low. For example, cultures have different prescriptions for dating and marriage. Often, their

customs (for example, keeping one's virginity until marriage versus cohabiting with a partner before marriage; accepting an arranged marriage versus marrying for love) are mutually exclusive; in such cases, bicultural individuals may have to choose one or the other, and there is no possibility to integrate them. Researchers developed questionnaires to measure BII and they conducted research on its relations to acculturation, well-being, and other phenomena (Chen et al., 2008).

The term *hybridity* comes from biology, which indicates mixing the qualities of two species or breeds (for instance, the grapefruit is a hybrid of the pomelo and the orange). An example of hybridity in humans is when a child is born to parents of two different ethnic origins: Black and Indian in Trinidad (named *Dougla*) and Aboriginal and Quebec French in Canada (known as *Métis*). Regarding identity, hybridity indicates that an individual is not categorized as Black-Indian and cannot choose to be only Black or Indian. Rather, she is a *Dougla*; however, she still may experience herself as more Black or Indian.

The term *diasporic identity* is applied to immigrants living in diasporas outside of their home country: for example, there are many Jewish, Indian, and Chinese diasporas across the world. The word *diaspora* came from Greek *diaspeiro,* meaning, 'scatter.' A diasporic identity is an ethnic and cultural identification with a diaspora of compatriots living outside of their country of origin (Naujoks, 2010). Diasporas may be compact or dispersed. In compact diasporas, their members know and may meet in person. Members of dispersed diasporas can be physically isolated but remain connected by various links or lines of communication. However, for the most part, diasporas are imagined communities where their members envision their connectedness to each other even though there are no actual ties.

Conflicting identities and their pathologies

There are situations in which people have conflicting social/ethnic identities that may lead them to stress, tension, and even pathology. Such pathologies usually happen with visible minorities; for example, Black, Chinese, or Aboriginal individuals who identify themselves with and/or want to behave like White individuals ("act White"). Some derogatory labels have emerged for these people, such as 'oreo' (black on the outside, white on the inside), 'banana' (yellow on the outside, white on the inside), and 'apple' (red on the outside, white on the inside). (For more information about how conflicting identities affect an Aboriginal youth in a settlers' society, read the memoir of Sherman Alexie: *The absolutely true diary of a part-time Indian*). For example, Black students in the US who study hard and try to get good grades with the aim of going to college are called 'oreos' by some other Black students. In some cases, 'acting white' means expressing disregard for fellow Black students and thinking that 'oreos' and/or White people are culturally superior to other African Americans (Perkins, 2008).

In the examples of 'oreos,' 'bananas,' and 'apples' mentioned above, the tension with conflicting identities arises for two reasons. First, white people do not accept such persons as 'white' because they are visible minorities and are not white 'on the outside.' On the other hand, these persons' own cultural groups may denounce their desire to 'act white;' more so, they may even consider such intentions disloyalty to or betray their ethnic heritage. As a result, people of the same race or ethnicity may reject individuals who act white, ridicule them, or boycott them. If both these forms of rejection happen simultaneously, then a person with conflicting identities is stuck in 'no man's land.' They have been rejected by their own people and the people with whom they identify. In turn, there is no way for this person to go regarding one's identity, behaviour, and future life goals. Such people are challenged by the identity negotiation between racism and social exclusion. People can handle these negotiations in many ways. For example, some dark-skinned individuals (predominantly women) may try to bleach their skin, so it looks whiter. The reason for this may be identity issues, dermatological problems, and the prospect of better employment and marriage. This practice is prevalent in some African, Caribbean, and South Asian countries. The sales of skin-whitening cosmetics have skyrocketed in recent decades. (CNN estimates its market growth went from $8bn US in 2020 to $11.8bn in 2026, https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/25/world/as-equals-skin-whitening-global-market-explainer-intl-cmd/index.html). Scholars believe that if this bleaching is related to identity concerns, then one of the underlying factors behind this practice is ethnic self-hate, especially in countries that have experienced slavery (for example, Jamaica) (Charles, 2003). Another way to resolve identity conflict is to create a movement, such as the "Black is Beautiful" movement, among people of African descent living in white-dominated countries, primarily the USA. This movement aims to instil pride in Black beauty, eliminate ethnic self-hate, and restore Black people's ethnic and racial dignity (Camp, 2015). If these or other ways of restoring ethnic identity harmony do not work, then severe psychopathology may arise (see Box 8.6).

Box 8.6 Case study: The Roast Breadfruit Syndrome

English psychiatrists Hickling and Hutchinson (1999, 2000) described a psychosis caused by disturbed racial identification in African-Caribbean persons who had immigrated and settled in Europe in the mid-20th century. They labelled it the "roast breadfruit psychosis." Breadfruit is a Caribbean and Pacific islands fruit that, when roasted, has dark skin and white edible flesh that tastes like bread. The psychiatrists used this fruit as a metaphor for the disturbance of ethnic identification among some African-Caribbeans who immigrated to Great Britain: They are black on the outside and sense as white on the inside.

African slaves in Caribbean countries were schooled in a European manner, and they were taught English. As a result, many of them internalized European culture; thus, when they started immigrating to England in 1948, they began thinking of themselves as Europeans. Therefore, the metaphor of roasted breadfruit comes to illustrate Black individuals who endorse White identity. The conflict emerged mostly because the White British/European population did not accept the "whiteness" of these individuals, and they rejected them as whites. This rejection and identity conflict triggered psychotic episodes in some immigrants. These episodes are characterized by being ashamed of one's African-Caribbean identity and having an overwhelming desire to be accepted by European society. These symptoms may be exacerbated by racial discrimination, prejudice, low socioeconomic status, and a lack of achievements, as measured by European standards.

It is important to note that the African-Caribbeans who continue to live in their home countries do not have such a mental disturbance. Moreover, white individuals who have immigrated to ex-colonial, mostly Black countries, do not experience the same symptoms of disturbed identity (Hickling, 1996). Therefore, the authors concluded that the colonial past, ethnic self-hate, and racism contributed to this form of psychosis. This form of psychopathology has its roots in the conflicting identities that unfold in the environment of rejection, marginalization, and racial discrimination. The authors also introduced the idea of "the sense of the cultural control of the environment" (Hickling, 1999, p. 133). White people in Europe and African-Caribbean people in Caribbean countries have this control. Subsequently, White people who immigrate to ex-colonies bring "the sense of ownership of the environment" (p. 133) based on the colonial domination of the past and therefore, they do not have such symptoms. In contrast, coloured Caribbeans who have immigrated to Europe lack this sense of cultural control and ownership; thus, the psychosis may unfold. These immigrants also lack the protective factors that buffer people's mental stresses in their home countries. In addition to seeking psychiatric treatment, the authors discussed that people suffering from this psychopathy require sociocultural interventions; among these, they highlighted the need for developing a sense of belonging and acceptance (Hickling, 2000).

Conclusion

Understanding the phenomena of personhood, selfhood, and identity constitutes one of the central challenges of sociocultural psychology. Specifically, sociocultural psychologists ask how cultural communities construct and shape their

members' primary constituents of humanness: the individual's self and their identities and the transformation of the individual into the person. The development of the human self in its multiple layers and manifestations in people's experiences goes together with the construction of people's various identities. Members of a cultural community construct and shape each others' identities through their interactions; first, they assign identification categories and then, they mould experiences of these identities. There are numerous theoretical and conceptual issues in understanding these processes. Because of this, the issues of selfhood, personhood, and identity remain a priority and a main challenge for many domains of social and cultural psychology.

The formation of a person's identity goes hand-in-hand with the development of their self. The sense of one's self and sense of identity are nearly inseparable experiences. There are different layers of a person's identity: ego-identity, personal identity, and numerous forms of social identities, including ethnic, cultural, and national identities; together, these comprise people's narrative autobiographical selves. Moreover, it is important to differentiate between the social identity categories that cultural communities assign to its members and outsiders from people's experiences of their identities. A person's sense and experience of their social identity may drastically differ from the social category(ies) assigned to them by others. Combined identities (hyphenated, hybrid, and diasporic identities) are common in our modern world. Such identities create challenges for their holders that may determine social and personal conflicts, and, in rare cases, they may lead to mental pathologies.

Glossary

Individual: The human individual is a corporeal biological organism of a particular gender and with certain psychophysiological attributes. Such an individual is touchable and visible. They occupy a place in space at a specific time. Each individual exists separately from other individuals and is distinct from them.

Person is an individual with a developed and mature self; correspondently, a person has a sense of self and an identity.

Self (the human) consists of the pre-reflective or experiential self and the autobiographical or narrative self. From the phenomenological point of view, **the sense of the self** or **the self** is a structuring dimension of the human conscious experience. This dimension relates to the individual's locus in space and time as well as to their first-person outlook on things and events that happen around them.

Pre-reflective or experiential self is a structural element of human consciousness. This self is not an entity; rather, it is a process of conscious experiences of a person who is located in a particular place and at a specific time. The pre-reflective *sense of the self* is the centre of the individual's lived experiences of the world. It is the sense that it is me and not somebody else who exists and functions in this world. The *pre-reflective sense of the*

self exists without reflections or contemplations from our side: We experience the flow of perceptions, thoughts, and emotions that are directly given to us.

Attributes: the *first-person perspective* designates the centre of our conscious experience. It is the point of departure for our visions, thinking, remembering, and feelings when we interact with the world.

The *first-person givenness* indicates that this perspective belongs exclusively to *me;* it is *my* perspective, and nobody else has access to it except *me*.

Temporal continuity indicates that I know that my conscious experience belonged to me in the past, belongs to me now, and will belong to me in the future.

The *sense of agency* is the sense that a person is an agent of actions towards their environment, body, mind, and life; it is I who initiates and performs actions, actively explores the world, and makes changes in my environment.

Self-awareness: *Self-awareness* and, related to it, the *reflexivity of our consciousness* is another fundamental dimension of consciousness. We see, think, and act from our first-person perspective and are always aware that we are doing these things.

Narrative or autobiographical self: The narrative level of experience of the self is structured by our interactions with others and by learning a language to describe the features and to structure a sense of the self along the cultural prescriptions of one's community. This sense of the self includes developing a story (narrative) about oneself that strongly depends on language and culture.

Personal self is the experience of having an idiosyncratic arrangement of an individual's biological, mental, personality, and social attributes (Self 2, according to Harré (1998)). Related to this is personal identity, which is based on reflecting on the personal self and developing beliefs about oneself, also known as self-concept or self-representation.

SCMs of *and* for *the person and self*

The Indian philosophical model of the person and self: Indian ancient philosophical traditions recognize the phenomenal/material self, the real self (*Atman*), and the absolute cosmic self (*Brahman*). Hindu sages directed their followers to cultivate their *Atman* so that they reach enlightenment and merge with Brahman. This merger is considered the highest goal of human existence, labelled *moksha*. The Indian SCMs for a person's life and *Atman* cultivation include four paths or *margas*. Specifically, these are *Jnana marga* – the way of knowledge, *Karma marga* – the way of righteous actions, *Bhakti marga* – devotion to God, and *Yoga marga* – seven stages for reaching enlightenment.

Buddhist SCM of No-Self: Buddhists see the self as a person's source of suffering and a barrier that prevents a person from reaching nirvana – the state of emancipation and happiness. This proposition is articulated in the form of the Four Noble Truths: the truth about suffering, the truth about the sources of suffering, the truth about the cessation of suffering, and the truth of the path leading to the elimination of suffering. As the philosophy aimed at eliminating suffering, Buddhism developed eight practices (The Noble Eightfold Path) within three groups: ethics, meditation, and wisdom.

Western SCMs of personhood and selfhood include a foundational sociocultural model of individualism, which strongly emphasizes the individual's intrinsic value and dignity, autonomy, privacy, and self-development. Individuals enter contractual social relations to build the social fabric of their communities and relationships with other people.

The Western self has a variety of conceptualizations. Based on his historical analysis, Seigel (2005) extracted three forms of the self: bodily or material, relational, and reflective. Markus and Kitayama (1991) articulated two forms of the self: the Western independent and the non-Western interdependent. Vignole et al. (2016) deconstructed the dichotomous categories of the self into seven factors: (1) differences from or similarities to other people; (2) self-containment or connection to others; (3) self-direction or receptiveness to influence; (4) self-reliance or dependence on others; (5) consistency or variability in behaviour; (6) self-expression versus harmony; and (7) self-interest or commitment to others. Roland (1987, 1988) and Shweder et al. (2003) identified three relatively universal structural elements of the self: familial, individualized, and spiritual. Many approaches and categorizations of the self do not differentiate the cultural conceptions of the self, the experiences of the self, self-representations, self-concepts, self-categorizations, and other aspects of this phenomenon.

Identity etymologically, means *sameness*, *oneness*, or the *state of being the same*. The person's identity is conceptualized at different levels. **Ego-identity** is mostly a subconscious feeling of sameness and oneness; it is a feeling of the reality of one's existence as a person. Ego-identity is closely related to the experiential self. **Personal identity** is an awareness of and reflection upon one's personal self; namely, it is a configuration of biological, psychophysiological, and mental attributes.

Social identities are identities that people acquire during socialization and enculturation through their memberships in different social groups. Researchers differentiate social identity as the social categorization of a person by their community from a sense of social identity, which is a personal experience of being categorized as a student, an employee, a soldier, or many other things.

Ethnic identity is a form of social identity that reflects people belonging to an ethnic group and sharing with this group its name, physiognomic features, language, religion, and some other characteristics. It is a categorization imposed on people predominantly because of their place of birth.

Cultural identity is another form of social identity. Cultural identity often refers to membership in ethnic or other social groups. Cultural identity is a sense of belonging to a particular group with a distinct culture; one shares a worldview, practices, values, moral norms, and other cultural attributes with its members.

Hyphenated, bicultural, and multicultural identities are assigned to people who belong to two or more ethnic or national groups. These are assigned categories behind which there are different experiences of having multiple identities. There are different strategies for categorizing bicultural identities. According to Hutnik (1991), they are an *acculturation strategy* (an acceptance of one's dual identities), a *dissociative strategy* (accepting only the home ethnic or national identity), an *assimilative strategy* (accepting a host country's national identity), and a *marginal strategy* (denying both identities and announcing oneself to be a citizen of the world).

Cultural frame switching is a proposed mechanism for managing multiple identities that becomes salient depending on the situation, the surrounding people, and other conditions (Benet-Martinez, 2002). *Bicultural Identity Integration (BII)* is the degree to which a bicultural individual perceives his or her two cultural identities as 'compatible' or 'oppositional.' (Benet-Martinez, 2005, p. 115).

Hybrid identity is the identity of a person who is an offspring of parents of different ethnic backgrounds. For example, *dougla* is a hybrid identification category of a child of Black and Indian parents in Trinidad.

Questions

1. Why do most scholars associate people's humanness and personhood with the development of their selves? Why is the human self so important?
2. Explain the phenomenology of the self.
3. What are the primary attributes of the pre-reflective or experiential self?
4. Why is it important to differentiate between the conception of personhood/selfhood and the experience of these states?
5. What are the primary differences between the experiential and narrative forms of the self?
6. Why did societies invent the SCMs of personhood and selfhood?
7. What are the primary aspects of the Hundy model of the self?
8. What is the Buddhist concept of "No-Self"?
9. Explain the Western model of selfhood.
10. How do 'social identity' (the assigned categorization of people) and the 'sense of social identity' differ? Have you experienced differences between these two aspects of your social identity?
11. How do you understand the concept of 'cultural identity?' Reflect on your own cultural identity.
12. What are the consequences of having multiple identities?

Recommended Reading

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Notes

1 I thank Dr. Meera Kachroo for helpful commentaries on and suggestions for this section.
2 Roland is a practicing psychoanalyst who used interviews with his patients and clients to devise his theorizing. In turn, Shweder is a cultural anthropologist who conducted ethnographic work in India and generated data from interviews with his informants to propose his conceptualization of the self.
3 The term 'cosmopolitan' (from Greek *kosmopolitēs* – a citizen of the world) has several interrelated meanings. Specifically, the idea is that all people are members of a single community of human beings (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/); cosmopolitan people are defined as "having wide international sophistication - worldly; having worldwide rather limited local or provincial ideas, prejudices, or perspectives (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cosmopolitan), and "showing an interest in different cultures" (https://www.britannica.com/dictionary/cosmopolitan).

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9 Culture, language, and the mind

Chapter content

- This chapter focuses on the phenomenon of Language and considers how it relates to Culture and the human mind.
- It starts by discussing the nature and functions of Language, and its multidisciplinary nature is emphasized. Four language functions – communication, representation, construction, and action – are presented; subsequently, the systemic essence of Language is highlighted.
- The phylogenetic emergence of Language and its co-evolution with Culture is one of the hardest scientific problems to uncover. Three main hypotheses of the evolution of Language are examined: discontinuity, continuity, and sociocultural.
- The ontogenetic acquisition of Language and the role of Culture in this process is addressed using Tomasello's shared intentionality theory.
- The chapter discusses other challenging and controversial issues: The interdependence of Culture, Language, and the human Mind, as well as the problem of linguistic relativity and universality. The recent revival of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has led researchers to focus on Language's role in framing human cognition and its relation to Culture.
- Finally, we discuss the influence of bilingualism on children's cognitive development and how bilinguals develop a sense of self and identity. Biculturalism is explained to be another demanding issue, as it demonstrates complex relationships with bilingualism.

Language is one of the primary and distinct attributes of the species *Homo Sapiens*. The emergence of Language[1] empowered humans: It raised them to the top of the evolutionary pyramid and made them the dominant species on the planet. Language is both mysterious and magical (Hauser et al., 2014). It is mysterious because it is unclear how and when it emerged and why it emerged only in humans.

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

Figure 9.1 Relationships among Culture, Language, and the human mind. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

Moreover, it is mysteriously complex. Language penetrates and influences all aspects of people's functioning: Culture, society, cognition, emotions, motivation, sense of self, and behaviour (Fitch, 2010). It is also magical because the emergence of Language transformed humans' anatomy and brains. Language gives people the power to do things that would otherwise be impossible to execute. Among these magical powers are the unbounded capacity of humans to think about almost everything that exists (and even what does not exist) in the world, to create imaginary worlds and present them in writing, to acquire mental freedom from various forms of pressure and control and many more. Language shaped humans and created the unique niche in which people live – it has no analogy in the animal world. This is the niche of the symbolic and meaningful things and objects – Culture – that people created through their physical and linguistic interactions. Language has biological and sociocultural aspects; as such, it is challenging and exciting to examine it. Many social scholars examine the relationships between Language and Culture and between Language, human mentality, and behaviour (see Figure 9.1). Specifically, they ask the following questions: What is Language? How does it evolve and develop? What functions does Language execute in people's lives? Does Language only describe and represent sociocultural realities/cultures or does it also construct them? Does Language express or also form people's psychological worlds? These and related questions are the focus of our discussion, and the answers constitute this chapter's main body.

What is Language?

What is Language? How did its features come about, and how do they function? What are the mechanisms of Language functioning, and what power it has over people's lives?

Language is a system of sounds (spoken languages), gestures, or symbols (sign or written languages) that are connected by rules and structured to transmit information among members of linguistic communities. Humans are anatomically and physiologically predisposed to learn any language. Researchers estimate that between 5,000 and 7,000 languages currently exist in the world. Each language has two primary components: A set of words that represent (are the signs of) the aspects of the natural, social, and mental worlds (*vocabulary* or *lexicon*) and a set of rules on how to string these words together to construct sentences that convey meaningful information (*grammar* or *syntax*). Additional subdivisions of language structure include *semantics* – the relations between *symbols* (spoken sounds and written signs) and their *meanings*; *pragmatics* – the dependence of the meaning of words and utterances on the context of their usage (i.e., how people use languages in their everyday lives); and *phonology* – how words are pronounced or spoken languages.

Box 9.1 Definition and explanation. The multidisciplinary nature of language studies

Because Language has a systemic nature, researchers from a wide range of disciplines – from biology to linguistics, psychology, and anthropology – study this phenomenon. **Linguists** examine Language in all its forms and manifestations: *lexicon, syntax, phonology* and *phonetics, semantics,* and *pragmatics*. **Biolinguists** study the biology and evolution of Language. **Neurolinguistics** and other scholars study the physiological aspects of language production**. Psycholinguists and researchers in the psychology of language** study the interrelations between cognition and Language, which goes both ways: how cognitive processes shape language/speech production and how Language influences people's cognitive processes. **Socio-** and **ethnolinguists** study how and what social and cultural factors influence language use. These scholars collaborate with **linguistic anthropologists** – who study cultures through their languages – and the **sociologists of language,** who examine the relations between society and Language.

Functions of Language

Different disciplines (see Box 9.1) emphasize different functions of Language. Sociocultural psychology focuses on four functions: *communication*, *representation*, *construction*, and *action*. The primary function of Language is *communication*. This function has several facets. Language allows people to *express* their mental states: needs, goals, thoughts, ideas, and emotions (note that animals also communicate their mental states and display signs that express fear, rage, happiness,

and other conditions. But their communication is non-verbal and void of intentional meaning). Language (more precisely, linguistic communication) enables humans to *transmit* these states and information to other people. Different communities have developed different languages. Speaking the same language within one's community is essential to sharing communal sociocultural models, cooperating, preserving communal coherence, and maintaining people's cultural identities. Because of these achievements, people and their communities survive and prosper.

For people to communicate, the objects of their communication must be identified and labelled. People need to have a common ground to communicate – they need to have something to talk about. Thus, another function of language is *representation*, meaning the function of representing and mapping the world and its meanings in linguistic signs and symbols. "Representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people" (Hall, 1997, p. 61). Representation is both the process of representing something and the results of doing it – a word or image. Members of linguistic communities cognitively group and categorize the world, people, events, mental states, and everything they encounter. Using language, they name these entities and categories by words, making them available to the entire community as *symbolic linguistic representations*. These representations are meaningful because they stand for something else. Therefore, by saying a word, we mean the item that it represents. For example, we differentiate trees from bushes and label them with corresponding words/symbols – 'a tree' and 'a bush.' We use them to speak about (represent) these plants, and our fellow citizens understand these terms and differentiate between these items. Through linguistic representations, the world is not given to humans directly. Rather, it is filtered and presented through linguistic symbols that stand between a person and external reality. As a consequence of this function, humans may use linguistic representations to talk and think about physical, social, and mental objects and phenomena that are not present in their immediate perceptual fields. For example, linguistically-capable humans may contemplate and communicate about trees without ever seeing them but by having only an understanding of a tree expressed in words: 'tree' in English, 'baum' in German or 'arbre' in French. The representation function opens the door for abstraction, imagination, and creativity, especially in verbal genres.

The third function, which is not overtly evident but has been emphasized by linguist philosophers, is the *construction* function. Social and linguistic constructionism is a challenging topic that philosophers, social scholars, linguists, and psychologists have been working on since the first half of the 20th century (Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009; Grace, 1987/2018). The representation function implicitly conveys that the world exists out there and that Language represents that world to us. There are many objects and things in the world; by using Language, people categorize, label, and represent these objects and things to themselves and others. Constructionism goes deeper and states that Language does not simply denote or map the world;

rather, it constructs the world in a meaningful manner. The verb 'construct' suggests that by using Language to name things, people assign meaning to the objects of the world. Hence, members of linguistic communities create meaningful cultural objects, and these constitute the human-made environment in which people live. For example, by naming a strip of sand on the ocean shore a *beach,* people construct such meanings as 'vacation,' 'resort, 'escape,' and 'retreat.' Thus, this piece of sand is constructed as a meaningful entity around which numerous human activities, such as vacations, relaxation, meditation, swimming, and other pastimes, can be structured. Language constructs the meaningful world and people themselves. People's selves and identities bring meaning to their existence. That is why many communities pay close attention to how they label others. For instance, rather than call someone an 'invalid,' they might call them a 'person with disabilities.' Instead of labelling people 'subjects' in psychological experiments, participating individuals become 'participants.' A 'secretary' in an office may instead be called an 'administrative assistant.' These examples can be multiplied. Linguistic labelling also creates new cultural objects such as money, national flags, marriage, divorce, education, and millions of other things. These objects and their meanings are constructed collectively (we all know what plastic or metal pieces named 'money' mean) through engaging in never-ending linguistic and social practices with community members.

Language as action or the *agentic function* of Language means that, by using Language, people do things. To act, language must be included in a broader cultural system or 'social institute,' for example, the justice system. When a judge announces a jury's verdict, they do not simply communicate information; rather, they convict or acquit the defendant. Following this verdict, the defendant is either imprisoned or released from custody. Using their words, the judge does justice. The agentic function of Language is inseparable from physical actions and practices. The judge's words are embedded within the criminal justice system; they follow the crime investigation and the work of police officers, lawyers, and the jury. In this case, actions and words are intertwined. Together, they generate meaningful practices.

The systemic nature of Language and the interrelatedness of its functions

It is a mistake to consider the above four functions – communication, representation, construction, and agentic – independent forms of Language performance. These four functions are interrelated because of the systemic nature of Language. *Systemic functional linguistics* studies the dynamic relationships among Language functions in sociocultural settings. This discipline states that Language is a system that has numerous components/parts, such as sounds, words, and rules; Language is regulated by the brain, the mind, and the sociocultural environment; it is present in every aspect of people's lives and mental functioning; it is multidimensional, as is humans' existence.

Communication requires representations: To communicate about any subject matter, these subject matters must be extracted, labelled, infused with meaning, and represented in the speakers' minds as concepts, ideas, or images.

Construction demands representations: By naming and linguistically representing things, people unavoidably assign meaning to these things and in turn, construct a meaningful world out of them.

Construction needs communication: To execute the linguistic construction of the sociocultural environment, people must communicate and interact with each other using symbolic linguistic representations. By systematically using them in their interactions, people develop and maintain collective intentional things in their communities (construct their culture) and construct the corresponding intentional states that make-up people's mentalities.

Construction is executed through doing things: By using Language within the institutions they have constructed, members of communities do things and execute various actions using their words: They educate children and heal people's souls, but also abuse others and make their life miserable.

The mystery of Language lies in its systemic nature; Language's functions work together, complement each other, and generate its magical power. This power lies not within Language's linguistic properties but in its mediating role within sociocultural settings and its ability to implant human behaviour into these settings to transform it into meaningful social acts (see Figure 9.1). In this way, the verbal behaviour of a person within the justice system becomes the judge's conviction. Therefore, Language is one of the central phenomena to study in sociocultural psychology.

Origin of Language

The evolutionary sciences argue that the emergence of Language has shaped modern humans and played a crucial role in developing their social, cognitive, and other mental capabilities (Christiansen & Kirby, 2003; Fitch, 2010; Tomasello, 2014). Moreover, they suggest that Language has created a discontinuity between humans and their close relatives – non-human primates. The animal world has no form of communication that comes even close to human languages or the uniquely human way of communicating and doing other things with symbols. Christiansen, and Kirby (2003) argue that explaining this discontinuity and understanding the mechanisms of Language emergence and its relationships with Culture and the human mind is "the hardest problem in science." In the 19th century, European linguists considered this problem extremely challenging. As such, in 1866, the prestigious *Société Linguistique de Paris* (the Linguistic Society of Paris) banned any debates on the origin of Language, as did the *Philological Society of London* in 1872. They justified these bans by stating that the lack of empirical evidence for this problem turned such discussions into mere speculations. As many scholars

have noted, because of these bans, investigations into language origin were frozen until the early 20th century.

However, over the last 50 years, the research and theorizing about the emergence of Language has flourished. Now, this problem constitutes one of the central topics of Language and human evolution sciences.

Investigating the evolution of Language

For linguists interested in the evolution of language, the main research questions are:

- "How and why did language emerge in humans and not in other species?
- How and why did language evolve with the properties that we observe rather than some other set?" (Bouchard, 2013, p. 7).

Using these questions, language scholars study and debate about the continuity or discontinuity of animal and human forms of communication, the inherited or learned components of language propensity, the mechanisms of language evolution (either through natural selection or spontaneous mutation), and the level, if any, to which social relationships and Culture have contributed to the genesis of Language.

There is no consensus as to when Language emerged. Researchers have assigned the emergence of Language to different periods in human evolution. Some believe that language and speech communication emerged with *Homo Erectus*, who lived between 2 million and 110,000 years ago (Everett, 2017); others insist that "adaptations for complex vocalizations" emerged around 400,000 years ago (in *Neanderthals* and *Homo Heidelbergenis*) (de Boer, 2017, p. 160). Tomasello (2003) suggests that linguistic communication appeared about 200,000 years ago, while several others argue that Language evolved about 70,000 to 100,000 years ago (in *Homo Sapiens*) (Bolhuis et al., 2014).

Researchers use multiple pieces of evidence to study language origin and triangulate them to try to reach consilience. This evidence includes but is not limited to researching animals' forms of communication and comparing them with human communication, examining hominin fossils, archeological artifacts and other elements of material cultures; investigating and comparing the diversity of languages and their geographical distribution, studying the acquisition of language by children, and examining linguistic behaviour of persons with various mental pathologies.

Approaches to studying Language emergence

As with the problem of human evolution, there are many directions and schools of thought regarding the issue of Language evolution and its co-evolution with

Culture and the human mind (see Fitch, (2010); Ulbaek, (1998)). The first divergence surrounds whether Language is a learned behaviour or whether people have an inherited predisposition towards Language instead. The "learning theory" of language evolution is associated with behaviourism. It states that Language (together with the other mental capacities of humans) evolved because of the contingencies of reinforcements (rewards and punishments) in human environments (Baum, 2017). Early humans who produced sounds relevant to the existing situation were reinforced by receiving positive responses from others. Those who could not generate such useful sounds were outcasted and were not rewarded with positive outcomes. Thus, through these contingencies of rewards and reinforcements, human Language evolved. Chomsky (1959) conducted one of the most severe critiques of the behaviourist theory of language emergence. More than six decades later, this theoretical approach is almost entirely discredited.

Chomsky's idea of Universal Grammar and the discontinuity hypothesis. The belief that language origin is inherited has three lines of arguments: *discontinuity*, *continuity*, and *sociocultural* approaches. The discontinuity line of thinking emphasizes that human Language is unique to Homo Sapiens; thus, its emergence qualitatively separates humans from the rest of the animal world. The continuity line of thought argues that there is no such gap. It suggests that, as with other human adaptations, Language evolved as the result of natural selection. Finally, the sociocultural approach states that Language was derived from the social nature of humans' lives and the emergence of Culture to regulate these lives.

American linguist and cognitive scientist **Noam Chomsky (1928–)** developed the idea of *universal grammar* (UG). Chomsky based his theorizing on the apparent facts that children can learn and master any language and can intuitively grasp its grammar (or syntaxis – the rules of putting words together to form comprehensible utterances) long before they explicitly learn any language rules. According to Chomsky, children have the innate disposition to grasp the grammatical structure of any language (hence, he used the term 'universal grammar'). The faculty of UG is genetically transmitted, and it constitutes the inherited make-up of *Homo Sapiens*. He argued that the emergence of UG is a break in the continuity of the communication mechanisms in apes and humans. This discontinuity happens because humans' propensity for developing linguistic symbols and manipulating them in a profoundly sophisticated manner is, in principle, different from any form of communication in the biological world. (Hence, it was labelled the discontinuity hypothesis). Following this hypothesis, Chomsky and other cognitive scientists (Fodor, 1983) proposed the existence of a localized language module in the human brain. (Other scholars insist that people's language acquisition skills are distributed across the brain (Lieberman, 2016)). Regarding the mechanism of language emergence, Chomsky and his colleagues (Hauser et al., 2002) theorized that language evolved not by the mechanisms of natural selection (that lie behind the continuity hypothesis) but

because of spontaneous gene mutation. According to them, this spontaneity of mutation explains the discontinuity of language origin.

Language as adaptation. The continuity hypothesis states that language evolved through the mechanisms of natural selection from animal communication (Pinker & Bloom, 1990). American cognitive linguist Steven Pinker stated, "The human language faculty is a complex biological adaptation that evolved by natural selection for communication in a knowledge-using, socially interdependent lifestyle" (Pinker, 2003, p. 16). According to this line of thinking, adaptation is a trait whose genetic basis is shaped by natural selection. Thus, language is an evolved adaptation and an inherited trait. Language as an adaptation is a complex integrated mechanism comprised of lexicon (vocabulary) and grammar (rules to put words together into meaningful utterances) that include syntax, semantics, and other components. According to Pinker's hypothesis (2003), Language emerged under the demand to encode propositional information that includes but is not limited to communicating to others information about people's actions, their actors, and targets, regarding what, when, why, and to whom something happens. He believes that such communication gave humans an adaptational advantage, which has led to their survival.

The sociocultural approach to Language evolution. The third line of thinking about the origin of language is the sociocultural approach, which states that Language emerged in social groups of hominins as a result of the co-evolution of numerous factors (Dor et al., 2014). These factors included the size and structure of the social groups, the development of the human brain and its cognitive capacities; the emergence of human cultural forms such as art, music, and dance; human anatomical features, mostly relating to the anatomy of the larynx and other voice-generating mechanisms, among some other factors. This approach is also theoretically diverse. Here is a list of hypotheses about the sociocultural influences on language origin (Bouchard, 2013, pp. 9–10). These hypotheses are rooted in the idea that language evolution was instigated by humans' need for precise and articulated communication within their social groups.

- Language emerged for communication because that made primary sustenance practices – hunting and foraging – more successful; this advantage increased with group size and environmental changes. Larger groups required more elaborated social relationships; in turn, this demanded the invention of more sophisticated forms of communication. This hypothesis also indicates that such communication required intersubjectivity among people and the development of theories regarding the minds of others (see also Chapter 4 on evolution).
- Language evolved to better regulate cross-gender relationships. Specifically, females learned to use directed and articulated vocalizations to attract males. This hypothesis proposes that female coalitions invented speech and language. Therefore, scholars have also suggested that language proficiency was a factor

in sexual selection – females preferred partners with better communicative capacities. Within this line of thinking, some scholars hypothesized that vocal communication allowed early humans to execute 'social grooming,' also known as grooming at a distance, because face-to-face grooming became impossible due to the increased group sizes.

- Complex vocalization for singing and other music/dance activities emerged first; later, humans utilized this vocalization capability for verbal linguistic communication.
- Language emerged because mothers needed to be connected to and communicate with their children.
- Between 60,000 and 40,000 years ago, language co-evolved along with several demographic and sociocultural factors. Among these factors are an increase in population, the emergence of art, the diversification and specialization of tools, and the facilitation of complex cognitive abilities. These factors developed in a manner that was interconnected with the emergence of speech and language. In turn, the development of speech and language further facilitated these and related symbolic-cultural activities and inventions.

As this list of hypotheses shows, researchers have demonstrated diverse thinking about the role social interactions, communication, cultural-symbolic activities, and various environmental factors played in the emergence of Language.

The ontogenetic development of linguistic faculty: The role of culture

As with the general theories of child development (see Chapter 6 on ontogenetic development), there are also several theories of ontogenetic speech and language development (Duranti, Ochs, & Schieffelin, 2011). *Behaviourist theory* states that the verbal behaviour of children is learned through operant conditioning. Adults reinforce children's attempts to say something, and children acquire their role models' habits of speaking. *Nativist theory* announces that children are wired for Language, which emerges naturally as the children mature. This theory is closely connected to both the discontinuity and continuity approaches discussed above. Naturally, the sociocultural approach is prominent in understanding the Language acquisition by children. It is evident to ordinary people and researchers that children do not invent languages. Children who were left alone outside of linguistic communities would never become linguistically capable. Children learn languages from their sociocultural environments by interacting with the caring adults around them.

In this vein, it is important to consider Tomasello's neo-Vygotskian *shared intentionality theory* (SIT) (Tomasello, 1999, 2003). This theory states that the ontogenetic acquisition of Language follows the same trajectory as its phylogenetic development. Children show the first signs of comprehending and using Language

around their first birthdays. Tomasello states that children acquire Language by using it to communicate with adults. This transmission starts with *communicative cooperative intentions*. Children develop these intentions because of our inherited capacity to cooperate with other human beings and because humans are endowed with mental mechanisms for such cooperation. These mechanisms include people understanding others as intentional agents like themselves, understanding other people's perspectives, and intending to coordinate one's perspective with those of others (see Chapter 4 for more on humans' inherited capabilities for cooperation)

Children's cooperative intentions emerge within continued interactions with caring adults in cultural environments. During such interactions, the children experience a strong motivation to be with caring adults, get their attention, share experiences with them, and convey their desires to them. Tomasello hypothesizes three communicative motives – *requesting*, *informing*, and *sharing*. Such inclinations first manifest themselves in gestural forms, such as pointing and pantomiming.

Using pointing as well as conventional and iconic gestures, twelve-month-old children start using linguistic conventions; for example, they say "mama," "dada," the name of a pet, labels of toys, and household items. Subsequently, children begin to acquire Language during everyday family interactions inside and outside their homes: shopping malls, medical clinics, restaurants, visiting friends, accepting guests, and in dozens of other places. During these interactions, adults talk among themselves in the presence of the children and continuously interact with them by directing their attention, naming things, and delivering various utterances about happenings. For early language acquisition, joint intentionality between children and adults is crucial for communicative acts to become educational. This means that the children will use their rudimentary words only if they understand that the adults embrace this situation and attend to and understand what the children are trying to communicate.

The SIT states that Language is learned "by attempting to understand how others are using particular sounds to direct their attention within the space of their current common ground" (Tomasello, 2010, p. 161). This means that joint intentionality and intersubjectivity are the basis for language learning. Children understand that the noises coming out of adults' mouths are meaningful only if they comprehend that these adults are directing the children's attention to these noises and to the objects at which they are pointing. When this happens, children pay attention to these sounds and associate them with objects. Subsequently, they can reverse the perspectives and use the same sounds to guide the attention of adults to something in their environment. Children learn linguistic conventions through reversible learning exercises within collaborative activities requiring joint attention and goals. Higher animals and very young infants cannot do this; children's species-unique skills and motives for shared intentionality are mature enough to support language acquisition only when they are 12–13 months of age. Language learning cannot

happen outside of this intentional common ground shared with caring adults who focus on communicating with the children and teaching them linguistic conventions.

As children progress in learning these joint conventions, adults start teaching children grammar and the correct pronunciation of words. From the joint linguistic conventions that children and their parents and guardians develop and share in their home settings, children start moving into *collective linguistic conventions* or the *linguistic culture* of their community after their second birthdays. By the age of three or four, children usually begin to understand and correctly use language rules; they have a relatively rich vocabulary and demonstrate various language applications. For example, they regularly ask adults to help them with or teach them to do something (the function of requesting); they direct adults' attention to various objects in the environment (the function of informing) and intensively share their emotions, thoughts, and other experiences with them (the function of sharing). Children start using Language for its conventional purpose and become charming and engaging communicators.

Through Language, children gain access to new layers of their Culture as well as its meanings and practices. They learn the rules and rituals of politeness, greetings, and communication with people of different ages and statuses; they learn culturally important symbols (for example, a national flag, money), the types of relationships among people (for example, husband and wife, sister and brother), and the responsibilities of being involved in such relations. They learn the scripts for acting in different situations (for example, visiting a doctor, going to a supermarket, attending a birthday party, and many others. Through Language, children become enculturated into the sociocultural models of their communities, including their collective systems of meaning and scripts for acting. Thus, children become language-capable and culturally-embedded members of their community.

The interdependence of Culture, Language, and the human mind: The problem of linguistic relativity

Culture, Language, and human mentality are closely intertwined. Culture saturates the Language learning environment with institutions and practices, and it supplies the vocabulary, grammar and meaning of various sounds and signs that children must use within these institutions; through Language, adults transmit cultural subtleties to children. People act within constructed sociocultural institutions and communicate with the institutions' parties. After acquiring Language, individuals become capable of abstraction, logical reasoning, sophisticated forms of imagination, and expressing experience. These actions and communication acts are packed with meanings that bring sense to these practices. Therefore, Language is positioned between Culture and the human mind; it participates in constructing and elaborating the cultural environment and people's mental sophistication, and they

influence it (Figure 9.1 illustrates such relationships). Next, we will examine the highly debated topic of the nature of the interactions within the triad of Culture, Language, and the human mind.

The problem of linguistic determinism and linguistic relativity: The Sapir-Worf hypothesis

The starting point of linguistic determinism and relativity debates is the fact that people speak different languages. Among other differences, languages have different vocabularies (identifying and naming different parts of reality and people's mental experiences; these namings have different meanings) and grammar (putting words into sentences using various syntaxes that construct different utterances). In addition, members of various linguistic communities use diverse sounds to articulate their words (different phonetics) and different ways of using words and phrases in various situations (different pragmatics).

Based on this premise, since the 18th century, linguists have assumed that language differences may be associated with several aspects of people's lives. They have hypothesized that (a) Language *determines* or *is associated with* people's cultures and their national character: People who speak the same language possess a unique national character and share the same worldview; these are related to or even shaped by their language; ('determines' means that Language causally influences communal Culture); (b) Language *determines* or *is associated with* the way people perceive and think about the world: Members of different language communities perceive the world differently and think differently because their perceptions and thoughts are structured and directed by different languages; (c) Language *determines* or *is associated with* the structure of people's behaviours: Members of different language communities behave differently because of the languages they speak.

There are three approaches to address these hypotheses: *linguistic determinism*, *linguistic relativism*, and *linguistic universalism* (see Box 9.2). According to linguistic determinism, the Language people speak *determines* the attributes indicated in (a), (b), and (c) – Culture, national character, cognition, and behaviours. Some scholars call it also a *strong version of linguistic relativism*. Linguistic relativism states that Language may be *associated with* these aspects, but it does not determine them. In other words, people's cognitions and actions are relative to their Language. Some scholars labelled it a *weak version of linguistic relativism*. In turn, linguistic universalism suggests that, while languages vary in their surface structures, every language is based on the same underlying universal structures or laws. In contrast to linguistic determinists and relativists, universalists argue that we can say whatever we want to say in any language and that whatever we say in one language can

always be translated into other languages (extracted on May 12, 2023 from: https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/oi/authority.20110804150420139;jsessionid=AFB545003AF189C292F894715F228116#:~:text=2.,(see%20also%20universal%20grammar).

Box 9.2 Definition and explanation. More on *linguistic universalism and relativism*

Language relativism and **universalism** can be explained by considering the following questions (Regier et al., 2010). Is the diversity of languages the result of arbitrary linguistic conventions? Do linguistic differences cause perceptual and cognitive differences in the speakers of these languages? (p. 165). Relativists answer "yes," while universalists respond "no" to both questions. Linguistic relativists believe that no cognitive universals constrain language structure; as such, people are free to develop any linguistic structure. These semantic differences "leave their imprint on thought and perception" (p. 165) of the people who speak these languages. Universalists argue that cognitive and perceptual universals constrain language structures and that these structures cannot alter the universals. Therefore, despite linguistic diversity, people have common cognitive frameworks that help them understand each other even when they are speaking different languages.

Why is the issue of linguistic relativity significant for sociocultural psychology? Why, for several centuries, have social scholars been concerned with Language's role in people's lives beyond its communication function? There are several reasons for this interest. Language is a unique feature of our species, and deciphering its relationships with human cognitive faculties may allow researchers to examine these faculties in more depth. Pinker (2007) used the metaphor of a 'window' to convey the role Language plays in understanding human nature. Another metaphor for Language is that it is the 'glass' or the 'lens' through which people perceive the world (Deutscher, 2010). The question regarding the direction of influence is always present in these discussions: Some argue that human cognition determines the development, diversity, and use of languages, while others suggest that the emergence and acquisition of Language determine the uniquely human ways of cognition while different languages shape different mentalities. Another aspect of the relativism problem is the relationship between languages and communal cultures. If languages correspond to the ways of life and the primary values of cultural communities, social researchers may use languages to explore these cultures more deeply. Thus, language becomes a 'window' into the sociocultural realities of different communities. This option is primarily rejected because researchers have found

no correspondence between cultures and spoken languages. For example, English is the official language of multiple countries and is used worldwide by many different cultural groups. Moreover, people of similar cultural heritage, such as the Aboriginal peoples in North America, may speak different languages. In Canada, there are over 70 Indigenous languages; in the USA, there are approximately 175 of them. However, culturally, North American Aboriginal people have much in common despite the languages they speak.

A history of language determinism/relativism debates

German linguist and philosopher of Language **Wilhelm von Humbolt** (1767–1835) was one of the first scholars interested in the relationships among Language, Culture, and human mental functioning. In different writings, he expressed mostly the 'strong' version of language relativism. Here are some of his ideas.

> Language is the external manifestation, as it were, of the spirit of a nation. Its language is its spirit and its spirit its language; one can hardly think of them as sufficiently identical… . The spiritual characteristics and the linguistic structure of a people stand in a relationship of such indissoluble fusion that, given one, we should be able to derive the other from it entirely.
>
> (cited from Brown, 1967, p. 82)[2]

In these quotations, Humboldt understands Language as the expression of Culture, and he interprets these two items as inseparable phenomena. As we discussed in Chapter 3, in the 18th and 19th centuries, Germany struggled to develop its nationhood. Humboldt suggested using language to identify and build the collective spirit of the Germans and then using it to unify the emerging German nation. Therefore, Germans have a particular national character because they speak German. Correspondently, English people have their unique 'spirit of the nation' because of their English language. Consequently, by studying these languages, scholars can get to know and examine the spirit of the corresponding nations.

Humboldt also held a similar 'strong' position regarding Language and thoughts. He considered language "the organ of the formation of thought" (cited from Kaitaro (2022, p. 258). According to him, it is impossible to think without Language. Humboldt also highlighted that Language makes people's thoughts public; it externalizes them so that others may access the individuals' ideas and contemplations. "Language is the formative organ of thought. Intellectual activity, which is completely psychic, completely inward, and to a certain extent temporary and without trace, becomes in speech, by means of sound, outward and able to be apprehended by the senses" (cited from Brown, 1967, p. 68).

This line of thinking was continued by American linguistic anthropologists **Edward Sapir** (1884–1939) and **Benjamin Whorf** (1897–1941), among others. Sapir made a

significant contribution to linguistic relativity discussions. Sapir, a student of Franz Boas – the founder of American cultural and linguistic anthropology – was an expert in North American Aboriginal languages (Sapir, 1964). By studying Aboriginal languages' diverse and unique features, Sapir suggested that Language might play a formative role in developing people's worldviews and ways of life.

> The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached.
>
> (Sapir, 1964, p. 69)

Sapir argued that languages represent and produce the social reality of communities. People categorize the world, then use Language to label these categories and infuse them with meaning. These meaningful categories are the building blocks of the sociocultural reality in which people live. Therefore, he argued, "language is a guide to 'social reality'" (p. 68) (here, Sapir directly speaks about the constructionist function of Language). Sapir also saw Language as indispensable to studying "the network of cultural patterns of civilization" (p.68) (or cultures of communities). These patterns are recorded in the Language of this civilization. Therefore, he considered that Language is "the symbolic guide to culture" (p. 70) (Sapir's interpretation of the differences between 'social reality' (the social aspects of a community) and the 'cultural patterns of civilization' (the cultural aspects of a community) are not clear).

Sapir differentiated between the linguistic and cultural meanings of various linguistic forms. Using the interpretation of a poem as an example, he cited that understanding the meaning of the words (the linguistic meaning) is not enough to appreciate a poem. To truly appreciate a poem, a reader must comprehend "the whole life of the community" (p. 69) and the meanings of its "cultural patterns." This means that a reader must know the cultural context within which the poem was written and to which it refers.

Ultimately, Sapir connected the language habits of a community with the ways its members perceive and interpret the world. People from different communities perceive and understand numerous physical (a thunderstorm or a volcano eruption) and social (marriage or a criminal court) events differently because their ancestors labelled them differently and infused them with specific communal meanings. Subsequently, Sapir concluded that Language is an indispensable window into and tool for studying people's sociocultural and mental realities.

Benjamin Whorf was one of the most vocal proponents of linguistic relativity. Under the supervision of Sapir, he studied Aboriginal languages. He was fascinated by the unusual and complex structures of these languages. He aimed to determine if such structures, which were quite different from the English language structure, influence how Aboriginal people see and think about the world. His answer to these concerns was affirmative: 'Yes,' the structure of a language affects how people

think: "The world is presented in a kaleidoscope flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic systems of our minds" (1956, p. 213) (see Box 9.2).

Sapir's and Whorf's assumptions about Language's role in the organization of and navigation through people's worlds were labelled by other linguists as the *Sapir-Whorf hypothesis* or simply the *Whorfian hypothesis*. However, as a linguist, Whorf made these assumptions exclusively based on the analyses of languages. He never tested whether people speaking different languages perceive and think about the world differently. Such experimental studies were only conducted many years after his death.

Whorf asked two questions related to his examination of linguistic relativity.

> (1) Are our own concepts of 'time,' 'space,' and 'matter' given in substantially the same form by experience to all men, or are they in part conditioned by the structure of particular languages? (2) Are there traceable affinities between (a) cultural and behavioral norms and (b) large-scale linguistic patterns?
>
> (Whorf, 1956, p. 138)

The first question addresses the association of Language and human cognition, and the second examines its relationships with cultures.

In response to the first question, Whorf argued that such categories as 'time,' 'space,' and 'matter' are not experienced universally by humans; rather, they "depend upon the nature of the language … through the use of which they have been developed" (p. 158). This conclusion was based on his observations that, for example, in the Eskimo language, there are many words for 'snow' (see Box 9.3).

Box 9.3 'In Focus' feature. Examples of vocabulary and grammar differences across languages

The observations on which Whorf grounded his conclusions about language relativity were partly based on studying the vocabularies of different languages. In particular, Eskimo-Aleut languages have dozens of labels for 'snow.' Among them are the following:

qanuk: 'snowflake'
kaneq: 'frost'
kanevvluk: 'fine snow'
qanikcaq: 'snow on ground'
muruaneq: 'soft deep snow'
nutaryuk: 'fresh snow'
pirta: 'blizzard'
qengaruk: 'snow bank.'

(from https://www.princeton.edu/~browning/snow.html)

On the other hand, the Aztec language, which is used by the Aboriginal peoples of Mexico, has only one word for 'frost,' 'ice,' 'cold,' and 'winter' – **Itztlacoliuhqui**; notably, this is also the word used for 'sin,' 'punishment,' and 'human misery.' The term is also the name of the god responsible for these misfortunes in people's lives (from: https://www.mexicolore.co.uk/aztecs/ask-experts/did-the-aztecs-have-a-god-of-snow).

These examples demonstrate that (1) the environment in which people live shapes their vocabulary and (2) people's vocabularies influence their perception and the meaning of various environmental conditions. The second conclusion was not tested by Whorf; it was only presumed.

Grammar differences in their relations to time representation

Whorf reported that the Hopi Indian language (one of the Aboriginal languages of southwest North America) has differences from the structures of tenses of English and other European languages (i.e., the verbal system that relates to time). European languages have a linear temporal representation of the past, present, and future. In contrast, Hopi verbs do not reflect such a timeline. Instead, they distinguish the length of time the event lasts, whether an action is completed or ongoing, and whether it is unexpected or regular and predictable. Verbs can be inflected to show the repetitiveness of an action (from https://www.britannica.com/topic/Hopi-language). In addition, Whorf did a similar analysis of the representation of 'space' in the Hopi language, which is also different from how it is represented in the European languages. Subsequently, Whorf concluded that the Hopi people must have representations of time and space that are different from Europeans' representations of time and space. Therefore, he became a strong proponent of linguistic determinism.

Whorf's answer to the second question about relationships between Culture and Language was less uncompromising. He suggested that Culture and Language are connected but have no diagnostic correspondence. This means that by knowing the language, scholars cannot infer the cultural system of values and people's behaviour patterns. Worf suggested that the converse holds true too: By knowing cultural patterns, researchers cannot infer the language people speak.

Humboldt, Sapir, and Whorf raised a challenging question regarding the role Language plays in people's sociocultural and mental lives, and they suggested theoretical answers to it. They based their ideas on linguistic and anthropological studies. More empirical data are needed to make irrefutable conclusions.

Recent developments in linguistic relativity research

Historically, in response to the problem of linguistic relativity, the scientific community's attention has gone through ups and downs. There was harsh criticism of Whorfian linguistic relativism in the 1960s and 1970s; in turn, a more balanced approach had arisen by the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. It has been accompanied by thorough reflections on Sapir's and Whorf's works and a more positive acceptance of the ideas of linguistic relativism. The current research on the issue is characterized by intensive philosophical reviews and experimental and anthropological studies of various languages and human cognition in diverse linguistic communities (Everett, 2013; Gentner & Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Lucy, 1992, 1997). The extreme form of linguistic determinism is rarely discussed today, as scholars primarily focus on the relationships between Language and cognition: How, in what sequence, and through what mechanisms human mentality and Language are connected. As we may expect, many arguments exist for and against linguistic relativism.

Arguments against linguistic relativity. The arguments against linguistic relativity state that language does not shape people's cognition; human cognition is guided by rules beyond linguistic regulation. Cognitive universals exist independently of languages (see Box 9.2 on Linguistic Universalism versus Relativism). Here is a summary of the main arguments:

a. There are prelinguistic cognitive activities in humans. Language shapes, transmits, and externalizes the results of such activities. Language and human thoughts are not identical. Research on apes and prelinguistic infants indicates that it is possible to represent the world and manipulate these representations without using Language (Gallistel, 2011; Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Pinker, 1994/2007). Some researchers discuss image-based, motor-based, and emotion-based representations that may complement or function independently of language/symbol-based representations (Gumperz & Levinson, 1991). These and similar studies convey that thoughts may emerge independently of their linguistic shaping: Language has access to relatively formed cognitions. Often, Language cannot express all the richness of one's thoughts and experiences. Language is a medium for transmitting representations and thoughts, not their generator.
b. Linguistic relativists deny that there are any forms of linguistic and cognitive universals in humans. In contrast, linguistic universalists endorse the universality of some cognitive and grammatical forms (Pinker, 1994/2007). Pinker is a vocal universalist who followed Chomsky's idea of Universal Grammar. These two scholars have strongly influenced language relativity critics because their ideas emphasize the inherited and universal cognitive aspects of Language that transcend the diversity of various languages.

c. One highly researched domain for testing the linguistic relativism hypothesis involves perception and naming colours. Such research was initiated because different languages have different numbers of colour labels. For example, in English, there are 11 primary colours (*foci*): black, white, red, green, yellow, blue, pink, grey, brown, orange, and purple. In contrast, the Zuni language spoken by the Indigenous people of the southern parts of North America has only one term for the yellow/orange colour. The Papua-New Guinean Dani language has only two terms, one for dark colours and another for bright colours. The Bolivian Amazonian language Tsimane has three words for colours, which represent only black, white, and red. Another Papua-New Guinean language, Berinmo, has five colour labels. After discovering these linguistic differences, researchers asked: Does colour naming relate to colour perception and cognition? An inquiry about cross-cultural colour naming follows this question: Is colour naming an arbitrary convention? Relativists are expected to answer 'Yes' to both questions, while universalists are expected to answer 'No' to both.

   Researchers Berlin and Kay (1969/1991) examined 20 languages and determined that the answer to both questions was 'No.' Regarding the first question, they found that participants from the linguistic communities with only a few colour terms perceive, have representations of, and can memorize the full spectrum of colours. This means that language does not determine human colour perception. The researchers suggested that members of communities name the colours that are relevant in their everyday lives, even though they can perceive and differentiate more colours. Regarding the second question, Berlin and Kay found that there are universal rules for colour naming:

   - All languages have words for "black" and "white."
   - For languages with three terms, the third term is always "red."
   - For languages with four terms, the fourth term is either "yellow" or "green."
   - For languages with five terms, there are terms for both "yellow" and "green."
   - For languages with six terms, the sixth term is "blue."
   - For languages that contain seven terms, the seventh term is "brown."
   - For languages that contain eight or more terms, there are terms for purple, pink, orange, grey, or a combination of these colours.

   Linguistic relativists have criticized Berlin and Kay's universalist theory of colour naming on several grounds where their studies' methodological weaknesses were the strongest. Nonetheless, research on naming and perceiving colours across linguistic communities continues (see (Everett, 2013; Regier et al., 2010)).

Arguments for the linguistic relativity hypothesis. Arguments for linguistic relativism state that language people speak is associated with how people think, or,

saying this differently, human cognition is shaped by the language they speak. Below are some arguments for this proposition.

a. Thinking for speaking: Slobin's version of linguistic relativism. American linguist Slobin (1996) proposed his version of linguistic relativism; he suggested that it relates closely to the Humboldtian version of language-thoughts relationships. He labelled this hypothesis "thinking for speaking." This means that only part of human experience is related to language; this encompasses the thoughts a person decides to verbalize for communication purposes. Therefore, a person structures their thinking so that it is codable in the language of their community. Thus, language does not structure all the thoughts, experiences, and ideas a person has; rather, it only structures the thoughts a person decides to communicate.
b. Experimental studies on linguistic relativism. American cognitive scientist Boroditsky experimentally tested the role of language in shaping the perception of time in English and Mandarin speakers (Boroditsky, 2001). She based her study on observations that English speakers predominantly represent time horizontally, whereas Mandarin speakers talk about time as though it is vertical.[3] She conducted three experiments that confirmed these patterns. Boroditsky concluded by arguing the primary postulates of linguistic relativism (but not linguistic determinism) that Language is a powerful tool in shaping thoughts about abstract domains (p. 1). January and Kako (2007) conducted six studies that aimed to replicate Boroditsky's results but failed to achieve the same results. In turn, they questioned Boroditsky's results and strongly doubted linguistic relativism as a viable scientific hypothesis. Another line of research on English and Mandarin speakers was performed by Tse and Altarriba (2008). Although these researchers partially replicated Boroditsky's results (determining that Chinese-English bilinguals were faster with a vertical spatial prime), their results with English monolinguals (which demonstrated the same tendency) refuted the linguistic relativity hypothesis. As with many other lines of research, these studies provided inconclusive results: In some conditions, linguistic relativism was seemingly verified, whereas, in others, it was barely detectable.
c. Translatability of languages. The translatability of speech and text from one language to another can be used to argue against linguistic determinism and for linguistic relativism. Box 9.2 presents linguistic universalism, and it reflects that translating one language to another would not be possible if linguistic determinism were valid. If languages construct radically different conceptual models of the world, it would be impossible to translate from one language to another. The translators would not have common ground to reconcile the texts in different languages. However, translation is possible, so this hypothesis suggests that there must be common cognitive structures behind diverse languages. These allow

translators to bridge texts in different languages. Therefore, according to this line of thought, the hypothesis of linguistic determinism can be deemed false.

Culture–Language relativism can still occur in the context of translation. Full and rich translations can happen only if a translator is culturally competent in both language communities. Translation scholars differentiate between *translating* and *understanding*. A translator can translate a text word-by-word and sentence-by-sentence without fully understanding (and correspondently, conveying) its meaning if they do not have a higher-order comprehension of the two cultures between which they are translating. Translating requires linguistic competency; in contrast, understanding needs cultural competency (see Sapir's above explanation of understanding a poem). Cultures supply languages and linguistic situations with broader meanings. Without knowing these meanings, a translator cannot provide an accurate rendition. Good translators deviate from word-to-word translations to better convey the original text's cultural meaning (Bahar, 2001). These arguments support the idea that language is embedded into the cultural context from which it gains meaning; thus, they support linguistic relativism for Culture–Language relationships.

d. Linguistic relativity and second language acquisition (SLA). In recent years, linguists have tested the linguistic relativity hypothesis on people learning foreign languages (Lucy, 2016; Pavlenko, 2014). Traditionally, researchers believed that learning a second language required people to acquire only the formal linguistic properties of a new language (learning new words and the grammar to know how to string these words together in meaningful sentences). Moreover, they believed that students of a second language needed to develop the pragmatic aspects of successfully using a new language in various practical situations. Connecting SLA with the problem of linguistic relativity adds a deeper level of analysis. Linguistic relativists state that the lexical and grammatical structures of languages shape the differences in the cognition of these languages' speakers. If this hypothesis is correct, as some reviews indicate (Lucy, 1992), then one may expect that second language (L2) learners will acquire a new way of categorizing reality, obtain new pathways to connect these categories and, ultimately, develop a new cognitive outlook on the world. Therefore, it is logical to argue that learning a second language changes learners' cognition. Consequently, this change must be coordinated with the cognitive models associated with L1, and the resultant cognitive framework will represent a mixture of these models. SLA researchers have labelled the linguistic and conceptual interactions between first and second languages *cross-linguistic influence*. To say it differently, as a result of having two language-related cognitive models interacting and creating new world outlooks, L2 learners undergo cognitive restructuring. Numerous reviews and empirical studies have focused on testing these hypotheses and connecting the results with the problem of linguistic relativity (Bylunda & Athanasopoulosb, 2014; Ferreira & Mozzillo, 2021; Pavlenko, 2014).

In conclusion, for the past few decades, research on language and cognition has been gradually moving towards a subtle version of linguistic relativism. This version states that the language(s) people speak constructs in their minds a conceptual model of the world rooted in the lexical and grammatical properties of their spoken language. This model is connected to the cultural models that are broader and more pervasive systems of meaning created by cultural communities. Nonetheless, theorizing and research on linguistic universalism also continue. Thus, the enigma and mystery of Language continue to attract curious minds who seek a solution.

Bilingualism and multilingualism

The population of any country rarely speaks only one language. Typically, diverse people in a country speak several languages. For example, Nigeria hosts 516 languages, India has 427, and Brazil has 200 (Grosjean, 2013). In many Western countries, bilingualism and multilingualism are part of their national policy. Canada has two official languages: English and French. Belgium has three official languages: Flemish, French, and German. Switzerland has three official languages: German, French, and Italian. According to different sources, between 54% and 65% of Europeans are bilingual. In Canada, about 35% of the population speaks more than one language, and approximately 18% are bilingual in the country's two official languages (Statistics Canada https://www12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2016/as-sa/98-200-x/2016009/98-200-x2016009-eng.cfm). The UK is home to nearly the same percentage of bilinguals – 36%. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 21.6% of the country's population speaks a language other than English at home (Grosjean, 2010). According to different sources, worldwide bilinguals and multilinguals (~60%) outnumber monolinguals; therefore, multilingualism is the norm in the modern world, not monolingualism.

Bilingual people speak two languages, while multilingual people speak more than two. To simplify our discussion, we will focus on bilinguals as a prototype of multilanguage usage. Bilingualism scholars differentiate between bilinguals who learned two languages during their childhood (*early bilinguals*) from those who learn a second language late in their lives after acquiring their first language (*late bilinguals*). In regard to bilingual children, researchers ask, how does simultaneously learning two languages influence children's cognitive development? Moreover, does the mind of a bilingual child differ from that of a monolingual child? These questions echo the discussion in the previous sections about the relationship between language and cognition. In addition, researchers and educators raise the issues of bicultural children's cultural and ethnic identity along with their sense of self and personality development.

For late bilinguals, such as immigrants, refugees, expatriates, travellers, and researchers, we will focus on the ties between second language learning and

people's cultural identities, their selves, and their experiences living in different linguistic worlds. The primary question from the sociocultural perspective is, do people's behaviours, senses of the selves, and cultural and personal identities change when they become bilingual? The ultimate concern is to determine what SLA brings to people's existence in our multicultural world.

Does learning several languages during childhood influence children's cognitive development? If yes, is this influence positive or negative?

Children who live in multilingual families are socialized simultaneously into two (a father is an immigrant who speaks Polish, while a mother is a citizen of English-speaking Canada), three, or even more (a father is an immigrant and speaks Korean, a mother is an immigrant and speaks Russian, and their daughter goes to a French-immersion school in an Anglophone community in Canada and speaks French and English at school). Naturally, parents ask how such a mixture of languages influences their children's mental development: Will their children's mental growth progress normally? Will their personality and identity be cultivated to benefit their healthy and balanced maturation? There is a basis for the concerns of these parents. Bialystok (2015) reported that during the first half of the 20th century, a mainstream conviction held that children's exposure to several languages was detrimental to their mental development. But by the end of the century, the idea of bilingual benefits had gained momentum.

Developmental linguists and psychologists have conducted numerous studies to examine the relationships between children's bilingualism and their cognitive development. Several reviews of such studies allow us to summarize the results on this topic (Adesope et al., 2010; Bialystok, 2015; Bialystok et al., 2009; De Groot, 2013; Javier, 2007; Pavlenko, 2014). Their primary conclusion is that bilingualism is beneficial for children's intellectual development. Exposure to two or more languages positively influences the following functions: executive functions, including their non-verbal aspects; working memory, inhibition, and attention regulation in changing environments; metalinguistic awareness, the theory of mind, and abstract and symbolic representation skills (see Box 9.4 for the definitions of these functions). Raised in bilingual homes, children as early as one-year-old outperformed infants from monolingual homes in several eye-tracking experiments that required changes in habitual reactions. Researchers have found that the competition between and interaction of language systems brings executive advantages to bilingual children. These children must be in control of two activated languages and choose between them depending on the situation. Findings have shown that this advantage may even delay the onset of Alzheimer's disease and dementia in one's older years. Studies including fMRI have led researchers to

suggest that learning another language changes brain functioning by restructuring it in some areas.

Box 9.4 Definition and explanation

Executive function and self-regulation skills are the mental processes that enable humans to plan, focus attention, remember instructions, and juggle multiple tasks successfully. Consider how an air traffic control system at a busy airport safely manages the arrivals and departures of many aircrafts on multiple runways. Similarly, the brain needs the skill set to filter distractions, prioritize tasks, set and achieve goals, and control impulses.

Components of executive function

Working memory governs our ability to retain and manipulate distinct pieces of information over short periods of time (https://developingchild.harvard.edu/science/key-concepts/executive-function/).

Inhibitory control allows people to control their attention, behaviours, thoughts, and/or emotions to override a strong internal predisposition or external lure and instead do what is more appropriate or needed (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4084861/, accessed May 24, 2023).

Metalinguistic awareness "is the conscious understanding and awareness of the full formal properties of a language, including its function and semantic properties. … A linguist typically has metalinguistic awareness where they have a working knowledge of the full formal properties of their languages." (https://psychologydictionary.org/metalinguistic-awareness/, accessed on May 24, 2023).

Theory of mind is a person's ability to attribute and understand another person's mental states.

Abstract and symbolic representation skills are people's abilities to represent an object or an idea by a symbol – a number, a word, or a picture.

Bilingualism and the sense of self and personal identities

This section moves from cognition to personality, self, and identity. The main question is, does speaking two languages create a sense of dual self, split identities, and related incongruencies in a bilingual person's experiential fields? Several reviews provide information on this topic, and their conclusions are summarized here (Grosjean, 2010; Javier, 2007; Pavlenko, 2006, 2014).

At the beginning of the 20th century, many scholars, including psychoanalysts, considered bilingual people to be similar to people with schizophrenia because of

their split linguistic mental schemas (*schizophrenia* (Greek) means the split mind). Surprisingly, comparisons between bilingualism and some form of split personality also emerged in the autobiographies of bilingual writers and other bilinguals (Pavlenko 1998, 2001). Some of these writers indicated that, for example, writing in English, in contrast to French, completely changed their memoirs' discourses, rhythm, and moods. Pavlenko (2006) reported the dominant metaphors of the bilinguals that she analysed were "tongue snatching, border crossing, borrowing, bigamy, betrayal, bifurcation, fragmentation, multiplicity, split, gap, alienation, dislocation, and double vision" (p. 5). Such states of experiential duality may naturally develop confusing emotions and feelings that accompany bilingualism. Among them are insecurity over the legitimacy of a newly-learned language, guilt over linguistic and ethnic disloyalties, angst over the inability to bring together one's incommensurable worlds, anxiety about the lack of wholesome oneness, and the sadness and confusion caused by seeing oneself as divided, a self-in-between, or a self in need of translation. (p. 5). However, some bilingual writers indicated that their dual language allegiances provided them with creative enrichment from the continuous relativity of their stances and perspectives. Empirical studies have supported some of these conclusions. Researchers who studied bicultural bilinguals using projective tests and personality questionnaires discovered that the participants answering these tests in one language demonstrated personality tendencies different from their answers to the same test in their second language. It is important to note that when researchers describe studies on personality differences in bilinguals, they characterize their participants as "bicultural bilinguals" instead of simply "bilinguals." This terminology change indicates a close relationship between language, culture, and people's mental functioning (later in this chapter, we discuss bilingualism and biculturalism).

Although there are more disadvantages of bilingualism than advantages, according to Table 9.1, advantages have more weight and may benefit lives of bilinguals in substantial ways.

Other dimensions of bilingualism

Language proficiency is a person's ability to use a second language accurately to transfer meaning to others and to achieve comprehension when another person speaks. Language proficiency is comprised of *vocabulary* (the number of words used in one's speech; typically, a native language speaker has a vocabulary of between 20,000 and 40,000 words, whereas a person with basic proficiency in the second language might only know and use between 3,000 and 4,000 words), *sentence structure* (how grammatically proper utterances are constructed), and *meaning communication* and *comprehension* (how well a person can communicate and understand the meaning in speech). Different agencies that require knowledge of

Table 9.1 A summary of the advantages and disadvantages/inconveniences of Bilingualism as reported by participants (Grosjean, 2010; Pavlenko, 2006)

Advantages of Bilingualism	*Disadvantages or inconveniencies of Bilingualism*
- Bilingualism provides bilinguals with distinct behaviour repertoires and cultural perspectives that monolinguals do not have. This is especially evident in 'late' bilinguals.	- Speaking different languages makes some bilinguals feel like they have become different persons. Other bilinguals emphasize that their core self remains intact: "I stay the same when speaking different languages."
- Bilingualism allows individuals to communicate directly with people speaking different languages and interact with many people.	- They feel that L1 is 'real' and 'natural,' whereas the other language(s) is 'fake,' 'artificial;' when they speak this other language, it can be perceived as a performance.
- Bilingualism allows people to read books and texts in their original languages; it also enriches vocabulary and provides greater clarity in speaking.	- Other people may perceive bilinguals as behaving differently when they speak different languages and may even see them as different people.
- Learning one new language helps people to learn more new languages.	- Bilingualism may be linked to different cultural models, scripts and expectations, linguistic repertoires, levels of emotionality, and autobiographic memories.
- Bilingualism fosters divergent thinking. Research shows that bilingual people have a tendency to be more creative.	- Sometimes, bilinguals cannot express themselves fully in their weaker language.
	- There can be cross-language interference: the stronger language may influence the weaker one. A bilingual person may use the grammatical rules of the stronger language when speaking the weaker one.
	- Bilinguals may become frustrated with using their weaker language for a long time, as they may continuously make mistakes and feel like they are not expressing themselves fully.
	- Bilinguals are often asked to serve as interpreters, which they may find challenging.

more than one (native) language have developed scales and corresponding tests to evaluate people's level of proficiency. One such scale is The *Interagency Language Roundtable Scale* (IRS), which was developed in the US. In Canada, educational institutions and businesses use the *Language Proficiency Index* designed and produced in British Columbia. Conventionally, it recognizes five levels of proficiency: Level 0 – no proficiency, Level 1 – elementary proficiency, Level 2 – limited working proficiency, Level 3 – professional working proficiency, Level 4 – full professional

proficiency, and Level 5 – native language proficiency. Each level has criteria, and there are tests to assess them. Language proficiency also incorporates *language fluency,* or a condition when a speaker encodes and decodes meanings quickly and efficiently and can construct sentences and questions nearly automatically.

Language use encompasses purposes, domains, and situations where people use languages (one language is used at home and another at work; for example, in Paraguay, one language is used in the countryside, and another is used in cities) (Grosjean, 2010). **The frequency of language use** ranges from daily to almost never (Grosjean, 2010). Finally, the **channels of language use** are comprised of spoken and written.

Bilinguals may use *code-switching* and *borrowing*. "Code-switching is the alternate use of two languages" (Grosjean, 2010, p. 51). 'Intra-sentential code-switching' occurs when a speaker starts a sentence in one language and incorporates another language in the middle or at the end of the sentence. Another type of code-switching that is frequent among bilinguals happens when they can greet each other in their native language and continue conversing in their second language. This tendency is labelled 'inter-sentential code-switching.' Moreover, they may switch to their native language to express strong emotions and then return to their second language.

Code-switching serves various **functions,** including ensuring that one uses the right word or phrase to fully express oneself (using English to a decent extent to present a good standing) or marking group identity. Black people in America often speak African American Vernacular English in their everyday lives. To fit into their communities, some Black speakers must switch from Standard English to *sociolect* African-American English (AAE) or demonstrate its comprehension by code-switching while speaking. Other functions of code-switching consist of excluding or including others from a conversation by using a second language in speech when other people do not understand it to exclude them from the conversation (considered to be bad-mannered) compared with switching from one's native language to the common language of the land when a third person walks over to join a conversation (considered to be respectful). Some people may use a second language to raise their status by demonstrating their competence in that language. In some non-English speaking countries, it can be considered 'cool' to include English words while speaking because this indicates that a speaker knows English.

Language borrowing (also called *loanword*) is, in many aspects, similar to code-switching (Poplack, 2018). Code-switching happens in the moment during speech and it can include many different words. In contrast, language borrowing takes time and has a history; over time, borrowed words from other languages become part of the original language. Many scientific terms in English are derived from Greek or Latin, including *logos*, *episteme*, *onto-*, *graph*, *biblio*, and many other terms and their roots. In addition, languages borrow everyday words from other (donor) languages: 'aviation' comes from the French word *aviation*; 'sputnik' comes from the

Russian word *спутник*; 'breeze' comes from the Spanish word *brisa* (north-west wind); 'embargo' comes from the Spanish word *embargar* (to bar); 'kindergarten' comes from the German word *kindergarten* (garden for children); 'iceberg' comes from the German word *eisberg* (ice mountain); 'volcano' comes from the Italian word *volcano*; 'fiasco' comes from the Italian word *fiasco* (to fail a performance); and 'boss' from Dutch *baas* (a chief). Naturally, there are many other examples of borrowing.

Bilingualism researchers also discuss the *linguistic accent* (from Latin *accentus* meaning 'the intonation in singing') that a person has when they speak a language that is not their home tongue. An accent is a way of pronouncing words and sentences differently from the accepted phonetics of that language. An accent happens when a speaker uses the phonology of their native language to pronounce sounds in the second language. An accent may be loaded with different meanings and serve various functions in communication. Some accents can carry more prestige than others (from French, *prestige* means 'illusion' or 'glamour'); an accent may suggest a person's socioeconomic status, country of origin, geographic location within a country, profession, and many other characteristics. Some of these conclusions may lead to stereotyping and discrimination.

Bilingualism and biculturalism

Inevitably, bilingualism leads researchers to question whether a bilingual person is also bicultural. If a person knows a foreign language, do they also know and identify with the culture that uses that language? Bilingualism may be exclusively a linguistic competency (people may learn a foreign language without deeply knowing and living in the corresponding cultural community) (Abizadeh, 2001), or it may be part of people's cultural competency. A bicultural person internalizes the sociocultural models (SCMs) that belong to two cultural communities and participates in maintaining them. A bilingual person is proficient and fluent in two languages and uses them in their life, but they do not necessarily internalize their sociocultural models. Earlier in this chapter, we identified early and late forms of bilingualism. Linguists also recognize *coordinate* and *compound* bilinguals (Chen, 2015). When children learn two languages in the same cultural environment (for instance, their parents speak different languages or they learn a second language in school), these children become *compound bilinguals*. In contrast, when immigrants arrive in their new country and learn its language, they become *coordinate bilinguals*, meaning people who learn and use two languages in different cultural contexts. These classifications highlight that the relationships between bilingualism and biculturalism can be complicated (Chen, 2015; Grosjean, 2015).

Soffietti (1960) identified four types of individuals based on the combinations of their competencies in languages and cultures: 1. Bicultural-bilingual;

Table 9.2 Four groups based on the combinations of competencies in Languages and Cultures

	A person lives in two cultural communities	*A person lives in one cultural community*
A person speaks two languages	1. Bicultural-bilingual. An immigrant who was socialized and lived in their home community and learned its language; later, after moving abroad, this person also learned the language of their host community and successfully functioned in it.	3. Monocultural-bilingual. A person who lives in their community and speaks two languages fluently.
A person speaks one language	2. Bicultural-monolingual. An Aboriginal person who lives on a reserve participates in its cultural rituals, and successfully works in the White community and speaks only English. Another example is an English-speaking immigrant from India living in the USA and successfully working in this society.	4. Monocultural-monolingual. A person who lives in their community and speaks only one language.

2. Bicultural-monolingual; 3. Monocultural-bilingual, and 4. Monocultural-monolingual (see Table 9.2).

In the above four cases, the mechanisms of the relationships between culture and language may differ. The culture that a person internalizes during their childhood creates in them the deepest level of sociocultural regulation. This enculturation is executed through language, which carries or transmits sociocultural models from the community to a child's mind. In this case, the culture and its language are so tightly blended that it is impossible to separate them. As Grace (1987) commented, "A language is shaped by its culture, and a culture is given expression in its language, to such an extent that it is impossible to say where one ends and the other begins, i.e. what belongs to language and what to culture" (p. 10). Learning a second language at school creates a different linguistic model of the same cultural reality; however, it does not maintain or transform it. The second language may be less functional in a child's everyday life because their parents and other community members may not use that language. The usefulness of the second language is the primary factor in its acquisition and retention.

Moving to a different culture (in the case of immigration) or encountering one (in the case of colonization) leads a person to develop different dynamics between culture and language. Immigrants, for example, deeply internalize their home sociocultural models and have a mature and developed self that helps them reflect on their

home and host cultures. They learn their new SCMs consciously, and they continuously compare them with the corresponding home community models. Therefore, they internalize these new models less deeply and less decisively in terms of how these models regulate their behaviour. In this case, language also works as a transmitter of SCMs. However, it is under the continued control of the agentic self, which is equipped with one's home language and sociocultural regulation.

The dynamic of being bilingual and bicultural

Grosjean (2015) argues that bilinguals use their language competencies along a continuum. One pole is bilinguals talking to monolinguals – the "monolingual mode" of bilinguals. For example, bilingual international students in an Anglophone university speak to their English-speaking peers. In turn, these same students speak to their parents in their home language. In the monolingual mode, bilinguals use only one language at a time, and they automatically refer to the sociocultural models that correspond to that language and the domain of their interactions with that group of monolinguals. At this time, they inhibit their other language and its matching models, which allows them to pass as monolinguals. Nonetheless, the deactivated language may still interfere with the language in use through things like an accent, grammatical confusion, unconscious word borrowing, and other transgressions. It can be difficult to inhibit the cultural models that go with the deactivated language. Tiny manifestations such as interpersonal space, eye contact, body language, greetings, humour, topics for conversation, and many other cultural marks may be unconsciously present in the behaviour of a bicultural individual who is in a monocultural/monolingual mode.

Grosjean labelled the other pole as the "bilingual language mode" (p. 579). This happens when bilingual students talk to their bilingual relatives or friends. In these cases, they may do language code-switching and borrowing, and they may refer to the cultural features of both languages and cultures. The situation will dictate the "base language" they will select for communication. For example, when alone, bilinguals may converse in their first language. Subsequently, when their monolingual peers approach, they may switch to their second language to indicate their intention to include their peers in their discussion. In contrast, they may instead continue talking in their first language, conveying that they would like to be left alone to finish the talk. As with language, biculturals choose their "cultural base" for the interaction, and they may switch between and borrow different cultural behaviours, attitudes, and values to make their points. The language and cultural freedom bilinguals feel in their bilingual/bicultural mode may relax them and bring them a sense of being fully themselves.

Chen (2015) concurs that the interactions that bilinguals/biculturals have with other people depend on the context and interlocutors (communication partners)

that are involved. Different contexts and various interlocutors activate corresponding internalized cultural and linguistic models. Bilinguals may switch from one model to another as the communication environment changes. Some researchers (Hong et al., 2000) refer to this as 'cultural frame switching,' which is similar to the identity frame switching we discussed in Chapter 8 on Personhood, Selfhood, and Identity. Nonetheless, they consider cultural regulation to be the deeper and primary mechanism of this communication, whereas language transmits the meaning relevant to the activated models.

It is important to consider that communal culture is not a homogeneous and undifferentiated whole; rather, it is a system of interrelated SCMs that regulates all domains of people's lives. There are domains of family life, romantic relationships, education, health maintenance, cooking, entertainment, and hundreds of others. A corresponding SCM regulates each domain and has a specific language: vocabulary, way of talking, semantic meanings, and even pronunciation. Depending on the domain, bicultural bilinguals activate either their home or their host culture's SCMs, and, in turn, they use the corresponding language. Grosjean (2010) called such selective use of cultural and linguistic models in specific domains the "complementarity principle" (p. 29). For example, when attending classes, an immigrant Chinese student uses the Western SCM of education and speaks to professors and fellow students in English with all its academic-related nuances. In turn, when they come home and start to prepare a meal, this activates the Chinese SCM of food preparation, and most ingredients and ways of preparing them are expressed in Chinese. Going to a party with a mixture of Chinese and Euro-Canadian students activates in this student several models for party behaviour, and these models invite them to switch from English to Chinese and back, depending on the interlocutor and the topic of conversation.

In summary, bicultural bilinguals constitute a walking laboratory for studying the interactions among internalized sociocultural models, situations, contextual interpretations of these situations, language, and the person's agentic self. Despite the efforts of social scholars, the dynamics and mechanisms of these interactions still need to be explored in more detail and explicitly articulated.

Conclusion

This chapter started with a statement about the mysterious and magical nature of Language. Researchers still argue about when, why, and how Language emerged phylogenetically. They continue to try to determine why Language emerged only in humans and not in other species. Scholars discuss the functions of Language and its potential to not only serve humans' mentality but also construct their environment – Culture. Language infiltrates all spheres and aspects of people's performance and their niche for existence. The depth of this infiltration and its consequences continue to attract researchers' attention worldwide.

Glossary

Bilingualism: Bilingual people speak two languages, while multilingual people speak more than two. Bilingualism scholars differentiate between bilinguals who learned two languages during their childhood (*early bilinguals*) from those who learn a second language late in their lives after acquiring their first language (*late bilinguals*).

Code-switching is the alternate use of two languages (Grosjean, 2010, p. 51).

Continuity hypothesis states that language evolved through the mechanisms of natural selection from animal communication.

Discontinuity hypothesis: Chomsky argued that the emergence of UG is a break in the continuity of the communication mechanisms in apes and humans. This discontinuity happens because humans' propensity for developing linguistic symbols and manipulating them in a profoundly sophisticated manner is, in principle, different from any form of communication in the biological world.

Language is one of the primary and distinct attributes of the species *Homo Sapiens*. Language is a system of sounds (spoken languages), gestures, or symbols (sign or written languages) that are connected by rules and structured to transmit information among members of linguistic communities.

Language borrowing is adopting words from other languages.

Language functions

Communication: Language allows people to *express* their mental states: needs, goals, thoughts, ideas, and emotions and *transmit* these states and information to other people.

Representation: This function represents and maps the world and its meanings in linguistic signs and symbols. "Representation means using language to say something meaningful about, or to represent, the world meaningfully, to other people" (Hall, 1997, p. 61). Representation is both the process of representing something and the results of doing it – a word or image.

Construction: Linguistic constructionism states that Language does not simply denote or map the world; rather, it constructs the world in a meaningful manner. The verb 'construct' suggests that by using Language to name things, people assign meaning to the objects of the world. Hence, members of linguistic communities create meaningful cultural objects and construct the human-made environment where they live.

Language as action: The agentic function of Language means that, by using Language, people do things. To act, Language must be included in a broader cultural system or 'social institute,' for example, the justice system, educational institutions, or business organizations.

Language proficiency is a person's ability to use a second language accurately to transfer meaning to others and to achieve comprehension when another person speaks.

Language use encompasses purposes, domains, and situations where people use languages.

Linguistic determinism states that the Language people speak *determines* Culture, national character, cognition, and behaviours.

Linguistic relativism states that Language may be associated with Culture, cognition, and behaviour, but it does not determine them. In other words, people's cognitions and actions are relative to their Language.

Linguistic universalism suggests that, while languages vary in their surface structures, every language is based on the same underlying universal structures or laws.

Sapir-Whorf hypothesis suggests Language's role in the organization of and navigation through people's worlds. It represents several forms of linguistic determinism and relativism.

Sociocultural approach to Language evolution states that Language emerged in social groups of hominins as a result of the co-evolution of numerous factors: the size and structure of the social groups, the development of the human brain and its cognitive capacities; the emergence of human cultural forms such as art, music, and dance; human anatomical features, mostly relating to the anatomy of the larynx and other voice-generating mechanisms, among some other factors.

Universal Grammar is Chomsky's idea that children have the innate disposition to grasp the grammatical structure of any language (hence, he used the term 'universal grammar'). The faculty of UG is genetically transmitted, and it constitutes the inherited make-up of *Homo Sapiens*. This concept is related to the discontinuity hypothesis of Language emergence.

Questions

1. In this chapter, why is Language often characterized as "mysterious" and "magical"? Justify your answer.
2. Describe the four functions of Language – communicative, representational, constructionist, and agentic – by using examples from your daily language use.
3. Explain the systemic nature of the relationship of Language with the human Mind and Culture.
4. Compare and contrast the discontinuity, continuity, and sociocultural hypotheses of the phylogenetic origin of Language.
5. Do you agree with Tomasello's hypotheses about the acquisition of Language in the context of children's social cooperative interactions with adults? Justify your position.
6. The discussion of linguistic relativity versus linguistic universalism can seem convoluted. Based on the evidence provided by both approaches, do you feel Language plays a role in forming human cognition? Justify your position.
7. Many university students are bilingual or multilingual. How does this shape their sense of identity, sense of self, and other personal attributes? Do these students behave differently when speaking different languages? If you are bilingual or multilingual, reflect upon and comment upon your experiences. If you are monolingual, reflect upon the behaviours of friends and classmates who know multiple languages.
8. Define *code-switching* and *language borrowing*. Provide examples. Explain how they are similar and how they are different.
9. Some relations of Language and Culture are manifested in the issue of bilingualism and biculturalism. Based on the provided discussion, how do you think Language and Culture interact?
10. Scholars aim to articulate the mechanisms of Language and Culture interdependence in the cases of bilingualism and biculturalism. What mechanisms or components have been proposed? Summarize the main ones.

Recommended reading

On the nature of Language and its evolution

Bouchard, D. (2013). *The nature and origin of language*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Christiansen, M. H., & Kirby, S. (Eds.). (2003). *Language evolution*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Fitch, W. T. (2010). *The evolution of language*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

B. C. Malt & P. Wolff (Eds.), *Words and the mind: How words capture human experience*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

On linguistic relativity

Everett, C. (2013). *Linguistic relativity: Evidence across languages and cognitive domains*. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton.

Kaitaro, T. (2022). *Language, culture and cognition from Descartes to Lewes*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Brill.

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(pp. 37–69). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Linguistic relativity and second language learning

Lucy, J. A. (2016). The implications of linguistic relativity for language learning. In R. A. Alonso (Ed.), *Crosslinguistic influence in second language acquisition* (pp. 53–70). Bristol, UK: Multilingual Matters.

Bilingualism and multilingualism

Bialystok, E., Craik, F. I. M., Green, D. W., & Gollan, T. H. (2009). Bilingual minds. *Psychological Science in the Public Interest*, *10*, 89–129. doi: 0.1177/1529100610387084

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Pavlenko, A. (2006). Bilingual selves. In A. Pavlenko (Ed.), *Bilingual minds: Emotional experience, expression, and representation*. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters.

Notes

1 In this chapter, I use the same distinctions for the word *language* I used for the term *culture* in Chapter 1. I use the term 'Language' (with a capital 'L') to denote the universal symbolic system that evolved during evolution, represents the world, is used for communication, and is irrelevant to particular languages. In turn, I use 'language(s)' (with a small 'l') when discussing specific languages – English, French, Spanish, German, and many others that communities use daily.

2 In these quotations, Humboldt used the idea of "the spirit of nations," which he borrowed from Herder as a synonym for his 'volksgeist' – *the spirit of people* – which means 'Culture.' Humboldt might have also been influenced by Voltaire, who, in 1756, coined the concept of *l'esprit des nations* (the spirit of nations). Speaking of "the spiritual characteristics" of people, Humboldt referred to the national character of members of a nation (see Chapter 5 on the history of the ideas of sociocultural regulation).

3 The horizontal metaphor for time perception includes words such as ahead (the good times ahead of us) or behind (the hardships behind us), together with words forward, backward, before, and others. The vertical metaphor is reflected by "the spatial morphemes shàng ('up') and xià ('down') [that] are frequently used in the Chinese language to talk about the order of events, weeks, months, semesters, and more" (Boroditsky, 2001, p. 5). Moreover, according to Boroditsky, the horizontal time perception metaphor also exists in the Chinese language.

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10 Communication within and across cultural communities

Intra- and *inter*-cultural interactions

Chapter content

- The chapter starts by analysing *intra*cultural communication, meaning the communication among members of the same sociocultural community. It identifies the structure and primary components of the communicative act.
- Then, it discusses various communities of people that are structured around language, speech, discourse, and other linguistic and communicative features.
- Special attention is paid to the role that common communal and cultural grounds play in determining the cohesiveness and success of intracultural linguistic interactions.
- Linguistic and communication common grounds are analysed using the concepts and theories of cultural schemas, speech codes, and cultural scripts.
- Next, *inter*cultural communication is characterized as occurring between people lacking or having only minimal cultural/communal and linguistic/communicative common grounds. This lack of common grounds creates challenges for interacting across cultures, which generates misunderstandings, confusion, and conflicts.
- Various dimensions and aspects of intercultural communication are discussed. They include high versus low-context communication styles, mono- and polychronic time orientations, and nonverbal forms of communication.
- The chapter ends by discussing strategies that can help intercultural encounters.

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This chapter focuses on the first and the most apparent function of Language – *communication*. Merriam-Webster English Dictionary defines communication as "a process by which information is exchanged between individuals through a common system of symbols, signs, or behavior" (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/communication). The primary questions for our discussion are: How and for what purpose does communication work in modern human societies? Moreover, what roles do Culture and cultures play in regulating and maintaining various forms of communication within and across different cultural communities?

*Intra*cultural communication

We start our analysis with the predominant form of communication: When members of the same cultural community exchange information, or *intra*cultural communication. Communication scientists, sociolinguistics, public relations scholars, organizational communication experts, and other social science researchers intensively examine this form of communication for theoretical and applied purposes (Bonvillain, 2014; Stanlaw et al., 2018).

Components of communication acts

1 A **sender** or **speaker** aims to communicate with another person and transmits information.
2 A **receiver** or **listener** is a person to whom a sender aims to transmit information.

A father wants to talk to his son. The father is the sender, and his son is the receiver. In communication sciences, both the sender and receiver are called **interlocutors**, meaning those participating in a dialogue or conversation.

3 There is a **context** within which a communicative act takes place. Communication researchers use *speech situations* to designate "the context within which speaking occurs" (Stanlaw et al., 2018, pp. 201–202). The father and the son can talk at home, in school, on the street, or in a store – anywhere. In each of these contexts, various factors may influence the flow of the communication activity. For example, at home, the father and son have privacy and can talk uninterrupted; at school, which is a public space, others might observe this conversation and thus, the father and his son will have several restraints on how they can behave. Other examples of speech situations are business meetings, university seminars, birthday parties, canoeing trips, and many other contexts where participants exchange information.
4 The **intended information** to be communicated refers to the ideas, opinions, conclusions, feelings, and other content a sender has in mind and wants to transmit to a receiver. For example, the father might intend to communicate his pride in his son's recent academic or sports accomplishments.

5 **Encoding** is when the intended ideas, thoughts, or feelings are encoded into a sequence of symbols (verbal, non-verbal, or written). The father can verbally articulate his pride in his son's achievements; instead, he can hug his son, shake his hand and pat his shoulder, write a letter, or take him for ice cream. In each of these cases, the father encodes his feelings into different sets of symbols: oral verbal, non-verbal, written verbal, or actions.
6 **Message:** If the father decides to transmit his feelings orally, he might use the phrase, "Son, I am very proud of you." He sends this message to his son. The *content* of this message is an expression of pride, and its *form* is an oral verbal utterance.
7 A **channel of communication** is similar to the message form: It can be presented through oral verbal, non-verbal, or written verbal channels. This category also indicates whether the message is sent in person during a face-to-face interaction or by phone, via WhatsApp or Zoom, with or without video, etc.
8 The **rules of interaction** are the requirements for structuring a conversation and prescribing what is or is not appropriate to say or do during it. In many cultures, it is not acceptable for a father and son to kiss in public (although there are situations when this is acceptable; for example, when a father is saying farewell to his son who is going to fight in a war). In some cultures, when receiving a compliment, it is appropriate to accept the compliment by saying, 'Thank you.' In other cultures, the recipient must reject the compliment and remark that they do not deserve it and the praise is unwarranted (see Box 9.3 on the Japanese and American communication scripts).
9 **Decoding** by applying **norms of interpretation** is a process a receiver executes to interpret the sent signs and symbols and understand the intentions, the transmitted information, and its meaning. The son will interpret his father's hug and translate it into his father's feeling of pride for him; he uses the norm of interpretation of a masculine hug as a sign of closeness and appreciation.

This is the relatively universal schema of the communication process, which we will use in this chapter.

Other useful communication terminology

Communication scholars coined some other terms and use them in their research.

Language community is a community of people who speak the same language. Very often, it coincides with a cultural community. *Speech community*; language communities are not homogenous; they have subgroups of people based on gender, age, socioeconomic status, job, ethnic background, sexual orientation, hobbies, and many others. Each of these subgroups has its subculture and, among other items, specific ways of speaking and communicating. *A speech community* is comprised of people "who share specific rules for speaking and interpreting speech"

(Stanlaw et al., 2018, p. 200). Speech communities are relatively bounded communities of people who develop their unique vocabularies, meanings of words, norms, and scripts for asking questions, resolving conflicts, requesting help, and many other *speech events*. A speech community is different from a language community. Inner city people of low socioeconomic standing and professionals from suburbs belong to the same language community because they speak one language, for example, English. However, they constitute distinctive speech communities because they differ in their speech, vocabulary, sentence structures, and the meanings they communicate through various utterances and speech forms.

The speech act is the smallest unit of speech activity. Speech acts include words and expressions such as "Hello" (a greeting), "Thank you" (a show of gratitude), "Sorry" (an apology), "Let me introduce you to Mr. Jones" (an introduction), "Could you please pass the salt to me?" (a request), and many others. Speech acts combine linguistic and social norms and have a performative function. As a rule, speech acts serve a function for the speaker, as noted in the examples above. Building from this, a coherent sequence of speech acts constitutes a *speech event* – a basic verbal interaction unit consisting of several speech acts structured by corresponding social and linguistic norms. Anglophone Canadians constitute a language community. An academic university community is a speech community; a university lecture is a speech situation; a Q&A period during a class is a speech event; and a student's question is a speech act.

A *discourse community* is similar to a *speech community*. Linguists use *discourse* to designate "a formal and orderly and usually extended expression of thought on a subject" (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discourse). Socio- and ethnolinguists and other social scholars use this term more broadly as an expression to denote the use of a particular language of political, ideological or cultural ideas, values and beliefs; hence, they use terms like a political discourse on democracy, a liberal discourse on the status of women in a society, a popular discourse on computer games, a scientific discourse on human evolution, and many others. In the second meaning, discourse is not only a linguistic or speech event but also a sociocultural event that expresses a specific cultural or political stance and a system of values that frames a listener's or reader's thoughts. French philosopher **Michel Foucault** (1926–1984) is often noted for introducing this understanding of historical, social, and political science discourse (Foucault, 1972). A *discourse community* is a subset of a speech community. Even though they belong to different language communities, psychologists from Canada, France, Germany, and Japan belong to the same discourse community because they use the same scientific language (terminology), share the same ideas, focus on similar topics, and, ultimately, easily understand each other through common linguistic means. Membership in discourse communities is a matter of choice; in contrast, people are born into language and speech

communities and do not choose them. In addition to sharing particular linguistic forms, norms, and communication rules, members of a discourse community share values, interests, worldviews, and other cultural and non-linguistic attributes. To some extent, a discourse community could be considered a sociocultural community of choice.

Why does intracultural communication run smoothly?

As a rule, intracultural communication events run smoothly because this form of communication has been designed to make cultural communities coherent. Through linguistic interactions, community members set collective goals, share knowledge, negotiate plans for their achievement, and coordinate practices to complete their communal aspirations. Notably, they express and experience feelings similarly while doing all these activities. Several sociolinguists have suggested the mechanism of this smoothness – *common cultural* and *linguistic grounds* in these communities.

Cultural common ground

Based on the analyses of various speech events within a language community, American linguist Clark (1996) concluded that Language is a cooperative activity that interlocutors can execute when they share *common ground*. Common ground is fundamental for coordinating joint actions. What something means to the sender must mean the same to the receiver. Clark identified two forms of common ground: *communal* and *personal*. A cultural community's members possess *communal ground*, which includes sharing knowledge, expertise, and practices that may differ from other communities. *Personal common ground* is rooted in the joint experience of communicative partners. You and your friend watched the same movie or attended the same concert and, as a result, you have personal common ground to communicate about these events.

Tomasello also introduced the concept of *cultural common ground,* which is based on group members sharing *conventional cultural practices* (see Chapter 4). For example, these practices may apply to hunting and how hunters talk about their expeditions. Group members share and mutually understand these aspects, making their hunting expeditions and conversations about hunting flow smoothly.

Linguistic and communication common ground: Cultural schemas

In addition to *communal cultural common ground*, researchers discuss the *communication common ground* that contributes to the coherence of intracultural

communication. Japanese communication scholar Nishida (2005) proposed a *cultural schemas theory* for social interactions. She defined cultural schemas as "cognitive structures that contain knowledge for face-to-face interactions in one's cultural environment" (p. 403). The researcher identified eight primary social interaction schemas that supply information to and regulate social interactions. (1) *Fact-and-concept schemas* provide information for interactions; this information is predominantly about the topic of communication. (2) *Person schemas* categorize people into different types and provide information about their psychological traits. (3) *Self schemas* represent a person's knowledge of themselves – their self-perception and the perception of them by others. (4) *Role schemas* contain knowledge about interlocutors' appropriate communicative behaviours in different social statuses and roles. (5) *Context schemas* position social interactions within a particular context: They outline what can and cannot be said or done in different situations. (6) *Procedure schemas* prescribe the sequence of steps and the rules of behaviour during an interaction. (7) *Strategy schemas* make social interactions successful. The choice of such schemas depends on the experience and expertise of the interlocutors. Finally, (8) *Affective/emotion schemas* prescribe the affective tone of the interaction: to be calm, angry, lively, joyful, or sad. They also contain rules for when and in what form to express these feelings (pp. 405–407). These schemas are rooted in a group's communal stock of knowledge about communication. People learn them early during their socialization and carry them for the rest of their lives.

Speech codes

American linguistic anthropologist Philipsen (1992, 1997; 2005) conducted an ethnographic study of how people speak in different speech communities in the US. In particular, he studied the communication and social interactions in Chicago's blue-collar, low-income, predominantly white multiethnic neighbourhood. He called this cultural speech community "Teamsterville culture." In addition, he examined communication in the lives of two women from the American Northwest and analysed a popular TV show where communication was an important part. He labelled these speech communities "Nacirema (the word *American* written backward) culture." These groups represent different speech communities in American society. Each has its unique *speech codes,* as he labelled them. These codes are the systems of meaning and discourses about speech, speaking, and communicating in these communities. What does speaking mean to these people? What symbolic load does it carry? Neshida's cultural schemas deconstruct communication processes and aim to answer the question, What do these processes consist of? Subsequently, Philipsen focused on understanding the meaning of communication

in different cultural communities, asking: What does speaking to your fellow ingroup members mean? and What meanings do different ways of speaking have? He defined *speech codes* as historically transmitted, socially constructed systems of symbols, meanings, premises, and rules about communication conduct. These codes are about the nature of people, the ways persons can and should be linked together in social relations, and the role symbolic actions of speaking play in forging, sustaining, and altering such interpersonal linkages (1992, p. 127). Box 10.1 presents a speech code of manliness in Teamsterville.

Box 10.1 Case study: Speaking like a 'man' or a speech code for manliness in Teamsterville

A man can speak a great deal if he is in the company of equal-status males from his neighbourhood or group. For example, he can talk a lot when they meet at their "corner bar," which is considered their territory or "turf." A man should not speak much if he is talking to a person of different status: his wife, children, boss, an outsider to the neighbourhood, or a person from a diverse ethnic background.

Manliness is demonstrated by using speech acts that are adequate to a situation. Talking is not appropriate in case of being insulted by an adult outsider; a man must physically punish the perpetrator. However, if a boy insults the mother or girlfriend of his peer, the speech act is considered an appropriate form of neutralizing the attacker; the solidarity ties with the perpetrator do not allow them to use physical force in that case. Talking is inappropriate for a misbehaving child (primarily a boy); such a boy must be physically punished.

A man earns his living by doing and not by talking. However, having 'connections' with useful others and the ability to effectively verbally use these connections to achieve his goals is considered appropriate and 'manly.'

When it is necessary to talk to outsiders or people of higher status and authority, it is appropriate to use intermediary figures such as a priest, a local police captain, or a union steward to lead such negotiations. In these situations, too much speaking on one's behalf is not 'manly.' Personal connections to these intermediaries constitute a man's social status in his group. Codes of honour and dignity complement the speech code of manliness.

(Philipsen, 1992, pp. 23–31)

In conceptualizing his speech code theory, Philipsen and colleagues (2005) continuously emphasized that speech codes are cultural products and that intracultural communication is culture-rich. This idea of the cultural embeddedness of speech codes means that the sender and receiver, encoding and decoding, the context and rules of interactions, and the other components of a communicative act are not formal and neutral abstractions. In the case of communication within living communities, these components are loaded with cultural meanings that prescribe proper communication behaviour. In different communities, these meanings are different. Consider the speech code of manliness in Teamsterville: for a man to become talkative, the receiver must be of the same gender, status, and place of living. If the status, age, or gender of the receiver changes, the amount of speech and its tone dramatically change. The place and context of communication are also strongly saturated by cultural meanings. Communicating on one's 'turf' differs from speaking on the receiver's territory. Cultural meanings and values influence the content and dynamic of communication. However, communication is a manifestation of the neighbourhood culture, or as Philipsen worded it, "culture [is] in speaking (1992, p. 131). We again come to the systemic interactions model that intracultural communication and the culture of a community are two sides of the same phenomenon. Culture shapes communication, and communication manifests and maintains culture.

Cultural scripts

Linguists and social scientists use the concept of *cultural scripts* to understand the cultural structuring of the communication process broadly. Polish-Australian linguist Wierzbicka devised a theory of cultural scripts in communication (Wierzbicka, 1991, 1996). She examined Japanese (Wierzbicka, 1996), Russian (Wierzbicka, 2003), and English cultural communication scripts (Wierzbicka, 2006). Cultural scripts consist of *cultural values* and *communication scripts* that reflect these values. This is how the researcher describes relationships between them: "The different ways of speaking prevailing in different societies [culture-specific speech practices and interactional norms] are linked with, and make sense in terms of, different local cultural values" (1991, p. 47) (see Box 10.2 for more on these relationships). Thus, she devised the idea that cultural scripts refer "to tacit norms, values and practices widely shared, and widely known (on an intuitive level) in a given society" (1991, p. 43). *Cultural communication scripts* are the communal norms for interacting and speaking: who, when, how, with what words, and in what sequence one should speak in various situations. In contrast, cultural values explain why such scripts exist in their particular forms. Communities develop the communication scripts that exist in the public intersubjective space. These scripts are learned and internalized by children through language and communication socialization.

Box 10.2 Examples of cultural values determining communication scripts (from Wierzbicka, 1996)

Note: Scripts are written in the Natural Semantic Metalanguage using semantic primitives (see Wierzbicka, 1996, endnote 2)

Values and corresponding scripts of Japanese culture	*Examples and commentaries*	*Values and corresponding scripts of Anglo-American cultures*
Values: Sincerity, accepting responsibility, and willingness to cooperate. *Speech event:* Frequent apologies. *Communication script (CS):* • When someone says to me something like this: 'You did something [and] something bad happened (to someone/to me) because of this' it is good to say something like this to this person: "I feel something bad because of this" it is bad to say something like this to this person: 'I didn't do anything bad' (p. 533).	An office worker (A) (who is a cultural outsider) did not correct the typos made by another worker (B) in a document. The boss became angry at A for not making the corrections. (A) answered that it was not her fault. The boss became even angrier at (A). Why? Because (A) did not apologize and behaved defensively. *Communication script:* • It is not good to say something like this to other people: "I didn't do anything bad" (p. 534).	*Values:* Justice; people cannot be responsible for others' mistakes. People must be responsible for their mistakes but not for the mistakes of others. It is unfair to blame a person for another person's fault. • Thus, it is good to say: • "I did not do anything bad."
Values: Humility; self-effacement (an ability to not attract attention to oneself) and self-disparagement (self-depreciation). *Communication script:* • "When someone says to me something like this: 'something good happened to you because you did something good' • It is good to say something like this to this person: 'I can't think this[;]' this good thing happened not because I did something good" (p. 538).	An American family hosted an exchange student from Japan. The boy was an exceptional person and an excellent student during his six-month stay in the USA. When the father of the Japanese boy visited the family, they praised the boy very highly. The father did not accept this praise and complained about his son's terrible manners and selfishness, and the father apologized that he and his wife failed as parents. The American family became confused with such evaluations (p. 538–539). What was the source of the confusion? "Japanese people often show their respect to others by humbling themselves, … and this often takes the form of denigrating themselves and their family members" (p. 539).	*Values:* self-esteem, self-appreciation, and self-pride. *Communication scripts:* when someone says to me something good about me it is good to say, 'Thank you' or otherwise show appreciation Or "I have to say something like this to this person: 'I know you say this because you want me to feel something good. I feel something good toward you because of this'" (pp. 541–542).

Values and corresponding scripts of Japanese culture	*Examples and commentaries*	*Values and corresponding scripts of Anglo-American cultures*
Values: Paying attention to another's needs and wants; avoiding bothering others with one's desires *Speech event:* It is taboo to express one's wants and desires. *Communication script:* (a) "when I want to do something good for someone I can't say something like this to this person: 'I want to know what you want.'" (b) "I can't say something like this to other people: 'I want this, I don't want this'" (p. 543).	There is a Japanese guest in an American home. A hostess continuously asks the guest what he wants: tea or coffee, with milk or cream, with or without sugar, etc. The guest becomes annoyed by such treatment despite the explicit hospitality of the hostess. Why does the Japanese guest become upset and even think that the hostess was rude? People in Japan do not ask about other people's preferences directly. Drinks, for example, should be served without asking for input. A host must infer guests' preferences; expressing one's wants may bring too much trouble to the host.	*Values:* self-expression, self-assertion; it is good to express one's wants clearly and unequivocally. *Speech event:* always ask another person (a guest) what he or she prefers. *Communication script:* "when I want to do something good for someone it is good to say something like this to this person: 'I want to know what you want'" (p. 543).

From this conceptual review, we may conclude that the common ground that makes intracultural communication occur smoothly exists on two levels: cultural and linguistic. To provide conceptual coherence with the other chapters, I will interpret these communication regulation structures using sociocultural models. There are (1) foundational sociocultural models (SCMs) that include basic communal values and moral principles, (2) SCMs of the subject matter and domain of communication, and (3) SCMs for communication. The foundational models provide the guiding principles that structure the social fabric of communities (see Box 10.2 and Tables 10.1–10.3 on East Asian communication). The SCMs of the subject matter structure the topic of communication when interlocutors converse about family issues, parenting, politics, health, and many other things. Finally, the SCMs for communication regulate communicative acts. These models are similar

to the notions of cultural communication schemas, codes, and scripts. The SCMs for communication generate the required regularities for language use in particular situations: greeting, questioning, bargaining, reporting, complaining, resolving a conflict, etc. The SCMs for communication are nested within the more general SCMs of particular domains within which linguistic interactions occur. In turn, these domain-specific SCMs are nested within the communal foundational SCMs. These three layers of models are shared by community members and known to interlocutors. They use these models automatically and, as a result, understand each other instantly.

At this point of our discussion, let us talk about *communicative intersubjectivity*. You may recall that we talked about intersubjectivity in Chapter 1. To continue this logic, intersubjectivity during communication can presented like this: I know what you are talking about and why you are talking the way you do; you know what I am talking about and why I am conversing the way I do; I know that you know what I am talking about and you know that I know the topic of our conversation. Ultimately, anyone from our community who joins our conversation will understand what we are discussing. Moreover, other people will know that we know they are aware of our discussion's content and form. This communicative intersubjectivity comprises the cultural and communicative common grounds that make intracultural communication effortless and coherent.

Consider two students socialized in the same cultural community and who speak the same language starting to discuss their academic issues. They share the same understanding of academic life (the SCMs of education) and know the students' way of talking about lectures, profs, and other students (the SCMs for communication). Because of these cultural and communication common grounds, the conversation between these students is fluent and efficient, and there is complete mutual understanding.

Now, imagine conversations between a host culture student and an international student, between a visiting professor and a host student, or between a professor from the host culture and an international student. These cases are examples of *inter*cultural communication.

*Inter*cultural communication

The term *intercultural communication* indicates situations when interlocutors belong to different cultural communities and often to different language, speech, or discourse communities. Examples of such situations are numerous: two individuals from different cultures going on a date; a husband and wife in an intercultural marriage have a conversation about their children's discipline, household chores, or visiting in-laws; an international student discusses grades with their professor; a

boss and their multicultural employees have a meeting; colleagues in a multicultural work team have a coffee break.

Box 10.3 Intercultural communication studies

Intercultural communication studies is an interdisciplinary area of inquiry where scholars from anthropology, communication studies, linguistics, cultural and cross-cultural psychology, organizational psychology, and business conduct their research. It examines basic principles of communication across cultures and their application in business, marketing, military, politics, health, education, and many other segments where members of different cultures interact and communicate. It also incorporates studies on Culture, cultures, languages, and identity (see several editions of the *Handbook of International and Intercultural Communication*.) Because of the practical importance of intercultural communication in modern life, scholars and practitioners have created numerous intercultural training programs for various groups of people (Landis & Bhawuk, 2020; Landis, Bennett, & Bennett, 2004). There are schools and courses worldwide that prepare students, businesspeople, military personnel, and diplomats for various types of intercultural encounters (for example, Global Affairs Canada offers courses on intercultural learning, diversity, inclusion, and country-specific cultural exploration: https://www.international.gc.ca/global-affairs-affaires-mondiales/services/cfsi-icse/programs-programmes/intercultural-interculturelle.aspx?lang=eng).

Intercultural communication is notorious for producing confusion and misunderstandings. The misunderstandings that emerge during intercultural communication may damage the well-being of people along with the lives of their families, institutions, corporations, and even governments. (See Box 10.4 for some examples of misunderstandings. Read more examples of miscommunication on campuses in Barna (1998).)

Box 10.4 'In Focus' feature. Examples of intercultural misunderstandings

1. "Sit Where You Like" (Chinese versus American culture)

   An American company was trying to sell high-end technical goods to a potential Chinese buyer. Relations had been going well, and members of the Chinese contingent were invited for a factory tour in anticipation of the contract between the two companies finally being signed. The evening after the tour, the Americans hosted the Chinese delegation for dinner at a local restaurant. Upon entering the restaurant, the head of the Chinese

delegation was greeted by a junior member of the US team. The head of the delegation asked where he should sit, to which he was told to "sit where you like." The next day the Chinese delegation left the USA without signing the contract. Days later, the US team received word that the Chinese felt humiliated and were reconsidering the business relationship.

So, what happened?

In Chinese culture, hierarchy is essential; in contrast, in American culture, equality is emphasized, and displays of hierarchy are not culturally comfortable. So, when the head of the Chinese delegation was greeted only by a junior member of the team rather than the most senior one, he immediately felt a loss of face. To add insult to injury, he was then told to 'sit anywhere' – according to Chinse customs, he should have been given the seat at the head of the table next to the most senior US team member. In Chinese culture, people tend to hide their feelings. For this reason, the team did not say anything at the time; instead, the Chinese left without signing the contract. The US team had to work hard to repair the damage. This cultural misunderstanding led to an eight-month delay in signing the contract. (edited from: https://www.commisceo-global.com/blog/3-real-life-examples-of-cultural-misunderstandings-in-business; accessed on July 15, 2023).

Comments: This is an example of relationships between cultural values and communication scripts (see Box 10.3 on the Wierzbicka approach). Communication scripts represent cultural values. It is also an example of *ethnocentrism in communication*. Such a form of ethnocentrism occurs when one communicative partner assumes that their model/script/code of communication is universally applicable or at least applicable to their partner. This may happen when an ethnocentric person does not know or does not care about their partners' models or scripts for communication.

2. "I'm Just Joking!" (Australian versus Thai Culture)

An Australian national moved to work in Bangkok, Thailand. In attempt to show his affable nature, he made good-humoured jokes about his colleagues. Within a very short time, the Thai nationals in the office were not very impressed with their new colleague. Complaints were being made against the Australian for inappropriate behaviour. Most notably, many of the Thais said that he was rude to them. The Australian's Thai colleagues were giving him the cold shoulder and not making him feel welcome.

So, what went wrong?

In this example, the Australian was trying to make friends by making jokes about his Thai colleagues in front of other people. In Australia, this is an acceptable way of making friends. 'Banter' (the playful and friendly

exchange of teasing remarks) between colleagues is typical, and Australian people will make jokes about one another to show friendliness.

In Thailand, however, this does not translate. You do not make jokes about people in front of others, especially work colleagues. As a result of the Australian's behaviour, all the Thais in the office thought that he was extremely rude and insensitive (edited from: https://www.commisceo-global.com/blog/3-real-life-examples-of-cultural-misunderstandings-in-business; accessed on July 15, 2023).

Commentary: This example shows the relationships between the communication script and people's attitudes towards others. In Australia, 'banter' in communication represents a friendly and humorous attitude towards others; no insult is intended. In Thailand, jokes about your colleagues in front of others are considered to be rude and unfriendly. This example also highlights that humour, jokes, and anecdotes are culturally sensitive forms of communication and should be used with caution in another culture. What is considered funny in one cultural community may be considered boring or even offensive in another.

3. British versus American English.

An American woman's Indian boyfriend visited her mother and said, "You have a very homely home." She was offended even though he meant no offence. *Homely* means "ugly" in American English, but "like a home" in British English. When visiting England, the woman's British host said to her, "I'll knock you up in the morning." She was stunned, while he was just being friendly. In Britain, the phrase means to knock on the door and wake someone up. In American English, it means to get someone pregnant (Laura William-May; edited from https://www.quora.com/What-are-some-examples-of-cross-cultural-misunderstandings; accessed on July 15, 2023).

Commentary: These are examples of linguistic misunderstandings: some words and phrases in similar languages (British English versus American English) have different meanings.

Why does intercultural communication go wrong?

The essential thesis of the theory of sociocultural models about communication is that intercultural challenges happen because interlocutors do not share or only partially share the three layers of sociocultural regulation of communication: the foundational model, the SCMs of the objects of conversation, and the SCMs for communicative events and acts. The primary way to improve intercultural communication is to increase the interlocutors' intercultural communicative competence

by teaching them about the basic values of corresponding communities determined by the foundational models, about the domain of life within which communication happens (the SCM of the content of conversations), and about the style of communication – how, to whom, and in what context to speak (the SCM for communication).

I illustrate this hierarchical structuring of communication by using the East Asian sociocultural models of fundamental moral values, relationships among people, and communication, as described by Korean sociolinguist Yum (1999; 2022). Yum does not use the term cultural models; rather, she outlines and presents three levels of East Asian values, principles and norms of relationships, and communication that have a close correspondence with our hypothesis of sociocultural regulation of communication (see Tables 10.1–10.3).

East Asian sociocultural models of values, relationships, and communication

These models are rooted in Confucian philosophy about human nature and people's relationships. For centuries, this philosophy has been accepted by China, Korea, and Japan. Confucian philosophy has several fundamental principles that guide people's lives and social relationships.

These fundamental Confucian values structure interpersonal relationships among people in many East Asian countries. For comparison purposes, Yum outlined the North American principles of relationships.

Table 10.1 The foundational model (of values) of Confucian relationships

Primary principle/moral value	*Translation and interpretation*
1. *Jen* (pronounced *wren)*	**Humanism:** human heartedness, benevolent human relationships, goodness in human relations. This is the core value for people's communion. All other values and practices stem from *Jen.*
2. *Shu* (pronounced shuu)	**Reciprocity:** how Jen should be practiced; you should treat others the same way you want to be treated by them; you should work to understand how it feels to be in another person's position.
3. *Li* (pronounced *lee)*	**Propriety:** respect for rituals and social forms of behaviour. *Li* also signifies showing deference to others and reservation about oneself – choosing proper actions that fit a situation. It is an outward manifestation of *Jen*.
4. *Yi* (pronounced yee)	**Righteousness** and **faithfulness:** a sense of the morality of a person who differentiates right from wrong; to know what the right thing to do.
5. *Chih* (pronounced chee)	**Moral wisdom:** knowledge about right and wrong.

Table 10.2 Confucian and North American Principles of interpersonal relationships

East Asian Principles of Relationships	*North American Principles of Relationships*	*Comments*
1. Particularistic. Specific rules and practices are applied depending on the type of relationships and contexts. Even an invitation for dinner sounds different when offered to people of different ages, statuses, levels of familiarity, and different purposes of the event.	**Universalistic.** Treat all people fairly and equally, independently of their status and situations. People give an equally friendly approach to friends or strangers.	East Asians regulate relations depending on levels of trust and intimacy, a person's status, and context. This pattern of relationships is considered morally right (*Li*) and follows *Jen*.
2. Long-term complementarity with compulsory reciprocity. Relationship partners feel indebted to others and dependent on them.	**Short-term and contractual reciprocity.** People join and depart clubs and teams without serious repercussions from these groups. People strive to maintain their autonomy and independence in their choices. Relationships and reciprocity are based on contracts and not obligations.	East Asians value reciprocity (*Shu*) as a manifestation of *Jen*. They need to build relationships that require reciprocity. In turn, this allows them to manifest their benevolence.
3. Sharp distinction between in- and out-group members. The style of speech and meanings of things are different when speaking with in-group members compared to out-group ones.	**No sharp distinction between in- and out-groups.** The style of speech and meanings of things are consistent for all.	Long-term and close-knit groups provide an opportunity to fully reciprocate (*Shu*) and experience interconnectedness with people in accordance with *Jen* and *Li*.
4. **In- and out-group distinctions.** When speaking to an out-group person, one requires the presence of personally-known and trusted intermediaries	**If intermediaries between groups or persons are needed, they bring in professional and contractual individuals.** Some people provide special services, such as lawyers, negotiators, counsellors, real estate agents, professional wedding planners, entertainers, and many others.	East Asians must follow a proper ritual (*Li*) to establish new relationships. To this end, you require an intermediary who is in-group for both parties.
5. Personal and professional relationships often overlap. Business associates need a good social relationship to create a good working relationship.	**As a rule, personal and professional relationships are kept separate**. Professional relationships are contractual, business, and for-profit associations that are kept distinct to achieve specific goals. Personal relationships are built around intimacy and benevolence; in principle, they differ from business relations.	Confucian values induce a distaste for purely business-like, calculated, and for-profit relations. There should be humanness in all relationships.

Table 10.3 East Asian and North American sociocultural models for communication

East Asian Sociocultural Model for Communication	*North American Sociocultural Model for Communication*
1. Process oriented. Proper communication is the basis of good relationships. Thus, East Asian speakers pay close attention to the communication process by following rituals and fitting them into the context, the type of communication partners, and the nature of the event. They give importance to how a sentence, greeting, or request is worded and delivered.	**Outcome oriented.** Because there is a more universalistic model of relationships in North America, the communication model pays less attention to the particulars of the speech event and focuses on achieving the outcome of the speech act: delivering the message.
2. Receiver centred. A communicative act is about listening and interpreting what a partner intends to say and actually communicates. It is the responsibility of the receiver to decrypt the message correctly. If a receiver says, "I do not understand you," this means that the receiver is not skillful in communication, and it is the fault of the receiver.	**Sender centred.** It is the responsibility of the sender to deliver a clear message. Senders must work on formulating clear messages and refining their delivery. If a receiver says, "I do not understand you," this means that the sender is not skillful in delivering a clear message. It is the sender's fault for having poor communicative abilities.
3. Differentiated (honorific) linguistic code. In East Asia, a person's status and position in various social hierarchies are critical. Language and communication patterns reflect this importance – people develop differentiated honorific styles of communication to address persons of different ages, statuses, and closeness of relations. In contrast, "In the Korean language, ... there are three different ways to say 'to eat': *muk-da* (plain), *du-shin-da* (polite), and *chap-soo-shin-da* (honorific)." (p. 69). Even Korean food is named differently to reflect different occasions: "Rice may be *bap* (plain), *shik-sa* (polite), or *jin-ji* (honorific)" (p. 69).	**Less differentiated and honorific linguistic codes.** In North America and other Western countries, people use less differentiated communication styles, even though these countries may differ in executing their codes. In English, speakers use 'you' when referring to the president, a child, or a friend. A dinner invitation will be worded the same way for people of different statuses. In French, Russian, and various other languages, there are two forms: 'tu' or 'ты' and 'vous' or 'вы.' Tu is used for informal communication among close relatives or friends. When speaking to someone in authority (a teacher, elder, professor or boss), it is proper to use vous or вы. In English, such differentiation is usually expressed either by using a first name (Hi, John) or a title and the last name (Good afternoon, Dr. Smith).

(*Continued*)

Table 10.3 East Asian and North American sociocultural models for communication (Continued)

East Asian Sociocultural Model for Communication	*North American Sociocultural Model for Communication*
4. Indirect communication style	**Direct communication style**
Indirect and direct communication styles exist in all speech communities. In some of them, one of the styles is normative and implemented regularly. Some scholars consider these communication styles elements of *high-* and *low-context communication orientations* (see later in this section) and aspects of cross-cultural politeness requirements (Grainger & Mills, 2016).	
East Asian communities, among others (Arabian and Indian), emphasize and predominantly use an *indirect communication style*. In this style, a speaker transmits to a receiver more than they actually say. The extra information and meanings rely on mutually-shared cultural models. The speaker expects that the receiver will understand and interpret them correctly. Examples of indirect speech acts are metaphors, irony, jokes, insinuations, and innuendos. Moreover, there is a refusal to say "No" or "You are wrong" directly. Rather, they use more implicit indicators of disapproval instead. For example, the Japanese use 16 speech forms to avoid saying "No" directly. It is believed that indirect speech allows people to protect their 'face,' which symbolizes their dignity and respect. It is also considered an essential element of politeness. Direct-style-communication speakers may find such a style insincere, indecisive, time-wasting, and annoying.	The direct style of communication is predominant in North America and Western Europe. Because many communication events in these countries happen on a contractual basis, it is essential to have direct, open, and clear communication. These communities demand that people directly say "No"" when they do not want something and "I disagree" if they hold a different opinion. Such a communication style is the norm; however, people also use indirect speech daily. Indirect-style communication people may interpret such a style as rude, impolite, demanding, and aggressive.

Communication acts are rooted in the values and take place within particular relationships. Therefore, after analysing the Confucian values and their corresponding models of and for relationships, the author unpacked the East Asian communication model and compared it with the North American one.

It is important to emphasize that these values, relationship patterns, and communication scripts constitute the public, often institutionalized, conventional models of relationships. They exist in a community's intersubjective space, have a history, and are communicated to children during their enculturation. The members of communities have access to and internalize these models to different extents. Thus, East Asians may deviate from these prescribed models and may not consistently

demonstrate them in all situations. In addition, many East Asians may encounter and learn other models of relationships, including Western ones. Therefore, they may act in the manner expected of North Americans or Europeans in some situations. Moreover, it is important to remember that these traditional models developed centuries ago. In modern times, some of them may be perceived as outdated, and communities may modify them and create new interactions that researchers may not yet have noted or recorded.

The importance of context, time, and space in communication

American anthropologist **Edward T. Hall** (1914–2009) is considered a founder of intercultural communication studies. Hall (1959/1973, 1969, 1976) identified several cross-cultural differences in communication and conceptualized them as *high- and low-context communication*, *mono- and polychronic time orientation,* and *proxemics*. Now, we review these ideas.

Contexting process and high- versus low-context cultures

An important aspect of societies' SCMs for communication is what Hall (1976) labelled the "contexting process" (p. 86). Using this process, speakers scan the environment (when, where, with whom, and under what circumstances communication happens) and regulate their communications accordingly. This contextual embeddedness of communicative acts dramatically reduces the amount of information interlocutors must process during the communication event because the context they find themselves in dictates the rules and content of the conversation. The contexting process codes the meaning of what a sender says during a conversation and defines what meaning is decoded by a receiver. For example, the meaning and emotional charge of the phrase "I love you" depends on the context of the conversation: a mother talking to her child, two lovers confessing their deep attachment, or a wife saying farewell to her husband-soldier. In addition, consider an instance in which interlocutors are structuring their arguments differently depending on their context: being a member of a university debate club, a prosecutor outlining charges in court, a kindergarten child having a conflict with a classmate, or partners disputing at home.

Depending on how interlocutors use the context in communication, Hall differentiated between *high-* versus *low-context messages* and corresponding *styles of communication*. "A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person[s – both the sender and receiver, VC], while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message" (Hall, 1976, p. 91).

In Western cultures, examples of HC communication include dialogues between husband and wife, parents and their children, siblings, or friends. These people may

talk using few words, and their communicative acts are often firmly embedded in the context of a situation. The question "What are you doing?" can have many meanings depending on who is asking whom and in what context. This expression may convey a genuine question, sarcasm, fear, or disgust. In HC communication, communicative partners understand the meaning of a question despite the limited words used. HC messages are typically indirect (see Table 10.3).

In contrast, "A low-context (LC) communication is just the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code" (p. 91). To work efficiently, the LC communication style is used by professors talking to students about their exams, lawyers participating in court arguments, politicians drafting policies, and more. LC messages are direct and explicit.

Members of some cultural/language communities emphasize and use context in communication more often than in other communities. Because of such differences, Hall suggested to differentiate between *high-context* and *low-context cultures*.

High- versus low-context cultures. Members of HC cultures use HC messaging for communication in most situations. Among such cultures, Hall identified Asian (primarily East Asian), Aboriginal, and some Latin American communities. Subsequently, LC cultures use the LC style of communication most of the time and consider it to be proper and efficient. These are mostly Western cultural communities. Note that these countries vary in the directness of their speech. For instance, Germanic and Scandinavian cultures are more direct and at a greater level of LC than English-speaking communities such as Great Britain, Canada, the US, and others.

Members of LC cultures frequently interpret conversations with people from HC cultures as obscured and vague; as a result, they may consider these people insincere, untrustworthy, and poorly organized. In contrast, members of HC cultures may perceive people with LC communication styles as pushy, demanding, and even rude.

Empirical verifications of the HC versus LC communication cultures

Hall hypothesized these two styles of communication and the corresponding classification of cultures based on his ethnographic studies, personal observations, and literature analysis. However, he did not articulate his theory of contexting, did not identify dimensions along which HC and LC cultures differ, and did not justify the empirical basis for his conclusions.

Several scholars have worked to fill this gap (Cardon, 2008; Ohashi, 2000). The empirical research in this area has focused chiefly on identifying HC and LC communication dimensions, developing psychometric scales, validating them, and conducting comparative studies to test Hall's hypotheses. Cardon (2008) summarized studies on Hall's contexting theory in the following way.

Primary features of communication in high-context cultures

Senders are sensitive about who they are talking to and in what situation. Close attention is paid to social cues and context. The contexting process is noticeable, and interlocutors are continuously aware of the context.

Interlocutors rely on communicative intersubjectivity and know that they share the same understanding of the content and scripts for communication. They rely on internalized communication models and schemas.

Maintaining these relationships is paramount and comes before the importance of any task. Politeness is emphasized, confrontation is avoided, and the primary message is not explicitly expressed – the receiver must infer it. The meanings of words vary; thus, their exact meanings must be inferred from the context and other cues.

A slow pace of communication is appreciated; artful language with proverbs, sayings, tales, and stories is preferred. Reasoning and persuasion are holistic; the truth is relative, and general principles of logic are preferred. Few emotions are displayed, and communication contains little self-disclosure. The goals of communicative events and relationships are long-term and oriented towards stability.

Primary features of communication in low-context cultures

Although interlocutors in low-context cultures understand to whom and in what conditions they are talking, the role of context and various social cues are not emphasized. The primary focus is on delivering the message.

Despite speakers belonging to the same low-context sociolinguistic community, communication only partially relies on hidden, internalized knowledge and meaning. The primary message must be unambiguously expressed and stated at the start of the conversation. Confrontations and disagreements are typical; they should not be avoided but facilitated. Politeness is relevant but not highly emphasized.

Precise and detailed information is preferred; a fast pace and quick responses are appreciated; social cues and context are not strongly emphasized. Executing tasks comes before relationships; the goals of relationships and communicative events are short-term and may change. Language must be task-oriented; ambiguities should be avoided, and the meaning of words should not vary greatly.

Truth is absolute; the reasoning is linear and 'black and white'; adherence to rules is strong, and contracts are followed strictly. Emotions are displayed, and self-disclosure is appropriate. Researchers have developed psychometric scales to measure these styles (Ohashi, 2000) and have conducted cross-cultural studies to empirically investigate HC and VC messaging (Gudykunst et al., 1996; Kim et al., 1998). Although not all the dimensions of contexting have been empirically supported, researchers have confirmed that the constructs of high- and low-context communicative cultures are valid. This confirmation has helped researchers better understand cross-cultural communicative differences.

Time in intercultural communication (chronemics)

Hall also contributed to intercultural communication studies by conceptualizing how people manage time. Time is a fundamental dimension of people's lives. The philosophical understanding of time describes it as "the indefinite continued progress of existence and events of the past, present, and future, regarded as a whole" (Soanes & Stevenson, 2008, p. 1506). Sociocultural psychologists are interested in time as a cultural thing (the phenomenon shaped by cultural communities and managed according to this understanding) that is represented in human consciousness (temporal consciousness) (Bluedorn, 2002).

Hall articulated two styles of managing time in relationships and communication: the *Monochronic* (M-time) and *Polychronic* (P-time) forms of time organization (Hall, 1983). *Mono* means one, alone, or single; *poly-* means many, numerous; *chronos* (Greek) means time. According to Hall, monochronic time organization means that people do one thing at a time, whereas polychronic time organization reflects when people do more than one thing at once (see Table 10.4). Western cultures, especially Nordic and Germanic ones, are considered M-time oriented. Middle Asian, Latin American, and Aboriginal communities are usually P-time oriented

Table 10.4 Monochronic and polychronic time dimensions (based on Hall, 1983 and Kaufman et al., 1991)

Monochronic Time Dimension	*Polychronic Time Dimension*
Time is money	Time is just time.
Schedules organize relationships; the focus is on the task at hand and getting the job done.	Relationships are focused on people; communicating with them is more important than completing tasks and achieving deadlines.
Do not be late; it is rude and disrespectful	It is okay to be late; interruptions happen.
Monochronic people often refer to their clocks and watches.	Polychronic people use an 'internal' clock; they do things when the time is right.
Plans and schedules are essential.	Plans can be changed, and schedules may always be corrected.
Time should not be wasted; time is a road, and people should strive to get moving.	There is no such thing as 'wasted' time. Time is a point, and people should live in the present.
Work should be done linearly: one thing at a time.	During work time, several tasks can be handled simultaneously.
Monochronic organizations are demanding and, most of the time, efficient.	Polychronic organizations are centralized, less complex, and can be overwhelmed by having too many functions.

As with other cultural dimensions, all communities have their sociocultural models of time management that their members internalize to different extents. Consequently, there can be monochronic people in polychronic cultures and polychronic people in monochronic cultures. Researchers continue to investigate the temporal aspects of people's subjectivities in different settings (Kaufman et al., 1991).

Nonverbal aspects of communication

An essential aspect of intra- and intercultural communication is nonverbal forms of transmitting messages (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1998; Guerrero & Hecht, 2007; Knapp et al., 2013; Matsumoto, 2006; Stanlaw et al., 2018). Nonverbal communication refers to transmitting information during interactions through channels other than the verbal one (words and sentences). The main channels of nonverbal expressions are presented in Table 10.5.

Table 10.5 Primary nonverbal channels of communication (based on Ekman & Friesen, 1969 and Knapp et al., 2013)

Vocalis from Latin *vōcālis* ("sounding, vocal"), clipping of *mūsculus vōcālis* ("vocal muscle"). **Vocalis or paralanguage** is an aspect of vocal communication that does not include words. This is how people use their vocal capacities to convey their intentions, attitudes and opinions, feelings, and motivations over and above the meanings conveyed by their verbal messages.

Proxemics from *proximity+emic* was coined by Hall (1969). It refers to the use of space between interlocutors in life and communication.

Kinetics "relat[es] to muscular motion;" it first appeared in 1841 from Greek *kinētikos*, "moving, putting in motion," and from *kinētos*, "moved." Kinetics or **body language** includes several channels to transmit information: facial expressions, posture and body movements, and gestures.

Haptics from Greek *hapticos*, "able to come into contact with" (https://www.etymonline.com/word/haptic). Haptics or touching refers to everything related to the sense of touch. It includes self-touch and other types of touch (hugging, tapping a shoulder, handshaking, touching a hand or arm) in communication and other domains: education, therapy, work, etc.

Oculesics from the Latin *oculus*, "eye." It means *eye gaze*. In communication, it refers to all forms of eye movements: gaze, winking, glancing, eye contact, eye rolling, blinking, and some others.

Olfactics from the Latin *olfacere*, "to smell." It refers to everything related to smell. In communication, it relates to a body's odour and its role in exchanging messages unconsciously and consciously.

Physical appearance and attire include the body, face, hair, nails and other body parts, decorations, and clothing in all their manifestations (Knapp et al., 2013).

Paralanguage

The primary dimensions of paralanguage are volume, pitch, the pace of speech, articulation, intonation, and accent (Matsumoto et al., 2013). Just as slow and quiet music played by a flute provides a different mood from fast and loud music played by an electric guitar, the dimensions of your voice hold these same abilities. *Voice volume* – from soft to loud – may indicate one's emotions. If a person is loud, it could indicate aggressiveness, demand, threat, fear, or even just excitedness; if one speaks softly, it could indicate calmness, self-assertion, intimacy, or secrecy. *Pitch* – from high to low – is also related to emotions (the higher the pitch, the stronger the emotion). It is also related to gender (women usually have a higher pitch than men) and age (youngsters typically have a higher pitch than adults). The *pace of speech* – from fast to slow – may indicate emotions and motivation. Asthenic feelings like sadness, disgust, and depressive mood decrease speech rate; a fast pace of speech usually accompanies an active state of mind, agitation, excitement, and a desire to move and act. Strong emotions (fear, joy, curiosity, or anger) or high levels of task and goal orientation increase one's speech rate. *Articulation* – distinct to indistinct – may indicate different mental states: Impatience and confusion may lead to obscure speech while being demanding and threatening can lead one to be distinctive and loud. *Intonation* indicates a pitch modulation and a change in stress to produce meaning. For example, a question in English requires a person to raise their voice at the end of an utterance. At the end of a declarative English sentence, the pitch goes down. Different languages use different intonations in communication, and it is crucial to recognize them to comprehend the meaning.

In addition to the quality of voice and speaking, paralanguage includes *paralinguistic respirations*, such as gasps, sighs, moans and groans, throat-clearing, and saying "mhm" and "huh." Within different SCMs for communication, these respirations may convey different meanings; thus, it is essential to understand when and how to use them.

Proxemics

In his book, *The Hidden Dimension* (1969), Hall elaborated on proxemics in communication and outlined four types of communicative distance: *intimate, personal*, *social*, and *public*.

Intimate distance (from 8 to 30 cm) relates to intimate relationships: lovemaking, mother-child bonding, comforting, and protecting. At this distance, partners can smell each other, sense body heat, hear breathing, and feel heartbeat; they can see only limited parts of the other's face and body. One's voice is usually soft, low-pitched, and slow. In the USA and Canada, intimate distance is mostly used in private settings and is avoided in public. When circumstances, such as crowded buses

or trains, push people close to each other, this can create high levels of discomfort and distress.

Personal distance (from 40 to 120 cm) is the distance at which two persons hold hands or one person touches another person. The far end of this range indicates keeping someone at "arm's length." This is the distance at which another person's face and upper body are clearly visible, revealing details without distortion. Subjects of a personal nature may be discussed at this distance using a soft, low-volume voice and a slow to moderate pace. In Canada and the US, friends and couples keep this distance when in public.

Social distance (from 120 cm to nearly 4 m) is typical when discussing impersonal and business matters. Colleagues usually work at the low end of social distance (120 cm to 2 m). The far end of social distance indicates formal and business-like relationships. The voice is louder than in the previous distancing and better articulated. At about 4 m, people feel relatively isolated and can work as if they are alone.

Public distance (from 4 to 8 m and more) is used for public meetings and gatherings. At this distance, speech is loud and amplified. Notably, at 10 m and more, some meaning, paralanguage and non-verbal behaviours can be lost. The distance at the close end allows a person to notice a threat and execute a flight or fight response.

As we may expect, this classification does not hold true for all cultures. Cultural communities have developed various socially acceptable distances for different types of communication; we may call them the SCMs of proxemics or *objective proxemics*. Outsiders can observe how far apart people stand when communicating. Consequently, people from different countries feel comfortable at different distances for different types of communication (Sorokowska et al., 2017). These are the internalized aspects of the SCMs of proxemics or *subjective proxemics*. For example, some Arabic communities prefer closer distances than Westerners during business interactions. This is their model for business proxemics. Westerners may feel uncomfortable in the Arabic negotiation environment because their internalized model of business proxemics does not correspond to the conventional Arabic business proxemics model. Sorokowska and colleagues found that countries with hotter climates prefer to use a smaller communicative distance. Countries in the Middle East, Latin America and Southern Europe are typically recognized as *close-contact cultures*. In contrast, North European and North American communities are considered *distant-contact cultures*.

Kinetics or body language

Gestures are the oldest form of communication. Our communicative abilities began developing by transmitting information using body movements and hand gestures. In intercultural communication, gestures may often substitute our lack of language knowledge and help us interact with people from other language communities.

Gestures continuously accompany our verbal communication, assisting us to transmit the intended meaning, intention or feeling. Researchers have developed several classifications of gestures and body movements. One classification includes *emblems*, *regulators/manipulator*, *pointing*, and *iconic/illustrator* gestures (Ekman & Friesen, 1969; see also Morris, Collett et al., 1981). These gestures have different meanings in different cultures; thus, intercultural communication researchers describe, classify, and study them intensively (Matsumoto, 2006; Morris, 1994; Samovar et al., 2013).

Emblems are culturally universal or culturally specific ways of expressing a particular idea, attitude or emotion using gestures. In English-speaking countries, a person makes the OK sign by creating a circle with their thumb and index finger. This gesture means 'everything is fine,' 'I am in good shape,' and other positive statements – this is an example of an emblem. 'Thumb-up' and 'give-me-five' are other examples of emblems. Emblems substitute for one or two-word phrases and can be expressed verbally. The most typical emblems are those that stand for 'yes' and 'no.' In many countries, nodding one's head up and down indicates 'yes,' while moving one's head from side to side means 'no.' In other countries such as Bulgaria, these emblems have the opposite meanings: nodding means 'no' and swinging the head from one side to the other indicates 'yes.' The emblem OK in Japan and Korea means 'money; in Arab countries, it means hostility; in some Latino cultures, it symbolizes an orifice and is offensive (Samovar et al., 2013, p. 282). Almost all cultures have insulting emblems (Lefevre, 2011). These emblems, such as 'showing the middle finger,' 'the fig,' 'the arm of honour,' 'the fork,' and many others, substitute for swear words. (Read about correctly swearing in different countries (Sacher, 2012).) Therefore, intercultural communicators must be careful of using their culture's emblems in other countries because they may be offensive there.

Regulators/manipulators are gestures interlocutors use to regulate the flow of conversation: taking turns speaking, inviting a speaker to continue, repeating, or stopping talking. As with other nonverbal forms, regulators may be unintentional or intentional. Intentional regulators are influenced by people's culture, social status, gender, and other characteristics.

Pointing or *deictic gestures* direct someone's attention to an object or a person. They show direction by a head movement, using an index finger, a gaze, or moving other body parts. In many cultures, pointing at another person can be interpreted as rude. People should avoid explicit pointing until they learn the proper gestures of a different culture.

Illustrators or *iconic gestures* illustrate the attributes of the object or phenomenon a person is speaking about. For example, to show a big object, we often spread our hands to demonstrate how big or wide the object is. Iconic gestures accompany human speech nearly universally and help people illustrate their thoughts and express their ideas.

A unique form of kinetics is **facial expressions**. They are essential sources of information about people's feelings, intentions, attitudes, and other mental states and are an integral part of all intra- and intercultural communication forms. Researchers interested in the relationships between culture and emotions intensively investigate emotional expressions and corresponding emotional feelings and experiences in different communities (Mesquita et al., 2016).

In everyday life and communication, nonverbal indicators, including emotional expressions, can be *involuntary* or *voluntary*. Involuntary nonverbal expressions, called *leakages*, happen without a person's intention or awareness and control. Very often, leakages reveal true feelings, intentions, and mental states. Researchers have established a hierarchy of leakages regarding their level of voluntary control. Face and facial expressions are most easily controlled; body movements, postures and gestures are less controllable; finally, voice is least controllable (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1998, p. 777).

Following the logic of this textbook's theoretical framework, I will use the idea of the cultural/sociocultural models of emotion (Karandashev, 2021; Mesquita et al., 2014; Wong & Tsai, 2007) to articulate how sociocultural communities shape and regulate their people's volitional emotional experiences and expressions. Affective states that include emotion, mood, and motivation are longstanding, evolved, biologically structured, and physiologically wired systems that regulate organisms' behaviours and experiences (Panksepp & Biven, 2012). Many of these reactions function automatically and have different levels of voluntary control.

American psychologist **Paul Ekman** developed and validated a universalist hypothesis about emotions and emotional displays (Ekman, 1999; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). He identified six basic emotions – anger, disgust, fear, joy/happiness, sadness, and surprise, and argued that these emotions are universally felt, expressed, and recognized across cultures. Later, Ekman added *contempt* as the seventh basic emotion.

Anthropologists accept the universal and biologically determined nature of affective states; however, they emphasize that culture shapes these states, especially their experiences and expressions (Lutz & White, 1986). As with other biologically-determined phenomena in humans' lives, such as sex, genitals, lactation, parenting, and hundreds of others, communities have culturalized and domesticated emotions, infused them with cultural meaning, and developed means to control them. The sociocultural models of emotion or, as Marta Nussbaum called them, "the emotional 'grammar'" (Nussbaum, 2001, p. 149) of a person's society, are the communal norms and prescriptions of the meaning of emotions, the role various affects should play in people's lives, and how members of a community must deal with their emotions. The SCMs of emotions determine what events should trigger what emotions and what feelings people should experience in different situations. Thus, they determine how these feelings should be labelled, how persons should display their feelings, and what expressions they should use. Mesquita and colleagues (2016) stated

that communities construct a representation of reality and attitudes towards it by shaping people's affective states. For example, a community prescribes that a man should be angry at an intruder who is making advances on his wife or girlfriend, and he should fight back to protect them. This prescription represents the old-fashioned idea of the ownership of a woman and the man's duty to protect her; it conveys the norms of real manhood and regulates man-to-woman and man-to-man relationships. This 'emotional (and communication) grammar' is a complex set of taken-for-granted rules and instructions that members of a community use to structure their emotional reactions and interpret the affective states of their fellow community members. Because of its origin, structuring, and regulation, the nonverbal emotional component of communication is a complex mixture of physiologically-determined and culturally-shaped aspects.

What do we know about the cultural shaping of affective states? Many communities prescribe that their members should have as few emotions as possible. In other words, they advise having an emotionless way of life. The Stoics' teaching of Ancient Greece is one such doctrine (Graver, 2007). However, Graver's analysis indicated that Stoics are not against emotions and feelings in people's lives; instead, they propagated the volitional control of what, why, and how we experience our feelings. These feelings are of different origin and should be regulated differently. The ultimate goal of this school of thought is to establish rational and moral control over a person's person's emotional life. Ancient Indian teachings also invited people to control their emotions and corresponding feelings (Bilimoria & Wenta, 2015; McDaniel, 1995). Indian sages developed sophisticated theories of emotions that allowed Indians to interpret and regulate their emotions differently from what is taught by the Western approach.

Culturally-specific treatment also targets particular emotions – for example, anger. According to Ekman, anger is one of the basic emotions that emerges when something or somebody prevents a person from achieving their goals; in interpersonal relationships, it also arises when facing unreasonable behaviour or negligence by other people (Scherer, 1983). However, different communities frame and consider anger differently. In societies that value the individual, experiencing and expressing anger is considered a positive reaction because it allows people to channel their negative feelings, express themselves and, ultimately, 'be who they really are.' Some authors use the term "expressive individualism" (Lynch, 1990) to emphasize that persons are relatively unrestrained in their experiences and the manifestations of feelings and desires. In societies where harmony and balance among community members are paramount, anger is considered to be a destructive and undesirable emotion that must be strictly controlled by the community and its members (Briggs, 1970).[1]

This discussion of the expression of anger brings us to the concept of display rules. "Display rules are socially learned … and prescribe different procedures

for the management of affect displays in various social settings, roles, etc." (Ekman & Friesen, 1969, p. 75). Matsumoto and colleagues (2005) identified five display rules:

1 Express an emotion *without inhibition* (expression). Some cultures prescribe that one must have sincerity and authenticity when feeling and expressing emotions.
2 Express an emotion with *less intensity* than it is felt (deamplification). Many cultures prescribe being constrained when expressing various positive and negative emotions to demonstrate that one has a balanced mental state.
3 Express an emotion with *more intensity* than it is felt (amplification). Some cultures prescribe that their members, especially women, must be loud and expressive in displaying their grief at a funeral. Some communities require that during positive events, their members should express joy and excitement very articulately and have intense verbal and facial expressions as well as body movements (for example, calling out, "Yes, oh my God, I cannot believe this!!!" accompanied by jumping and raising one's arms).
4 Even if someone experiences an emotion, they must *display no feelings* (i.e., have a "poker face") (neutralization). Diplomats, card players, therapists, judges, police officers, and other professionals must neutralize the expression of their feelings so they do not interfere with their professional duties.
5 Close to neutralization is *masking*, which includes hiding a real emotion by displaying a different one. For example, some cultures prescribe that their people smile when they are experiencing confusion, frustration, fear, or indecisiveness.

These rules vary within and across cultures. They differentially prescribe expressing affective states with reference to the type of emotion, age, gender, social status, profession, and other social factors (Safdar et al., 2009).

Cultures also prescribe what actions should be taken after displaying particular emotions. In Box 10.1, we discussed how Teamsville's culture code prescribed either actions or words after various forms of insult. In some communities, a heated confrontation is expected if an automobile accident happens, while others advocate for being calm and controlling oneself.

Haptics or touching in intercultural communication

Touching is a deeply biological and ancient form of communication. Touching is a universal way to communicate a variety of attitudes and affective states; almost all cultures use it during interactions. The differences between cultures involve who touches whom, for what purposes, where, and how often. Different cultures normalize different amounts and intensities of touching. Hall suggested

differentiating between *contact* and *noncontact cultures* (Hall, 1969). This distinction also reflects a culture's preferred personal space during communication. Contact cultures prescribe a close distance and consider it normal to have a fair amount of touching during communication. In contrast, noncontact cultures prescribe fewer haptic contacts and larger personal spacing. Haptics and proxemics have been intensively studied cross-culturally (Burleson et al., 2018; Hall, 1969; Sorokowska et al., 2021). These studies have discovered that Middle Asian, Latin American, and South European communities prefer close contact and more touching, whereas Northern European and Anglo-Saxon cultures are typically characterized as 'non-contact' or 'low-contact' cultures. North Americans typically perceive people from contact cultures as either warm and emotional or, because they stand 'too close' and touch 'too much,' pushy and even aggressive. In contrast, people from contact cultures may perceive members of noncontact cultures as cold, distant, and unapproachable. The SCMs of nonverbal behaviour regulate touching between and within genders, people of different ages, statuses, and authority; they also regulate the context of communication events and other factors. For example, many Asian cultures prescribe little or no public contact between members of the opposite sexes, even if these persons are in relationships. Remember that each action within a culture, including touching, personal spacing, and looking at each other, is saturated with meanings determined by the corresponding cultural models. Before judging these cultural habits, outsiders must inquire why people behave these ways, what their SCMs are, and what meanings they have infused in these practices.

Important aspects of intercultural communication to consider (based on Foshner, 2017). Below are suggestions for organizing successful intercultural encounters and communication that are particularly helpful for travelling to another country.

1 *Observe the cultural landscape and the context of communication*. The cultural landscape and the context of communication are the materials and social manifestations of culture that structure communication: they organize physical space, architecture, people's pace of life, appearance, smell, and noises; traffic, vehicles, styles of driving, streets and roads, and many other public and material forms. They also structure people's interactions, their positioning on streets, shops, restaurants and markets, interactions between men and women, among men, among women, and between people of different ages. Thus, one should monitor greetings, styles of talking and laughing, resolving issues, and responding to conflicts. The cultural landscape represents the public aspects of sociocultural models. These are the aspects that outsiders can easily observe and monitor. For example, if men show dominance over women, this tells us about the SCM of gender relations; similarly,

women's covered faces tell us about the models of femininity, and loud conversations and deafening laughs convey the styles of public conversations. Watch for relatively stable patterns of social interactions: Have you seen the same communication modes in similar contexts? Can you consider them typical for this context? If possible, ask your guide or your host to summarize your observations and put them together to help you solve the puzzle of the unknown culture.

2 *Suspend your judgment*. Always remember that we see the world through the lenses of our sociocultural models. These lenses make us ethnocentric, biased, and prone to stereotyping and prejudice. It is essential not to rush to judge what you see to avoid these biases. It is important to suspend one's taken-for-granted home-country-based SCMs and aim to perceive different cultural landscapes from 'the native point of view.' Focus on understanding what you see from the perspective of the people you are observing. Suppose you did your homework and read about the country you are visiting. In that case, you may find it helpful to apply this knowledge to look at the cultural landscape based on that country's historical, political, and economic backgrounds.

3 With the notion of the *native point of view*, we reach the idea of *taking other people's perspectives* by interpreting and understanding their sociocultural models. This means that to communicate appropriately, we need to see things from other people's points of view. Do not rush to conclusions until the taken-for-granted models of the community you are in become clear to you. Interpret each piece of an observational puzzle as a hypothesis and then aim to verify each of them by making further observations. Cultural meanings manifest themselves in various forms. Before grasping them, we need to put their manifestations together. It is easier said than done, but we should try. By taking other people's perspectives, we aim to reach an understanding with them. Remember, understanding something does not mean that you must like it. Understanding means that you appreciate people's cultural perspectives even if you do not accept or admire them. Keep your emotions and opinions to yourself.

4 When communicating with members of other cultures, consider their and your communication styles and the relevance of these styles in different contexts. Styles can include high-context and indirect or low-context and direct patterns, sender- or receiver-orientations, honorific modes, and many others. Forms of context include formal and official encounters, casual conversations, man-to-man, woman-to-woman, or man-to-women talks, compliments, complaints and disagreements, assertions, threats, and many others. Styles and contexts must be congruent. Your insights into the SCMs of and for communication and comments and lessons from your hosts can make you relatively culturally competent.

5 *Be polite*. When communicating, almost all cultural and language community members follow a special set of rules and practices that linguists label *politeness* (see Box 10.5). But what is politeness? Why has politeness evolved? What is the purpose of politeness in people's communal lives? Is politeness universal or culturally specific? These and related questions have been the focus of linguists, anthropologists, and other social scientists (Armaşu, 2012; Leech, 2007, 2014; Watts, 2003; Watts et al., 2005).

Box 10.5 Definition and explanation. Etymology of the terms *polite* and *politeness*

The word polite is traced back to mid-13th century Latin *politus,* which means 'refined' and 'elegant.' It also includes considerations for others, using tact, and observing social norms. It has the same roots as to *polish*, *police,* and *politics,* meaning to be refined and under social control. (https://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/polite#:~:text=The%20adjective%20polite%20comes%20from,the%20qualities%20of%20being%20polite).

In the Century Dictionary of 1895, "*Polite* applies to one who shows a polished civility, who has a higher training in ease and gracefulness of manners..." (https://www.etymonline.com/word/polite)

However, being polite may have a connotation of being insincere or superficial: "The audience politely applauded" (this indicates that spectators did not appreciate the performance but thanked the artist out of a social obligation).

Politeness in intra- and intercultural communication: Definitions of politeness

It is important to note that politeness is a cultural phenomenon – different cultural communities have their own definitions and understandings of politeness. This section is mostly written from the Anglo-European cultural perspective.

Dictionaries and politeness researchers have both provided their definitions of the terms politeness and polite.

- Cambridge English Dictionary: Politeness is a "behaviour that is socially correct and shows an understanding of and care for other people's feelings." (https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/politeness);
- Dictionary.com: (1) "showing good manners toward others, as in behavior, speech, etc.; courteous; civil; (2) refined or cultured" (https://www.dictionary.com/browse/politeness);
- Oxford Learner's Dictionary: "(1) good manners and respect for the feelings of others; (2) the fact of being socially correct but not always sincere" (https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/politeness).

Researchers commonly understand that politeness works as a lubricant for communication: It reduces the potential for conflict between interlocutors and promotes smooth verbal or behavioural exchange.

Brown and Levinson (1987) defined politeness "as a complex system for softening face threats" (p. 1). Brown and Levinson's theory of politeness is considered the primary theory in linguistic pragmatics and is the starting point for many other politeness theories and their critiques. These authors postulated that conversational acts are fundamentally threatening to the public image, self-esteem, or the "face" of a person. Thus, politeness emerged to eliminate or soften face threats during communication.

Leech (2014) suggested that "to be polite is to speak or behave in such a way as to (appear to) give benefit or value not to yourself but to the other person(s), especially the person(s) you are conversing with" (p. 3). Chinese etiquette highlights the same principle of the value of others: "Speaking of *lǐ* (i.e., politeness), humble yourself and show respect to others" (Leech, 2014, p. 3).

It is important to emphasize that politeness is not an individual invention; rather it is communal convention. As Lakoff (1975) highlighted, as a practice, politeness has been "developed by societies in order to reduce friction in personal communication" (p. 64).

Another group of definitions characterizes politeness not from the pragmatic perspective but as a concordance between the speaker's and hearer's expectations. Eelen (2001) stated that "To be polite is always 'to act appropriately' ... according to the hearer's expectations" (p. 128). This suggests that politeness is not an objective lingo-behavioural phenomenon but a match between interlocutors' expectations.

Functions of politeness

Understanding a social or cultural phenomenon often means articulating what it does for people or the functions it performs in social settings. Politeness is most frequently used to request or offer something, ask a question, present an invitation, thank a person, deal with a disagreement, compliment a person, apologize, congratulate, offer condolence, or give advice. It serves several functions within each of these speech acts (based on Leech, 2014).

- Polite behaviour maintains a *reciprocal asymmetry*. For example, in complimenting somebody, a speaker attributes a high value to the recipient and, implicitly, a low value to oneself. A polite response to a compliment is to assign a low value to oneself and directly or indirectly offer a higher value to the complimenter.
- Polite speech and behaviour are primarily evident in speech acts that have a *transaction value*. You did something for me; I politely thanked you, and you politely indicated your humbleness in executing such action: "Not at all," "It was nothing," "No problem," or "Don't mention it." Reciprocal asymmetry also works here.

- Polite actions maintain a *balance of value* between interlocutors. You did something good to me, and this act indebted me. By thanking you, I am paying some of this debt. Therefore, polite speech is often used as a linguistic 'repayment of debt.' This function also includes reciprocity between interlocutors. I sent you a card or gift, and it is polite for you to reciprocate by sending me a card or gift. At the very least, I expect a sincere "thank you."
- The level of politeness reflects the level of motivation of a person who requests something (the more polite the request, the more the requester wants the addressee to execute this request). Politeness motivates (often through moral obligation) the addressee to respond positively to the request, invitation, or offer.
- In communities where politeness is a social norm, polite behaviour serves as a sign of belonging to and identifying with that community.

Cross-cultural specificity of politeness

Does politeness have universal principles, or is it culturally specific? The phenomenon of special actions and speech forms during conversations and interactions that we call politeness exists in nearly all cultural communities. Every community must maintain smooth and cooperative relationships among its members to remain coherent and functional. However, the speech forms, actions, and non-verbal behaviours that are considered polite differ across cultures. Nonetheless, are there any universal principles of politeness across cultures behind this diversity of politeness signs and practices?

Researchers suggest that the European "social politeness" system reflects the British idea of *civilization* and *being civilized*, French *civilité,* and German *Kultur* (Leech, 2014, p. 258). This politeness is based on manners: how to behave at a table, treat women and elderly people, speak and act in public, and many other customs and rituals. The sociopsychological account of politeness comes with the concept of *face and face-work*. The notion of *face* is primarily attributed to Chinese culture (*miànzi* -prestige, honour, dignity, status, social acceptance, respect). In Western social sciences, it was introduced by American sociologist Ervin Goffman (Goffman, 1955). 'Face' is a person's positive evaluation (or an expectation of evaluation) bestowed by others based on that person's actions and reactions during contact with them. If a man on a date with a woman at a restaurant belched loudly, he would lose face in the eyes of his date and other people around. If a professor was unable to answer a student's challenging question, she could lose face in front of her students. If you started swearing during an argument with another person and threw things at your opponent, you would lose face in the eyes of your opponent and other witnesses. Goffman called the tactics of gaining or saving face "face-work" (Goffman, 1967). Many researchers ground their thinking about politeness in terms

of 'face' and 'face-work.' Specifically, politeness is one of the methods of face-work. By being polite, people save their face and support other's efforts not to lose their face. As such, politeness maintains dignity and social harmony among interlocutors. Brown and Levinson (1987) provided their elaborate theory of politeness based on the idea of 'face-work.'

The practices of politeness in various cultural communities may differ. For example, in Israel (Blum-Kulka, 2005), politeness (expressed in the two terms *nimus* and *adivut*) has a positive connotation related to tolerance, restraint, good manners, being nice to people, showing deference, and being civilized. At the same time, politeness is also associated with something unnatural, hypocritical, and insincere; it is something that is not positive and should be avoided. Therefore, people consider it polite to speak directly and truthfully, while hypocritical speech is considered improper and impolite.

In Japan, the honorific style of communication is one of the pillars of politeness. Honorific speech recognizes the status and authority of a person objectively and/or in the eyes of an actor. Using this style, a person maintains their face, respects their conversation partner, and maintains social harmony. In Thailand, to be polite means, among other markers, to be modest (downplay compliments), avoid negative replies, and follow the honorific way of speaking.

Politeness is a sociocultural phenomenon with universal and culture-specific aspects. Politeness is rooted in several important values: people's dignity and face, social harmony, and a balanced social life. These values constitute the sociocultural basis for politeness. Based on them, communities develop and prescribe the verbal, non-verbal, and behavioural practices of politeness to their members.

Impoliteness and verbal insults

The opposite of politeness is *impoliteness* (Bousfield, 2008; Culpeper, 1996). Sociolinguists study the structure, nature, and functions of impoliteness and examine its variations cross-culturally (Culpeper et al., 2010; Culpeper et al., 2014). Politeness smooths and lubricates social interactions. In contrast, impoliteness disrupts the social order, disbalances interactions, and threatens interlocutors' faces. Extreme cases of impoliteness, when a person aims to offend another person or persons, are usually called *rudeness*. Other words used to describe severe impoliteness include *insult*, *offence*, and *verbal abuse*. Most researchers consider impoliteness a contextual and relational phenomenon. This means that words and phrases considered polite or appropriate in one context may be impolite in another. This impoliteness is the result of the relational dynamics and interactions between interlocutors. Moreover, impoliteness and offence are related to a person's interpretation of an event or interaction. Sometimes, people become offended when offence was not intended.

Sociolinguists investigate strategies and forms of impolite and offensive behaviour and aim to discover the cross-cultural regularities in using these forms of communication. European researchers Semin and Rubini (1990) examined how the foundational models of individualism and collectivism shape the content of an insult. The authors hypothesized that by verbally abusing another person, an actor would target that person's most culturally and personally sensitive features, which constitute the essential core of personhood. In individualistic cultures, they hypothesized that the abuser would aim at the person as an independent entity irrespective of social relationships. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, they believed that an offender would target culturally significant relationships, predominantly with family members and relatives, as well as other important social groups (religious, political, or ethnic).

The researchers collected verbal insults from 30 college students in the southern Italian city of Catania, which is predominantly collectivistic, and 30 college students from the northern city of Trieste, which is primarily individualistic. The collected insulting expressions were coded as individualistic or relational insults or swear words. The individualistic insults included references to a person's mental or physical deficiencies, indications of abnormalities, and/or sexual connotations. The relational insults contained references to incestuous relationships, sexual insults referring to one's relatives, wishes of harm against relatives, references to relatives fornicating with domestic animals, and insults referring to one's affiliation group (political or ethnic) membership. The relational insults partially supported their hypothesis. Specifically, participants from the collectivistic city generated more relational insults than those from the individualistic community. However, the hypothesis about individualistic insults was not supported. A more detailed analysis of individualistic insults reveals that in individualistic communities, people use more insults regarding intellectual deficiencies, excretions, and sex organs. In collectivistic settings, people prefer to use sexual adjectives to abuse an opponent verbally. This study provides some hints that the SCMs of a person may play a role in structuring the content of verbal insults.

Conclusion

This chapter analysed how communication is socioculturally shaped among members of the same and different cultural communities. It highlighted that communication has several layers of regulation that construct common ground for successful verbal interactions. In the case of intercultural communication, the common cultural ground is minimal or lacking. This groundlessness of communication across cultures creates problems in such interactions in many domains of people's lives: education, work, military, health, and governance. Intercultural communication scholars examine the factors and conditions for training and successfully executing this form of communication.

Glossary

Cultural common ground is the basis for successful intracultural communication. This notion includes cultural practices, knowledge, expertise, values, and interpretation schemas shared by members of a community. In the terms used in the theory of sociocultural models, this is an intersubjectively shared SCMs that address the content of the domain of everyday life that interlocutors communicate about.

Cultural schemas are "cognitive structures that contain knowledge for face-to-face interactions in one's cultural environment" (Nishida, 2005, p. 403).

Cultural scripts (by Wierzbicka) consist of cultural values and the communication scripts that reflect these values.

Cultural communication scripts are the communal norms for interacting and speaking: who, when, how, with what words, and in what sequence one should speak in various situations. In contrast, **cultural values** explain why such scripts exist in their particular forms.

Communicative intersubjectivity is the mechanism that explains the coherence of intracultural communication. Interlocutors know the content and styles of communication, and they also know that their partners know these contents and styles; moreover, they know that anyone from their community who joins the conversation will know what they are talking about and how they talk about it.

Contexting processes (as defined by Hall) are the processes individuals use to scan and define the speech situation. Using these processes, speakers scan the environment (to determine when, where, with whom, and under what circumstances communication happens) and regulate their communication accordingly.

Discourse is a complex concept that has multiple meanings. Linguists use this term to designate "a formal and orderly and usually extended expression of thought on subject." For others, discourse is not only a linguistic or speech event but also a sociocultural event that expresses a specific cultural or political stance – a system of values that frame a listener's or reader's thoughts. Scholars such as Foucault contributed to understanding the idea of discourse. The concept of discourse forms the idea of a *discourse community*.

Discourse community is a subset of a speech community. It is a group of people who share the same ideas and values regarding particular topics and the same way of speaking (discourses) about them. For example, types of discourse communities include business community, artistic community, academic community, and many others.

High- and low-context styles of communication in and across cultures were introduced by Hall. "A high-context (HC) communication or message is one in which most of the information is either in the physical context or internalized in the person[s] [both the sender and receiver VC], while very little is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message" (Hall, 1976, p. 91). "A low-context (LC) communication is the opposite; i.e., the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code" (p. 91).

Intracultural communication refers to members of the same cultural community exchanging information.

Intercultural communication refers to members of different cultural, language, or speech communities exchanging information.

Intercultural communication studies form an interdisciplinary area of inquiry that unites scholars from anthropology, communication studies, linguistics, cultural and cross-cultural psychology, organizational psychology, and business. Scholars perform basic research on communication across cultures and its application in business, marketing, military, politics, health, education, and many other segments in which members of different cultures interact and communicate.

Impoliteness is the lack of politeness; when it expands to rudeness and insult, impoliteness damages relationships and people's dignity, esteem, and 'face.' According to Culpeper (2009), "Impoliteness is a negative attitude toward specific behaviour occurring in specific context … Situated behaviours are viewed negatively when they conflict with how one expects them to be, how one wants them to be and/or how one thinks they ought to be … Various factors can exacerbate how offensive an impolite behaviour is taken to be, including for example whether one understands a behaviour to be … intentional or not."

Language community refers to people who speak the same language.

Linguistic and communication common ground is a set of shared communicative devices that make the styles and forms of verbal interactions congruent for members of the same community. The chapter discusses three related concepts: the cultural schemas for social interactions (by Nishida), speech codes (by Philipsen), and cultural scripts in communication (by Wierzbicka).

Monochronic (M-time) and polychronic (P-time) forms of time organization were introduced by Hall. *Mono* means one, alone, or single; *poly-* means many, numerous; *chronos* (Greek) means time. According to Hall, monochronic time organization occurs when people do one thing at a time, whereas polychronic time organization reflects people doing many things simultaneously.

Nonverbal communication includes several channels. **Vocalis or paralanguage** is an aspect of vocal communication that does not include words. **Proxemics** is the human use of space in life and communication. **Kinetics** uses several channels to transmit information: facial expression, posture and body movements, and gestures. **Haptics** refers to everything related to the sense of touch. **Oculesics** literally means *eyes gaze*; in communication, it refers to different eye movements: gazing, winking, glancing, eye contact, rolling eyes, blinking, and some others. **Olfactics** refers to everything related to smell. People communicate using all these nonverbal manners.

Politeness is a communal linguistic and communication phenomenon that has numerous definitions. Generally, it is considered a "behaviour that is socially correct and shows an understanding of and care for other people's feelings" (Cambridge English Dictionary). Leech (2014) argued that "to be polite is to speak or behave in such a way as to (appear to) give benefit or value not to yourself but to the other person(s), especially the person(s) you are conversing with" (p. 3). Chinese etiquette highlights the same principle of the value of others: "Speaking of *lǐ* (i.e., politeness), humble yourself and show respect to others" (from Leech, 2014, p. 3). Politeness serves several functions in communication. Primarily, it helps to build smooth, cooperative relationships among members of communities by protecting their 'face,' dignity and self-respect.

Speech situation is "the context within which speaking occurs" (Stanlaw et al., 2018, pp. 201–202).

Speech community is comprised of people "who share specific rules for speaking and interpreting speech" (Stanlaw et al., 2018, p. 200). It is similar to the notion of a *discourse community*.

Speech act is the smallest unit of speech activity.

Speech event is a system of speech acts that come together to address or resolve a situation: conflict, requesting help, offering advice, negotiating a deal, and many others.

Speech codes are the historically-transmitted, socially-constructed systems of symbols, meaning, premises, and rules about communication conduct. These codes are the codes about the nature of persons, the ways people can and should be linked together in social relations, and the role symbolic actions of speaking play in forging, sustaining, and altering such interpersonal linkages (Philipsen, 1992, p. 127).

Questions and tasks

1 Consider one of your regular communicative acts and deconstruct it into its components. Identify your language, speech, and discourse communities. Reflect on their features and relations to their cultural backgrounds. How do these communities structure your everyday life?
2 What forms of cultural and linguistic ground were discussed in this chapter? Why are these forms of common ground essential for smooth intracultural communication?
3 Compare and contrast the concepts of cultural schemas by Nishida, speech code by Philipsen, and cultural scripts by Wierzbicka.
4 Why may intercultural communication go wrong? Provide an example of an intercultural communicative act that went wrong for you; analyse the causes of confusion and misunderstanding.
5 When do you use the high-context communication style? When do you use the low-context one? Reflect on why you are using them the way you do.
6 Do you typically have an M-time or a P-time orientation? Provide examples of such usages of time.
7 Spend part of your day paying attention to various forms of nonverbal behaviour that members of your and other cultural communities use to send messages.

Using the primary categories of nonverbal communication discussed in the chapter, provide examples of the following items: paralanguage, proxemics, facial emotional expressions, gestures, touch and touching behaviour, and polite and impolite behaviours.

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Note

1 It is fair to say that some collectivistic societies appreciate and support anger. For example, the Kalilu culture in Papua New Guinea encourages the expression of anger (Schieffelin, 1983). The twofold attitude to anger has been recorded in the Samoan and Pintupi cultures (for a review, see Karandashev, 2021, pp. 220–223).

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11 Migration and acculturation

Chapter content

- This chapter starts by defining the primary terms for people migrating within and outside their countries.
- Migration motivation is explored using multidisciplinary lenses. This section examines economic and psychological theories about why people migrate.
- The chapter focuses on migrants' intention to migrate and provides empirical evidence that supports some aspects of such decision-making.
- Immigrants' acculturation is a contentious issue in sociocultural psychology. The corresponding section starts by presenting the history of research and a conceptualization of acculturation. Special attention is paid to the attitudes of members of receiving societies and their influence on the adaptation of immigrants.
- The concepts of assimilation, integration, separation, and marginalization are discussed.
- The chapter appraises the history and current state of investigating acculturation dynamics and their outcomes and considers the autobiographical, narrative, and psychotherapeutic approaches to studying acculturating persons.
- Special attention is paid to the quantitative and statistical approaches used to examine acculturation, including the uni- and bidirectional models of acculturation. The quantitative way of examining acculturation is critiqued.
- The chapter ends by discussing acculturation from the position of the theory of sociocultural models.

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Chapter 1 presented the gruesome example of the Shafia family quadruple murder case. We used this example to unpack the construct of 'Culture' and introduce the idea of sociocultural models as the 'cells' of the fabrics of Culture. The Shafia family were immigrants in the process of acculturating to the Canadian culture and its way of life. Indeed, their acculturation went horribly wrong. Thousands of families from all over the world arrive in Canada and other countries, and they do not kill their daughters; rather, they encourage them to learn to be Canadians (or citizens of other nations) and live happily and successfully as members of the host societies. Unfortunately, this did not happen in the Shafia family. The head of the Shafia family did not want his daughters to be Canadian teenagers, live like Canadians, and share their values of freedom, dignity, the right to education, privacy and, finally, the right to life. Instead of accepting these values, Mohammad Shafia decided to kill them. Where and why did the acculturation in this family go so wrong? In this chapter, we will discuss people's migration and their problems as they adjust to host countries and learn and accept (or not accept) their cultures. Therefore, the primary topics for this chapter are immigration and acculturation.

Box 11.1 Definitions and explanations

According to the International Organization for Migration, a *migrant* is a person who moves away from their residence, whether within a country or across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for various reasons (https://www.iom.int/about-migration).

Emigration is the act of leaving one's country to settle permanently in another; thus, an emigrant is a person who commits the act of migrating from their home country. Consequently, *immigration* is the act of coming to a foreign country for permanent settlement; thus, an immigrant is a person who commits the act of migrating and settles in a country that is not of their origin. For example, a person who leaves China for Canada is an emigrant in China; the same person in Canada is an immigrant. *Illegal immigrants* are migrants who enter a foreign country in violation of that country's immigration laws or reside in that country without heaving a legal right to live there.

Expatriate (from *ex-* 'out of,' and *patrie* 'one's native land') is a term that is frequently substituted for the word immigrant. An expatriate lives outside of their country of origin (for example, Pakistani expatriates living in the United Kingdom) and may settle abroad primarily because of work reasons (for example, South Korean business expatriates living in Singapore). Typically, immigrants live in another country permanently. In contrast, expats are free to move among

countries. Moreover, immigrant is a general term for people in foreign countries, whereas expats are typically people of high socioeconomic status who have high-paying jobs. However, some also consider construction workers in Saudi Arabia expats. *International students* are migrants who stay in a foreign country on student visas. They may be considered expatriates for the duration of their studies. *Repatriates* (from *re-* 'back') are migrants who have returned to their homeland voluntarily or who were *deported* from their host country. For example, Japanese who return to Japan from Latin American countries, Jews coming to their ancestral homeland of Israel, and ethnic Germans returning to Germany are repatriates.

Another frequently used term is *sojourners*, which refers to migrants who stay temporarily in foreign countries. International students, foreign and seasonal workers, and businesspeople who move to companies in foreign countries for extended business trips are sojourners.

Other types of migrants include *refugees* and *asylum seekers*. Refugees are forced to leave their country to escape natural disasters, persecution, or war; they acquire refugee status from the country to which they arrive or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. *Asylum seekers* are migrants who arrive in a foreign country for protection; they apply for *asylum* (i.e., international protection) from that country. *Exile* is a punishment when a person is expelled from their native country or to remote regions of their country. Some governments use it as a penalty for crimes and other misdeeds. People who were involuntarily exiled cannot return to their homes, which adds to their psychological suffering.

A term that was intensively used during the 20th century is *uprooted*. It metaphorically describes displaced migrants, especially those who experienced forced migration, as being taken out of the 'soil' where they planted their 'roots' and being thrown into foreign grounds where they must undergo 'transplanting.'

The discussion of the terms in Box 11.1 indicates that motivation to migrate is one of the primary factors differentiating the types of migrants: people migrate willingly or unwillingly; they migrate to build their careers, learn new cultures, and extend their knowledge, or they seek a new country to survive and live in decent conditions. Migration motivation also determines the long-term consequences of immigration, including adjustment and acculturation success. In this chapter, we first discuss the migration motivation of different groups of migrants and the consequences of these motivations for their adjustment and success. Then, we will define the concept of acculturation and related terms and analyse how researchers study acculturation and the theories they have develop to explain this phenomenon. Special attention will be paid to applying the theory of sociocultural models to understand acculturation mechanisms.

Migration motivation

For many years, economists, political scientists, and sociologists have studied people's motivations for emigration. Why do people move from their homes to foreign countries? What are these emigrants looking for? How does their migration motivation relate to their selves, identities, and worldviews, and how does it affect their acceptance of their host and home countries? Ultimately, how do these migrants' motivations influence or relate to their adjustment and acculturation to new places?

There are two sides to any form of migration. The human side (or micro-level factors) is related to a migrating person. It includes their personality, personal and familial conditions, motivation, skills, knowledge, values, and preferences that contribute to their decision to move abroad. This aspect is related to the *agency* of the individual. *Agency* implies that migrants are active and rational individuals who decide to move abroad – they are the agents of migration. Theories that analyse the human side of migration are also labelled *micro-level* or *psychological theories of migration*. The other side of migration is comprised of economic, political, ecological, and other macro-level factors. They primarily reflect the socioeconomic conditions in the home and host countries, the state of their labour markets, levels of unemployment, and wages. In addition, macro-level constituents include the home country's political situation and living conditions, the climate, and other factors beyond the individual's control. These constituents are often labelled *structure* or *structural factors*. The corresponding theories of migration are called *macro-level theories*. Hence, the fundamental dilemma of social sciences – the relationships between *structure* and *agency* – is boldly present when studying migration motivation.

Migration motivation theories

One of the most known and popular theories/classifications of migration motivation considers two types of factors: 'pull' and 'push.'[1] 'Push' motives drive emigrants from their country. These could be ecological disasters (earthquakes, famine, or flooding), economic conditions (high unemployment, inflation, low salaries, or the economic collapse of the country), or political turmoil (revolutions, coups, political prosecutions). 'Pull' factors exist in the receiving country and look attractive and rewarding for migrants. Such 'pulling' factors include high-paying jobs, good living conditions, bright perspectives for children, and opportunities for further education, training, and self-development. As a rule, emigration driven by 'push' motives is considered *forced* emigration. This means that people move to another country not because they want to emigrate but because they must do so to survive. Staying in their home country may cost them their health, commodities, or lives. Refugees migrate involuntarily due to the 'push' factors. In contrast, moving to a foreign country because of 'pull' motives is labelled *voluntary* migration.

This means that immigrants could stay in their home country but choose to move abroad (Sert & Erenler, 2021).

One of the oldest and most widely-accepted sets of migration motivation theory is based on the model of *Homo Economicus* or the *Economic Human Being*. This model is the theoretical background of many economic theories. There are macro- and micro-level neoclassical economic theories of migration. The macro-level theories are based on the geographical differences in the supply and demand levels for labour that fuel migration (Massey et al., 1993). The human and financial capital markets strive to reach equilibrium across different geographical areas, and this fuels international migration. The governments of sending and receiving countries control immigrants' flow by regulating their labour markets, including unemployment rates, wages, benefits, and other labour-related conditions and immigration policies.

According to the economic doctrine of migration on the micro level, human beings are rational individuals whose primary motivation is to pursue wealth for their self-interests. When applied to migration motivation, this doctrine suggests that migrants are primarily motivated by economic motives to financially benefit themselves and their families by moving to countries with higher wages and better benefits. In terms of benefits, migrants consider good living conditions, high-quality education and medical care, and optimistic perspectives for themselves and their children, among other factors. According to this approach, the main force that drives migration (primarily labour migration) is wage difference. Therefore, potential emigrants do cost-benefit calculations to compare their skills and the corresponding wages in different countries; then, they decide to stay or move abroad.

Researchers who study the psychology of migration motivation focus on the micro- or psychological level and aim to examine the individual motivations of different categories of migrants and their consequences (Boski, 2013). They work at the level of human agency. These researchers are primarily social and cross-cultural psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists.

The psychology of migration motivation

Migration is initiated when a future emigrant starts thinking about migrating. *Migration decision-making* is a complex cognitive and motivational process that includes a person's values, personality characteristics, and other individual dispositions. It also includes the connection with and embeddedness in the community of people at home and in countries of potential destination. Such decisions are also influenced by macro-economic, social, and political forces within which future migrants and their communities function. Researchers study all three layers of migration regulation – individual, communal, and structural – because communal, socioeconomic, and political factors strongly influence individual choices.

Psychologists of migration examine the personality and motivation characteristics of people planning to emigrate. Researchers use different methods to study the motivation processes. They apply surveys and questionnaires on samples of migrants, conduct individual and group interviews and use other techniques to generate data. Researchers study migration from and to various countries (for example, Turks in the Netherlands or Mexicans in the USA) and examine different categories of migrants: immigrants, refugees, international students, business expatriates, and immigrants who returned to their home countries. Because of such diversity of methods, countries, and groups of migrants, it is challenging to create a uniform psychological theory of migration motivation. In the following, I compile some prominent theories and approaches to this phenomenon.

Intention to migrate and the decision-making process

European scholars Czaika et al., (2021) articulated four parameters of migration decision-making: (a) the formation of migration aspirations, (b) searching for and analysing information about migratory options, (c) the timing and planning horizons for preparing and realizing migratory decisions, and (d) the degree of agency one has in making a migration decision (p. 15). The overarching theme for these four parameters is the fundamental *uncertainty* within the process and its outcomes. This uncertainty shapes all the phases of the decision-making process.

The intention to migrate begins with the formation of aspirations. Every person wants to be healthy, happy, and successful; however, they and their culture define these conditions. The researchers conceptualize the *aspiration gap* between people's aspired and the actual state of these three universal life goals. Gaining awareness of this gap triggers the migration decision-making process. If there is drought in a country, citizens may aspire to move to a place where they will never be hungry. If people feel their country lacks options for them and their children to live good lives, they may strive to move to a place where they feel they can be happier. In cases where they cannot get a good education and excel professionally in their home countries, people may strive to get a better education and succeed in their dream jobs in other countries. People's personality, education, level of enculturation, cognitive, economic, and other resources determine their "capacity to aspire" (p. 19), including their ability to imagine a life that is better than the current one but achievable through migration.

When aspirations are formed, future migrants start *collecting information* about where, how, and for how long they want to migrate. They search for information about job options, living conditions, and opportunities for other family members. The sources of such information are diverse: listening to the stories of friends and relatives who have already migrated, working with immigration consultants and lawyers, and gathering information on the Internet, in books, and other sources.

Their initial aspirations may become higher or lower depending on the information they discover. Potential emigrants evaluate the cost-benefits of different options, the probability of their success, the presence of support people at their potential destinations, and many other factors.

Within Czaika and colleagues' approach, *time* is essential in the migration decision-making process and the migration itself. Historical time is related to the periods of political and economic developments in migrants' home and host countries that cause and facilitate the migration of large groups of people. For example, at the end of the 19th century, a famine in Ireland coincided with the United States opening its borders to immigrants. This created a condition when thousands of Irish people emigrated across the Atlantic Ocean. Individual time for migration is related to the life stage where future migrants are positioned. For example, young people are typically more eager to migrate than older ones. Middle-aged individuals tend to say they are too old to relocate and start a new life in a new country. Individual time also considers that the preparation and execution of migration take time. It may take years between the initial decision to emigrate and the moment when immigrants exit the airplane in a new country. During that time of preparation and waiting, many events (the birth of a child, illness, a pandemic, or political change in a home country) may accelerate or hinder the migration process.

The last dimension of migration decision-making is the level of *self-determined agency* that future migrants experience. Agency is a person's ability to generate actions – to approach or avoid something. Concerning migration, agency involves a volitional decision to either stay in one's home country or move abroad. This decision may result from, for example, curiosity and interest in seeing and exploring foreign countries. Such motivation is called *intrinsically motivated agency*. Many students and young people move abroad to see the world, discover themselves, or acquire new life experiences. People may also decide to migrate after contemplating their current life situation, discussing things with family members and friends, and analysing relevant information. This is an *autonomous or self-determined agency*. This means that migrants decide not because of interest or curiosity but rather based on deliberating all conditions, circumstances, and potential outcomes (Ryan & Deci, 2017). Examples of such motivation are giving children a better education and better perspectives in life (Paat, 2013) and looking for more affluence or a free life regarding intellectual pursuits, artistic expression, or other forms of self-realization. Many migrants move abroad with their families, so their decision to migrate is collective, not individual. The collective/familial nature of the intentions to migrate makes the decision-making process more complicated than the individual one because all family members' desires and aspirations must be considered.

The third type of migration intentions emerges when a person makes a move because they are forced to do so by unfavourable conditions. Without these adverse conditions, they would have stayed in their country. Self-determination theorists

call this *controlled motivation* or *controlled agency*, meaning that a person's actions are controlled by forces beyond their selves. Again, refugees exemplify controlled agency or 'forced,' 'involuntary,' or 'reactive' migration motivation (Richmond, 1993). They decided to move (thus, they are agentic); however, this move was determined by, for example, the war being waged in their country and not their desire to explore the world.

Czaika and colleagues highlighted that these four dimensions – the formation of aspirations, gathering and analysing information, temporality, and the level of self-determination – do not influence migration decision-making in isolation. They are interconnected, constituting a motivational system for migration. Forming aspirations to migrate depends on people's level of knowledge about the countries of destination and the conditions for getting the necessary documents. Moreover, the aspirations to migrate are associated with the stage of life of the future migrants and their life goals. Although many scholars have highlighted the systemic nature of migration motivation, more systemic theoretical thinking is needed.

Empirical evidence that supports some dimensions and factors of migration decision-making and migration motivation

Numerous empirical studies of migration motivation focusing on different groups of migrants have confirmed the proposed dimensions and examined other factors that contribute to people's desire to migrate. We will review some of these studies. These researchers come from different disciplines, use a variety of methodologies, and study different groups of migrants. Despite this diversity, some trends and factors can be extracted.

Understanding the historical and political backgrounds of migration

Many studies start their discourse about migration motivation by describing the history of migration from and to particular countries and their economic and political situations at different periods of immigration tides. Garip (2012) addressed different migration periods from Mexico to the United States and identified distinct clusters of Mexican migrants with different motivations. Gu (2014) analysed the migration of Taiwanese nationals to the United States. The researcher started by analysing the history and politics of Taiwan. She identified two politically and culturally different groups of Taiwanese. The first group, called *benshengren* – 'people of this province' – is comprised of Mainland Chinese nationals who immigrated to Taiwan before 1945 and lived under Japanese occupation, which lasted from 1895 until the end of WW II in 1945. The second group, labelled *waishengren* – 'people of other provinces' – is comprised of Mainland Chinese who moved to Taiwan after the withdrawal of Japanese troops and especially after 1949, when the government of the Republic

of China was defeated, and the People's Republic of China was founded. Members of these two groups formed and participated in different political parties; they have distinct national identities (members of the first group identify themselves as Taiwanese while those in the second as Mainland Chinese); they speak different languages (the first group speaks Taiwanese and the second Mandarin) and have dissimilar cultures. Correspondently, emigrants from these groups had unique motives when they moved to the USA. Rumbaut (1991) examined the migration, adaptation, and acculturation of Indochinese refugees arriving in the USA. Likewise, he started by analysing the history of political and military conflicts in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that forced these migrants to move abroad. These and other studies demonstrate that examining the history, politics, and economics of migrants' home and destination countries is an essential starting point for the fruitful study of migration motivation and migrants' success.

Studies on migration initiation, expectations, and motivation

Sladkova (2007) examined the formation of Honduras's nationals' intentions to migrate to the USA. Specifically, he studied emigrants from one of the country's poorest regions. The researcher generated the information for her analysis by teaching free English classes for adults, reading and analysing local newspapers on emigration issues, participating in and observing various local events, and conducting interviews with potential emigrants. Her respondents discussed different 'push' and 'pull' motives for their migration. They explained that they wanted to avoid poverty and get higher wages to support their families; they wanted to escape the toxic political environment in Honduras, provide better opportunities for their children, and pursue their education and professional development. These respondents were potentially undocumented (illegal) immigrants; upon moving, they would strongly rely on their network of relatives and friends in the USA to survive. These networks also served as an essential source of information about their future life abroad – a life that would include constant fear of deportation, limited mobility because of being undocumented and facing discrimination as Latino workers. These immigrants-to-be planned to stay abroad for 2–5 years. However, many temporary migrants never returned home. An essential motive for migration is the prospect of sending remittances, money, and gifts back home to support their families. The amount of money and the quality of gifts their families in Honduras receive from the USA inspire other family members to go to that country for work. A substantial issue for future migrants is how to execute their migration – legally, by obtaining a visa, or illegally, by crossing borders and entering the USA on foot or by train. Both ways have their challenges and hassles: The legal path has high costs and severe bureaucracy, while the illegal path risks danger to their lives, possible injuries, and potential detention and deportation.

This research illustrates the dimensions of migration decision-making proposed by Czaika et al. (2021). Potential migrants built their aspirations based on the unfavourable economic and political conditions in Honduras; they collected information from their social networks about the conditions in the destination country; they determined the timing for their migration and the length of their stay; they mainly demonstrated controlled agency when they actively moved abroad even though they felt forced to do this by unfavourable conditions in their country.

Quality of migration motivation and migration success

Several studies have focused on the relationships between the quality of migration motivation – the autonomous versus controlled motivation of different migrant groups – and the quality of people's migration outcomes. Chirkov and colleagues (2007, 2008) examined how the quality of Chinese international students' motivation relates to their success as they study in Belgium and Canada. In the (2007) study, the researchers assessed two motivational variables: self-determined versus controlled motivation for studying abroad and the students' goals for moving to a foreign country to study: preservation or self-development. To assess self-determined motivation, the researchers developed a questionnaire, which, among other questions, asked, "I moved to (Belgium or Canada) because it was personally important to me" and "... because this is what I really want to do with my life." In turn, controlled motivation to study abroad was assessed by questions such as "I moved because other people (relatives and friends) expected me to do this" and ".... because I expected to get respect and recognition from others for doing so." The 'preservation' goals were related to avoiding disadvantageous conditions in their home country, while the 'self-development' goals focused on getting a good education and having better career opportunities after completing their degrees. Researchers developed questionnaires to measure these types of goals. As outcome variables, they assessed the quality of academic motivation, subjective and psychological well-being, desire to accept the foreign way of life and various indicators of social adjustment. Data were generated on samples of Chinese applicants preparing to study in Belgium and Chinese students attending Belgium and Canadian universities. The results were congruent across countries and categories of participants (applicants and students). Specifically, self-determined motivation to study abroad was positively associated with academic success, self-determined academic motivation, striving to learn a foreign way of life, and well-being. These associations mean that students with high levels of self-determination in their decisions to move abroad also demonstrated high scores in their self-determined academic motivation, grades, positive well-being scores, and indicators of the desire to learn more about their new country. The indicators for preservation goals were negatively correlated with self-determined academic motivation scores (students with higher scores on such goals indicated that they felt forced to attend

classes and do assignments), acculturation motivation (students got low scores on the desire to learn the foreign way of life), and well-being (the indicators of moving abroad to avoid unfavourable conditions in their country were associated with lower parameters on well-being scales). In a second longitudinal study of diverse samples of international students in Canada, Chirkov and colleagues (2008) confirmed the tendency of positive correlations between self-determined motivation to study abroad and psychological well-being, social adjustment indicators, and having fewer psychosomatic symptoms. The relations of migration goals were less conclusive.

Researchers from Hong Kong (Ganotice Jr. et al., 2022) replicated this study on Mainland Chinese students in Hong Kong and generated similar results. Specifically, autonomous motivation to study abroad (which was positively associated with self-development goals) positively correlated with the scores of intellectual development and sociocultural and psychological adaptation. Controlled motivation to move abroad to study (which was positively correlated with preservation goals) was negatively associated with sociocultural and negative psychological adaptation markers.

Researchers from New Zealand (Udahemuka & Pernice, 2010) studied the acculturation of African immigrants in New Zealand. They discovered that immigrants who demonstrated volitional motivation – those who came to New Zealand to explore a new country and build a family – showed a positive adaptation orientation and interest in learning New Zealand culture. In contrast, immigrants who escaped dangerous conditions at home (controlled or forced migration motivation) preferred to maintain their culture of origin and were less oriented towards the host culture.

This group of studies illustrates two aspects of migration motivation: volitional and self-determined compared with forced and controlled. The quality of motivation is associated with how migrants feel in a new place, how they perform their primary duties, and how their adaptation unfolds. It follows that self-determined migration motivation – which happens when migrants decide on their own to move abroad and have attractive goals in the destination country related to self-development, education, and growth, is associated with better outcomes in multiple areas, including studies, adaptation, and psychological well-being. Migrants with such motivation are more interested in their host countries and want to embrace them. These positive associations disappear when emigrants are forced to move from their countries or when other people control their motivation to migrate. Immigrants with such motivation demonstrate lower happiness and success and poorer health outcomes.

Acculturation

After migrants decide to migrate, form their motivation to do this, arrange all the documents, and successfully arrive in the country of their destination, critical and complex processes start unfolding: adaptation and acculturation to their new sociocultural environment.

A history of research and a conceptualization of acculturation

Historians of science credit American geographer, amateur ethnologist, and early anthropologist **John Wesley Powell** (1834–1902) with coining the term acculturation. In 1880, he used it in a U.S. Bureau of American Ethnography report. In 1883, he defined acculturation as the psychological change induced by cross-cultural imitation (https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/John_Wesley_Powell).

Etymologically, the term *acculturation* consists of the Latin prefix *ad*, which means *to* or *towards* and was transformed into English as *ac*, *cultur*, which means 'Culture,' and *-ation*, which means 'process.' Therefore, acculturation is the process of moving towards Culture. The term has been widely used by many social scholars, anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and other social scientists.

The phenomenon of acculturation was introduced into anthropological research in the first half of the 20th century when American anthropologists intensively studied the outcomes of the Spanish and British colonization of the Aboriginal people in the Americas. They were interested in the changes in the cultures of Aboriginal and African peoples under the influence of Western civilization. Anthropologists found the term acculturation helpful for conceptualizing these changes. The first systematic definition of acculturation was articulated in 1936 when anthropologists published the "Memorandum on the study of acculturation" (Redfield et al., 1936). According to this memorandum, "Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either or both groups" (p.149). Since then, this definition has been the baseline understanding of this concept. As the research on acculturation broadened, in 1954, a second attempt to define this phenomenon was undertaken ("Acculturation: An Exploratory Formulation. The Social Science Research Council Summer Seminar on Acculturation, 1953 (1954)"). In that document, acculturation was defined as "culture change that is initiated by the conjunction of two or more autonomous cultural systems." (p. 974). The first and second definitions of acculturation were formulated by researchers who were interested in understanding the cultural changes at the communal level, including the changes in the patterns of beliefs, values, and practices of ethnic groups or communities. Thus, these definitions addressed *group* or *communal acculturation*.

Individual acculturation

Many anthropologists highlighted that the members of acculturating groups are the subjects of cultural changes and are also transformed by acculturation. This means that acculturation must also be considered and examined at the individual level. In 1932, in "The Psychology of Acculturation," anthropologist Thurnwald (1932) invited his colleagues to explore the cultural changes in individuals' personalities, cognition,

and habits during acculturation. Although he reduced individual acculturation to learning new skills and technologies, this article was influential in attracting the attention of anthropologists to acculturating individuals. In 1967, American anthropologist Beals (1967) explicitly differentiated acculturation at the collective level, which considers the cultural changes in society, from acculturation at the individual level, which is accompanied by changes in personal values, behavioural practices, attitudes, and other mental attributes. Other anthropologists supported this distinction (Graves, 1967).

In subsequent decades, some of the research on acculturation shifted to studying immigrants. In addition, social researchers focused on other cases of various cultural encounters, including the processes of rural-to-urban relocation (such relocation intensively happens in China (Yue et al., 2019)), the adaptation of unskilled foreign workers in South Korea (Kim et al., 2018), the unification of diasporic ethnic minorities with their ancestral homeland (such as the immigration of Jews from various countries to Israel (Skliar, 2021) and the return of ethnic Germans to Germany (Lambroschini, 2004), and refugees and asylum seekers' adaptation in many countries (Sheikh & Anderson, 2018).

The migration of people from the countries of their birth to foreign ones is a natural tendency of humankind (our ancestors migrated from Africa to other continents and then spread all over the world). Modern migration has become a humanitarian, political, and economic phenomenon that requires researchers to monitor who, why, from where, and to what countries people migrate; what the consequences of migration are to the sending and receiving countries and their citizens; and whether governments can control the flow of people between countries (the question of immigration policies). In this regard, since the 1950s, psychologists have been interested in the psychological changes in immigrants' cognition, personalities, values, attitudes, relationships with host nationals, and the consequences of locals cohabiting with immigrants (Taft, 1953, 1957).

Acculturation psychologists borrowed the definition of acculturation from the 1936 "Memorandum of the Study of Acculturation." As I highlighted above, this definition addresses acculturation at a group level. However, psychologists needed an understanding of acculturation at the level of immigrants' personalities and mental makeup.

One of the first psychological definitions of acculturation borrowed concepts from social psychology. In 1957, Australian psychologist Taft applied the term *social assimilation* to the processes that happen after migration: "Social assimilation ... is the process whereby, as a result of social interaction, a person transfers his membership from one group to a second group whose norms are inconsistent with those of the first" (1957, p. 141). Through social interactions, an immigrant accepts a host society's norms and starts feeling like a group member. The term 'assimilation' stayed in immigration research to denote one form of acculturation (further in this

chapter, see integration, separation, and marginalization). Taft also introduced the cognitive concept of "the shared frame of reference" that describes the psychological aspects of immigrant adaptation (Taft, 1953). According to him, *the shared frame of reference*, which refers to a shared understanding of the social environment and the shared norms of conduct, unites "a pluralistic nation" into a unified community. Using this term, the researcher defined assimilation as "the process by which persons originally possessing heterogeneous frame of reference converge towards the common frame of reference as a result of social interaction" (p. 49). Notably, within both definitions, the social interactions between locals and immigrants constitute the vehicle through which the assimilation of immigrants takes place; the more these two groups interact, the sooner the shared perception and understanding of the world will develop, and the sooner immigrants assimilate.

Acculturation from the perspective of receiving societies

Most acculturation research has focused on cultural changes in newcomers. In turn, acculturation psychologists also focus on the attitudes towards immigrants and changes in cultural patterns in host communities. The presence of immigrants in a community may transform the members of a host society. Even before immigrants arrive, members of receiving communities develop attitudes towards newcomers. Such attitudes strongly influence the acculturation of immigrants, their well-being, and the well-being of the host communities and their members. Several studies have examined the attitudes of host countries' members towards immigrants arriving in Canada (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001, 2004), Italy and the USA (Fedi et al., 2019), Spain (Navas et al., 2007), the USA (Buckingham et al., 2017). These studies can be summarized as follows. *Receiving community members* (RCM) have attitudes towards immigrants that are formed through the media, directed propaganda, governmental policies, 'word of mouth,' and personal contacts with the members of immigrant communities. RCM put the responsibility for successful acculturation on immigrants. 'They must acculturate, and we will see how successfully they do this.' RCM do not expect to adjust their behaviours or change their cultural practices because of the presence of immigrants. If immigrants fail to acculturate, 'it is their fault,' even if this happens because of prejudice and discrimination against them by some people or institutions in the host society.

RCM may identify valued and devalued immigrant groups. In this case, the concept of *cultural distance* comes into play. Cultural distance is the perceived difference in the values, rules of conduct, religions, languages, and world views between a host and immigrants' cultures. For example, languages from the same language family are perceived as linguistically and, correspondently, culturally close; the followers of the Christian faith may be seen as culturally closer than followers of other

religions; in contrast, the cultural practice of eating particular foods may create cultural distance with representatives for whom this food is taboo (e.g., the prohibition to eat beef in Hindu Indians). Consequently, RCM may perceive immigrants from culturally close countries as being more valuable than newcomers from culturally distant ones.

In the opinion of RCM, the acculturation of immigrants should include learning the host country's language and acquiring and following the rules of conduct of the receiving society. RCM prefer that immigrants *assimilate* into their society in all life domains or at least in the public sphere. Both immigrants and RCM, expect that immigrants will acculturate differently in different domains of life. Navas and colleagues (2007) identified the following five domains of acculturation: work, social life, family, religion, and economic behaviour. The attitudes towards acculturation in these domains among immigrants and RCM may be similar or different, and discrepancies between these attitudes may create problems regarding immigrants' acceptance and acculturation.

Researchers have found that people's attitudes towards immigrants depend on the frequency and quality of their contact with them. The 'contact hypothesis' (Allport, 1954) states that more frequent contact leads to better relationships with newcomers. Regular personal contact leads to feelings of empathy, reduced anxiety, and more positive attitudes towards newcomers. This happens when such contacts are productive and enjoyable and do not cause unnecessary stress. RCM who have frequent positive contact with immigrants believe that differences will smooth out over time, and the newcomers will become one of them. RCM with a low frequency of contact with newcomers may have either negative or unrealistic attitudes, less empathy, and even develop elements of xenophobia (negative attitudes to different ethnic groups and members of different cultures). These people may not value diversity and may even perceive it as a threat to their community.

Canadian acculturation researchers Bourhis and colleagues (Bourhis et al., 1997; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2004) conceptualized, developed measurement scales, and empirically validated five types of attitudes that RCM have towards immigrants. When RCM expect that newcomers will maintain their culture and adopt the essential attributes of the host culture, they have the *integrationist orientation*. The public policy based on this orientation is labelled *multiculturalism*. Australia, Canada, and Great Britain endorse multiculturalism as their policy towards immigrants. When RCM expect immigrants to abandon their cultural heritage and identity and fully embrace the host culture and its identity, they demonstrate the *assimilationist orientation*. By institutionalizing this orientation, governments create a policy called the *melting pot*. France, Israel, and the USA endorse such a policy. "Members of the host community who prefer a *segregationist orientation* accept that immigrants maintain their heritage culture as long as they keep their distance from host majority members, as they do not wish immigrants to adopt, 'contaminate,'

or transform the host culture" [italics are added, VC] (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001, p. 700). *Segregation policies* institutionalized this orientation; in the past, this led to ghettoing immigrants and building reservations for colonized people. Members of the receiving culture who do not want immigrants to practice their heritage culture and deny their rights to adopt the host culture demonstrate the *exclusionist orientation*. An *anti-immigration policy* typically represents this orientation when society and government do not want immigrants on their soil. For example, Japan was culturally isolated from the 17th to 19th century, prohibiting immigration, especially from Western countries. Bourhis and his colleagues called the fifth type of attitude the *individualist orientation*. This means that people, regardless of their group affiliation, are treated as individuals who have dignity and inherent value and are worthy of respect. This humanistic orientation correlated with the integrationist orientation.

Box 11.2 Definition and understanding. Acculturation and its forms: Definitions and synonyms

Although the term *acculturation* remains the primary umbrella term for learning a foreign culture, researchers differentiate several forms of acculturation depending on how things unfold as immigrants learn a new and retain their home culture. (Read a historical review of different forms of acculturation and their terms in Rudmin (2003, 2009).) The presented forms are based on the fourfold schema of acculturation, which we will discuss later in this chapter. This fourfold thinking about acculturation is depicted in Figure 11.1.

Assimilation is a term that traces back to the 17th century. It was derived from the Latin *assimilationem*, meaning 'likeness, similarity' and *assimilare,* "to make like." Initially, it was used to indicate the body's use of nutrition (https://www.etymonline.com/word/assimilation). Later, social scientists borrowed the term (see Tafts' usage of the term *social assimilation.*) *Cultural assimilation* is "the learning and adopting of customs of another culture to merge with that culture" (Corsini, 2002, p. 242). Many scholars use this term as a synonym for acculturation. However, assimilation means 'swallowing' the practices and customs of another culture and, thus, becoming a member of that culture. Through assimilation, individuals who were initially culturally diverse become one people. Synonyms include 'identification,' 'reorientation,' progressive adjustment,' 'melting pot,' and 'rebel reaction' (based on Rudmin, 2003).

Integration came into use in the 17th century from the Latin *integrare*, meaning "make whole" or "renew, begin again." (https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=integration). In psychology, it means the "integration of parts into a totality" (Corsini, 2002, p. 493); it is widely used in developmental and personality psychology. Regarding acculturation, integration means learning

new cultural practices and worldviews while maintaining one's home culture and seamlessly integrating elements of one's home and host cultures. The result of integration is *biculturalism* (see Chapter 9). Synonyms include 'cultural pluralism,' 'indirection,' 'accommodation,' 'double loyalty, 'and stabilized pluralism' (based on Rudmin, 2003). Moreover, "selected acculturation" means that immigrants learn some parts of a new culture while retaining particular practices of their home (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006).

Separation is the action or state of moving or being moved apart. This word comes from Latin *separare*, meaning 'divide.' Concerning acculturation, this term means retaining one's home culture while rejecting the host culture. Separation means that immigrants separate themselves or are separated by their host communities from the host culture. Synonyms include 'segregation,' 'withdrawal,' 'chauvinism,' 'native,' 'reactive adaptation,' 'rejection,' and 'solidarity' (based on Rudmin, 2003).

Marginalization occurs when a person is assigned a place of insignificance or a powerless position within a society or group (https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/marginalize). This term was first used in the 19th century and is related to making notes in margins. Regarding acculturation, marginalized immigrants reject their home culture and do not accept the host one. It is important to stress that this is only an attitude of an immigrant and not of members of the receiving society. In turn, members of a receiving society may have a 'segregation' attitude towards immigrants when they strive to set immigrants apart from the mainstream host culture. Synonyms include 'apathetic reaction,' 'marginal man,' 'cultural disintegration,' 'deculturation,' 'desegregation,' 'autonomous,' and 'isolation' (based on Rudmin, 2003).

How acculturation researchers study and theorize acculturation

One of the first social scientific investigations of immigration and acculturation was performed by American sociologist William Thomas and his Polish colleague Florian Znaniecki (1918/1996) at the beginning of the 20th century. The researchers studied the adaptation and acculturation of Polish peasants in Chicago. Nearly 2.2 million Poles immigrated to the USA between 1820 and 1914 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polish_Americans). The researchers analysed various written documents that reflected the actions, attitudes, and feelings of these Polish immigrants and their relatives back home. These documents included letters, newspaper articles, church records, court proceedings, various civil acts, and archival records. The researchers also examined some cultural aspects of the immigrants' home country and the country of their new settlement.

Thomas and Znaniecki investigated the changes in the immigrants' family lives, among other topics. The central idea was that before immigration, these Polish peasants (the representatives of any traditional and rural culture) had lived in close-knit communities where their families were the primary unit of social functioning. These communities regulated people's behaviours, morals, interpersonal interactions, and identities through norms and prescriptions. Subsequently, when these peasants moved to the United States, they discovered themselves in a world of detached individuals whose behaviours were regulated by laws, not group sanctions. In this world, their extended families, the villagers' supportive ties, and the interdependence that they had known were substituted by personal agency and independence.

Family relations paid the hardest toll for this change. In Poland, when there was a severe conflict between a wife and her husband, their community, through either direct or indirect involvement, worked to keep the family (as the primary unit of peasant life) intact. They aimed to find solidarity and reconciliation between the parties to save the family. In contrast, in the American juridical system, disputing husbands and wives were perceived "as contesting parties, as individuals between whose claims a just balance should be established" (p.100). As a result of this difference in family conflict resolution, the focus shifted from keeping the family together to judging who was right and who was wrong. Because of this shift, the power distribution within immigrant families changed. Women who were abused, or from whom their husbands withheld sustenance acquired the power to defend themselves and their children. Husbands were required to take good care of their families because of legal obligations, not moral duty. This alteration tremendously changed the nature of husband-and-wife relationships. Women acquired the power to defend themselves, while men became the potential subjects of juridical prosecution if proven guilty of wrongdoing. Many Polish immigrants could not keep up with such changes, and the number of divorces among them dramatically increased. In addition to analysing the written documents, the researchers included a *case analysis* and examined the autobiography of one peasant, Wladyslaw Wisniewski. The results of this extraordinary research, which has been deemed one of the classics of modern sociology of migration, were published in five volumes. This study applied the qualitative methodology, specifically the document analysis method. The researchers studied the contents of the letters and archival records and extracted information related to the social and psychological changes in immigrants, their families, and their communities. Subsequently, acculturation researchers have used various qualitative methods to examine immigrants' acculturation.

Another way of studying the immigration and acculturation experience is *autoethnography*, when researchers, therapists, and other scholars describe and reflect on their experiences of immigration, their understanding of what has

happened to them, and the consequences of these transformations. For example, in the book *Immigrant Experiences: Personal Narrative and Psychological Analysis*, editors Elovitz and Kahn (1997) collected 14 essays from social scholars and therapists who immigrated to the USA at a young age. The authors reflected on the challenges they faced and the achievements they accomplished during and after their migrations. Some of these essays are autobiographical, whereas others have some systematic descriptions of and analytical reflections on the acculturation processes. For example, Japanese American psychoanalyst Meaders reflected on the development of her transcultural self and identified the phases and pitfalls of this development. Indian American therapist Ramanujam examined the issues of identity, family dynamics, and the adaptation strategies of Indian immigrants. He analysed his own immigration experiences, observed social gatherings, participated in religious rituals, and reflected on his clinical work with Indians in the United States. Many of these essays examine the cultural and political contexts of the countries before and during their authors' migration; their authors connect their experiences with the changes in the political and economic lives of their home and host countries. Despite the analytical elements in several essays, these narratives are descriptive and serve as rich illustrations of various phases and processes of migration, adjustment and acculturation from immigrants' perspectives.

Narrative and life-story approach to acculturation

In autoethnography, researchers describe and analyse their own experiences; in contrast, when conducting *narrative* or *life-story analysis*, they listen to and represent the experiences of their participants who migrated to and live in host countries. Such life stories are typically summarized, analysed, and presented to scientific communities in monographs. An example of such an approach is the book *North African Women in France: Gender, Culture, and Identity* (2006) by American sociologist Killian, who studied the adjustment and acculturation of North African women in France. You can find a summary of this study in Killian (2002). Killian travelled to France to interview 45 first-generation immigrant women from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. The North and Northwest regions of Africa are often referred to as *Maghreb*, the name Muslim Arabs gave to this region, which means 'the place where the sun sets.' The researcher conducted semi-structured interviews mainly in French, while two interviews were conducted in Arabic with the help of an interpreter. The women were of different ages, socioeconomic statuses, employment histories, and marital statuses and had different numbers of children. The sampling was purposeful, not random. Killian was an outsider to her participants; however, she argued that this position had advantages. Because she did not know the Maghrebin cultures, the

participants explained their features to her, while insiders would have taken these features for granted. In addition, because she was not French, the participants felt comfortable discussing racism in France and expressing both the positives and negatives of French society. She asked open-ended questions about the cultural practices in their home and French cultures regarding children's socialization, cooking, attire, language use, religious practice, gender roles, family lives, and some other topics. They talked about their likes and dislikes in France, the pressures they had experienced as female Muslim immigrants from North Africa, and how they coped with such pressures. This research is rich in stories, events, and episodes that vividly describe what it means to be a Maghrebin woman in France.

Regarding acculturation, the researcher did not use the encompassing categories of integration or assimilation. She used the more pragmatic concept of *selective acculturation,* meaning that the immigrants chose to learn and accept new cultural practices in some domains – such as work, public spheres, and children's education, among others – while maintaining their home cultural practices in other parts of their lives – primarily family and gender relations, religious practices, dressing, and cooking. Killian highlighted that acculturation is a continuous process of making cultural choices. Specifically, her interviewees chose what domains of life, what practices (French or Maghrebin), and to what extent to incorporate them into their lives. However, they transformed these practices to fit their lives in France – even the deeply internalized practices, such as the Muslim religion, which they continued practicing.

This study focused on how these women maintained and adjusted their identities related to their gender, religion, ethnicity, and immigrant status. The researcher asked: Do they feel themselves French or Maghrebin? The majority felt they were either Maghrebin or both Maghrebin and French. Only 7 of the 45 interviewees self-identified themselves as more French than Maghrebin. These women had different reasons for their identifications, and these identities had different meanings for them. For some women, receiving French citizenship was enough to identify as French. Some reflected on the North African cultural practices they used daily and the frequency of using them; based on these reflections, they evaluated how Maghrebin or French they were. Others considered their birthplace to be the fundamental marker of their identity.

Regarding acculturation outcomes, the author concluded that the women who took control of their lives demonstrated better mental health than those who felt helpless in the new country. Taking control included verbally standing up against racist comments or working through bureaucratic barriers to get necessary papers. More passive forms of exercising control included dressing nicely, monitoring their actions, being polite, and executing other acts that allowed them to blend in with the French community.

Therapists' reflections on immigrants' acculturation problems

Another way of studying acculturation is by examining the psychological and behavioural problems of immigrants who visit psychiatrists and psychotherapists. Many therapists have analysed and summarized the issues and challenges of their immigrant patients and published them in articles and books. These doctors have reflected on the nature of these challenges and the role the patients' cultures, their cultural selves, and migration challenges played in these problems.

Psychoanalytic therapists or psychoanalysts have often worked with refugees, immigrants, and people in exile. *Psychoanalysis* is a theory of human mentality and therapy practice for patients with severe mental problems. This school of thought goes back to the Austrian neurologist and psychiatrist **Sigmund Freud** (1856–1939). The primary idea of psychoanalysis is that people's conscious lives are strongly influenced by unconscious and subconscious forces (*Id*) that determine and shape their experiences, cognition, emotional lives, and behaviours. These forces may create conflicts among themselves and with the conscious and rational *Ego* (the part of one's personality that is guided by the reality principle) and the social *Superego* (our internalized social regulations and prescriptions). These conflicts are the sources of people's mental disturbances.

According to psychoanalysis, migration, exile, deportation, and other ways of moving people from culture to culture may create such conflicts (Akhtar, 1995; Garza-Guerrero, 1974; Grinberg & Grinberg, 1984/2004; Roland, 1987, 1996). As a result, migrants may develop mental problems. To understand the sources of such conflicts, therapists reflect on their patients' cultural backgrounds, analyse their selves, deeply examine their personalities and life histories, and develop an understanding of how a cultural change may disturb people's healthy mental functioning. Psychoanalysts have labelled migration as a *culture shock* (Garza-Guerrero, 1974), *trauma*, and *crisis* (Grinberg & Grinberg, 1984/2004). Culture shock is a form of distress that is caused by an encounter with a new culture. Culture shock tests the maturity and adequacy of newcomers' personality functioning and severely threatens their identities (Garza-Guerrero, 1974, p. 410). Trauma is any violent shock that has consequences for the personality (Grinberg & Grinberg, 1984/2004, p. 10). A crisis is an abrupt and decisive change during any life process (p. 13). Migration is also represented as *separation*, like separating a child from their mother, or even as death and the *mourning* that the child experiences because of this loss.

In their book *Psychoanalytic Perspectives on Migration and Exile*, Grinberg and Grinberg (1984/2004) followed the stages of migration: the premigratory period, migration decision-making, mourning the separation with loved ones, and the arrival to the new land. They studied the individual cases of their patients, literature, diaries, and other sources to describe the sophisticated mental dynamics

occurring in migrating persons; subsequently, they analysed these cases within the psychoanalytic conceptual framework. For example, they stated that the separation is caused by emigrants losing a securely established bond with good 'inner' objects that give their ego the ability to endure (p. 56). These objects can be other people, places, foods, smells, landscapes, etc. Because of the fear of such losses, "a person experiences deep feelings of insecurity, increased isolation, loneliness, and a fundamentally weakened sense of belonging to an established social group" (p. 59). The authors discuss migration and identity, migration and language, exile as a specific kind of migration, adoptions as special migrations, and the possibility or impossibility of returning to the immigrants' homelands, among other topics.

After working in India and Japan (Roland, 1988), American psychoanalyst Roland (who we discussed in Chapter 8). became familiar with these cultures and the mentalities and selves they shape in their members. After returning to the USA, he treated the same nationals living in New York (Roland, 1987, 1996, 2011). He examined these immigrants' problems and provided psychoanalytic accounts of their challenges and the role the discrepancies between home and host cultures, their cultural selves, and the demands of new sociocultural environments play in immigrants' maladies. The therapist explored how patients' culture of origin and their cultural selves participate in their adaptations and examined where the barriers and conflicts emerged. As you may recall, Indians' cultural selves are family- and hierarchy-oriented. Their individualized selves are different from the individualized selves of Americans; they strive for goals and organize their achievement differently than Americans do. Like most psychoanalytic studies, Roland paid attention to the tensions between his patients' cultural selves and the demands for high individualistic achievements, competitiveness, and the focus on a person's individualized self and its cultivation in their host American culture.

In his concise and informative article, Indian American psychoanalyst Akhtar (1995) reflected on the conditions and trajectories of acculturation. Based on his therapeutic practice and observations, he articulated nine factors that influence the acculturation process (see Table 11.1).

This table illustrates the consilience of many of the success factors discussed in this chapter. Using different methodologies, sociologists, anthropologists, psychologists, and psychoanalysts have created nearly identical lists of conditions that influence immigration successes.

Following his primary psychoanalytic metaphor that the mental mechanisms of immigration and acculturation are akin to the separation-individuation phase of child development, Akhtar articulated four dimensions of acculturation and adjustment. These dimensions include drives (motivations) and affect, space, time, and social affiliation. They are: "(1) from love or hate to ambivalence, (2) from near to far to optimal distance, (3) from 'yesterday' or 'tomorrow' to 'today,' and (4) from mine or yours to ours" (p. 1057).

Table 11.1 Akhtar's (1995) factors of successful acculturation

Factors of Successful Acculturation	*Commentaries*
1. Whether immigrants' settlement is temporary or permanent	Psychologically, obtaining permanent residence, especially when there is no possibility of revisiting one's home country, exerts intense negative pressure on immigrants. This may prevent their successful adaptation and acculturation. Temporary settlement because of job assignments or studies is less stressful, but it may deter sojourners from acculturating. (See different forms of migration in Box 11.1).
2. Whether migration motivation was self-determined and volitional or forced and controlled	In addition to the different forms of migration motivation we discussed, Akhtar mentioned two more. Even if parents were self-determined to move abroad, their children might lack autonomy and be forced to follow them. Time is needed before the decision to migrate and the actual migration to prepare emigrants for the feelings of loss and mourning they will experience. Sudden migration is stressful.
3. Possibility of revisiting the home country	Immigrants who can visit their home countries and know they can do this anytime experience less migration stress.
4. Age at the time of migration	The younger a person is at the time of migration, the easier their adaptation, acculturation, and identity change.
5. Reasons for migrating	We discussed different goals for migration; migrants are either pushed by unacceptable conditions at home or pulled by attractive perspectives in a host country. The quality of their motivation matters. In psychoanalytic terms, Akhtar wrote: "Psychologically, was immigration an anxious or angry repudiation of primary objects or a manifestation of the ego's healthy alloplastic capacity?" (p. 1055). [Alloplastic adaptation happens when people deal with a problematic situation by changing their environment.]
6. Personal maturity	Akhtar defined this as "The extent to which an individual achieved the intrapsychic capacity for separateness before migration will also influence the effects of the actual separations involved in immigration" (p. 1055). Mohammad Shafia could not tolerate the separateness from his culture's norms that he witnessed in his daughters' behaviours and family relations. The entire family paid a very high price for this.
7. Attitudes of the receiving community	We discussed the attitudes and orientations of receiving communities and societies.
8. Cultural distance	As we discussed, the more the home and host cultures are culturally close (linguistically, religiously, and regarding cultural values and practices), the better the immigration outcomes will be.
9. Roles' continuity after migration	Migrants may have numerous professional, social, and familial roles in their home country. Maintaining these roles and their related statuses is important for their success after migration.

FROM LOVE OR HATE TO AMBIVALENCE

Because of the traumatic nature of migration, migrants' emotions and motivations related to their home and host cultures and their practices can become polarized between love and hate; occasionally, they may switch. The author argued that such a split of affects is caused by a lack of adaptive ego defences, which cannot integrate the home and host cultures and their sometimes-contradictory values and practices. A typical reaction is to have strong negative emotions towards one's host culture and idealized love towards one's home culture. As an example, the author wrote:

> For an East-to-West immigrant, this often gives rise to the idea that Western culture is characterized by greed, sexual promiscuity, violence, and disregard of generational boundaries; the Eastern, by contentment, instinctual restraint, love, humility, and respect for both young and old. For a West-to-East immigrant, a similar splitting of object representations yields a view of the East as riddled with indolence, filth, superstition, subservience, and a pathetic withering of instincts; the West as industrious, conscientious, orderly, instinctually gratifying, and encouraging of self-actualization.
>
> (pp. 1058–1059)

As time passes, one's representations of the two cultures and their self-representation (identities) must be synthesized. Love (libido) must prevail over hate (aggression); subsequently, self-constancy must be established. The indicators of this progression are having a "good-humoured ambivalence" (p. 1060) towards both cultures and a hyphenated identity. "An external manifestation of this psychostructural achievement is the immigrant's increasing comfort in simultaneously associating with individuals from both of his two cultures" (p. 1060). As a result, healthy biculturalism develops in immigrants.

FROM NEAR TO FAR TO OPTIMAL DISTANCE

The second integration considers the 'distance' between an immigrant and their homeland, between them and other people in the host country, and within their intrapsychic self-representations. Akhtar repeatedly compares an immigrant with a child longing to be close and connected to their "mother of symbiosis," which is represented by their homeland. In contrast, the host country represents the "mother of separation" that requires the child to become independent and mature. Therefore, acculturation happens along an immigrant's attempts to bridge these distances. Immigrants dream about their homes; if they can, they typically travel back home, bring gifts to their friends and relatives, and take valuable cultural artifacts back to their host country. These artifacts are symbolic reconnections with their 'mother' because they link the space between her and the child. Immigrants also struggle with the intrapsychic space between their self-representation (identities) at home

and those in their newly adopted countries. According to the author, the inability to negotiate these distances and develop a healthy, hyphenated identity results in either "ethnocentric withdrawal" or "counterphobic assimilation" (p. 1063). The first form is similar to the *dissociative identity strategy* (by Hutnik; see Chapter 8). With such an identity, an immigrant clings to an idealized view of their home culture: they identify themselves as members of their home country. In turn, they eat only their ethnic food, associate only with their compatriots in their host country, recreate their home country's environment, and support the actions and policies of their native government. In contrast, 'counterphobic assimilation' is comparable with Hutniks's *assimilative identity strategy*. In such cases, an immigrant renounces their connection to their home culture and builds their identity only with their adopted land. The psychoanalyst considered both of these identities unhealthy and immature. The mature bridge between the home and host cultures' self-representations is "(1) increased comfort with one's ethnic/national origins in the workplace, along with greater use of one's new self-representation at home" (p. 1064), (2) scheduled refuelling connections with people back home through phone calls and visits, and (3) if a child is born in a new country, to deeply appreciate their "mixed but predominantly local loyalties" (p. 1064).

FROM 'YESTERDAY' OR 'TOMORROW' TO 'TODAY'

The third dimension of acculturation identified by Akhtar relates to "the immigrant's rootedness in the time experience" (p. 1064). Following the separation from their homeland, an immigrant continues to cling to their memories of their former streets, houses, and landscapes. They intensely idealize their past at home, where they believe they were absolutely happy and life was wonderful. The author calls this "the fantasy of the lost paradise" (p. 1065). This *past orientation* accompanies a fantasy that 'someday' they will return home – either retired or in a coffin – to reconnect with their mother of symbiosis. Such simultaneous orientations towards the past and future that are both fixated on the homeland lead to psychic fracturing, which prevents immigrants from having a healthy adaptation to the present. Psychoanalytically speaking, to make a meaningful living in the present, immigrants must progressively deidealize their lost objects (memories of the past) (p. 1066). They should not erase all their memories but renounce their excessive concentration upon them: the past and future should not replace the present (p. 1066).

FROM MINE OR YOURS TO OURS

The fourth dimension of acculturation relates to building associations with and finding one's place in one's host communities. The first phase of acculturation is accompanied by the 'mine' and 'yours' split. Almost everything in the immigrants' lives is coloured by this split: language, food, games, values, and practices. By gradually

becoming accustomed to and enjoying their new country's attributes, immigrants start moving "toward 'we-ness' and [the] associated identity change" (pp. 1067–1068). Immigrants from paternalistic and restrictive cultures often resist embracing their new cultures because of their permissiveness in several areas of life: gender relations, women's freedoms, liberal attitudes towards dressing, behaviours, and free-time structuring. Akhtar explained that such cultures threaten immigrants' ego stability, and this leads to high anxiety. The cause of such anxiety is that the new culture exhibits less strict social control, which lessens the Superego's power. This weaker social control requires a strong Ego to deal with it. In a new culture, immigrants' actions should be guided by the mature and integrated Ego and not by the external regulations represented by the Superego. An essential means of unifying oneself with a new culture is learning its language. Again, immigrants struggle with their rootedness in their native language, its idealization ("I can best express my ideas and feelings using this language"), and the necessity to dive into a new language. Akhtar indicated that accepting a new language reality is marked by understanding the humour in that language, appreciating and telling jokes and anecdotes, and, ultimately, expressing strong emotions by swearing in a new language. The author argues that languages (native and foreign) shape immigrants' selves and the frames of reference with which they approach the world (we discuss the issue of bilingualism in Chapter 9).

The psychoanalytic approach to migration and acculturation is characterized by its scrupulous attention to the feelings and fantasies of migrants, the dynamics of the internal mental and external sociocultural forces that interact during the stages of migration, its clear articulation of the points of tension that lead newcomers to suffering, and the ways it drafts to resolve them. Psychoanalysts focus on migrants' subjectivities. However, in contrast to the phenomenological approach to acculturation (which also examines the experiences, cognitions, and feelings of immigrants), they focus on describing migrants' experiences and using these experiences to infer the mental forces and barriers that cause migrants to suffer or flourish. To say it differently, these scholars focus on articulating the psychoanalytic mechanisms of acculturation. This search is unique in acculturation studies because no other approach targets these mechanisms. Currently, the psychoanalytic studies of migration are underrepresented in acculturation literature and should be more broadly used to understand the mechanisms of migration and acculturation.

Quantitative and statistical approaches in acculturation research

The quantitative approach in acculturation research is rooted in the paradigm of cross-cultural psychology. As we discussed in Chapter 3, cross-cultural psychologists aim to replicate the natural science methodology and apply it to examining people's mentalities in different cultures. They believe that they can discover

		HOST CULTURE	
		Accepted	**Rejected**
HOME CULTURE	**Maintained**	*Integration*	*Separation*
	Rejected	*Assimilation*	*Marginalization*

Figure 11.1 2 × 2 Acculturation framework

the universal laws of acculturation by enumerating mental and cultural processes and using statistical analysis on these numbers, which they obtain from samples of participants. When applied to acculturation, these researchers follow exactly the same logic. They try to measure acculturation and, by using statistical methods, aim to find the universal features of that process. They quantify immigrants' acculturation orientations and the outcomes of acculturation: the health of immigrants, their attitudes, identities, personality structures, and almost everything that reflects immigrants' functioning in a new context. Subsequently, they aim to find associations between acculturation orientations (see below) and these outcomes. The ultimate goal of such research is to find the orientation that universally benefits all immigrants.

Conceptualization of acculturation. Quantitative acculturation psychologists typically use the 2 × 2 or fourfold schema for understanding acculturation and guiding their studies. Figure 11.1 illustrates this model.

Acculturation researchers call the four cells in this table the *acculturation orientations*. Box 11. 2 provides definitions of these orientations and their synonyms. This fourfold thinking about acculturation emerged at the beginning of the 20th century. Anthropologists, sociologists, and psychologists broadly used this schema. Rudmin (2003) offered an exhaustive historical analysis of such thinking and related conceptualizations. With the emergence of cross-cultural psychology in the 1970s, the fourfold way of acculturation thinking was popularized by Berry (1997, 2003), who labelled four acculturation orientations – *integration*, *assimilation*, *separation*, and *marginalization* – which most researchers have accepted.

The idea of such an approach is intuitive and straightforward. Immigrants (along with other populations that live in contact with two (or more) cultures) were socialized and enculturated in their home cultures and, after migration (or colonization),

faced another culture represented by the host (or colonizing) cultural communities. To successfully function in such a situation, these people must consciously or subconsciously choose how to manage their bi-cultural reality. Based on empirical data and the logical analysis of these people's alternatives, many scholars have independently come to the same idea. Immigrants (or colonized people) either accept or reject each of these two cultures. Combining these two options with two cultures brings researchers to the fourfold thinking.

There are several versions of this approach's application. They are called the *unidirectional/unidimensional* and *bidirectional/bidimensional* models of acculturation. A unidirectional model emerged in the USA in the middle of the last century and reflected its accepted societal mode for immigrants that included three pillars: *Anglo-conformity*, '*melting pot*,' and *cultural pluralism* (Gordon, 1961). Anglo-conformity means maintaining English institutions, the English language, and English practices and traditions, and accepting them as the dominant 'standard.' The 'melting pot' metaphor connotes that, members of all cultures and ethnicities who live in the USA must "melt" together to create one nation of American people. Cultural pluralism denotes that ethnic minorities may create enclaves and preserve their native language, cultural patterns, and traditions. Sociologist Gordon (1964) promoted the unidirectional assimilative understanding of acculturation. According to Gordon, during their acculturation, immigrants must distance themselves from their ethnic and religious cultures to absorb American culture and become members of the big family of American people. The researcher identified seven types of assimilation (see Table 11.2).

Table 11.2 Seven types of assimilation (by Gordon, 1964)

Types of Assimilation	*Short description*
Cultural behaviour	Acquisition of host culture's behavioural patterns: Newcomers should behave like Americans.
Structural	Immigrants enter and participate in the host culture's social institutions, for example, political parties, associations, clubs, and societies.
Marital	Intentions to marry and marrying an American man or woman.
Identificational	Immigrants identify themselves as Americans and start using the pronoun 'we' when talking about themselves in American society.
Attitudinal Receptional	Absence of prejudice towards ethnic groups.
Behavioural Receptional	Absence of discrimination towards ethnic groups.
Civic	Immigrants do not experience a conflict of values regarding civic life issues, such as birth control, divorce, abortion, and sexual education, among others.

Social scientists used these types and their related indicators to empirically test this typology (Williams & Ortega, 1990) and assess the level of assimilation of different groups of immigrants (Alba, 1976). In Europe, France exercises an assimilationist immigration policy, as it requires immigrants to learn the French language and adhere to the values of French society. In 1774, the Canadian province of Quebec was the object of the British government's assimilationist policy, which expected Francophone Canadians to assimilate with English-speaking settlers. The Quebecers resisted that policy and negotiated their cultural, linguistic, and political autonomy. Currently, they aim to preserve this sovereignty by demanding that immigrants who enter the province learn French and accept pluralism and democratic values in their public lives. Social scholars continue to discuss the acceptability of assimilation as a desired policy towards immigrants (Alba & Nee, 1997).

Although assimilationism remains the primary immigration policy used by some governments, in research communities, the unidirectional model of acculturation has been replaced by a bidirectional one. Within the fourfold approach, researchers have started to consider that it is equally crucial for immigrants to accept a host culture and maintain and practice their home culture. Therefore, the *integration acculturation orientation* has become the primary focus of acculturation research. The mirrored governmental policy was labelled *multiculturalism* or, metaphorically speaking, the *'cultural mosaic'* policy. The primary characteristic of the bi-dimensional model of acculturation is that accepting and assimilating into a host culture does not automatically mean moving away from and rejecting the immigrants' home culture. Bidirectionalism indicates that acculturation occurs along two dimensions – the home and host cultures – relatively independently. Specifically, accepting a host culture still allows a person to be proud of and maintain their home culture and identity. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and some other countries endorse multiculturalism as their national integration policy for immigrants. At an everyday level, an example of multiculturalism is the acceptance and normalization of the holidays of various cultural groups. For example, many societies acknowledge the holidays of different cultural communities even if they do not celebrate them: *Christmas* (a Christian celebration of the birth of Jesus Christ on December 25), *Hanukkah* (a Jewish holiday that lasts for eight days, typically in December), *Diwali* (the Indian festival of lights that is celebrated in the Fall), *Eid* (the Muslim celebration of sacrifice; the timing varies), *Kwanzaa* (a holiday that celebrates African values and cultures around the end of a year), and some others. However, discussions continue about the meaning of multiculturalism and its implications for nations' unity and cohesion and the cohabitation of immigrants and receiving society members (Duncan, 2005; Goldberg, 1995; Smith, 2004; Verkuyten & Martinovic, 2006).

Acculturation theorizing. There are no theories of acculturation. Researchers develop various 'frameworks' and 'models,' which typically describe some aspects of acculturation without hypothesizing the acculturation mechanisms or explaining the phenomenon (for a review, see Safdar & van de Vijver, (2019)). A widely used framework, primarily based on quantitative studies, was developed by Canadian psychologist John Berry (1997). Berry used the classical fourfold model and added new aspects to apply it to psychology. Specifically, he differentiated between the cultural (communal) and psychological levels of acculturation. At the cultural level, he talked about changes in the home and host cultures, while on the psychological level, Berry discussed *behavioural shift*, *acculturation stress*, and *psychological* and *sociocultural adaptation* (2003). In the context of immigration, *adaptation* (primarily sociocultural) is usually understood as newcomers learning the skills and practices that allow them to function in a host society; for example, managing their money, acquiring necessary documents, shopping, visiting a doctor, and many other everyday mundane tasks (Searle & Ward, 1990). Adaptation does not consider whether immigrants accept and internalize a host culture. For example, international students typically adapt to their host culture but are not acculturated into it. They aim to graduate successfully by following the institution's rules; however, for the most part, they do not aim to live and think like host society members.

Berry used the term *acculturation strategies* to describe the four cells in the fourfold model. According to his understanding, these strategies include *attitudinal* (what immigrants prefer) and *behavioural* (what they do) components. For example, an attitudinal question to assess an immigrant's assimilation strategy is, "When I have to furnish a room, I would not buy Korean furniture because it looks so out-of-place, and also because there is so much beautiful Canadian furniture available" (taken from Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001). A behavioural item on the separation strategy reads, "Most of my friends are Koreans because I feel very comfortable around them, but I don't feel as comfortable around Canadians" (Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujali, 1989). The primary purpose of this acculturation framework was to guide the development of the questionnaires used to assess the four acculturation strategies and then correlate them with various outcome measures, such as health indicators, indicators of performance at school or work, social relationships with different people, and many other markers of adaptation. A primary goal of the quantitative approach to acculturation (also Berry's goal) is to find a universally beneficial strategy to make all immigrants happy, healthy, and successful. Subsequently, many researchers have announced that they found it through the *integration* strategy/orientation (Berry et al., 2006).

To summarize, researchers who use a quantitative approach target samples of immigrants and apply questionnaires to extract these immigrants' attitudes,

strategies, and orientations. They use questionnaire scores to predict (by calculating various statistical indices) or explain people's outcomes in terms of adaptation and acculturation. These procedures featuring predictions and explanations create an impression that the fourfold model is a legitimate theory of acculturation. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

Despite the popularity of the quantitative approach, primarily employed by utilizing the two-by-two framework, many acculturation scholars have strongly criticized it on many fronts (Bhatia & Ram, 2009; Chirkov, 2009; Doucerain, 2019; Rudmin et al., 2017). The first critique is that this approach does not incorporate Culture as a powerful mechanism that regulates people's behaviour (Waldram, 2009). In this research, Culture is represented only as the participants' nations, nationalities, or ethnicities. This means that quantitative acCULTURation research (research incorporating the term Culture in its definition) is a-cultural in practice.

The second flaw of this type of research concerns its search for the universal "law" of immigration in the form of an acculturation strategy that fits *all* immigrants at *all* times. Many researchers rejected such goal of acculturation studies. For instance, Bornstein (2017) advocated that the *specificity principle* should be used in acculturation research instead. This principle means that instead of searching for a universal acculturation strategy, acculturation scholars must focus on "what is studied, where, in whom, how, and when" (p. 3). The author identified five components of the specificity principle: conditions, person, time, process, and domain (p. 6) (see Table 11.3).

Because acculturation is a multidimensional and dynamic phenomenon, the primary proposition of this principle is that looking for a universal strategy for all immigrants is futile. Thus, acculturation researchers must instead focus on discovering the sources, mechanisms, and dynamics of acculturation processes and apply them to different people, places, and times.

Another aspect of the specificity principle, not directly articulated by Bernstein, is that individual psychological acculturation happens inside a person and not in samples of immigrants. This means that acculturation is an intimate and delicate process that each immigrant manages and experiences uniquely and distinctively. Thus, trying to understand acculturation mechanisms on samples of participants is as pointless as trying to understand the mechanisms of disease by doing epidemiological studies on large samples of people from different regions with various conditions. Epidemiological studies are important to understand the distribution of disease, its pattern in different regions, and the segments of the population that are prone to it. However, these studies will never tell health researchers about the mechanisms of disease or, correspondently, about its cure. Diseases happen within a person's body due to interactions of inherited and environmental factors. Thus, instead of building multivariate statistical models, acculturation researchers must use case-based

Table 11.3 Five facets of the specificity principle (by Bornstein, 2017)

Components of the Specificity Principle	*Content of the Components*
1. Setting Conditions moderate the dynamic and outcome of acculturation	*Reason to migrate*: we discussed migration motivation. The primary motivation factor is whether migration is voluntary or involuntary. *Home and host countries*: the politics and economic situations in home and host cultures; the culture and demographics of host communities (for example, if they welcome immigrants or have an anti-immigrant orientation); the relations between the home and host countries. *Experience*: the immersion in and acceptance of host culture; the legal, economic, and cultural statuses of immigrants in the host country.
2. **Person:** the individual characteristics of an immigrant	*Gender*: acculturation is gendered; men and women acculturate differently. *Personality & individual differences*: some personal traits (such as openness to new experiences, extraversion, low neuroticism, and high self-esteem) are conducive to positive acculturation.
3. Time	*Age of migration*: younger immigrants acculturate quicker and with less stress than older migrants. *Time in a host country and adjustment*: the longer immigrants reside in their host country, the better their adjustment. *History or historical time* of migration of different cohorts of migrants or waves of migration: for example, prewar (WW2) migration to North America, migration after WW2, migration after the collapse of the Soviet Union)
4. Processes through which the new culture is presented to and absorbed by immigrants	*Socialization*: the process through which a host culture is presented to and learned by immigrants. This is a convoluted procedure because sources and processes of socialization and acculturation are implicit, informal, and nondidactic. *Learning*: one of the mechanisms of enculturation. This occurs through observation, trial and error practice, and reinforcement. *Instruction*: formal didactical instruction in education institutions. *Opportunity*: the options and resources immigrants can access to gain better options and prospects. *Transaction*: the social interactions among immigrants and those between immigrants and host nationals are the primary vehicle of socialization and acculturation.
5**. Domain:** acculturation happens selectively by domains of immigrants' lives, for example, their public and private domains	*Multidimensionality*: immigrants acculturate to different degrees in the domains of work, health, family and gender relations, parenting, education, and many others. *Dynamic adaptability*: the adaptation and acculturation of migrants depend on immigrants' involvement in these processes. (Some researchers use the term *acculturation motivation*). This motivation may be different in different domains.

Note: Because acculturation is a systemic process, the above-listed components do not operate in isolation; rather, they interact, creating a complex acculturation dynamic specific to people, time, places, and other conditions.

studies more widely and work with individuals or small groups of migrants to target the psychosociocultural mechanisms of acculturation.

The third is a strong critique of psychometric instruments quantitative acculturation researchers use to assess migrants' acculturation orientations (Boski, 2008; Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001). This critique targets the mediocre design of questionnaire items (the frequent use of two-barrel questions that simultaneously ask two questions but require one answer), the poor psychometric properties of these scales, and the inconsistent application of these questionnaires in different samples. The low psychometric quality of many acculturation questionnaires strongly reduces the reliability and validity of the results of such studies.

Other points of critique concern the limited attention paid to language as a tool for maintaining one's home culture and acquiring the host culture. Language encodes many aspects of cultures; therefore, a detailed analysis of culture-language relations is essential to understanding this vital channel for culture transmission. Acculturation is a process that unfolds over the years. Despite this fact, quantitative acculturation researchers predominantly use a cross-sectional design in their studies, even though a longitudinal one would be more appropriate. It is fair to say that some longitudinal acculturation studies appear in the literature (Fuligni, 2001; Gong & Chang, 2007; Ward et al., 1998). However, the complexities of designing, conducting, and analysing the results of such studies precluded them from mainstream acculturation research.

Acculturation through the lens of the theory of sociocultural models (TSCM)

The TSCM we have used in this textbook can successfully address some of the critiques and provide productive ways to advance acculturation research (Chirkov, 2023). The primary concept of this theory that applies to acculturation is *acculturation mechanisms*. The experiences of immigrants extracted by qualitative investigators and the statistical associations calculated by quantitative researchers are the patterns of events and empirical regularities that *describe* some aspects of acculturation but do not *explain* them. To explain acculturation, researchers must hypothesize under the influence of what forces, how, through what processes, and under what conditions acculturation happens. These forces, powers, processes, and conditions are labelled mechanisms of acculturation. Researchers aim to explain the empirical regularities registered in qualitative or quantitative studies by discovering the acculturation mechanisms. These mechanisms consist of sociocultural, structural, and mental processes fueled by energies and powers from the environment (the two sets of SCMs) and from the human body and mind (a person's motivation, self, and personality). These mechanisms are responsible for what immigrants do, how they feel, how healthy they are, and how successfully they function.

These mechanisms are real and exist independently of the immigrants who are influenced by them and the researchers who study them. Acculturation science must aim to hypothesize these mechanisms and then empirically verify their existence. According to the TSCM, these mechanisms include the following components: the *sociocultural models of the home and host cultures,* an *acculturation gap between these models, the trajectories of navigating this gap*, and *immigrants' reflectivity and autonomous agency.*

The sociocultural models of the home and host cultures. The presence of these models is why acculturation occurs when people move from one country to another. As we have learned, each community creates various sociocultural regulatory devices to coordinate people's activities by uniforming their experiences and behaviours. These are the SCMs that guide community members' activities in every domain of their lives. Community members internalize these models and make them part of their mentalities, identities, and worldviews. They think similarly to other members in many ways; they laugh at the same jokes, become sad about the same events, and become proud of similar achievements; in short, they become mentally congruent with each other.

Immigrants are socialized and enculturated into their home communities' SCMs and have the worldviews that these communities have shaped. After migrating, they arrive and settle in a country with different models that have shaped their members' mentalities, identities, and worldviews. Moreover, the models that regulate host members' activities in multiple facets of life, such as in family life, at school, in the market, at work, and in government offices, differ from the models that the immigrants internalized for the same domains in their home countries – the models they have brought with them. Immigrants do not know their host culture's models; they suspect that they exist and are different from theirs, but nobody taught them the specific details. When interacting with host nationals, they have no option but to use their home communities' internalized models. Think about Mohammad Shafia, who, after moving to Canada, continued perceiving and treating his daughters and ex-wife according to the rules and criteria that are customary in Afghanistan. The Canadian SCMs of women, their dignity, privacy, and freedom remained alien to him. He saw the world through the lens of his original and deeply rooted models of family honour.

Here, the concept of the acculturation gap comes into play (see Figure 11.2).

This notion is similar to cultural distance and describes a symbolic distance between immigrants' home and host sociocultural models. For Mohammad Shafia, this gap was unbridgeable, and he resolved the conflict created by this gap by murdering his daughters to remove his sources of frustration.

African American researcher Sawadogo (1995) provides an example of a gap in the adult training that Western non-governmental agencies offer in Africa. He identified five Western learning principles that these agencies use that do not fit the African learning model. For instance, a primary Western learning principle is that a



Figure 11.2 An acculturation gap between immigrant's home and host cultures. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

learner must actively participate in learning and that "passivity connotes a lack of energy, a lack of direction and leadership. For this reason, one consciously avoids being perceived as a passive person" (p. 283). In contrast, in the African setting, passivity is a valued quality that reflects self-control and wisdom. "By extension, valuing passivity in a learning situation acknowledges that no one possesses the whole truth and therefore one should not rush to make statements or choices" (p. 283). An example is when students actively ask questions. The Western model strongly supports such behaviour because it demonstrates students' engagement and motivation. However, in the African context, "the child or adolescent is expected to be a passive learner and one who asks a minimal number of questions" (p. 283). African wisdom suggests that students should observe, listen, reflect, and then make their own inductive conclusions on the subject matter. Asking questions, especially strangers and the elderly, is considered intrusive and disrespectful. Thus, some African students experience frustration and stress when they enter Western schools.

It is essential to distinguish between the *objective* and *subjective* forms of this gap. An *objective acculturation gap* is registered by researchers and can be verified by other people: one community believes in Jesus Christ, and another believes in Allah; people in one community do not eat beef, while members of another one

like it and eat it regularly; in one community, it is okay for young couples to cohabitate before marriage, while in others, it is taboo. These differences are publicly available, surveyed, and often visible to both insiders and outsiders. Immigrants' interpretations of the observable differences between models determine their *subjective acculturation gap*. One immigrant may consider some differences negligible, whereas another may interpret them as impenetrable barriers that make them unable to accept the host culture. For example, in my city, some Muslim parents send their children to Catholic schools because they believe that learning about the Christian faith is better for their children's moral development than learning nothing about faith. In this case, they have ignored the objective gap between the two religions and subjectively made them almost equal, at least for their children.

However, these gaps exist whether immigrants and researchers acknowledge them or not. The challenge for immigrants is that such gaps create tension for them, known as *acculturation stress*. Immigrants must become aware of them and discover in what domains, to what extent, and how challenging these gaps are. Then, they can decide whether to bridge them and find ways to navigate between the two sets of models.

Once they are aware of these gaps, immigrants can start the challenging path towards acculturation. This path is different for every individual because numerous unique factors and conditions contribute to the success of their journey (see the specificity principle above). Immigrants become the agents of their acculturation and the centre of their decision-making as they choose their path. At this point, immigrants' agentic self, ability to reflect on their home and host cultural models, capacity to face new challenges, and motivation to learn a new culture determine their success. Figure 11.3 represents the dynamics and mechanism of acculturation.

Nobody can predict the level of success of immigrants' acculturation, and no 'one-size-fits-all' strategy can be prescribed for them. This schema provides the basis for the following definition of acculturation.

> Individual acculturation (in contrast to group acculturation) is a process that agentic individuals execute (i.e., it is not a process that happens to them) after contacting and entering a cultural community that is different from the cultural community where they were initially enculturated. Acculturation involves the deliberate, reflective, and, for the most part, comparative cognitive activity of understanding sociocultural models – frames of references and meanings concerning the world, others, and oneself that exist in immigrants' home culture and that they have discovered in their host cultural community. This process emerges during regular physical and symbolic interactions with members of both communities. Acculturation is an open-ended, continuous process that includes progression, relapses, and turns. As such, it is practically impossible to predict and control it.
>
> (based on Chirkov, 2009, p. 94)


Immigrant's home cultural community
The host cultural community
The newcomer has internalized SCMs
They enters the host community
The sytem of SCMs of the host community
Experiences tension because of the acculturation gap; may understand or not the source of this tension
Navigates between two sets of SCMs
Acculturation strategy 1
Acculturation strategy 2
Acculturation strattegy 3
Reflects on discrepancies between two sets of SCMs
Immigrant's reflective and agentic Self
Acculturation outcomes

Figure 11.3 The dynamics and mechanism of acculturation. (This figure was created by IHCM CmapTools.)

How to study acculturation using the TSCMs approach. Studying acculturation following the above-described logic is straightforward. First, researchers may examine the SCMs of, for example, education in immigrants' home and host communities. They would start by examining the public aspects of these models, which exist overtly in these communities. Researchers may analyse the existing research on education in these communities, examine the normative documents of the Departments of Education, and ask principals, teachers, and parents about how they perceive the educational policies and schooling practices in their community. They may use an anthropological approach by doing ethnography and interviewing the members of several communities on the topic of education (Quinn, 2005). The researchers would then summarize these data and recreate how education is publicly constructed and executed, what structures support it, what rules govern its execution, how teachers are required to teach and how students are expected to learn. This research may also have independent value because uncovering such a model may help understand the sociocultural fabric of the corresponding communities because education is a cornerstone social institution in every community.

Performing an analysis in this manner would enable scholars to articulate the objective gap between the models.

Returning to our immigrants, researchers should subsequently focus on the internalized aspects of the models. The internalized aspects of the parents' educational models are the primary regulators of their behaviours and attitudes towards education in their host country. By discovering them, researchers can understand what drives these parents as they guide their children in their academic activities. Studying internalized aspects is also crucial to understanding how accurately these parents represent their home culture's public model and how strongly they support it. These parents do not fully know the models of the host country and may only guess about it based on their own and their children's observations. Researchers can also ask them about their perception of the differences between their home and host cultures' SCMs, which of these models they prefer, and why. For example, in my work with immigrants, I had cases when some parents from India and China were so unhappy with how school education is organized in Canada that they even contemplated moving back to their home countries, so their children could "get a decent education." If children are mature enough, researchers may also interview them about their experiences at school. As a result of these investigations, researchers can create a representation of the acculturation gap that parents and their children face and outline the problems it may cause for their acculturation.

The next step is to investigate the strategies that family members implement to overcome the challenges of that gap. Specifically, researchers must determine how parents and their children navigate the discrepancies between the two education models. Some parents may require their children to have extra schooling by attending online classes in their home country. Some may fully embrace the host country model and say, "You are in Canada now, so study as a Canadian." Conducting interviews with family members, teachers, and the children's classmates may help pinpoint the difficulties immigrant students experience and how they have overcome them. Studying several purposefully selected families will allow researchers to articulate acculturation mechanisms in the educational domain. Researchers will summarize the models, identify the acculturation gap, and synthesize the strategies for bridging it. They may also examine the role of various conditions listed in the specificity principle play in acculturation. When such a project is executed, researchers will draw a relatively complete picture of the acculturation challenges for immigrants in the educational domain.

Moreover, these results will support a practical intervention to help teachers, parents, and immigrant students deal with the stress of education acculturation. Lectures, workshops, and discussions may include a presentation about the home and host cultures' SCMs of education and an explanation of the social, economic and political factors that shape them. Subsequently, the facilitators may talk about how parents and their children represent these models and how they can

use them in their academic activities. Then, workshop members may examine and discuss their representations of their home and host countries' educational models. Subsequently, the group could have conversations about various strategies that may be used to deal with the models' discrepancies. Ultimately, the workshop should focus on what parents and teachers can do to help students avoid unnecessary stress and confusion to be academically successful and happy.

Conclusion

Immigration and acculturation constitute complicated and multidimensional sociocultural phenomena. They are studied by economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists. From the psychological perspective, one of the productive approaches is the sociocultural one that highlights and aims to incorporate the perspectives of various disciplines to understand the behaviours and experiences of different groups of migrants, looks for the mechanisms of these processes, and uses a multiplicity of methods to study them. One of the central topics of migration is migration motivation, which is best approached interdisciplinarily. After arriving at their destination, the next step for immigrants is acculturation, which constitutes an enormous natural experiment on the role of culture in shaping people's behaviours. Specifically, people who were enculturated and deeply rooted in one cultural community find themselves in a land that is run by different norms and practices. So, the questions are: How do people manage their migration situations? How do their mentalities, identities, and worldviews change? How does their agentic self manage this predicament? Ultimately, the aim is to determine what researchers can learn about Culture-Mind relationships by studying immigrants and other groups of migrants and how to use this knowledge to help immigrants acculturate.

Glossary

Acculturation from the Latin prefix *ad,* which means *to* or *towards* and was transformed in English as *ac, cultur,* which means 'culture,' and *-ation,* meaning 'process.' Therefore, acculturation is the process of moving towards Culture. In the social sciences, it means learning and internalizing foreign Cultures. *Group/communal acculturation* happens when groups of people with different cultures come in contact. *Individual acculturation* takes place when, as the result of contact with another culture, a person's self, identity, frames of reference, and worldviews change. *Selective acculturation* happens when immigrants choose to learn and accept some host cultural practices while maintaining their home culture practices in other spheres of their lives. Definitions of other forms of acculturation – *assimilation*, *integration*, *separation*, and *marginalization* – are provided in Box 11.2.

Acculturation mechanisms are introduced by the theory of the sociocultural models. This term designates a set of processes, including various conditions, forces, and powers, that set acculturation in motion. Acculturation researchers aim to hypothesize these mechanisms and empirically verify their existence. According to the TSCM, these mechanisms include the following components: *sociocultural models* of one's home and host cultures,

an *acculturation gap* between these models, *trajectories of navigating the gap*, and *immigrants' reflectivity* and *autonomous agency*.

Acculturation gap is similar to cultural distance; this notion describes a symbolic distance between immigrants' home and host sociocultural models. An *objective acculturation gap* is determined by researchers and can be verified by other people. These differences are publicly available, surveyed, and often visible to insiders and outsiders. Immigrants' interpretations of the observable differences between models determine their *subjective acculturation gap*. Some immigrants may consider some differences negligible, whereas others may interpret them as impenetrable barriers to accepting the host culture.

Agency (in migration) is people's ability to make rational decisions about migration and act upon them. *Autonomous* or *self-determined agency* to migrate is initiated and driven by the person's goals, life conditions, education level, and other personal factors. It is based on their contemplations and rational reasoning and is not forced in any way. It is related to autonomous or self-determined migration motivation. *Controlled agency* occurs when a person acts under the influences of forces outside of their self. Some migrants move because they cannot live and function under their existing conditions. While this decision is also rational, it is controlled by impersonal forces. This form of agency relates to *controlled migration motivation*.

Bidirectional or unidirectional models of acculturation: The bidirectional model corresponds to the integration strategy, and the unidirectional model corresponds to assimilation. Bidirectionality means that immigrants move towards or away from two cultures, home and host. The unidirectional model invites immigrants to move in one direction towards embracing the host culture.

Migration is the process of moving from one place to another. *Migrants* are individuals who commit the act of migration. Other related terms – *emigration* and *emigrants*, *immigration* and *immigrants*, *expatriates*, *sojourners*, *international students*, *repatriates*, *refugees* and *asylum seekers*, and *uprooted* – are defined in Box 11.1.

Migration motivation is a set of processes and conditions that determine migration. *Macro-level theories of migration* study the structural factors of migration. They include political, economic, ecological, and other determinants. *Micro-level* or *psychological theories of migration* study the individual factors of migration, including migrants' personalities, identities, social relations, and other sociopsychological determinants. The *'Push and Pull' theory of motivation*: 'Push' motives/factors drive emigrants from their country. As a rule, emigration caused by 'push' motives/factors is considered *forced* emigration. 'Pull' factors exist in the receiving country and look attractive and rewarding for migrants. Moving to a foreign country because of 'pull' motives/factors is sometimes labelled voluntary migration. Theories of motivation based on the *Homo Economics* model are the most widely used. *Macro-level economic theories* are based on the geographical differences in the supply and demand for labour that fuel migration. *Micro-level economic theories* consider human beings rational individuals whose primary motivation is to pursue wealth for their self-interests.

Migration decision-making is a complex cognitive and motivational process that initiates migration. It includes a person's values, personality characteristics, and other individual dispositions. According to Czaika et al. (2021), decision-making includes (a) the formation of migration aspirations, (b) searching and analysing information about migratory options, (c) the timing and planning horizons for preparing and realizing migratory decisions, and (d) a degree of agency in making a migration decision.

Receiving community members' (RCM) attitudes and orientations towards immigrants (according to Bourhist and his colleagues). *Integrationist orientation*: RCM with this orientation expect that immigrants will maintain their culture and adopt the essential attributes of the host culture; the public policy is *multiculturalism*. *Assimilationist orientation*: RCM with this orientation expect that immigrants will abandon their cultural heritage and identity and fully embrace the host culture and identity; the public policy is *melting pot*. *Segregationist orientation:* RCM with this orientation expect that immigrants will maintain their home culture as long as they do not blend with the host culture; the public policy is *segregation*. *Exclusionist orientation:* RCM with this orientation expect that immigrants will not blend with the host community and will not practice their heritage culture; the public policy is *anti-immigration*. *Humanistic orientation:* People with this orientation believe that people, regardless of their group affiliation, should be treated as individuals with dignity, inherent value, and respect.

The specificity principle of acculturation (by Bornstein, 2017) means that instead of searching for a universal acculturation strategy, acculturation scholars must focus on "what is studied, where, in whom, how, and when" (p. 3). The author identified five components of the specificity principle: conditions, person, time, process, and domain (p. 6). (See Table 11.2.)

Questions

1. What is the difference between *emigrants* and *immigrants*?
2. What is the difference between *expatriate* and *repatriate*?
3. Can *international students* be called *sojourners*? Explain your answer.
4. What is the *structure* and *agency* problem in migration?
5. Imagine that you are planning to migrate to another country. If you or your family has emigrated to Canada, consider your own experiences. Describe the four parameters of the migration decision-making process by Czaika et al. (2021).
6. How do you understand migrants' agency? Define the differences between autonomous and controlled agency. Provide evidence that immigrants' quality of migration motivation is related to their migration outcomes.
7. What is the difference between individual and communal acculturation?
8. Explain how national policies towards immigrants relate to the attitudes of receiving communities towards them. Define the four main forms of such attitudes.
9. What are the differences between qualitative and quantitative studies of acculturation?
10. Why do some scholars believe that the four-fold model of acculturation is logical and valid?
11. What acculturation strategy corresponds to the unidimensional model of acculturation? What strategy corresponds to the bidirectional? Explain both of them.
12. According to the TSCM, what is the mechanism of acculturation, and what are its main components?
13. How does the concept of acculturation gap relate to the idea of selective acculturation?

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Note

1 Scholars argue about the authorship of the pull-push theory of migration. Some attribute it to English scholar Ravenstain, who, at the end of the 19th century, articulated the idea of the pull-push factors in internal migration in Great Britain. Others refer to modern researchers Heberle (1938) and Lee (1966) (see Sert & Erenler, 2021).

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